Shofner v. Shenyang Dadong District People's Court

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-0931
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KELLY SHOFNER, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 26-931

SHENYANG DADONG DISTRICT PEOPLE’S COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiffs Kelly and Joseph Shofner bring this action arising from an

early-education investment project in Shenyang, China, asserting claims under the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Torture Victim Protection Act. See

ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at 1–4. Plaintiffs filed an eight-page Complaint on the public docket. Id.

They concurrently moved to file a separate, unredacted Complaint — together with a voluminous

set of exhibits — under seal. See ECF No. 2 (First Sealing Mot.). The Court denied that initial

Motion for failure to address the governing framework set out in United States v. Hubbard, 650

F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Minute Order of Mar. 31, 2026. The Shofners have now

renewed their request. See ECF No. 5 (Second Sealing Mot.).

Plaintiffs’ Motion arises from concerns that the Complaint contains “sensitive

information relating to personal safety, foreign-related legal procedures, and ongoing matters

involving foreign government entities.” First Sealing Mot. at 1. Two flaws, however, pervade

their request: the scope of information Plaintiffs have redacted far exceeds the narrow request

1 they claim to advance, and the harms they invoke — threats from Defendants themselves — are

harms that sealing cannot prevent. The Court will therefore deny the Motion without prejudice.

I. Legal Standard

Generally, a plaintiff or petitioner filing a civil action must identify the parties and file on

the public docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR 5.1(c)(1). “The starting point in considering

a motion to seal court records is a strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial

proceedings.” Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting

EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). When a party seeks

to overcome this presumption and seal court records, courts engage in the six-factor inquiry

described in Hubbard). Those factors are:

(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings.

Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 (citing Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317–22).

II. Analysis

Before turning to the Hubbard factors, the Court pauses on the unusual nature of

Plaintiffs’ request. The customary approach to protecting sensitive information in a complaint is

for the plaintiff to file a single operative complaint on the public docket with targeted redactions,

while submitting an unredacted version of that same complaint under seal for the Court’s review.

See, e.g., CCC of DC Ltd. Co. v. Fed. of Kings Point Ass’ns, 2025 WL 2719280, at *1 (D.D.C.

Sept. 24, 2025) (allowing partial seal “to redact portions of the ‘Introduction,’ ‘Factual

Background,’ and ‘Causes of Action’”). At first glance, Plaintiffs seem to follow the right path

2 by identifying five categories of information that warrant protection: the identity and location of

Kelly Shofner’s mother, the identities of witnesses and associates in China, the contents of

certain recorded conversations, Plaintiffs’ residential address, and specific numerical details of

financial transactions. See Second Sealing Mot. at 8.

What Plaintiffs have actually done, however, is markedly different. They have filed on

the public docket a skeletal eight-page pleading that is bereft of substantive allegations and

instead points the reader to a separate document that exceeds 300 pages and was submitted under

seal. See Compl. at 4 (“Plaintiffs assert TVPA jurisdiction based on allegations contained in the

sealed, unredacted Complaint submitted to the Court.”); id. at 6 (“[ATS] allegations appear only

in the unredacted Complaint filed with the Court.”). Although Plaintiffs disclaim any intention

“to seal the entire case,” First Sealing Mot. at 2, the practical effect of what they propose is

indistinguishable from wholesale sealing of the operative Complaint.

A second difficulty also attends the Motion. The harms Plaintiffs invoke to justify

sealing are, by their own account, harms threatened by Defendants and affiliated actors in

Shenyang. See Second Sealing Mot. at 1 (sealing required because “those responsible for the

conduct alleged . . . monitor these proceedings and respond to developments with coercive

action”). But Defendants are the parties Plaintiffs have chosen to sue, and they will necessarily

learn of the allegations against them as this litigation proceeds. A theory of sealing premised on

shielding the contents of a pleading from the very parties entitled to answer it asks for a form of

protection that sealing cannot provide. These errors inform the Hubbard analysis that follows.

The first factor — “the need for public access to the documents at issue,” Nat’l

Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 — weighs strongly against sealing. The documents Plaintiffs

seek to keep from public view are not discrete exhibits, a narrow set of paragraphs containing

3 sensitive information, or peripheral filings. See FTC v. Seven & I Holdings, 2023 WL

11730304, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2023) (allowing “targeted” redactions aimed at confidential

business information). They instead constitute the operative pleading — the very document that

invokes this Court’s jurisdiction and defines the contours of the anticipated litigation. See

United States ex rel. Durham v. Prospect Waterproofing, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 (D.D.C.

2011) (“When [plaintiff] filed his Complaint, his purpose was for his allegations to be the basis

of a potential trial,” and “there is a strong presumption for public access weighing in favor of

unsealing the Complaint.”). Plaintiffs’ proposed substitute does not cure the problem. The

eight-page shell on the public docket deprives the public of precisely what the presumption of

access is meant to secure: the ability to understand the cause of action, the theory of liability, and

the basis on which a court will eventually adjudicate the dispute.

The second factor — “the extent of previous public access to the documents,” Nat’l

Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 — carries little weight on the present record. A court assessing

this factor “consider[s] the public’s previous access to the sealed information, not its previous

access to the information available in the overall lawsuit.” CNN v. FBI, 984 F.3d 114, 119 (D.C.

Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs represent that a narrow set of information has not been publicly disclosed:

the identity and medical condition of Kelly Shofner’s mother, witness identities, recorded

conversations, Plaintiffs’ residential address, and certain bank-transaction details. See Second

Sealing Mot. at 2–3. To the extent those representations are accurate, this factor provides some

support for protecting those items. But Plaintiffs’ representations on this point describe a narrow

set of information they say warrants protection, not the scope of what they have actually

withheld from the public docket. The redactions Plaintiffs have in fact imposed sweep far

4 beyond those categories to encompass the operative Complaint in its near entirety. This factor

therefore does not support the sealing Plaintiffs request.

Plaintiffs gain some traction on the third factor. “[T]he fact that a party moves to seal the

record weighs in favor of the party’s motion.” Zapp v. Zhenli Ye Gon, 746 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149

(D.D.C. 2010). The Shofners have so moved, and, as is common at this stage, no objection to

the Motion has been lodged. See Second Sealing Mot. at 3.

The fourth factor — “the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted,” Nat’l

Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 — requires careful treatment. Some of the Shofners’ asserted

interests have independent footing. Residential addresses pertaining to Plaintiffs and their minor

child implicates ordinary privacy protections, and specific bank-transaction details implicate

financial-privacy norms that this Court routinely credits. See Second Sealing Mot. at 3–5; Fed.

R. Civ. P. 5.2(a). Those interests could support targeted redaction of the relevant items within a

publicly filed complaint. But, once more, targeted redactions are not what Plaintiffs have

proposed in their sealed Complaint.

Even setting aside the discrepancy in scope, a majority of Plaintiffs’ asserted interests —

the identity and location of Kelly Shofner’s mother, witness identities, and recorded

conversations — rest on a risk of retaliation primarily carried out by Defendants. See Second

Sealing Mot. at 1. The Court does not discount the seriousness of those representations,

particularly given the fact that Kelly Shofner’s father was allegedly detained after this suit was

filed. Id. But as noted above, sealing the Complaint from the public docket cannot shield

Plaintiffs from Defendants, who will learn of the allegations lodged against them as this

litigation proceeds. This factor may support some measure of protection for discrete items of

particularized information, but it does not support the wide-scale sealing Plaintiffs request.

5 The fifth factor — “the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure,” Nat’l

Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 — looks to “whether disclosure of the documents will lead to

prejudice in future litigation to the party seeking the seal.” United States v. All Assets Held at

Bank Julius Baer & Co., 520 F. Supp. 3d 71, 85 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Durham, 818 F. Supp. at

68). The Shofners advance several theories of prejudice, but none moves the needle. For

instance, Plaintiffs invoke the risk that Kelly Shofner’s mother, as well as Plaintiffs and their

minor child, could face personal harm. See Second Sealing Mot. at 4–5. As grave as those

harms may be, they do not constitute legal prejudice within the meaning of this factor. See

generally Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 539 F. Supp. 3d 44, 57 (D.D.C. 2021).

Plaintiffs’ other theories of prejudice carry slightly more credibility. They contend that

disclosure would enable Defendants and others to intimidate witnesses, destroy evidence, and

“coordinate testimony.” Second Sealing Mot. at 6. Witness intimidation and the destruction of

evidence, if they occurred, would indeed constitute cognizable legal prejudice. The preparation

of testimony, by contrast, describes the ordinary operation of adversarial litigation. Even

crediting the first two theories, they cannot support sealing for the same reason explained above:

the witnesses Plaintiffs fear will be intimidated and the evidence they fear will be destroyed are

subjects Defendants will learn of during this litigation regardless of whether the Complaint is

sealed from the public.

The sixth and final factor — “the purposes for which the documents were introduced

during the judicial proceedings,” Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 — weighs strongly

against sealing. Disclosure is the norm where “the parties explicitly intended the Court to rely

on [the sealed] materials in adjudicating their dispute.” Vanda Pharms., 539 F. Supp. 3d at 57

(citation omitted). Plaintiffs “voluntarily commenced a public proceeding . . . and invoked the

6 jurisdiction of this Court to do so.” Upshaw v. United States, 754 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 (D.D.C.

2010). As they explain, the information they seek to seal was “introduced for the purpose of

establishing the factual basis for Plaintiffs’ legal claims.” Second Sealing Mot. at 7. The

redacted information, therefore, is not merely relevant to the central claims in this litigation; it

comprises the substance of those claims. Cf. United States ex rel. Grover v. Related Cos., 4 F.

Supp. 3d 21, 28 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The more relevant a pleading is to the central claims of the

litigation, the stronger the presumption of unsealing the pleading becomes.”).

In sum, only the third factor clearly cuts in Plaintiffs’ favor. That outcome follows

largely from the two problems identified at the outset: Plaintiffs’ redactions sweep far beyond the

narrow categories they say warrant protection, and sealing cannot shield Plaintiffs from

Defendants themselves, who will learn of the allegations as this litigation proceeds. The Motion

will therefore be denied.

The Court’s denial does not foreclose a further, properly structured submission. Should

Plaintiffs’ wish to proceed, any renewed motion should be accompanied by (1) a single operative

Complaint filed on the public docket, containing targeted redactions limited to particularized

categories of sensitive information, and (2) an unredacted version of that same Complaint filed

under seal for the Court’s review.

The Court accordingly ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiffs’ [5] Motion for Leave to File Under Seal is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE;

2. Within fourteen days of the Court’s Order, Plaintiffs shall either file a new

Motion and Complaint or a Notice advising the Clerk of the Court that they wish

7 to proceed with filing the [1] Complaint, [2] Motion, and [5] Motion on the public

docket; and

3. If Plaintiffs do not do so within fourteen days, the Clerk is directed to terminate

the case.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: April 24, 2026