1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * *
4 SIERRA HAWKINS, Case No. 3:25-CV-00336-MMD-CLB
5 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE1 6 v.
7 FEDEX GROUND, et al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Before the Court is Plaintiff Sierra Hawkins’s (“Hawkins”) First Amended Complaint 11 (“FAC”). (ECF No. 8.) The Court now screens Hawkins’s FAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 12 I. SCREENING STANDARD 13 Prior to ordering service on any Defendant, the Court is required to screen an in 14 forma pauperis complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate under certain 15 circumstances. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126 (noting the in forma pauperis statute at 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 17 for the enumerated reasons). Such screening is required before a litigation proceeding 18 in forma pauperis may proceed to serve a pleading. Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 507 19 (9th Cir. 2015). 20 “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – (A) 21 the allegations of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 23 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). 25 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 26
27 1 This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Miranda M. Du, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate 1 granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 2 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. When reviewing the adequacy of a complaint 3 under this statute, the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). 4 See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for 5 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 6 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 7 standard for failure to state a claim.”). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling 8 on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 9 2000) (citation omitted). 10 The Court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light 11 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 12 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). Allegations in pro se complaints 13 are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Hughes 14 v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 15 A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 16 cause of actions,” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief 17 above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 18 “The pleading must contain something more. . . than. . . a statement of facts that merely 19 creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (citation and quotation 20 marks omitted). At a minimum, a plaintiff should include “enough facts to state a claim to 21 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 22 678 (2009). 23 A dismissal should not be without leave to amend unless it is clear from the face 24 of the complaint the action is frivolous and could not be amended to state a federal claim, 25 or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Cato v. United 26 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th 27 Cir. 1990). 1 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 2 Previously, the Court granted Hawkins’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 3 and screened her original complaint. (ECF No. 6.) The original complaint asserted claims 4 for racial discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil 5 Rights Act of 1964 against Defendants FedEx Ground, Adelzo Diaz, Angela Mladenovic, 6 and Eric Verwoest. (ECF No. 7.) Hawkins’s initial complaint alleged that she is a black 7 woman who has been employed as a maintenance support representative for FedEx 8 since December 2018 and that while employed, she experienced racial and gender-based 9 discrimination as well as retaliation after reporting the discrimination. (Id.) The Court 10 dismissed Defendants Adelzo Diaz, Angela Mladenovic, and Eric Verwoest from the 11 action and the complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 6.) However, the Court allowed Hawkins 12 to file an amended complaint as to her claims for racial discrimination and retaliation. The 13 Court also allowed Hawkins to amend her complaint as to the gender discrimination claim 14 but only to the extent she has exhausted her administrative remedies. 15 Turning to the FAC, Hawkins only includes claims for racial discrimination and 16 retaliation. (ECF No. 8.) The Court will discuss each claim in turn. 17 A. Racial Discrimination 18 Title VII of the Civil rights act makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an 19 employer to ... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 20 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, 21 religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a Title VII 22 discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) 23 she was qualified for her position and performing hers job satisfactorily; (3) she 24 experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 25 of her protected class were “treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding 26 the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hawn v. 27 Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(e). An adverse employment action is one that materially affects the 2 compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 3
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * *
4 SIERRA HAWKINS, Case No. 3:25-CV-00336-MMD-CLB
5 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE1 6 v.
7 FEDEX GROUND, et al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Before the Court is Plaintiff Sierra Hawkins’s (“Hawkins”) First Amended Complaint 11 (“FAC”). (ECF No. 8.) The Court now screens Hawkins’s FAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 12 I. SCREENING STANDARD 13 Prior to ordering service on any Defendant, the Court is required to screen an in 14 forma pauperis complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate under certain 15 circumstances. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126 (noting the in forma pauperis statute at 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 17 for the enumerated reasons). Such screening is required before a litigation proceeding 18 in forma pauperis may proceed to serve a pleading. Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 507 19 (9th Cir. 2015). 20 “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – (A) 21 the allegations of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 23 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). 25 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 26
27 1 This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Miranda M. Du, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate 1 granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 2 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. When reviewing the adequacy of a complaint 3 under this statute, the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). 4 See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for 5 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 6 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 7 standard for failure to state a claim.”). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling 8 on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 9 2000) (citation omitted). 10 The Court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light 11 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 12 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). Allegations in pro se complaints 13 are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Hughes 14 v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 15 A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 16 cause of actions,” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief 17 above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 18 “The pleading must contain something more. . . than. . . a statement of facts that merely 19 creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (citation and quotation 20 marks omitted). At a minimum, a plaintiff should include “enough facts to state a claim to 21 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 22 678 (2009). 23 A dismissal should not be without leave to amend unless it is clear from the face 24 of the complaint the action is frivolous and could not be amended to state a federal claim, 25 or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Cato v. United 26 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th 27 Cir. 1990). 