[695]*695SHARPNACK, Judge.
Robert E. Shoulders appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Shoulders raises three issues on appeal:
1. Did the post-conviction court err in holding that the supreme court's decision in Shoulders's direct appeal is res judica-to and bars reconsideration of the trial court's alleged error in prohibiting Shoulders from asking a state's witness, who, pursuant to a plea bargain, had agreed to testify against Shoulders, whether he knew the maximum possible penalty for a class A felony?
2. Was Shoulders deprived of effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel?
3. Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct which prejudiced Shoulders's right to due process of law?
Shoulders was convicted of robbery and theft. The facts of the crime are reported in the supreme court opinion affirming his conviction on direct appeal. Shoulders v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 211, 211-212.
While testifying at his trial, Shoulders admitted that he committed the theft, but denied that he committed the robbery. His conviction of robbery was based in part on the testimony of his accomplice, Floyd Mullins, who had earlier entered into a plea agreement with the state. The plea agreement provided that Mullins would testify against Shoulders and plead guilty to class B felony burglary and that the state, in return, would forgo prosecuting Mullins for class A felony robbery and class D felony theft. Mullins received a sentence of six years imprisonment on the burglary conviction.
At trial, Mullins divulged the terms of the plea agreement on direct examination. Under cross-examination, he stated that he had been informed of the maximum possible sentence for a class B felony. Shoul ders's counsel asked him if he was aware of the maximum possible sentence for a class A felony. The state objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.
Shoulders took a direct appeal to the supreme court challenging the trial court's refusal to allow his counsel to ask the question on cross-examination. The unanimous supreme court, writing through Justice DeBruler, rejected Shoulders's argument, stating:
Here, the State disclosed the entire plea agreement which indicated that a robbery charge and a theft charge were dismissed in exchange for a plea of guilty to burglary and for his testimony against appellant.
This disclosure was sufficient to inform the jury that Mullins received a substantially diminished penalty for his guilty plea and testimony. As a result, the jury had sufficient facts about the circumstances of Mullins's testimony to evaluate his credibility. In these circumstances, knowledge of the even greater sentence for the class A offense, if imparted to the jury, would not have added tellingly to the impeaching value of the bargain, and would have raised the danger of a compromise verdict.
Shoulders, 480 N.E.2d at 212-213.
A little more than one year after it affirmed Shoulders's conviction, the supreme court decided Jarrett v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 967. In Jarrett, a divided supreme court held that it was reversible error for a trial court to prevent a defendant from inquiring as to the extent of a witness's knowledge of the potential punishment which the witness avoided by entering into a plea agreement and testifying against the defendant.
After the Jarrett decision was handed down, Shoulders filed his petition for post-conviction relief claiming, based on the three-part retroactivity test announced in Fossey v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 173, 258 N.E.2d 616 and reaffirmed in Rowley v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 1078, that he was entitled to retroactive application of the rule announced in Jarrett. The post-conviction court rejected his claim. The court evidently recognized the relationship between federal and our own case law on retroactivity and noted that the United States Supreme Court had revised the federal rule in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 334. The [696]*696court apparently concluded, correctly as it developed, that our supreme court would modify Indiana's retroactivity rules to conform with those announced in Teague. The court determined that the Jarrett holding concerning the extent to which a defendant could cross-examine concerning plea agreements was not entitled to retroactive application and denied Shoulders's petition. Three weeks later, the supreme court adopted the Teague retroactivity test in Daniels v. State (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 487.
Shoulders argues that the supreme court's decision in his direct appeal is not res judicata despite the fact that the supreme court considered the identical claim of error upon which he predicates this post-conviction action. He acknowledges that the doctrine of res judicata normally precludes post-conviction reconsideration of issues decided on direct appeal. IND. RULES OF PROCEDURE, POST-CONVICTION RULE 1(8); Schiro v. State (1989), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1201, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 910, 110 S.Ct. 268, 107 LEd.2d 218. However, he argues that no case holds that res judicata bars relitigation of an issue which once had been decided against a defendant on appeal but which had been decided differently in a subsequent case involving a different defendant.
