NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
MARK SHUMATE, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RICHARD DAVIS, et al., Defendants/Appellees,
CRAIG BROADBENT, Appellant,
PAGE MORRIS, Third Party Defendant/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0984
FILED 08-25-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2019-003338
The Honorable Erik Thorson, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Mark Shumate, Fort Lauderdale, Florida Plaintiff/Appellee
Richard Davis, Beverly Hills, California Defendants/Appellees
Craig Broadbent, Phoenix Appellant
Rose Law Group PC, Flagstaff By Olen V. Lenets Counsel for Third Party Defendant/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
G A O N A, Judge:
¶1 Craig W. Broadbent appeals the award of attorneys’ fees and costs imposed against him as a sanction under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1). The superior court sanctioned Broadbent for continuing to pursue, on his clients’ behalf, a civil conspiracy claim against Page Morris premised on unjust enrichment. Broadbent did so despite Morris repeatedly explaining that unjust enrichment isn’t a tort and thus could not serve as the underlying tort necessary to maintain a civil conspiracy claim.
¶2 Broadbent contends there is no final judgment against him and asks us to dismiss his appeal, direct the superior court to recognize that no judgment exists against him, and prohibit further filings concerning him. Alternatively, he challenges the sanctions award on several grounds, including the superior court’s authority to sanction him and the factual and legal bases for the award. Because the final judgment permits our review of the judgment against Broadbent and the superior court didn’t err in imposing reasonable sanctions against a lawyer who prosecuted a frivolous claim, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 Mark Shumate and Richard Davis formed RAD Asset LLC (“RAD A”) to lease property in Scottsdale for short-term vacation rentals. Shumate and Davis were RAD A’s partners, and Davis served as its manager. Davis also managed RAD Ventures, LLC, which entered into an operating agreement with Shumate and RAD A. One Marquis, LLC, whose managing member was Davis, handled RAD A’s marketing. Shumate later
3
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
proposed hiring Page Morris as a RAD A employee. Although Davis opposed the proposal, he didn’t prevent Shumate from hiring Morris.
¶4 Shumate and Davis eventually had a falling out, leading Shumate to sue Davis, One Marquis, and RAD Ventures (“Davis”). Represented by Broadbent, Davis counterclaimed against Shumate and filed a third-party complaint against Morris. As is relevant here, Davis asserted unjust-enrichment, aiding-and-abetting, and civil-conspiracy claims against Shumate and Morris, and intentional interference with business expectancy against Morris.
¶5 Morris, then representing herself, moved to dismiss the third- party complaint. The superior court dismissed the civil conspiracy claim because civil conspiracy isn’t an independent cause of action but denied dismissal of the unjust-enrichment, aiding-and-abetting, and intentionalinterference -with-business-expectancy claims. The court granted Davis leave to amend the conspiracy claim to identify an underlying tort. Davis amended the claim to allege “Civil Conspiracy to Commit Unjust Enrichment.” Shortly after, Shumate’s counsel appeared on Morris’ behalf.
¶6 Morris and Shumate again moved to dismiss. They argued, among other things, that unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract remedy rather than a tort and thus couldn’t supply the tort underlying Davis’ conspiracy claim. Davis opposed the motion, maintaining that “[t]he tort of unjust enrichment” could support the claim. Morris and Shumate replied that Davis cited no authority treating unjust enrichment as a tort. The court denied the motion because Morris and Shumate didn’t attach the good faith consultation certification required by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1.
¶7 While the motion to dismiss was pending, Davis moved for partial summary judgment against Shumate. The superior court denied the motion. The parties later exchanged offers of judgment. Morris then moved for summary judgment on Davis’ remaining claims against her, arguing (again) that unjust enrichment isn’t a recognized tort in Arizona, meaning Davis failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy.
¶8 The superior court granted Morris summary judgment, agreeing that unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy rather than a tort. It concluded no reasonable juror could find Morris was unjustly enriched. The court also rejected Davis’ aiding-and-abetting theories because unjust enrichment isn’t a tort and Morris couldn’t aid and abet her own interference. And because civil conspiracy requires an underlying tort that the alleged conspirators agreed to commit, the court concluded Davis’
4
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
claim for civil conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment failed as a matter of law.
