Siguenza v. Cemusa, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Siguenza v. Cemusa, Inc.

127 A.D.3d 727, 4 N.Y.S.3d 552

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 1, 2015

Docket2011-08062

StatusPublished

This text of 127 A.D.3d 727 (Siguenza v. Cemusa, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Siguenza v. Cemusa, Inc., 127 A.D.3d 727, 4 N.Y.S.3d 552 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Strauss, J.), entered July 11, 2011, as denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1), and the defendants cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same order as denied their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the appeal and cross appeal are dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

The appeal and cross appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal and cross appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the companion appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]; Orellana Siguenza v Cemusa, Inc., 127 AD3d 727 [2015] [decided herewith]).

Dillon, J.R, Chambers, Duffy and Barros, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Strauss, J.), entered July 11, 2011, as denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1), and the defendants cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same order as denied their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the appeal and cross appeal are dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

The appeal and cross appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal and cross appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the companion appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]; Orellana Siguenza v Cemusa, Inc., 127 AD3d 727 [2015] [decided herewith]).

Dillon, J.R, Chambers, Duffy and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

127 A.D.3d 727, 4 N.Y.S.3d 552, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/siguenza-v-cemusa-inc-nyappdiv-2015.

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