Shoup v. JAG Welding, Fab & Services, Inc.

District Court, S.D. California·Decided April 25, 2025·No. 3:24-cv-01776·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 THOMAS SHOUP, an individual, Case No.: 24-CV-1776 JLS (AHG)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO INC., a Texas Corporation, et al., 15 QUASH SERVICE PURSUANT TO Defendants. CIVIL LOCAL RULE 7.1(f)(3)(c) 16

17 (ECF No. 25) 18 19 20 Presently before the Court is Defendant JAG Welding, FAB & Services, Inc.’s 21 Motion to Dismiss the Unserved Defendants and Defendants Mike McQueen and Jessica 22 Cannon’s Motion to Quash Service and or Dismiss (“Mot.,” ECF No. 25). Plaintiff 23 Thomas Shoup did not file any response to the Motion. See generally Docket. On April 17, 24 2025, the Court took the Motion under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil 25 Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). ECF No. 26. Having carefully considered the arguments and the 26 applicable law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ 27 Motion. 28 / / / 2 This case stems from a falling out between Plaintiff Thomas Shoup and Defendant 3 JAG Welding, FAB & Services, Inc. (“JAG”), a business that Shoup helped to create in 4 early 2021. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 17–19.1 As part of his employment with JAG, Shoup 5 entered into an Employment, Confidentiality, and Non-Compete Agreement 6 (“Agreement”) whereby Shoup “would primarily provide marine welding services for 7 JAG” and serve as Vice President of Operations in exchange for 400 shares of non-voting 8 stock representing a 40% ownership interest in the company. Id. ¶¶ 18–22. The formation 9 of JAG was aided by Defendant Douglas Huff who was described to Shoup “as a banker 10 and mentor capable of assisting with business formation or investment.” Id. ¶ 17. 11 After Shoup, in early 2024, reevaluated the terms of the Agreement, his relationship 12 with the company soured. Although certain individuals associated with JAG were at first 13 receptive to Shoup’s interest in renegotiating the terms, id. ¶ 24, Shoup alleges that “JAG 14 began fabricating alleged shortcomings and failures in Plaintiff’s and [sic] performance,” 15 which eventually resulted in Shoup’s termination from his position with the company, id. 16 Because Shoup’s termination was characterized as “for cause” by JAG, certain termination 17 provisions of the Agreement were triggered that significantly reduced Shoup’s ownership 18 interest. Id. ¶ 27. Shoup alleges, among other things, that his termination was wrongful 19 and that he was deprived of over $5 million in company equity. Id. ¶ 29. 20 Shoup initiated this action on September 26, 2024, in San Diego Superior Court 21 against JAG and seven individuals associated with the company. See Docket. Those 22 individuals are: (1) Douglas Huff, President of three JAG subsidiaries; (2) Timothy 23 Jagielski, JAG’s Executive Vice President; (3) Charles Minton, JAG’s Chief 24 Administrative Officer; (4) Mike McQueen, Douglas Huff’s secretary; (5) Jessica Cannon, 25 JAG’s head of Human Resources and Payroll; (6) Andrew Minton, a JAG Accounting 26

27 1 The Complaint—which was embedded within Defendant’s Notice of Removal—was not separately filed 28 as an individually paginated exhibit. Thus, all references to the Complaint refer to the Notice of Removal 1 Specialist; and (7) Josh Huff, JAG’s General Counsel. Compl. ¶¶ 5–11. Shoup asserts 2 nine causes of action, all under California state law, and he seeks monetary and injunctive 3 relief. Id. ¶¶ 34–98; Compl. at Prayer for Relief. JAG removed the case to this Court on 4 October 4, 2024, see ECF No. 1, and Defendants filed the instant Motion on March 10, 5 2025, see Mot. In the Motion, the individual Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the case 6 against them due to Shoup’s failure to properly serve them with process under Federal Rule 7 of Civil Procedure 4. Mot. at 5–7. In the alternative, Defendants Mike McQueen and 8 Jessica Cannon ask the Court to quash service of process because they were served only 9 with the California-court-issued summons after the case was removed to federal court. Id. 10 at 7–8. 12 I. Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) 13 Under Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c), “[i]f an opposing party fails to file the papers in 14 the manner required by Civil Local Rule 7.1.e.2, that failure may constitute a consent to 15 the granting of a motion or other request for ruling by the court.” Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(2) 16 requires the party against whom a motion is filed to file an opposition or statement of 17 non-opposition no later than fourteen days prior to the motion’s noticed hearing. Where a 18 party files neither an opposition nor a statement of non-opposition to a motion, Civil Local 19 Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) permits the Court, in its discretion, to summarily grant that motion. See 20 United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see also Park v. 21 Washington Mut. Bank, No. 10 CV 1548 MMA AJB, 2010 WL 4235475, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 22 Oct. 21, 2010) (summarily granting a motion to quash service under Rule 12(b)(5)); 23 Anderson v. Does 1-6, No. 18CV2137-JAH (WVG), 2019 WL 1017611, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 24 Mar. 4, 2019) (summarily granting a motion to dismiss); Holandez v. Ent., LLC, 25 No. EDCV211755JGBSHKX, 2023 WL 2559209, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2023) 26 (summarily granting, under a similar local rule, a motion for conditional certification of a 27 collective action). 28 “[Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c)] is designed to relieve the court of the burden of 1 reviewing the merits of a motion without the benefit of full briefing, because such a review 2 requires a significant amount of scarce judicial time.” Luna v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 3 No. 09-CV-2807-L NLS, 2011 WL 1099795, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011). Moreover, 4 by empowering district courts to decline to rule “upon issues which remain unfocused” and 5 which lack “that clear concreteness” provided by the “clash of adversary argument 6 exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding 7 interests,” Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3) serves the same goals that underlie prudential 8 restrictions on federal courts’ issuance of advisory opinions. See United States v. Fruehauf, 9 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 759–60 (2013). 10 A district court’s exercise of discretion pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) is 11 informed by the factors outlined in Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 12 curiam). These factors include “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 13 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 14 defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases o[n] their merits; and (5) the 15 availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 16 1423 (9th Cir.1986)). 17 II. Rule 12(b)(5) 18 A district court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a defendant without proper service 19 of process. Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Secs. & 20 Exch. Comm’n v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2007). Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 12(b)(5), therefore, authorizes a defendant to raise by motion the defense of 22 “insufficient service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Shoup v. JAG Welding, Fab & Services, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Shoup v. JAG Welding, Fab & Services, Inc. (Shoup v. JAG Welding, Fab & Services, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

United States v. Fruehauf
365 U.S. 146 (Supreme Court, 1961)
John Beecher v. George C. Wallace
381 F.2d 372 (Ninth Circuit, 1967)
United States v. Nathan J. Warren, Jr.
601 F.2d 471 (Ninth Circuit, 1979)
Harlan L. Jacobsen v. Richard Filler
790 F.2d 1362 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
United States v. Windsor
133 S. Ct. 2675 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ross
504 F.3d 1130 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Hernandez v. City of El Monte
138 F.3d 393 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Umbenhauer v. Woog
969 F.2d 25 (Third Circuit, 1992)