We cannot agree with Shoulders's argument, because our supreme court has applied res judicata under such circumstances. In Layton v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 567, 307 N.E.2d 477 (Layton III), the supreme court affirmed the denial of Lay-ton's post-conviction petition. Layton had been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed to the supreme court, which reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial. See, Layton v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 52, 221 N.E.2d 881 (Loyton I). Before his new trial, Layton filed a motion requesting that the trial court prohibit the state from seeking the death penalty or referring to it in any way, from asking the members of the venire panel any questions concerning their attitudes toward the death penalty, and from introducing any evidence of prior offenses. The trial court denied the motion except with regard to the prior offenses. At trial, Layton objected to all jury instructions concerning the death penalty, but the trial court overruled his objection and instructed the jury on the death penalty. The jury convicted Layton and he again appealed to the supreme court.
In this second direct appeal, Layton argued that the trial court violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by allowing the state to seek the death penalty in his second trial since the death penalty amounted to a greater sentence than he received in the first trial. The supreme court rejected his argument, and affirmed his conviction. See, Layton v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 205, 240 N.E.2d 489 (Layton II).
After our supreme court decided Loyton TII, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Price v. Georgia (1970), 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct.
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[695]*695SHARPNACK, Judge.
Robert E. Shoulders appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Shoulders raises three issues on appeal:
1. Did the post-conviction court err in holding that the supreme court's decision in Shoulders's direct appeal is res judica-to and bars reconsideration of the trial court's alleged error in prohibiting Shoulders from asking a state's witness, who, pursuant to a plea bargain, had agreed to testify against Shoulders, whether he knew the maximum possible penalty for a class A felony?
2. Was Shoulders deprived of effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel?
3. Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct which prejudiced Shoulders's right to due process of law?
Shoulders was convicted of robbery and theft. The facts of the crime are reported in the supreme court opinion affirming his conviction on direct appeal. Shoulders v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 211, 211-212.
While testifying at his trial, Shoulders admitted that he committed the theft, but denied that he committed the robbery. His conviction of robbery was based in part on the testimony of his accomplice, Floyd Mullins, who had earlier entered into a plea agreement with the state. The plea agreement provided that Mullins would testify against Shoulders and plead guilty to class B felony burglary and that the state, in return, would forgo prosecuting Mullins for class A felony robbery and class D felony theft. Mullins received a sentence of six years imprisonment on the burglary conviction.
At trial, Mullins divulged the terms of the plea agreement on direct examination. Under cross-examination, he stated that he had been informed of the maximum possible sentence for a class B felony. Shoul ders's counsel asked him if he was aware of the maximum possible sentence for a class A felony. The state objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.
Shoulders took a direct appeal to the supreme court challenging the trial court's refusal to allow his counsel to ask the question on cross-examination. The unanimous supreme court, writing through Justice DeBruler, rejected Shoulders's argument, stating:
Here, the State disclosed the entire plea agreement which indicated that a robbery charge and a theft charge were dismissed in exchange for a plea of guilty to burglary and for his testimony against appellant.
This disclosure was sufficient to inform the jury that Mullins received a substantially diminished penalty for his guilty plea and testimony. As a result, the jury had sufficient facts about the circumstances of Mullins's testimony to evaluate his credibility. In these circumstances, knowledge of the even greater sentence for the class A offense, if imparted to the jury, would not have added tellingly to the impeaching value of the bargain, and would have raised the danger of a compromise verdict.
Shoulders, 480 N.E.2d at 212-213.
A little more than one year after it affirmed Shoulders's conviction, the supreme court decided Jarrett v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 967. In Jarrett, a divided supreme court held that it was reversible error for a trial court to prevent a defendant from inquiring as to the extent of a witness's knowledge of the potential punishment which the witness avoided by entering into a plea agreement and testifying against the defendant.