¶9 Morris then moved for sanctions against Davis and Broadbent under A.R.S. § 12-349 and the court’s inherent authority. She argued that Davis pursued groundless claims against her, continued litigating those claims despite notice of their deficiencies, and unnecessarily expanded the proceedings. After Morris moved for sanctions, the superior court scheduled a trial-setting conference and ordered the parties to meet and confer beforehand because the sanctions motion would be addressed at the conference. Broadbent withdrew as Davis’ counsel a few days later. At the conference, Davis had new counsel and another attorney from Broadbent’s firm attended. Davis and his new counsel responded to the sanctions motion and provided Broadbent a copy. Morris then moved for entry of judgment against Broadbent because he didn’t timely respond and replied in support of her sanctions as to Davis. Broadbent received copies of both. Broadbent then responded to Morris’ proposed judgment.
¶10 The superior court granted the motion in part (“sanctions order”), because the conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment claim was brought without substantial justification, and awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs against Davis and Broadbent. Though the sanctions order specified that sanctions were appropriate under § 12- 349(A)(2), the court later corrected itself and clarified that it imposed sanctions under § 12-349(A)(1). Morris applied for a total of $53,937.43 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Broadbent moved for additional time to file a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions ruling and to respond to Morris’ fee application. The court denied reconsideration but gave Broadbent 10 days after that ruling to respond to the fee application. Davis challenged the amount of fees; Broadbent didn’t. In October 2022, the superior court awarded Morris $18,647.50 in attorneys’ fees and $5,457.93 in costs (“October order”), determining that only those fees associated with the claim for conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment were reasonable.
¶11 Morris lodged a proposed judgment, and in November 2022 the superior court purported to enter judgment against Broadbent for the sanctions award (“November order”). But the November order didn’t contain Rule 54(b) language. In May 2024, the court entered judgment resolving Morris’ claims against Davis, awarding the same fees and costs against Davis and Broadbent jointly and severally.
¶12 Davis and Shumate went to trial in July 2025. Broadbent filed a notice of appeal before entry of a final judgment, and we dismissed that
5
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
appeal. The superior court then entered a final judgment under Rule 54(c) in October 2025. Broadbent timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶13 Broadbent identifies 13 issues for our review, but nearly all overlap or restate the same arguments. Broadbent mainly argues that (1) no final, enforceable judgment exists against him and we lack appellate jurisdiction; (2) the superior court lacked authority to sanction him and erred in awarding sanctions; and (3) the resulting fee award was improper in amount and scope.
¶14 Before addressing Broadbent’s arguments, we note significant deficiencies in his opening brief under Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13(a)(7). Broadbent makes many arguments unsupported by authority (or relevant authority), have no basis in the law, and lack record citations. He also provides little developed legal analysis, relying instead on conclusory assertions. See id. Those deficiencies would permit us to deem many of Broadbent’s arguments waived. See Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (arguments “not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority” are waived on appeal) (citation omitted); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305 ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (failure to comply with ARCAP 13 “can constitute abandonment and waiver” of claims). But in our discretion, we address arguments that permit meaningful review.
¶15 Morris didn’t file an answering brief. “When debatable issues exist and an appellee fails to file an answering brief, we may consider such failure a confession of reversible error.” Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259
¶ 9 (App. 2014). But because Broadbent’s opening brief doesn’t present any debatable issues, we don’t treat Morris’ silence as a confession of error.
I. There is a Final Enforceable Judgment Against Broadbent.
¶16 Broadbent first argues that there’s no final judgment against him and thus asks us to dismiss the appeal he filed. He reasons that the November order lacked Rule 54(b) language and the post-trial Rule 54(c) final judgment didn’t name him. He separately argues the superior court improperly allowed proceedings concerning the sanctions order without formally serving him. Broadbent is wrong on both fronts.
6
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
a. We have jurisdiction to review intermediate rulings like the November order after the entry of a final judgment.
¶17 Our appellate jurisdiction is statutory. Madrid v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Chandler, L.L.C., 236 Ariz. 221, 223 ¶ 3 (App. 2014); see Ariz. Const. art. 6 § 9. Relevant here, A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) authorizes appeals from final judgments and Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54 describes two types of final judgments under that statute. Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 425 ¶ 1 (App. 2016). Rule 54(b) permits entry of a final judgment as to “fewer than all[] claims or parties,” when the court expressly determines “there is no just reason for delay” and directs entry of judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(c), in contrast, applies when the court resolves all claims against all parties and requires the judgment to state that “no further matters remain pending.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see Brumett, 240 Ariz. at 425 ¶ 1.
¶18 Broadbent is correct that the November order wasn’t independently appealable when entered. It lacked Rule 54(b) language, and other claims remained pending. See Rourk v. State, 170 Ariz. 6, 13 (App. 1991) (“An ‘intermediate order’ is one made between commencement of the action and final judgment, which is not separately appealable.”). But an intermediate ruling like the November order is appealable upon entry of final judgment. See A.R.S. § 12-2102(A) (on appeal from final judgment we review “any intermediate orders involving the merits of the action and necessarily affecting the judgment, and all orders and rulings assigned as error”).
