NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-802
SHU HUA LIN
vs.
HSIANG YING LIN & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff brought suit for unjust enrichment, among
other claims, seeking to recover from the defendants the
monetary contributions she made toward the purchase and
maintenance of a condominium in Brighton. After a jury-waived
trial, a Superior Court judge found for the plaintiff on her
unjust enrichment claim and awarded her $50,000 with prejudgment
interest. The defendants appeal, arguing that the plaintiff's
claim is barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine
of unclean hands and that the judge erred in determining the
1 Michael Pang. amount of the award and by adding prejudgment interest. We
affirm.2
Background. The plaintiff and defendant Hsiang Ying Lin
(Lin) are two of seven sisters. In 2005 the plaintiff, Lin, and
another sister Amy discussed purchasing the condominium for Lin
to occupy with their mother. When Lin expressed hesitance to
assume the financial burden of home ownership, the plaintiff and
Amy assured her they would help with the mortgage, condominium
fees, and some of the utilities and expenses.
Thereafter, Lin alone executed the purchase and sale
agreement, which reflected a purchase price of $230,690. The
plaintiff and Amy each provided $10,000 toward the down payment.
Lin took title to the condominium in June 2005 and then lived
there with the sisters' mother for the next two to two and one-
half years. During that time the plaintiff and Amy each paid
approximately one third of the monthly bill for the mortgage and
condominium fees and contributed toward various living expenses.
In 2008 the plaintiff and her family lived in the
condominium for a few months. Lin moved in again in 2009 and at
some point was joined by defendant Michael Pang, who is now
2 The judge found in favor of the defendants on their counterclaim for breach of contract and awarded them $30,750 in damages with prejudgment interest. The plaintiff did not appeal from that judgment, nor did she appeal from so much of the judgment as dismissed the remaining counts of her complaint.
2 Lin's husband. In 2010 they moved out and began leasing the
condominium. The last payment that the plaintiff made to Lin in
relation to the condominium was on August 20, 2009.
In 2018, during discussions about the plaintiff's repayment
of a loan, a dispute arose among the parties regarding their
respective interests in the condominium. The plaintiff claimed
in an e-mail message that she owned part of the condominium and
that Lin still owed her and Amy "all the profit" Lin had
realized "since [they] purchased the apartment back in 2005."
In a series of e-mail messages dated June 21, 2018, Lin replied
that the plaintiff had no interest in the condominium and that
she (Lin) "own[ed] the property 100%" and did not "owe [the
plaintiff] anything."
The plaintiff filed this suit on July 23, 2019.
Discussion. 1. Statute of limitations. The parties agree
that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is subject to the
six-year statute of limitations governing contract actions. See
G. L. c. 260, § 2; Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Benchmark Mechanical
Sys., Inc., 475 Mass. 150, 156 (2016). The defendants assert
that this six-year period began running on August 20, 2009 --
the date that the plaintiff made her last payment relating to
the condominium -- and that her claim, filed almost ten years
later, is therefore untimely. The trial judge concluded to the
contrary that the claim accrued under the discovery rule on June
3 21, 2018, when Lin first claimed that she owned one hundred
percent of the condominium and owed the plaintiff nothing. We
agree with the judge.
"Unjust enrichment is defined as retention of money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice or equity and good conscience." Sacks v. Dissinger, 488
Mass. 780, 789 (2021), quoting Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass. App.
Ct. 324, 329 (2005). Thus, because the retention of something
belonging to another is the crux of the cause of action, the
plaintiff's claim did not accrue until she knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the defendants intended to retain the
money she paid toward the purchase and maintenance of the
condominium. See Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 727
(2014) ("a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers
or with reasonable diligence should have discovered that [1] he
has suffered harm; [2] his harm was caused by the conduct of
another; and [3] the defendant is the person who caused that
harm"). The record shows that the plaintiff did not realize
this harm (that the defendants intended to retain her money)
until June 21, 2018, when Lin sent her e-mail messages claiming
that she owned one hundred percent of the condominium and owed
the plaintiff nothing. The defendants raise no argument that
the plaintiff with reasonable diligence could have discovered
the harm sooner.
4 Instead, relying on cases concerning the cause of action
for money had and received, the defendants argue that the
plaintiff's claim accrued, as a matter of law, at the time of
her last payment and that the discovery rule does not apply
absent some showing of fraud. But the cases the defendants cite
are inapposite because they involve claims to recover payments
made by mistake. See Suffolk Constr. Co., 475 Mass. at 156; New
Bedford v. Lloyd Inv. Assocs., 363 Mass. 112, 118 (1973); State
Nat'l Bank of Lynn v. Beacon Trust Co., 267 Mass. 355, 359-360
(1929). A cause of action to recover payments made by mistake
accrues "at once" because its elements are established at the
time of the mistake. State Nat'l Bank of Lynn, supra at 360.
