Shumway v. Woodward Brown Ventures LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 25, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-11292
StatusUnknown

This text of Shumway v. Woodward Brown Ventures LLC (Shumway v. Woodward Brown Ventures LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shumway v. Woodward Brown Ventures LLC, (E.D. Mich. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANIS SHUMWAY, 2:21-CV-11292-TGB-CI

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO vs. DISMISS

WOODWARD BROWN VENTURES, LLC,

Defendant. Janis Shumway, Plaintiff in this case, is disabled and uses a wheelchair. When she travels, she needs to book handicap-accessible hotel rooms. Planning a trip to Michigan during the summer of 2022, she attempted to access online reservation websites that host hotel room listings for one of Defendant’s properties: the Daxton Hotel, located in Birmingham, Michigan. According to the operative Amended Complaint, the third-party reservation sites she visited did not allow her to determine whether the hotel could accommodate her needs. Shumway claims these online reservation systems are in violation of regulations promulgated under Americans with Disabilities Act. In response, Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint, saying that its website, as well as the online reservation websites that host information about the

Daxton Hotel, fully comply with the applicable regulations and allow individuals with disabilities to reserve accessible accommodations. Having carefully reviewed the pleadings, the regulations, and the relevant web pages, the Court concludes that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a resident of Tennessee. She relies on a wheelchair to get around, and when she stays at a hotel, she requires different

accessibility features in the parking lot, common spaces, her room, and bathroom facilities. ¶ 1, ECF No. 6, PageID.31. Defendant owns the Daxton Hotel in Birmingham, Michigan. Id. at ¶ 3. In anticipation of travel to Michigan, Plaintiff says she visited the listings for the Daxton Hotel on the following third-party reservation websites: booking.com, expedia.com, hotels.com, orbitz.com, and travelocity.com. Id. at ¶ 11. She was interested in “reviewing and assessing the accessible features” of the Daxton Hotel to “ascertain whether they meet the requirements” of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”). Id. Plaintiff alleges that each website “did not identify or allow for reservation of accessible guest rooms and did not provide sufficient information regarding accessability [sic] at the hotel.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that these websites “infringe [her] right to travel free of discrimination and deprive her of the information required to make meaningful choices for travel,” and prevent her “full and equal

enjoyment” of publicly accessible services. Id. at ¶ 14. Seeking relief from such conduct, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit, alleging discrimination under the Title III of the ADA as her sole claim. She specifically alleges that Defendant is in violation of a regulation promulgated pursuant to the ADA, commonly known as the “Reservations Rule,” which outlines the standards that providers of lodging such as hotels must meet when creating and maintaining their reservation systems. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e). Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an answer. ECF

No. 12. The Court heard oral argument on February 9, 2022. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal of a lawsuit or claim where the defendant establishes the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008). In evaluating the motion, courts “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pled factual allegations as true and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of

facts consistent with their allegations that would entitle them to relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006)). Though this standard is liberal, it requires a plaintiff to provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” in support of her grounds for entitlement

to relief. Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the plaintiff must also plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A plaintiff falls short if she pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” or if the alleged facts do not “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Albrecht, 617 F.3d

at 893 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). III. ANALYSIS This kind of lawsuit is considered an ADA “tester” case. In such a case, an individual with some type of disability visits or seeks out a provider of goods and services such as a hotel, restaurant, or other business in order to “test” whether its accommodations meet the ADA’s requirements for individuals with disabilities. If the tester finds circumstances that appear to indicate the facility is out of compliance, she will bring a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) to get the facility

to bring its practices or infrastructure into compliance with the Act.1

1 While the Supreme Court has not specifically considered this issue under the ADA, it has held that a similar provision in the Fair Housing Act must be interpreted as allowing tester lawsuits. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs had Courts across the country have sanctioned this type of lawsuit, noting

that “the enforcement of civil rights statutes by plaintiffs as private attorneys general is an important part of the underlying policy behind the law.” Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Ga., 177 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1999). Public places can violate the ADA in different ways, and so the claims plaintiffs make when they bring these lawsuits will often vary. Correspondingly, the arguments that defendant entities make in motions to dismiss also vary, often challenging whether the plaintiff can show

injury in fact or standing. See, e.g., Mosley v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 942 F.3d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 2019) (considering whether a plaintiff had articulated a sufficient past injury and likelihood of future injury to meet the “injury in fact” requirement for standing to bring a tester claim against a department store). Here the claim is slightly different.2

standing when “without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, [they] pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices”). 2 The Court notes that challenges involving violations of the Reservations Rule seem to be a relatively new “type” of ADA tester case.

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Related

Bruce v. City of Gainesville, GA
177 F.3d 949 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman
455 U.S. 363 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Albrecht v. Treon
617 F.3d 890 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Cinemark Usa, Inc.
348 F.3d 569 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)
Kottmyer v. Maas
436 F.3d 684 (Sixth Circuit, 2006)
League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner
548 F.3d 463 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Jones v. City of Cincinnati
521 F.3d 555 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Mayberry v. Von Valtier
843 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Michigan, 1994)
Akers v. McGinnis
352 F.3d 1030 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)
Daimeon Mosley v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc.
942 F.3d 752 (Sixth Circuit, 2019)

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Shumway v. Woodward Brown Ventures LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shumway-v-woodward-brown-ventures-llc-mied-2022.