Siddharth Siddharth v. Rahul Chaturvedi.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 3, 2024
• Docket: 23-P-0427
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-427

SIDDHARTH SIDDHARTH

vs.

RAHUL CHATURVEDI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant appeals from a Superior Court judgment

enforcing the terms of a promissory note against the defendant

and awarding the plaintiff a total award in the amount of

$116,848.58.1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the judge

erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff on the issue

of the defendant's liability on the note and in her award of

damages after a jury-waived trial. Additionally, the defendant

claims that the judge made evidentiary errors during the trial.

Finding no error, we affirm.

1This amount includes $43,863.75 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the note. The trial judge later awarded the plaintiff an additional $3,326.35 in attorney's fees upon finding that the defendant had "strateg[ized] . . . to obfuscate and obstruct resolution of this case" by his filing of a motion for new trial. Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion for

summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the "light most

favorable to the nonmoving party" and "drawing all reasonable

inferences" in the nonmoving party's favor. Sullivan v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 38 (2005). Summary judgment is

"appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in dispute

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law"

(quotation and citation omitted). Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc.,

492 Mass. 676, 681 (2023).

Nowhere in the pleadings does the defendant deny that he

signed and entered into a promissory note on May 19, 2015, to

pay the plaintiff $53,000 on or before May 19, 2016. The

defendant does not dispute that he had not fully paid the

$53,000 on or before May 19, 2016. Since there were no material

questions of fact or law regarding the promissory note, the

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was properly allowed.

During the jury-waived trial on damages, the defendant

attempted to testify about information and file documents that

predated the May 19, 2015 signed promissory note. Upon

objection, the judge excluded the evidence. The defendant

appears to argue that the promissory note is not understandable

on its face and that other evidence was necessary to explain it.

Whether a legal document's language is ambiguous, and the

interpretation of an unambiguous document, are questions of law

2 that we review de novo. See Bank v. Thermo Elemental, Inc., 451

Mass. 638, 648 (2008). To determine whether a document is

ambiguous, "the court must first examine the language of the

contract by itself, independent of extrinsic evidence concerning

the drafting history or the intention of the parties." Id.

"[A]n ambiguity is not created simply because a controversary

exists between the parties, each favoring an interpretation

contrary to the other's." Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Lanco

Scaffolding Co., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729 (1999), quoting

Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Holyoke, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 475

(1987). Extrinsic evidence may only be admitted when the

document is ambiguous on its face or as applied to the subject

matter. See General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the U.S.

of Am., Inc. v. MacKenzie, 449 Mass. 832, 835-836 (2007).

Here, the promissory note is not ambiguous and establishes

the obligation of the defendant to make full payment within a

year of the note's formation. Accordingly, the defendant's

claim that the judge failed to consider extrinsic evidence to

fully understand the meaning of the promissory note is

unavailing. See Winchester Gables, Inc. v. Host Marriott Corp.,

70 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 591 (2007) (parol evidence "does not bar

extrinsic evidence that elucidates the meaning of an ambiguous

contract" [emphasis added; quotation and citation omitted]).

3 The judge ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff

$116,848.58.2 The defendant disputes the amount. He argues that

he paid the plaintiff $25,000 and should be credited that

amount.3 "We accept the judge's findings of fact in a bench

trial unless they are clearly erroneous." Makrigiannis v.

Nintendo of Am., Inc., 442 Mass. 675, 677 (2004). In deciding

whether a judge's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, "it

must be emphasized that it is the trial judge who, by virtue of

[her] firsthand view of the presentation of evidence, is in the

best position to judge the weight and credibility of the

evidence." New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass.

671, 675 (1977). Here, the judge weighed the evidence submitted

2 Judgment with costs and interest amounted to $170,207.62 when judgment entered on June 2, 2021. The defendant was ordered to pay an additional $3,326.35 in attorney's fees to the plaintiff in August 2021.

3 The judge found that the defendant paid the plaintiff only $5,000 on the note.

4 by the defendant and credited the testimony of the plaintiff

that he never received the $25,000. There was no error.4

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Englander & D'Angelo, JJ.5),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 3, 2024.

4 To the extent the defendant challenges the award for attorney's fees, the promissory note expressly provided for attorney's fees and costs. We see no abuse of discretion in the judge finding the attorney's fees fair and reasonable. See Trustees of Tufts College v. Ramsdell, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 585 (1990).

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.