1 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 2 Previously, the Court granted Hawkins’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 3 and screened her original complaint. (ECF No. 6.) The original complaint asserted claims 4 for racial discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil 5 Rights Act of 1964 against Defendants FedEx Ground, Adelzo Diaz, Angela Mladenovic, 6 and Eric Verwoest. (ECF No. 7.) Hawkins’s initial complaint alleged that she is a black 7 woman who has been employed as a maintenance support representative for FedEx 8 since December 2018 and that while employed, she experienced racial and gender-based 9 discrimination as well as retaliation after reporting the discrimination. (Id.) The Court 10 dismissed Defendants Adelzo Diaz, Angela Mladenovic, and Eric Verwoest from the 11 action and the complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 6.) However, the Court allowed Hawkins 12 to file an amended complaint as to her claims for racial discrimination and retaliation. The 13 Court also allowed Hawkins to amend her complaint as to the gender discrimination claim 14 but only to the extent she has exhausted her administrative remedies. 15 Turning to the FAC, Hawkins only includes claims for racial discrimination and 16 retaliation. (ECF No. 8.) The Court will discuss each claim in turn. 17 A. Racial Discrimination 18 Title VII of the Civil rights act makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an 19 employer to ... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 20 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, 21 religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a Title VII 22 discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) 23 she was qualified for her position and performing hers job satisfactorily; (3) she 24 experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 25 of her protected class were “treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding 26 the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hawn v. 27 Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(e). An adverse employment action is one that materially affects the 2 compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 3 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 The Court previously found that “Hawkins failed to state a claim for racial 5 discrimination because she did not provide the Court with sufficient factual allegations to 6 show she experienced an adverse employment action that materially affected the 7 compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment, based on her race.” 8 (ECF No. 5 at 6 (emphasis original); ECF No. 6 at 2 (adopting the recommendations in 9 ECF No. 5).) 10 In the FAC, Hawkins alleges she was demoted in March 2023 despite “exceeding 11 performance expectations” and receiving awards for her work. (ECF No. 8 at 5.) Hawkins 12 alleges this was because of an HR audit that showed a previous promotion was a mistake, 13 however, she was the only employee affected by this audit. (Id.) Hawkins alleges that she 14 was reelevated to her previous position in October 2024. (Id.) In the interim, Hawkins 15 alleges that she had to take a 10% pay cut and it delayed her career advancement. (Id.) 16 Hawkins also alleges that other employees who are not black held positions where they 17 did not meet every requirement on the job description. (Id. at 9.) 18 The Court finds that this is a sufficient factual basis to support a claim for racial 19 discrimination under Title VII, as Hawkins has now alleged she suffered an adverse 20 employment action based on her race. 21 B. Retaliation 22 When an employee files a complaint regarding an unlawful practice, she has 23 engaged in a protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(e). Employers may not retaliate 24 against an employee because he has opposed any unlawful act or practice. 42 U.S.C. § 25 12203(a); see also Pardi v. Kaiser Permanente Hosp., Inc., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 26 2004) (“Pursuing one’s rights under the ADA constitutes a protected activity”). To state a 27 retaliation claim under Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she engaged 1 in a protected act; (2) she suffered some sort of adverse employment action; and (3) there 2 was a causal connection between her protected action and the adverse act. Davis v. 3 Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (Title VII). 4 After screening the initial complaint, the Court found that “Hawkins did not provide 5 the Court with sufficient factual allegations to show she experienced an adverse 6 employment action that materially affected the compensation, terms, conditions, and 7 privileges of her employment.” (ECF No. 5 at 6 (emphasis original); ECF No. 6 at 2 8 (adopting the recommendations in ECF No. 5).) 9 The Court found above that Hawkins did allege a claim for racial discrimination 10 based on a demotion she received in March 2023. However, for a retaliation claim, 11 Hawkins must show a causal connection between her protected actions of complaining 12 of her disparate treatment and the adverse act of being demoted. Davis, 520 F.3d at 13 1093-94. Here, Hawkins does not allege that she raised any complaints about racial 14 discrimination or disparate treatment before she was demoted in March 2023. Thus, 15 Hawkins has not established a causal connection between her protected action and an 16 adverse employment action. Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal of the 17 retaliation claim, with leave to amend. 18 C. Leave to Amend 19 Consistent with the above, the Court recommends that Hawkins be granted leave 20 to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies of the complaint. If Hawkins chooses 21 to file an amended complaint, she is advised that an amended complaint supersedes 22 (replaces) the original complaint and, thus, the amended complaint must be complete in 23 itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 24 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original complaint is 25 irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original”). Any allegations, parties, or 26 requests for relief from prior papers that are not carried forward will no longer be before 27 the court. Hawkins should clearly title the amended pleading as “Second Amended 1 show that the Defendant violated her civil rights. Hawkins may not amend the complaint 2 to add unrelated claims against other defendants. The Court notes that, if Hawkins 3 chooses to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies, as outlined in this order, 4 Hawkins must file the amended complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of the 5 District Court’s order addressing this report and recommendation. If Hawkins chooses not 6 to file an amended complaint curing the stated deficiencies, the Court recommends 7 Hawkins proceed on only the Title VII racial discrimination claim against Defendant 8 FedEx. 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For good cause appearing and for the reasons stated above, the Court 11 recommends that Goodrum’s IFP application, (ECF No. 4), be granted, his complaint, 12 (ECF No. 1-1), be dismissed, with prejudice, as amendment would be futile, and his 13 motion for leave to file complaint, (ECF No. 1-1), be denied as moot. 14 The parties are advised: 15 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Rule IB 3-2 of the Local Rules of 16 Practice, the parties may file specific written objections to this Report and 17 Recommendation within fourteen days of receipt. These objections should be entitled 18 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” and should be 19 accompanied by points and authorities for consideration by the District Court. 20 2. This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order and any 21 notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the 22 District Court’s judgment. 23 V. RECOMMENDATION 24 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Title VII racial discrimination claim 25 proceed against Defendant FedEx. 26 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the retaliation claim be DISMISSED 27 WITHOUT PREJUDICE, AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 1 complaint curing the deficiencies of her complaint, as outlined in this order, she shall file 2| the amended complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of the District Court’s order 3 addressing this report and recommendation. 4 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that if Hawkins chooses not to file an amended 5 | complaint curing the stated deficiencies of the complaint, the Court recommends this 6 | action proceed on only the Title VII racial discrimination claim against Defendant FedEx. 7| DATED: October 8,2025 _. ‘
9 UNITED STATES‘MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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