¶19 Section 12-2102(A) determines the matter. After the superior court resolved all claims in the litigation, it entered a Rule 54(c) final judgment in October 2025 stating that “[n]o further matters remain pending.” That judgment terminated the action. The November order thus became reviewable as an intermediate ruling upon entry of that final judgment. See A.R.S. § 12-2102(A). Because Broadbent timely appealed after the Rule 54(c) judgment’s entry, we have jurisdiction under § 12-2101(A)(1).
¶20 Broadbent protests because the Rule 54(c) judgment didn’t name him. Relying on Madrid v. Avalon Care Center-Chandler, L.L.C., he argues the October 2025 judgment’s “no further matters remain pending” language shows that the superior court excluded him from final judgment and extinguished the November order. 236 Ariz. 221 (App. 2014). But Madrid addresses whether a judgment is final; it doesn’t state, let alone suggest, that a final judgment’s entry somehow vacates an earlier interlocutory ruling not specifically identified in a Rule 54(c) judgment. Id.
7
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
at 224 ¶ 11. The November order already determined Broadbent’s liability for sanctions. The October 2025 judgment resolved the remaining claims and made the November order reviewable—it didn’t erase it. Bottom line: the October 2025 judgment is final as against Broadbent, and we have jurisdiction to review it in this appeal he filed.
b. Broadbent’s due process claims fail because he had notice of the sanctions proceedings and the final judgment’s entry.
¶21 Broadbent next argues the superior court improperly permitted “post-judgment proceedings” concerning the sanctions ruling without notice to him, thus depriving him of due process. Relying in part on Rule 4, he contends the court couldn’t proceed against him without formal service. We disagree. Because the November order lacked a Rule 54(b) certification, it remained interlocutory until entry of final judgment. Its interlocutory status didn’t deprive the superior court of authority to determine the amount of the sanctions award or otherwise continue proceedings in the still-pending action.
¶22 Due process requires that an attorney facing sanctions receive notice and an opportunity to be heard. Precision Components, Inc. v. Harrison, Harper, Christian & Dichter, P.C., 179 Ariz. 552, 555 (App. 1993). It doesn’t require the formal service necessary to bring a new party into a civil action. See id.; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4. The relevant question is whether Broadbent had adequate notice of the proposed sanctions and a meaningful opportunity to contest them. See In re Radacosky, 183 Ariz. 531, 534 (App. 1995) (opportunity to challenge the court’s sanctions ruling through motion for reconsideration is sufficient).
¶23 Broadbent received both. After Morris moved for sanctions, the superior court scheduled a conference to address the sanctions motion. Broadbent withdrew as Davis’ counsel shortly after, but another attorney from his firm attended the conference—and not as counsel for Davis, Morris, or Shumate. Davis’ new counsel later sent Broadbent the response to the sanctions motion, and Broadbent received Morris’ reply. Broadbent then responded to Morris’ proposed sanctions judgment. And after Morris applied for attorneys’ fees and costs, Broadbent moved for reconsideration and sought extra time to respond to Morris’ fee application. The superior court gave him additional time, yet he didn’t respond.
¶24 Broadbent thus had notice of the sanctions proceedings and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Contrary to Broadbent’s contention
8
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
that formal service was required, what occurred here satisfied the demands of due process.
II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Sanctioning Broadbent Under A.R.S. § 12-349 for Pursuing a Frivolous Claim.
¶25 We now turn to the heart of Broadbent’s arguments: that the superior court erred by sanctioning him under A.R.S. § 12-349 for pursuing a legal theory unsupported by Arizona law.
¶26 We review the superior court’s interpretation and application of § 12-349 de novo, but we defer to its findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Ariz. Republican Party v. Richer, 257 Ariz. 237, 242 ¶ 10 (2024). We also view the evidence in the light “most favorable to sustaining the award.” Takieh v. O’Meara, 252 Ariz. 51, 61 ¶ 39 (App. 2021) (citation omitted).
¶27 In granting Morris’ motion for sanctions, the superior court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs under § 12-349(A)(1) against Broadbent and Davis. The court found the conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment claim lacked substantial justification, but concluded Davis’ other claims were “fairly debatable.” It also found no basis to conclude the claims were made primarily to delay or harass and recognized that all parties contributed to prolonging the litigation. Though Morris sought sanctions on several grounds, the superior court ultimately concluded the conduct was sanctionable only under § 12-349(A)(1).
a. The “conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment” claim lacked substantial justification.