After the Jarrett decision was handed down, Shoulders filed his petition for post-conviction relief claiming, based on the three-part retroactivity test announced in Fossey v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 173, 258 N.E.2d 616 and reaffirmed in Rowley v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 1078, that he was entitled to retroactive application of the rule announced in Jarrett. The post-conviction court rejected his claim. The court evidently recognized the relationship between federal and our own case law on retroactivity and noted that the United States Supreme Court had revised the federal rule in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 334. The [696]*696court apparently concluded, correctly as it developed, that our supreme court would modify Indiana's retroactivity rules to conform with those announced in Teague. The court determined that the Jarrett holding concerning the extent to which a defendant could cross-examine concerning plea agreements was not entitled to retroactive application and denied Shoulders's petition. Three weeks later, the supreme court adopted the Teague retroactivity test in Daniels v. State (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 487.
Shoulders argues that the supreme court's decision in his direct appeal is not res judicata despite the fact that the supreme court considered the identical claim of error upon which he predicates this post-conviction action. He acknowledges that the doctrine of res judicata normally precludes post-conviction reconsideration of issues decided on direct appeal. IND. RULES OF PROCEDURE, POST-CONVICTION RULE 1(8); Schiro v. State (1989), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1201, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 910, 110 S.Ct. 268, 107 LEd.2d 218. However, he argues that no case holds that res judicata bars relitigation of an issue which once had been decided against a defendant on appeal but which had been decided differently in a subsequent case involving a different defendant.
We cannot agree with Shoulders's argument, because our supreme court has applied res judicata under such circumstances. In Layton v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 567, 307 N.E.2d 477 (Layton III), the supreme court affirmed the denial of Lay-ton's post-conviction petition. Layton had been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed to the supreme court, which reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial. See, Layton v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 52, 221 N.E.2d 881 (Loyton I). Before his new trial, Layton filed a motion requesting that the trial court prohibit the state from seeking the death penalty or referring to it in any way, from asking the members of the venire panel any questions concerning their attitudes toward the death penalty, and from introducing any evidence of prior offenses. The trial court denied the motion except with regard to the prior offenses. At trial, Layton objected to all jury instructions concerning the death penalty, but the trial court overruled his objection and instructed the jury on the death penalty. The jury convicted Layton and he again appealed to the supreme court.
In this second direct appeal, Layton argued that the trial court violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by allowing the state to seek the death penalty in his second trial since the death penalty amounted to a greater sentence than he received in the first trial. The supreme court rejected his argument, and affirmed his conviction. See, Layton v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 205, 240 N.E.2d 489 (Layton II).
After our supreme court decided Loyton TII, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Price v. Georgia (1970), 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300, which held that the state violated the double jeopardy prohibitions of the federal constitution when, upon retrial following a successful appeal by a criminal defendant, it sought a greater sentence than that received by the defendant in his first trial. Our supreme court followed Price in Causey v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 19, 266 N.E.2d 795.
Layton then filed a petition for post conviction relief in which he argued that he was entitled to a new trial under the rule announced in Price and Causey. In affirming the post-conviction court's denial of Layton's petition, our supreme court wrote:
Secondly, the same issue, although differently assigned, was reviewed and determined upon the defendant's direct appeal and is therefore res judicata. At his second trial, the defendant objected to the giving of instructions that recited the criminal statutes applicable to the case and the penalties therefore, including the death penalty, if a jury saw fit to impose it. It was his contention that this constituted double jeopardy. This issue was decided against the defendant and is final, notwithstanding that [Price [697]*697and Causey ], cases upon which he here leans heavily for support, had not yet been decided.
Layton III, 261 Ind. at 570, 307 N.E.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
We hold that Layton III governs this case. Shoulders, just like the defendant in Loyton III, seeks to relitigate an issue that has been decided against him by the highest court of this state. Shoulders, just like the defendant in Layton IIL, as serts that he should be allowed to benefit from later cases which arguably overruled the decision in his earlier direct appeal. The supreme court rejected the defendant's petition in Layton III because it found its opinion on his direct appeal to be res judi-cata, and we reject Shoulders's petition here.1
Shoulders next asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel introduced evidence of Shoulders's past offenses which were not admissible for impeachment for dishonesty under Ashton v. Anderson (1972), 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210; because trial counsel failed to object to questions concerning the offenses which were allegedly beyond the seope of direct examination; because trial counsel failed to tender a jury instruction concerning evidence of other offenses; because trial counsel failed to object to allegedly prejudicial statements made during the state's opening argument2; and because trial counsel allegedly failed to make adequate final argument. In addition, Shoulders asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not raise any of these alleged errors.
