Shiva Stein v. Lloyd C. Blankfein

Court of Chancery of Delaware·Decided February 27, 2024·No. C.A. No. 2017-0354-SG·Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHIVA STEIN, derivatively on behalf ) of THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, ) INC., and ) individually as a Stockholder of THE ) GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) C.A. No. 2017-0354-SG )

LLOYD C. BLANKFEIN, M. ) MICHELE BURNS, GARY D. COHN, ) MARK A. FLAHERTY, WILLIAM W. ) GEORGE, JAMES A. JOHNSON, ) ELLEN J. KULLMAN, LAKSHMI N. ) MITTAL, ADEBAYO O. OGUNLESI, ) PETER OPPENHEIMER, DEBORA L. ) SPAR, MARK E. TUCKER, DAVID A. ) VINIAR, MARK O. WINKELMAN and ) THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, ) INC., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: November 9, 2023 Date Decided: February 27, 2024

Brian E. Farnan, Michael J. Farnan, Rosemary J. Piergiovanni, FARNAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: A. Arnold Gershon and Michael A. Toomey, of BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE, New York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Kevin M. Gallagher, Robert L. Burns, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A. Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

Kevin G. Abrams, Peter Shindel Jr., Matthew L. Miller, ABRAMS & BAYLISS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., David M.J. Rein, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, New York, Attorneys for Director-Defendants.

Anthony A. Rickey, MARGRAVE LAW LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Objector.

GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor

As ratoons spring from cut-down canes, so this case comes back before me on a third proposed settlement.1 Judicial consideration of the settlement is required because Plaintiff has proceeded derivatively on behalf of nominal Defendant The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman” or the “Company”). The Complaint, to oversimplify, was based on alleged inappropriate, and inappropriately implemented, compensation awards, by Defendant Directors to themselves and other corporate actors; it was characterized as containing claims direct and derivative. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was fully briefed. Before argument on the Motion, however, the parties agreed to settle the matter, largely to remedy allegedly inadequate disclosures regarding the awards, while releasing the derivative claims for disgorgement. A stockholder (the “Objector”) appeared to oppose the settlement (the “First Settlement”). I found the First Settlement inadequate, and therefore rejected it; I directed the parties to proceed with the Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, I granted the Motion in part, leaving intact the derivative claims for excessive compensation paid to the non-employee directors. Litigation ensued, negotiations were re-engaged, and the parties again reached a settlement (the “Second Settlement”), this time by reducing director compensation and by imposing certain therapeutic benefits in favor of Goldman, including a requirement of a

1 The first proposed settlement was cut down due to inadequate consideration; the second was felled on appeal concerning the scope of the release of claims, as discussed infra.

binding stockholder consideration of Defendants’ compensation through 2024. In return, the parties negotiated a release of claims, including theoretical future claims that might arise from any stockholder-approved incentives through 2024. A hearing was scheduled to consider approval of the Second Settlement. Objector again appeared, and argued, inter alia, that the release of future claims was impermissible. Nonetheless, upon consideration, I found the settlement in the interest of Goldman and its stockholders, and approved it.

Objector appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, on the ground raised by Objector at the hearing, that the release of claims that could arise in the future, as contemplated in the Second Settlement, was improper.

Upon remand, the parties again agreed to settle the matter (the “Amended Settlement”2), by retaining the terms in favor of Goldman, which I had found fair to Goldman and its stockholders, but omitting the release of claims which might, but had not yet, attached; that is, omitting that portion of the release disallowed by the Supreme Court. Objector again opposed the settlement, this time on the grounds of lack of adequate consideration, and offered to intervene as party plaintiff and litigate the matter.

2 I refer to the settlement pending before me as the “Amended Settlement” because it is identical to the Second Settlement, amended to remove the improper provisions of the release.

For the reasons that follow, I find that the law of the case obtains, that the Amended Settlement, retaining as it does the benefits to Goldman of the Second Settlement which I had found fair, while deleting the release that the Supreme Court found to be improper, is fair to Goldman and its stockholders. Accordingly, the Amended Settlement is approved.

I. BACKGROUND3

A. Factual Background Plaintiff brought claims both individually as a stockholder of the Company and derivatively on behalf of the Company. The following allegations were pled in the Complaint:

1. Count I: A derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Director Defendants based on excessive compensation awards to non-employee directors;

2. Count II: A direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Director Defendants based on failure to disclose material information to stockholders when Director Defendants approved the Company’s 2013 and 2015 Stock Incentive Plans (“SIP”); in

3 This memorandum opinion only contains facts that are necessary for my analysis. For an indepth review of the background facts, interested readers are directed to my May 31, 2019 memorandum opinion. Also, refer to that opinion for a detailed list of parties in this action. See Stein v. Blankfein, 2019 WL 2323790 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019).

particular, information required by certain Treasury and SEC regulations;

3. Count III: A derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Director Defendants based on issuing stock-based awards under the 2013 and 2015 SIPs, which are void because they were approved by uninformed shareholder votes; and 4. Count IV: A direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Director Defendants based on inadequate disclosure of material information in the Company’s 2015, 2016, and 2017 proxy statements concerning the tax deductibility of cash-based incentive awards to named executive officers made from 2011 to 2016.4 B. The First Proposed Settlement Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on July 28, 2017 (the “Motion to Dismiss”).5 On March 20, 2018, before oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, the parties agreed to settle the matter and submitted it for the Court’s approval (the “First Settlement”).6 The First Settlement required The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. to provide Goldman stockholders with disclosures that were omitted from the 2013 and

4 Verified S’holder Compl. ¶¶ 51–71, Dkt. No. 1. 5 Director-Def. Mot. to Dismiss Compl., Dkt. No. 6; Nominal Def. Goldman Sachs Group Mot. to Dismiss and Joinder to Director-Def. Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Compl., Dkt. No. 8. 6 Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement, and Release, Dkt. No. 27.

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