Shoji v. Gleason

420 F. Supp. 464, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12876
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedOctober 6, 1976
DocketCiv. No. 73-600
StatusPublished

This text of 420 F. Supp. 464 (Shoji v. Gleason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shoji v. Gleason, 420 F. Supp. 464, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12876 (D. Or. 1976).

Opinions

OPINION

Before GOODWIN, Circuit Judge, and EAST, Senior District Judge and BURNS, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Board of County Commissioners (Board), acting pursuant to ORS 368.405 et seq., undertook to widen a Multnomah county road adjacent to plaintiffs’ real property. The Oregon statute required the county to conduct road viewer proceedings to fix a value for the property to be taken. Plaintiffs contend the statute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide for adequate notice of this hearing.1 Because plaintiffs seek to enjoin the taking of their property, a three-judge court must be convened. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 et seq.

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,1343 and 2201, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The challenged statute requires the County to commence road widening by adopting a Resolution to widen. The County must send a copy of this Resolution, set out as appendix “A” to this opinion, by ordinary mail to record owners. The Resolution generally describes the affected area and legally describes the affected road. It advises the recipient that on a specified date the Board will hear objections to the proposed widening. Nowhere does the Resolution mention valuation or the road viewer proceeding; it merely speaks in terms of a “proposed road.” The statute does, however, allow persons to contest the proposed award before the Board. The statute also provides that if dissatisfied with the award the owner may appeal to the Circuit Court. Relevant portions of the statute are set out as appendix “B”.

Plaintiffs contend the statutory notice is constitutionally deficient in two respects. Citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), they contend that the notice fails fairly to apprise property owners of their right to a hearing on the value of the property taken. They further contend that notice by ordinary mail is insufficient and that notice by certified or registered mail is constitutionally required.

We need not reach the second contention because plaintiffs’ first contention is well taken. The notice, infra, does nothing more than apprise the affected property owner that the Board proposes to widen a road. It gives no date, time, or notice of any proceeding at which damages for the property taken are to be evaluated and assessed; it does not apprise the affected owners that they may contest the proposed award before the Board and thereafter seek review in state courts. Although the notice refers to the statute, where the diligent and sophisticated might find descriptions of these procedures, we are concerned only with the adequacy of the notice itself.

Notice must be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise [466]*466interested parties of the pendency of an action. It also must reasonably convey the required information, Mullane, supra, at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652. A notice which fails in either respect denies due process to interested parties. In light of all the circumstances and after reading the entire resolution, we cannot conclude that the notice sent reasonably conveyed the required information. Instead, it obscured it. Its dry prose and legalistic phrases obscured both the imminence and the significance of the proceedings to follow. A reasonable recipient easily could conclude that it was a notice of an event of general public interest rather than an initial, crucial step in a proceeding which could impinge upon his property rights.

Plaintiffs are thus entitled to prevail. Plaintiffs should prepare and submit a proposed form of judgment.

APPENDIX A

BE IT REMEMBERED, that at a meeting of the Board of County Commissioners held May 8, 1969, the following action was taken:

In the Matter of the Relocation, Widening and Establishment of N.E. and N. Columbia Boulevard No. 527, from N.E. 33rd Avenue westerly to N. Borthwick Avenue, to be known as N.E. and N. Columbia Boulevard No. 3988. RESOLUTION No. 3988

At this time the Board of County Commissioners of Multnomah County, Oregon, having duly determined to institute proceedings to relocate, widen and establish a section of N.E. and N. Columbia Boulevard No. 527, from N.E. 33rd Avenue westerly to N. Borthwick Avenue, to be known as N.E. and N. Columbia Boulevard No. 3988, and more particularly described as follows:

* * * * *

(Legal description omitted)

The proposed road is located in Sections 10, 11, 13 and 14, T-l-N, R-l-E, W.M., in Multnomah County, Oregon, and the Board being satisfied that the relocation, widening and establishment of said road will be of public benefit for the following reason, to-wit: To provide for vehicular traffic currently generated and expected in the future from the rapid growth of industrial and commercial enterprises in the vicinity. It is therefore:

RESOLVED AND ORDERED, that pursuant to the authority vested in the Board of County Commissioners of Multnomah County, Oregon, by O.R.S. 368.470 ank 373.-110 through said Commission, hereby declares its intention to relocate, widen and establish the county road as described above, reserving the right to discontinue proceedings if considered desirable. It is further

ORDERED that June 19th, 1969, being during the next term of said Board at 9:30 A.M. at Room 680, County Courthouse, Portland, Oregon, be set as the time and place at which the Board will hear objections to and remonstrances against the proposed relocation, widening and establishment of said road, and it is further

ORDERED, that the Director of the Department of Public Works, or a duly qualified deputy, is hereby ordered to give due and legal notice of said hearing by posting certified copies of the Resolution as provided in said section 368.470 O.R.S., and that notice be forwarded by mail, postage prepaid, to each record owner of land on or over which the proposed road or a portion thereof is to be laid out, located and established, at the last known post office address of such owner, and if the address of such owner be unknown to the person mailing such notice, that it be mailed to the address given on the latest tax roll in the office of the Tax Collector of said county, and if the address is unknown to the person mailing such notice, and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained and cannot be found in such latest tax roll, then such notice be addressed to such owner at Portland, Oregon, and it is further

ORDERED, that this Resolution be duly recorded in the deed records of Multnomah County, Oregon, by the Director of the De[467]*467partment of Judicial Administration immediately upon filing thereof.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR MULTNOMAH COUNTY

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Related

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306 (Supreme Court, 1950)

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Bluebook (online)
420 F. Supp. 464, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shoji-v-gleason-ord-1976.