Under our post-conviction rules, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that valid grounds exist for setting aside a judgment of conviction. IND.RULES OF PROCEDURE, POST-CONVICTION RULE 1 § 5; Boone v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 607, 608; Williams v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 893, 894. The post-conviction court is given the sole responsibility for judging the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Willioms, 464 N.E.2d at 894. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses on appeal of the denial of a post-conviction petition. Boone, 472 N.E.2d at 608. An appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition is an appeal from a negative judgment. We may reverse a negative judgment only if the evidence is without conflict and logically can lead to but one conclusion, but the post-conviction court reached the opposite conclusion. Vickers v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 3, 5.
In order to show that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel, Shoulders must prove both that his trial counsel's [698]*698performance was deficient and that the deficiency was so prejudicial that it deprived him of a reliable trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 LEd.2d 674, 693; Miller v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 260, 262. In short, Shoulders must prove that it is likely that he would not have been con-viected absent his counsel's alleged errors. Miller, 541 N.E.2d at 262.
We cannot find that the admission of evidence of Shoulders's prior offenses, his counsel's failure to object to the state's questions regarding one of those offenses, or his counsel's failure to tender a jury instruction on the prior offenses substantially prejudiced Shoulders in any way. We have reviewed the trial record, and have found overwhelming evidence of Shoulders's guilt. One of the victims testified that a man with the same color hair and the same build as Shoulders assaulted him while in the process of taking a riding lawn mower. - Another witness, a friend of Shoulders and Mullins, testified that they told her of the robbery and indicated that Shoulders used force to subdue the victim who was trying to prevent the theft. Mullins testified that Shoulders participated in the robbery. Shoulders's palm print was found on the riding mower. Finally, although Shoulders did deny using any other foree against the victim, he did admit both that he participated in the theft of the mower and that he attempted to wrest a rifle from the victim who was trying to prevent the theft. Given the overwhelming weight of this evidence, we cannot say that these alleged inefficiencies of counsel deprived Shoulders of a reliable trial. Gill v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 724, 726.
Shoulders argues that trial counsel's cloging argument was inadequate because counsel allegedly advanced inconsistent theories to the jury. This is not the case. Trial counsel argued that Mullins was a more culpable actor in the theft than was Shoulders, and that Shoulders fled the scene when it became apparent that force would be used. Counsel's strategy was apparent-he hoped that the jury would believe that Shoulders was guilty of theft but not robbery. The strategy may not have worked, but we cannot say that counsel was ineffective for attempting it. Of course, because we have found no merit to any of Shoulders's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we hold that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these issues on direct appeal.
Finally, Shoulders argues that the prosecutor at his trial engaged in prejudicial misconduct which violated his right to due process of law. Shoulders claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by cross-examining him concerning one of his prior offenses after his counsel opened the door by asking about the prior offense on direct examination. While it may have been error for the trial court to have allowed this line of questioning, we conclude the error was harmless due to the considerable evidence of Shoulders's guilt. See, e.g., Eckstein v. State (1988), Ind., 526 N.E.2d 693, 695. Shoulders also claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Mullins's credibility on opening argument. The prosecutor did not vouch for Mullins's credibility, however. She did inform the jury as to what his testimony would be, and also informed them as to what evidence would corroborate his story. In addition, she asked the jury not to discredit Mullins's testimony merely because he participated in the crime. At no point did she state a personal belief in Mullins's truthfulness, and, accordingly, her comments did not constitute misconduct.
The supreme court's decision in Shoulders's direct appeal is res judicata, and we are not free to reconsider the issues decided therein in the absence of manifest injustice or fundamental and compelling error. We have found no such error here, and we have found no merit in any of Shoulders's other allegations of error. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of Shoulders's petition for post-conviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
CHEZEM, J., concurs.
BARTEAU, J., dissents with iseparate opinion.