See Sturgis v. Preston, 134 Mass. 372, 373 (1883) ("plaintiff's
cause of action [for money had and received] arose immediately
upon the payment of the money" because "the defendant held, and
claimed as his own, from the moment it was paid to him, money
which in equity and good conscience he ought to have immediately
repaid"). In contrast here, the plaintiff made the payments to
Lin not by mistake, but with the expectation that she would
later be compensated. As it did not come to light until June
2018 that the defendants did not intend to compensate her, the
plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, filed a little over one
year later, was timely. See Sturgis, supra ("This case differs
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-802
SHU HUA LIN
vs.
HSIANG YING LIN & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff brought suit for unjust enrichment, among
other claims, seeking to recover from the defendants the
monetary contributions she made toward the purchase and
maintenance of a condominium in Brighton. After a jury-waived
trial, a Superior Court judge found for the plaintiff on her
unjust enrichment claim and awarded her $50,000 with prejudgment
interest. The defendants appeal, arguing that the plaintiff's
claim is barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine
of unclean hands and that the judge erred in determining the
1 Michael Pang. amount of the award and by adding prejudgment interest. We
affirm.2
Background. The plaintiff and defendant Hsiang Ying Lin
(Lin) are two of seven sisters. In 2005 the plaintiff, Lin, and
another sister Amy discussed purchasing the condominium for Lin
to occupy with their mother. When Lin expressed hesitance to
assume the financial burden of home ownership, the plaintiff and
Amy assured her they would help with the mortgage, condominium
fees, and some of the utilities and expenses.
Thereafter, Lin alone executed the purchase and sale
agreement, which reflected a purchase price of $230,690. The
plaintiff and Amy each provided $10,000 toward the down payment.
Lin took title to the condominium in June 2005 and then lived
there with the sisters' mother for the next two to two and one-
half years. During that time the plaintiff and Amy each paid
approximately one third of the monthly bill for the mortgage and
condominium fees and contributed toward various living expenses.
In 2008 the plaintiff and her family lived in the
condominium for a few months. Lin moved in again in 2009 and at
some point was joined by defendant Michael Pang, who is now
2 The judge found in favor of the defendants on their counterclaim for breach of contract and awarded them $30,750 in damages with prejudgment interest. The plaintiff did not appeal from that judgment, nor did she appeal from so much of the judgment as dismissed the remaining counts of her complaint.
2 Lin's husband. In 2010 they moved out and began leasing the
condominium. The last payment that the plaintiff made to Lin in
relation to the condominium was on August 20, 2009.
In 2018, during discussions about the plaintiff's repayment
of a loan, a dispute arose among the parties regarding their
respective interests in the condominium. The plaintiff claimed
in an e-mail message that she owned part of the condominium and
that Lin still owed her and Amy "all the profit" Lin had
realized "since [they] purchased the apartment back in 2005."
In a series of e-mail messages dated June 21, 2018, Lin replied
that the plaintiff had no interest in the condominium and that
she (Lin) "own[ed] the property 100%" and did not "owe [the
plaintiff] anything."
The plaintiff filed this suit on July 23, 2019.
Discussion. 1. Statute of limitations. The parties agree
that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is subject to the
six-year statute of limitations governing contract actions. See
G. L. c. 260, § 2; Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Benchmark Mechanical
Sys., Inc., 475 Mass. 150, 156 (2016). The defendants assert
that this six-year period began running on August 20, 2009 --
the date that the plaintiff made her last payment relating to
the condominium -- and that her claim, filed almost ten years
later, is therefore untimely. The trial judge concluded to the
contrary that the claim accrued under the discovery rule on June
3 21, 2018, when Lin first claimed that she owned one hundred
percent of the condominium and owed the plaintiff nothing. We
agree with the judge.
"Unjust enrichment is defined as retention of money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice or equity and good conscience." Sacks v. Dissinger, 488
Mass. 780, 789 (2021), quoting Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass. App.
Ct. 324, 329 (2005). Thus, because the retention of something
belonging to another is the crux of the cause of action, the
plaintiff's claim did not accrue until she knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the defendants intended to retain the
money she paid toward the purchase and maintenance of the
condominium. See Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 727
(2014) ("a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers
or with reasonable diligence should have discovered that [1] he
has suffered harm; [2] his harm was caused by the conduct of
another; and [3] the defendant is the person who caused that
harm"). The record shows that the plaintiff did not realize
this harm (that the defendants intended to retain her money)
until June 21, 2018, when Lin sent her e-mail messages claiming
that she owned one hundred percent of the condominium and owed
the plaintiff nothing. The defendants raise no argument that
the plaintiff with reasonable diligence could have discovered
the harm sooner.
