Shufelt v. Flint & Pere Marquette Railroad

55 N.W. 1013, 96 Mich. 327, 1893 Mich. LEXIS 765
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 25, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 55 N.W. 1013 (Shufelt v. Flint & Pere Marquette Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shufelt v. Flint & Pere Marquette Railroad, 55 N.W. 1013, 96 Mich. 327, 1893 Mich. LEXIS 765 (Mich. 1893).

Opinions

Grant, J.

I concur witb my Brother Montgomery that there was no negligence in the rate of speed of the defendant’s train, or in the piling of the wood along its track. I think the circuit judge was correct in directing a verdict for the defendant.

1. The plaintiff’s wife was herself guilty' of contributory [328]*328negligence. The road was dry and hard. She had two horses, and a lumber wagon with a box, and a spring seat fixed upon the box. She did not stop her team to listen. She had been for a long time familiar with the crossing, and had frequently driven over it. When upon the little rise of ground from 90 to 100 feet from the crossing, she looked to the west, and saw no train approaching. The horses were accustomed to the cars, and were not afraid. They were farm horses. She said she was on a slow walk. She did not stojr, and the horses stepped upon the track just as the train struck them. If the woodpile, from the rise of ground to the track, obstructed her view of the approaching train, it was her duty to stop and listen when nearer the track. Had she stojtped upon the rise of ground, it is quite probable that she would have heard the train. She testified:

“I did not stand still. My horses were on a walk, and when I got there I pulled on the linés, and came almost to a standstill, and looked, and listened if I could hear the cars, and I did not hear them, so I went along. I was on a slow walk. * * * I did not stop. I drove right onto the crossing. The horses were between the rails when I first saw the train. When I got on the track the train was right there.”

She did not listen for any train or signals, from the rise of ground to the track. She evidently assumed that there was no danger of the approach of a train before she could get across. In this she was not in the exercise of common prudence, either for her own safety, or that of those traveling upon the railroad. Van Auken v. Railway Co., ante, 307, and authorities there cited.

But, according to the evidence of her own witnesses, •when she came within 20 feet of the track she could have seen the train, had she looked. It is no excuse to say that she was looking to the east. The track to the east Was in plain view for some distance back from the cross[329]*329ing. The danger, if any, was from the other direction. She could, however, have looked both ways in an instant, and had ample time to stop within 20 feet. 'While she was Avalking her team, according to her own testimony, less than 100 feet, the train, which Avas running at 'a laAvful rate of speed, ran about 80 rods. Passengers upon the highway must be charged Avith knoAvledge of the lawful rate of speed at which trains may run, and must govern themselves accordingly. Trains are not limited in the rate of speed they may run in the country, and across the public highways, where the travel is limited. The •commerce of the country demands rapid! transit. Robinson v. Railroad Co., 79 Mich. 328.

These trains must run where the view is obstructed by cuts, by embankments, by trees, and other things. He who does not choose to stop and listen, where he cannot see, must suffer the consequences of his own negligence. My OAvn vieAVS of the duties of travelers upon the highway, in approaching railroad crossings when they cannot see, are fully expressed in Van Auken v. Railway Co., supra, and the authorities there cited.

2. The court Avas, in my judgment, correct in holding that it Avas conclusively established by the evidence that the statutory signals were given. I deem it proper to refer to the entire testimony in the case on this point, and the circumstances surrounding each witness who has testified thereto, in order that there may be no misapprehension of the facts to which the law is to be applied.

Mrs. Shufelt's testimony amounts simply to this: That, if the signals Avere given, she did not hear them. The only reason she had for saying that they Avere not given was because she did not hear them. She was in the midst of the noise made by two horses and a lumber wagon traveling over a hard road, and did not listen from the time she left the rise of ground until she reached the track.

[330]*330Miles J. McKay was sitting on his horse, 30 or 40 rods south of the crossing, facing west of north, and was watching the train all the time it came around the curve. He was waiting for a man who was coming across a farm near where he stood. His testimony, on direct examination, is: “I did not hear any signal, — whistle or bell.” On cross-examination, he said: “I was not paying particular attention to the whistle and bell; had no occasion, that I know of, particularly.”

Yirgil Wells and his brother were driving with a team about half a mile north of the crossing, saw the train come around the curve, and testified: “We did not hear the train whistle or ring any bell.” On cross-examination he said: “I did not hear whistle or bell. They might have sounded. I did not hear them. That is as much as I can say about it.”

Cephas Wells was with the last witness at the time. He testified: “I saw the train a minute or two, — a second or two. I did not hear it whistle or ring. We were within hearing distance. I did not notice any indications of a whistle, by a puff of steam or anything. I was watching it as it rounded the curve.” Cross-examination: “I wasn't paying attention to see if the whistle or bell sounded. I wasn't interested. All I can say on that subject is, I didn't hear it.”

Timothy Fee was a farmer whose house was about 40 rods west of the highway, and 30 rods south of the railroad. He- was in his field west of his house, cutting corn. He said: “I did not notice the train when it passed. I did not hear it whistle or ring. It is a general occurrence for trains to pass there every day. I paid no attention to the like. I was within hearing distance, but I did not hear it.” Cross-examination: “I paid no attention to the train. I might have seen it, but did not remark it. I can't say I saw it. I don't remember whether I did or not. I won't [331]*331swear it did not ring or whistle either. I did not hear it to draw my attention. Trains pass and repass so frequently I pay no attention, unless they whistle to drive stock off.”

Justus Berry lived 80 rods north of the crossing. From his house the railroad is visible from the curve to the crossing. He was at work to the west of his house, and saw the train just as it came out of the curve. He said: “1 can’t say positively whether it whistled or rung, or either. I can always hear them plain, and usually note it; but I can’t say, in regard to that special train, whether it did or didn’t. I don’t remember hearing it. I did when they got down to the crossing. I heard them toot the alarm. I thought it was cattle. They were then behind the woodpile, very close to the crossing, I should judge.”

The above is all the evidence on the part of the plaintiff on the subject of signals.

The engineer of the train testified positively that he sounded the whistle for the crossing. The fireman and the conductor also testified that the whistle was blown. The conductor testified that the train was behind time; that he had passengers for Grand Bapids, was anxious to make the connection at Beed City, and was listening for the sound of the whistle.

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Bluebook (online)
55 N.W. 1013, 96 Mich. 327, 1893 Mich. LEXIS 765, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shufelt-v-flint-pere-marquette-railroad-mich-1893.