¶28 Section 12-349(A)(1) requires the court to award a party their reasonable attorneys’ fees when an attorney or party brings, maintains, or defends a claim “without substantial justification.” Richer, 257 Ariz. at 242, 249 ¶¶ 9, 41. A claim lacks substantial justification when it is objectively “groundless” and “not made in good faith.” A.R.S. § 12-349(F). “A claim is groundless ‘if the proponent can present no rational argument based upon the evidence or law in support of that claim.’” Richer, 257 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 15 (citation omitted). But a claim isn’t groundless if it is “fairly debatable,” even if it’s a “long shot.” Id. (citations omitted). A claim isn’t made in good faith when the attorney or party knows, or should know, it’s groundless but pursues it anyway. Id. at 248 ¶ 38. We assess good faith by “what a professional, competent attorney would do in similar circumstances.” Id. at 249 ¶ 40 (citations omitted).
9
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
¶29 The “conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment” claim was groundless. Civil conspiracy requires two or more individuals to agree to commit and actually commit “an underlying tort.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 498 ¶ 99 (2002). Unjust enrichment isn’t a tort; it’s an equitable remedy requiring no tortious conduct. See Wang Elec., Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, LLC, 230 Ariz. 314, 318 ¶ 10 (App. 2012). Unjust enrichment thus couldn’t supply the underlying tort necessary to support the civil conspiracy claim.
¶30 Broadbent understates this defect by characterizing the claim as a “long shot.” A claim may be “fairly debatable” when the issues aren’t well litigated or clearly resolved by existing precedent, or when little authority addresses the circumstances presented. See Durable Invs. LLC v. Villarreal, 262 Ariz. 84, 90 ¶ 17 (App. 2026). That wasn’t the case here. Arizona law has long required an underlying tort for civil conspiracy, see, e.g., Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Tr. of Phoenix, Inc., 197 Ariz. 535, 545 ¶ 42 (App. 2000), and unjust enrichment has never been a tort, see Wang Elec., Inc., 230 Ariz. at 318 ¶ 10 (unjust enrichment is a flexible remedy “available when equity demands compensation for benefits received, even though the party has committed no tort and is not contractually obligated to the other”) (cleaned up). There was thus no “fairly debatable” application of existing law to Broadbent’s claim. And Broadbent never advocated for an extension or modification of that law or otherwise identified any rational legal basis for departing from it. His claim instead depended on treating unjust enrichment as a tort when settled law established otherwise.
¶31 Broadbent tries to avoid this reality by arguing that his complaint alleged a viable conspiracy claim because it separately alleged intentional interference with business expectancy, which the superior court found “fairly debatable.” But that isn’t the conspiracy claim Broadbent pled. After Morris moved to dismiss the original conspiracy claim, Broadbent amended his complaint and expressly pled “Civil Conspiracy to Commit Unjust Enrichment.” The superior court didn’t err by evaluating the claim Broadbent pled rather than piecing together a different conspiracy theory from allegations elsewhere in the complaint.
¶32 The record also supports the superior court’s finding that Broadbent didn’t make the claim in good faith. Morris and Shumate repeatedly identified the claim’s legal defect. Their motion to dismiss explained that Arizona doesn’t recognize civil conspiracy as an independent cause of action and that unjust enrichment is a quasi-
10
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
contractual remedy, not a tort. They also repeatedly explained (citing to many cases) that unjust enrichment could not provide the underlying tort necessary for the conspiracy claim—in their motion to dismiss, motion to amend the scheduling order, multiple emails with Broadbent, at a meetand -confer, and motion for summary judgment and reply. They did exactly what they should have when confronted with a claim lacking a legal basis. Broadbent’s only real response was to double down on his view that unjust enrichment was a tort, saying the motion to dismiss “argues . . . against any logical understanding of civil conspiracy.”
¶33 Although the court denied the motion to dismiss (on procedural grounds), Broadbent failed to correct the identified defect. And when Morris moved for summary judgment, she again cited controlling law and explained the problem with the conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment claim. Broadbent thus had repeated notice of the claim’s legal defect and opportunities to correct it but continued to pursue it. And he did so without identifying authority supporting unjust enrichment as the underlying tort. On this record, the superior court could find that a competent attorney knew—or at least should’ve known—the claim was groundless. Richer, 257 Ariz. at 248 ¶¶ 38, 40.
¶34 Broadbent seems to equate good faith with a lack of intent to harass or delay, pointing to his settlement efforts and the superior court’s finding that Davis didn’t bring the claims primarily for either purpose. But the court didn’t sanction Broadbent under § 12-349(A)(3). It sanctioned him under § 12-349(A)(1) for pursuing a claim without substantial justification. Neither Broadbent’s settlement efforts nor the absence of an improper purpose answer whether he continued to pursue a groundless claim. See Richer, 257 Ariz. at 248 ¶ 38. And to the extent that Broadbent asks us to reweigh the evidence bearing on that determination, we won’t. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009).