4 Instead, relying on cases concerning the cause of action
for money had and received, the defendants argue that the
plaintiff's claim accrued, as a matter of law, at the time of
her last payment and that the discovery rule does not apply
absent some showing of fraud. But the cases the defendants cite
are inapposite because they involve claims to recover payments
made by mistake. See Suffolk Constr. Co., 475 Mass. at 156; New
Bedford v. Lloyd Inv. Assocs., 363 Mass. 112, 118 (1973); State
Nat'l Bank of Lynn v. Beacon Trust Co., 267 Mass. 355, 359-360
(1929). A cause of action to recover payments made by mistake
accrues "at once" because its elements are established at the
time of the mistake. State Nat'l Bank of Lynn, supra at 360.
See Sturgis v. Preston, 134 Mass. 372, 373 (1883) ("plaintiff's
cause of action [for money had and received] arose immediately
upon the payment of the money" because "the defendant held, and
claimed as his own, from the moment it was paid to him, money
which in equity and good conscience he ought to have immediately
repaid"). In contrast here, the plaintiff made the payments to
Lin not by mistake, but with the expectation that she would
later be compensated. As it did not come to light until June
2018 that the defendants did not intend to compensate her, the
plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, filed a little over one
year later, was timely. See Sturgis, supra ("This case differs
widely from those in which the defendant is in the rightful
5 possession of money, making no claim to it as his own, but ready
to pay it over to the rightful owner; in which it is held that
no right of action arises, and that the statute does not begin
to run until after a demand upon him by the party entitled to
the money, and a refusal to pay it over to the rightful
claimant"). See also Suffolk Constr. Co., supra at 157 (claim
to recover moneys paid by mistake was time barred, but claim for
unjust enrichment was not).
2. Unclean hands. The defendants next contend that the
plaintiff is foreclosed from recovering on her unjust enrichment
claim because the judge's findings on her other claims show that
the plaintiff told "major lies" to try to justify her case. We
understand the defendants to be arguing that, because the judge
found certain aspects of the plaintiff's testimony not credible,
the doctrine of unclean hands bars the plaintiff from recovering
on any of her claims. The defendants cite no legal authority in
support of this proposition, and so their argument is waived.
See Halstrom v. Dube, 481 Mass. 480, 483 n.8 (2019).
Furthermore, to the extent the defendants raised the argument
below, they did not do so in a clear enough fashion to put the
judge on notice of it. Their argument is waived for this
additional reason. See id.
3. Amount of award. The defendants challenge the amount
of the award on two grounds. They first contend that the judge
6 erred by considering the current value of the condominium in
determining the value of the benefit that the plaintiff
conferred on the defendants. We are unpersuaded. Because
"measuring restitution for unjust enrichment poses special
difficulties, . . . trial judges need 'considerable discretion'
to fashion appropriate remedies." Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass.
App. Ct. 622, 626 (2017), quoting Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 371 comment a (1981). Here, the judge found that it
was the expectation of all parties that the plaintiff (and Amy)
"would realize some form of repayment for their contributions
toward [Lin's] ownership of the unit" and noted that Lin forgave
a considerable debt that Amy owed her "based upon Amy's one
third contribution and in light of the unit's potential sale
value." The judge further found that the plaintiff's payments,
totaling $34,048 from 2005 to 2009, contributed to the
maintenance of the condominium; that the condominium had
appreciated more than 62.5 percent since the purchase; and that,
although the plaintiff was never involved in managing the
condominium, she also did not share in the rental income, which
had recently surpassed the monthly costs. Based on these
factors and principles of equity, the judge determined that the
plaintiff was owed $50,000 for the benefit she conferred on the
defendants. The defendants have not shown this to be an abuse
of discretion. See Bonina, supra, quoting Restatement (Second)
7 of Contracts § 371 comment a ("[t]o the extent that the benefit
may reasonably be measured in different ways, the choice is
within the discretion of the court").
Second, and without citing any legal authority, the
defendants contend that the judgment should not have included
prejudgment interest. The sole basis for this argument is that
the judge's order for judgment mentioned prejudgment interest
only with respect to the defendants' counterclaim. Based on
this, the defendants assert that the judge did not make a
"finding" that prejudgment interest was warranted on the
plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim and so the judgment should
be amended accordingly. This argument is meritless.
Prejudgment interest is governed by statute, see G. L. c. 231,
§§ 6B, 6C, and 6H, and "it is settled that claims for damages
based in quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, both based in
equity, are eligible for statutory prejudgment interest."
8 Brennan v. Ferreira, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 319 (2023). We see
no error.3
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Shin & Toone, JJ.4),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: May 9, 2024.
3 The parties' requests for appellate attorney's fees, which specify no basis therefor, are denied.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.