¶35 Broadbent also claims that this all was just “zealous advocacy” on a client’s behalf. But our Supreme Court removed “zealous” from Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct more than two decades ago and instead directed lawyers to “act honorably” in pursuing their clients’ interests. Advocacy, zealous or otherwise, does not justify the continued pursuit of a claim an attorney knows or should know is groundless. Richer, 257 Ariz. at 248 ¶ 38.
¶36 On this record, the superior court didn’t err in finding that Broadbent continued to pursue the conspiracy claim without substantial
11
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
justification. An award under § 12-349(A)(1) was thus mandatory. See Richer, 257 Ariz. at 242 ¶ 9.
b. The superior court’s findings satisfied § 12-350.
¶37 Broadbent contends that the superior court’s findings in its sanctions order lacked the specificity required by § 12-350. But he didn’t directly raise this objection to the superior court. Ordinarily “the failure of a party to object to the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law in making awards of attorneys’ fees under . . . § 12-349 precludes that party from raising the absence of findings as error on appeal.” Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 301 (1994). That’s because the “court and opposing counsel should be afforded the opportunity to correct any asserted defects before error may be raised on appeal.” Id. at 300. But because Broadbent’s motion for reconsideration arguably preserved the issue, and because this principle of law bears repeating, we address the merits of his claim.
¶38 Section 12-350 requires a court awarding fees under § 12-349 to “set forth the specific reasons for the award.” It also provides eight factors which the court “may include . . . as relevant, in its consideration” in determining whether to award such fees. A.R.S. § 12-350 (emphasis added); see Bennett v. Baxter Grp., Inc., 223 Ariz. 414, 421 ¶ 28 (App. 2010) (consideration of such factors is permissive). Section 12-349 thus doesn’t require a particular form of findings or express discussion of every factor under § 12-350; it requires only that the superior court make findings “specific enough to allow an appellate court ‘to test the validity of the judgment.’” Id. (quoting Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 188 Ariz. 237, 243 (App. 1997)).
¶39 The November order satisfied that requirement. It found Davis continued to pursue the conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment claim after receiving contrary authority and expressly distinguished his limited access to relevant facts from his ability to determine the claim’s legal basis. The court made express findings on the factors in § 12-350(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (8), including Davis’ walk-away offer, before concluding that sanctions were appropriate.
¶40 That aside, Broadbent’s arguments mischaracterize both § 12- 350 and the court’s findings. He says § 12-350 provides “a checklist of factors the court must consider,” and argues the court failed to specify his “efforts to seek a just and speedy end to litigation.” But again, the § 12-350 factors are permissive and “guide[] the court in making awards authorized by § 12-349.” Donlann v. Macgurn, 203 Ariz. 380, 387 ¶ 36 n.11 (App. 2002).
12
SHUMATE v. DAVIS, et al/BROADBENT Decision of the Court
The superior court considered Broadbent’s efforts. It acknowledged Davis’ walk-away offer. And it found that Davis and Broadbent didn’t attempt to dismiss claims, even after having authority to the contrary. Broadbent’s interpretation of those circumstances doesn’t prove the court didn’t sufficiently specify them, and we defer to the court’s findings because the record supports them. Richer, 257 Ariz. at 242 ¶ 10.
c. Broadbent waived his challenges to the amount and scope of the award.
¶41 Finally, Broadbent challenges the amount and allocation of the award, arguing (1) Morris failed to establish the awarded fees were reasonable, (2) some fees were unrelated to the conspiracy claim and thus unlawful, and (3) fees incurred by Shumate were improperly awarded to Morris. Broadbent made none of these arguments below. Although he received notice of Morris’ fee application and an extension to respond, he filed no objection or response to the requested fees. We thus don’t consider these arguments first made on appeal. Scottsdale Princess P’ship v. Maricopa Cnty., 185 Ariz. 368, 378 (App. 1995).
CONCLUSION
¶42 “[O]ur courts provide a means of resolving . . . conflicts when issues are legitimately presented,” and shouldn’t sanction “parties and their lawyers for bringing debatable, long-shot complaints.” Richer, 257 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 49. But as we explain above, the “conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment” claim Broadbent prosecuted and forced Morris to defend wasn’t “legitimately presented,” “debatable,” or a “long-shot.” Because this is precisely the sort of case in which § 12-349(A)(1) sanctions are appropriate, we affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR