WALSH, Justice for the majority:
This is an appeal from a Superior Court judgment in a libel action following a jury verdict assessing damages. The plaintiff-appellee, Margo Kanaga, M.D. (“Dr. Kana-ga”) claimed to have been libeled by a newspaper account of her treatment of a former patient, Pamela Kane (“Kane”). [1178]*1178The article in question was written by Jane Harriman (“Harriman”) and published in a daily newspaper distributed by Harriman’s employer, Gannett Co., Inc. t/a The News Journal Company (“Gannett”). Gannett and Harriman (collectively the “media defendants”) defended the article as a substantially accurate report of a complaint to the New Castle County Medical Society and, thus, constitutionally protected.
The jury determined, through answers to specific interrogatories, that the article was factually false and defamatory. The jury also determined that the article caused actual damage to Dr. Kanaga, awarding her $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. The jury made separate compensatory and punitive damage awards against Kane. The awards against Kane, however, have not been appealed.
In this appeal, the media defendants contend that the article in dispute was constitutionally protected fair comment and, as a matter of law, not defamation. They also challenge the award of actual damages on the ground that it was based on speculation and inadmissible expert testimony. Dr. Kanaga cross-appeals from the Superior Court’s exclusion of evidence of Gannett’s wealth in relation to the proof of punitive damages.
We conclude that the jury’s determination of liability is sustainable factually and is consistent with the law of the case. We further conclude, however, that the jury’s verdict fixing actual damages was based upon expert testimony, to which timely objection was made, that lacked an admissible foundation. Accordingly, we reverse the damages award. With respect to the cross-appeal, we hold that under the modern view on punitive damages, the wealth of the defendant is an admissible factor and reverse the Superior Court’s holding to the contrary. In sum, we affirm the determination of liability but reverse the award of both actual and punitive damages and remand for a new trial limited to damages.
I
The factual basis for this litigation is set forth at length in a previous decision of this Court that reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See Kanaga v. Gannett Co. Inc., Del.Supr., 687 A.2d 173 (1996) (“Kanaga I”). We briefly summarize those facts as they unfolded at trial.
Kane consulted Dr. Kanaga on April 2, 1992, after complaining of a heavy menstrual flow. During a physical examination, Dr. Kanaga observed a fibroid tumor “sitting in- her cervix.” Dr. Kanaga told Kane about the tumor and that its position would prevent her from doing a myomecto-my (removal by surgical forceps). Dr. Ka-naga recommended a hysterectomy for treatment of the tumor and also recommended that Kane have her ovaries and tubes removed because of a risk of ovarian cancer. Dr. Kanaga testified that she discussed with Kane her opinion that a myo-mectomy would be a risky procedure and not the safest or best method for treatment considering Kane’s age and the position of the tumor. Dr. Kanaga, however, advised Kane to obtain a second opinion. On April 10, 1992, Dr. Kanaga’s office received a request by Kane for a copy of her medical records in order to obtain a second opinion.
On April 19, 1992, Kane experienced heavy bleeding and consulted Ronaldo Domingo, M.D. (“Dr. Domingo”) at the emergency room at St. Francis Hospital. Apparently, the tumor had changed position, because, upon examination, Dr. Domingo observed the tumor “coming two-thirds out of the canal.” Dr. Domingo attempted to determine whether the fibroid could be easily removed by grabbing it with forceps and twisting it. After twisting it several times, the fibroid came out. Subsequently, Kane asked Dr. Domingo whether she needed a hysterectomy. Since Kane had told him previously that [1179]*1179another doctor had recommended a hysterectomy, Dr. Domingo was not surprised by this question, but told Kane that she did not need one “because she’s no longer bleeding and the submucous fibroid is out.”
On April 29,1992, Kane called Dr. Kana-ga’s office to discuss scheduling a hysterectomy. Dr. Kanaga returned the call the next morning but was told Kane was unavailable and would call her that afternoon. When Kane called Dr. Kanaga, Kane secretly tape recorded the conversation.1 During this conversation, Kane led Dr. Kanaga to believe that she had received a second opinion concerning the hysterectomy.
Kane, apparently believing that Dr. Ka-naga had recommended an unnecessary surgical procedure for financial gain, contacted Harriman, a reporter for the News Journal who reported on health matters. The two met at Kane’s home, and Harri-man was told Kane’s version of the events, including the playing of the secretly recorded telephone conversation. Approximately one week later, Kane filed a written complaint with the New Castle County Medical Society alleging that Dr. Kanaga had recommended an unnecessary surgical procedure for financial gain. Kane had earlier shared this complaint with Harri-man.
Harriman proceeded to write an article detailing Kane’s experience with Dr. Kana-ga. Before the article was published, there was an apparent difference of opinion at the News Journal whether publication should be deferred pending the Medical Society action on Kane’s complaint. Harriman testified that she recommended that “we wait until after the New Castle County Medical Society makes a decision.” She was overruled, however, by her editorial supervisors.
On July 5,1992, the newspaper article in question was published entitled “Patient feels betrayed — Says proposed hysterectomy wasn’t needed.” The full text is printed in Kanaga /, 687 A.2d at 184-85. The theme of the article is captured in its opening paragraph:
BRANDYWINE HUNDRED — Pamela Kane feels the hysterectomy urged on her by a gynecologist she trusted would have been unnecessary, and she believes her story should be a warning to other women.
The disputed article appeared in full col- or on the front page of the Local Section of the July 5, 1992, Sunday News Journal. It was announced by a “teaser” on page 1 of the newspaper which included a photograph of Kane. Although the article noted that Dr. Kanaga had refused “to respond to a reporter’s telephone calls or a reporter’s letter seeking comments,” it did not fully explain Dr. Kanaga’s refusal, on ethical grounds, to discuss a patient’s care or records in a matter pending before the Medical Society without written authorization of the patient. The article also described Dr. Domingo’s reaction to Dr. Kanaga’s treatment recommendation as “incredulous” even though Harriman had not verified the direct quotes attributed to Dr. Domingo.
The Medical Society ruled on Kane’s complaint against Dr. Kanaga eight weeks after publication of the article. It found no basis for discipline against Dr. Kanaga, ruling, in effect, that a hysterectomy was “one of several appropriate therapies” for Kane’s condition. The News Journal reported the Medical Society’s ruling in an article headlined “Medical Unit Backs Doctor on Treatment.”
The case was submitted to the jury in two phases through special interrogatories. In the first phase, the jury found, as to the media defendants, that: (i) the July 5 article was defamatory; (ii) the gist of [1180]*1180the article was false; (iii) the statements were factual in nature; and (iv) that the article was negligently published. The jury fixed actual damages in the amount of $2.6 million. The second phase of the trial involved the presentation of evidence of punitive damages. As to the media defendants, the jury concluded that Dr. Kanaga had shown by clear and convincing evidence that both defendants had caused the July 5 article to be published with knowledge of its falsity and had acted outrageously. The jury awarded $250,000 in punitive damages against Gannett and $10,000 against Harriman.
II
The media defendants, Gannett and Harriman (hereafter “Gannett”), have asserted claims of error directed to both the liability and damages determination of the jury’s findings against them. As to liability, Gannett contends that, under a journalistic standard of care, it should not be held liable for an article that was essentially true. Moreover, it argues that the disputed article was a fair comment on a matter pending before a public body and, thus, was constitutionally protected.
A.
At the conclusion of Dr. Kanaga’s evidence at trial, Gannett moved for judgment as a matter of law on the question of whether the disputed article was fact or merely opinion. In denying the motion, the Superior Court concluded that the issue of whether the article was fact or opinion posed a jury question. We agree. Taken as a whole, the article conveys the impression that Dr. Kanaga recommended unnecessary surgery for financial gain. The reporting of Kane’s complaint to the Medical Society was prefaced by a headline depicting the patient as feeling betrayed by her physician — an obvious violation of the duty owed by a physician to a patient. The use of the term “incredulously” to describe Dr. Domingo’s view of Kane’s treatment by Dr. Kanaga also lacked a factual basis. In providing a characterization of Dr. Kanaga’s conduct by a fellow physician that questioned Dr. Kanaga’s medical ethics, the article, on its face, impinged upon her professional image.
Apart from the unfavorable depiction of Kane’s treatment by Dr. Kanaga, the jury could conclude that the timing of the publication of the article evidenced journalistic irresponsibility. As the trial judge noted in denying Gannett’s post-trial motion for judgment or a new trial:
Ms. Harriman and her superiors at Gan-nett were aware prior to July 5th that a ruling would be made by the Medical Society in the near future yet they decided to present a highly charged, biased, one-sided version of events. This story did not involve a plane crash or other immediate news event. In addition, the medical records attached to Kane’s complaint and which Ms. Harri-man had prior to presenting the article differed in several key respects from Kane’s complaint. In short, the media defendants had information available from these records to further alert them to the dangers of proceeding full speed ahead through Kane’s torpedoes. One treatise from England, for instance, which Ms. Harriman used was even unknown to the media defendant’s medical expert.
Kanaga v. Gannett Co., Inc., Del.Super., C.A. No. 92C-12-182-JOH, 1998 WL 729585, at *6 (July 10,1998).
Relying upon the Restatement (Second) of Touts, § 580B, cmt. g (1977), Gannett appears to suggest that juries should not be permitted to draw “lay inferences” to determine false or defamatory communications. It is not clear from the record that Gannett presented this argument below, but, in any event, we find it unavailing. Under D.R.E. 702, expert testimony is admissible if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence [1181]*1181or to determine a fact in issue. Whether expert testimony is required to pose a factual issue is a different question. There is some decisional support for the claim that expert testimony is required to prove negligence of a media defendant in a libel action. See e.g. Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., Utah Supr., 626 P.2d 968, 976 (1981). The majority, and better reasoned view, appears to the contrary. See Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 65 Haw. 584, 656 P.2d 79, 83 (1982); Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, 437 N.E.2d 205, 215 (1982); Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 998 (1979).
Gannett has not suggested what specialized knowledge was necessary to assist the jury. Although Harriman had many years of experience as a reporter, she had no special training to become one. The issue of whether the media defendants deviated from a journalistic standard of care was well within the grasp of a jury and no expert testimony was necessary.
Gannett concedes that the trial judge properly instructed the jury that Dr. Ka-naga was required to prove that Gannett had “deviated from that degree of care, caution or attention that a reasonable reporter and newspaper would use under similar circumstances.” In Kanaga I, 687 A.2d at 182, this Court set forth certain factual issues that the record, as now constituted, properly posed for the jury concerning both the content and timing of the article. The evidence presented at trial fully supported the viability of those issues for jury consideration. In rejecting Gan-nett’s explanation that Harriman followed accepted newspaper reporting techniques in investigating the facts and crafting the article, the jury viewed Gannett’s conduct as fully below acceptable standards to the point of irresponsibility.
B.
Gannett, supported by the amici,
The Chancellor’s dissent revisits issues already decided by this Court in Ka-naga I. In that Opinion, these issues were subsumed in the calculus of this Court’s careful and thorough consideration of the libel and First Amendment jurisprudence. We believe those issues were correctly decided in Kanaga I. Accordingly, it serves no useful purpose to reconsider them on this appeal. The law of the case doctrine requires that there must be some closure to matters already decided in a given case by the highest court of a particular jurisdiction, particularly when (with a different composition of jurists) that same court is considering matters in a later phase of the same litigation.
The Chancellor correctly notes that the law of the case doctrine is not inflexible in that, unlike res judicata, it is not an absolute bar to reconsideration of a prior decision that is clearly wrong, produces an injustice or should be revisited because of changed circumstances. See Brittingham v. State, Del.Supr., 705 A.2d 577, 579 (1998); Zirn v. VLI Corp., Del. Supr., 681 A.2d 1050, 1062 n. 7 (1996). The law of the case doctrine, like the stare decisis doctrine, is founded on the principle of stability and respect for court processes and precedent. The stare decisis [1182]*1182discussion of the majority of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), is applicable by analogy to the law of the case principles that should guide us in this case:
[F]requent overruling would overtax the country’s belief in the Court’s good faith.... [Excessive] disturbance of prior rulings would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation.
Exceptions to the law of the case doctrine for clearly erroneous decisions, unjust results or significantly changed circumstances are not applicable here. Cf. Weedon v. State, Del.Supr., 750 A.2d 521 (2000) (recantation of factual basis for hearsay exception may provide basis for different ruling notwithstanding the law of the case doctrine). Our decision in Kana-ga I is sound law and properly takes its place in the solid jurisprudence of this Court. When viewed through the retrospective lens of the trial in this case that followed that decision, it is clear that the defamation issues were properly submitted to the jury and should not have been decided on summary judgment. The verdict here on the issue of liability (as distinct from damages) was supported by ample evidence.
The basic thrust of Gannett’s fair reporting defense is that the disputed article “accurately reported Kane’s allegations” in a matter of public concern pending before a tribunal whose proceedings are “authorized by law.” The amici argue that the First Amendment provides a constitutional privilege to report on charges of misconduct made to official or grosi-official disciplinary bodies and that this case bears similarity to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). In Landmark, the Court reversed the criminal conviction of a newspaper publisher who reported on the pending inquiry of a judicial disciplinary committee into the alleged misconduct of a judge. The Court ruled that the need for confidentiality in commission proceedings did not justify the infringement of First Amendment guarantees through criminal sanctions. The ami-ci contend that the description of a complaint to the Medical Society relating to the competence of a physician is, at least, as much of public concern as the conduct of a judge.
While certain language in Landmark is supportive of the principle of free expression by the media, that holding must be viewed in the context of the underlying criminal prosecution which prompted review. Landmark did not involve a private action for defamation but, rather, a direct state action to punish for truthful and accurate publication of a government proceeding. Accordingly, the Court’s concern that governmental action through criminal sanctions may prove a form of censorship is not implicated here. Further, Dr. Kanaga was not a public official nor had she thrust herself into the public gaze. Her actions that were the subject of media scrutiny occurred entirely within the private treatment of a patient. Any review of that treatment by a regulatory body was, itself, subject to an aura of confidentiality for the benefit of both the physician and the patient. See Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 77 N.Y.2d 1, 563 N.Y.S.2d 380, 564 N.E.2d 1046, 1050-51 (1990). Thus, she was protected from public or private defamation.
As this Court noted in Kanaga I, in reversing the grant of summary judgment on the fair reporting claims, “since the statements published by the News Journal do not constitute the fair and accurate reporting of a judicial proceeding or the governmental acts of executive officials of government, the fair reporting privilege does not protect these statements against [1183]*1183actions for libel.” 687 A.2d at 182. The media defendants were permitted to raise the privilege as a defense, with the reasonableness of the claim left to the jury. See id. Even when the privilege is properly asserted, however, its protection extends to opinion, not express or implied misstatements of fact. Here, the jury specifically found that statements in the article were factual in nature and their substance was false. Even if the privilege of fair reporting is viewed as one of constitutional stature, the article’s falsity takes it out of the realm of such protection.
We conclude that the claim of defamation was correctly submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions by the Superior Court. We further conclude that the jury’s determination of liability is supported by the evidence and, therefore, we affirm. See Medical Center of Del. v. Lougheed, Del.Supr., 661 A.2d 1065, 1061 (1995).
Ill
We next address Gannett’s attack on the award of damages. The media defendants contend that Dr. Kanaga failed to present legally cognizable evidence of reputation injury and that her claim for lost profits was speculative and based on inadmissible evidence.
The parties are in sharp disagreement concerning the standard of review that this Court should apply to Gannett’s damages claims. Gannett contends that in view of the underlying constitutional privilege at issue, any award of damages should be subject to heightened appellate scrutiny. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). (‘While the State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity. Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered.”). Dr. Ka-naga maintains that the jury’s factual determinations are conclusive if supported by the evidence and, to the extent the damages awarded were affected by the admissibility of evidence, the trial court’s eviden-tiary rulings must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Laws v. Webb, Del.Supr., 658 A.2d 1000, 1008 (1995).
We need not decide whether review of the damages award arising out of constitutionally protected activity may implicate more exacting standards than those posed in other tort actions. Nevertheless, to recover in this case, Dr. Kanaga had to demonstrate “actual injury,” absent a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Without defining actual injury, the United States Supreme Court has stated that injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss and would include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering. See id. at 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Gertz has subsequently been held to be applicable when a matter of public concern was involved. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greemnoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985).
To a significant degree, the scrutiny imposed on our review of the damages awarded in this case has been limited by the jury’s factual finding of falsity in the liability phase of the trial. Moreover, the jury’s award of punitive damages was based on a determination that the media defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth of the statements contained in the disputed article. In view of the jury’s factual findings, we will review the Superior Court rulings on evidence directed to the damages claim pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.
[1184]*1184B.
The Superior Court instructed the jury that Dr. Kanaga must prove actual damages. Under that court’s instructions, the jury award for actual damages had two components: (i) humiliation and loss of reputation and (ii) past and future lost income attributable to impairment of professional standing.3 Although Gannett does not dispute the correctness of the court’s instruction, it contends that Dr. Kanaga produced no evidence of reputation injury through testimony of patients or other physicians. Gannett fails, however, to credit Dr. Kanaga’s own testimony that she suffered “daily humiliation and embarrassment.” Dr. Kanaga also testified that while she did not directly hear conversations in “supermarkets, beauty parlors and elsewhere,” she was told about them. We further find the scope of the defamation to be clearly established by its intended circulation to 140,000 readers.
In Spence v. Funk, Del.Supr., 396 A.2d 967, 970 (1978) (citing Prosser Law of Torts § 112 (1971)), this Court held that there is a presumption of damages with respect to statements that “malign one in a trade, business or profession.” Thus, under Delaware law, injury to reputation is permitted without proof of special damages. In Kanaga I, this Court ruled that “[t]o accuse Dr. Kanaga of recommending unnecessary surgery for her own pecuniary gain is to malign her in her business or profession.” 687 A.2d at 181. Spence’s presumption would sustain a separate humiliation award in this case had one been rendered. The jury’s 2.6 million dollar “actual damages” award, however, did not separate humiliation damages from economic damages. On this record, proof of the latter category is problematic.
C.
Four witnesses testified on Dr. Kanaga’s behalf on the issue of compensatory damages. Three of these witnesses were fact witnesses: Dr. Kanaga, Dr. Anna Marie D’Amico (“Dr. D’Amico”), and Dr. Kana-ga’s accountant, Anthony D’Amato (“D’Amato”). John Stapleford, Ph.D., (“Stapleford”), an economist, gave expert testimony concerning damages for past and future lost income.
Dr. Kanaga testified that she opened her solo practice in 1978 and that by 1991 her “new patient” waiting list was “roughly three months.” In 1998, however, her appointment list had “plenty of openings.” As a specialist she relied, in great part, on referrals from other physicians and patients! Dr. Kanaga also testified that following publication of the article, two people filed complaints against her with the [1185]*1185Medical Society, and others called to say, “I’m not coming to you because of the article.” In 1991, the last full year before the defamatory article, her gross income was $769,038 with a net income of $441,-149. In 1993, the first full year after the article, her gross had dropped to $556,151 and her net to $292,028.
Dr. D’Amico, also a Wilmington obstetrician/gynecologist, testified that she had known Dr. Kanaga since early 1970 and considered her a “fine practicing physician.” Dr. D’Amico was shocked and outraged when she read the News Journal article. She further testified that, at present, “women [OB/GYNS] are busier than ever” and that she has not seen a falling off of income in her own practice.
The only other fact witness on damages was D’Amato. D’Amato was proffered as a witness who, together with Dr. Kanaga, “will be providing causation testimony.” During trial, the defendants objected to D’Amato’s proposed testimony on the ground that it would be opinion based. A voir dire was permitted, during which D’Amato was asked, “[h]as Doctor Kanaga told you that the news article she’s suing about caused her income to drop?” D’Am-ato responded, “[y]es. She’s mentioned that and I agree.” He was then asked the basis for that opinion, to which he responded that he had many physician clients and that “her practice is the only one that has seen any severe drop-off of income over the past four or five years.” Also during voir dire, D’Amato, in response to a question whether he was offering comparison opinion, stated that Dr. Kanaga’s income started above the others and “now she’s below.” Thereafter, defense counsel objected to D’Amato’s testimony based on his not being identified as an expert, irrelevancy and hearsay.
The Superior Court ruled that D’Amato would not be permitted to testify that” a decline in Kanaga’s income must be due to the newspaper article, stating that “[i]n connection with comparison to other practices, it depends upon how far that question goes to be honest with you. I think that goes more to weight than to admissibility.” The court further held that D’Am-ato did not have to reveal the names of the other practices he considered. The defendants were provided no underlying documentation for the other practices as they had requested.
D’Amato testified that he prepared the income tax return for Dr. Kanaga and her husband from data supplied by Dr. Kana-ga. The work included the preparation of Schedule Cs.4 The Schedule Cs, which formed the basis for past and future income losses, were offered for identification at the end of D’Amato’s testimony but were not thereafter offered into evidence or specifically referred to by D’Amato. D’Amato gave no testimony regarding specific dollar amounts for Dr. Kanaga’s yearly income but spoke simply in terms of a “trend” in comparison with the income of other unidentified physicians. In overruling an objection to D’Amato’s comparison testimony as hearsay, the trial judge ruled:
First of all, the question does not elicit a hearsay answer. There’s no specific dollar figure. It is a question, a fact whether it goes up or down. That’s not an opinion. Whether something is higher than lower in terms of dollars and something else is not an opinion. That’s a fact. The amount, the difference, is not in evidence, and will not be in evidence, and I wouldn’t allow it to be in evidence, because your hearsay objection might be appropriate. But short of that, I will overrule the objection and I will note that it’s made, (emphasis added).
[1186]*1186Thus, D’Amato was not permitted to testify as to a dollar difference between Dr. Kanaga’s practice and those of other physician clients.
Despite this restriction, however, the earnings difference became a critical factor in the projection of lost income, past and future, when that matter became the subject of expert testimony. Gannett contends that the prejudicial effect of the admission of D’Amato’s comparison evidence, for which he provided neither specific dollar amounts nor causation, was compounded when Stapleford used that evidence and the Schedule Cs that were not offered into evidence, as the premise for his projection of lost profits.
We agree that Stapleford’s expert testimony lacked the required factual basis for projecting Dr. Kanaga’s claimed lost earnings. Stapleford was retained before trial to analyze the gross and net income from Dr. Kanaga’s practice from 1993 to 1997. He noted that she experienced a significant decrease in income in 1992 and 1993 and assumed that the reduction was attributable to the disputed article and to no other cause. Using net income figures provided by Dr. Kanaga’s husband,5 Stapleford prepared a chart comparing Dr. Kanaga’s ■ net income with the “Average OB/GYN” practitioners on a national level. This chart, later introduced into evidence, is attached as an Exhibit to this opinion. Stapleford observed that “Dr. Kanaga’s earnings went up, net and gross, at a rate that was almost double the rate of the average OB/GYN in the country over the time period 1982 through 1991 ... net earnings, 64 percent above and gross earnings, 37 percent above.” Extrapolating from that data, Stapleford calculated the total income loss from 1992 to assumed retirement ages of 60, 62 and 65. Future losses were discounted to present value at the rate of six percent. In making his calculations of past and future earnings losses, Stapleford assumed that the newspaper article was the “cause of the decline” and that the past rate of decline would not dissipate through the remaining years of Dr. Kanaga’s work life. In short, his projections of future wage loss assumed that Dr. Kanaga’s earnings pattern would never recover from the effect of the libel.6
Defendants twice filed motions in limine with respect to Stapleford’s proposed testimony. Both motions were denied. Just prior to his testimony, the defendants renewed their objection to Stapleford’s use of assumptions that were unsupported by the evidence. They also objected on the basis of hearsay to the use of dollar figures that were not in evidence. These objections were asserted post-trial in motions for a new trial and preserved for appeal. The Superior Court consistently ruled that the information upon which Stapleford relied was “the kind of information [upon] which experts in this field do rely” under D.R.E. 703 and permitted the testimony exemplified by the earnings chart.
On appeal, Gannett renews those objections directed to Stapleford’s trial testimony. It argues that the jury’s undifferented damages for income loss attributable to the libel was based on a “before/after” calculation of income premised on unof-fered and unadmitted income data. Dr. Kanaga, while conceding that the Schedule Cs were never actually admitted into evidence, claims they were nevertheless clearly admissible and would have been [1187]*1187admitted if offered. She also asserts that the defendants were not prejudiced by this technical deficiency because they had ample opportunity, both during discovery and at trial, to review, cross-examine and rebut the earnings data relied upon by Staple-ford.
The admissibility of the underlying data relied upon by Stapleford turns on an interpretation of D.R.E. 703. Under that Rule:
[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
To what extent an expert witness may rely on material facts not directly in evidence but assumed is an issue unresolved under D.R.E. 703. Further, there is a split of authority in the interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which is identical to D.R.E 703. A majority of courts facing the issue take the position that while the “inadmissible data” relied upon by the experts in forming their opinion is admissible to explain their reasoning, that information is not admissible as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matters therein. See, e.g., United States v. 0.59 Acres of Land, 9th Cir., 109 F.3d 1493, 1496-97 (1997); State v. Recor, 150 Vt. 40, 549 A.2d 1382, 1388 (1988) (interpreting an identical Vermont Rule of Evidence). Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., D.Del., 576 F.Supp. 107, 158 (1983); but see In re Art Shirt Ltd., Inc., E.D. Pa., 93 B.R. 333, 340 (1988) (permitting testimony of expert to serve as substantive evidence of insolvency notwithstanding underlying report not being admitted into evidence.)
While an expert is afforded latitude under Rule 703 to incorporate into the methodology source material normally relied upon in the expert’s field, the use of specific contested data poses a particular risk of circumvention of hearsay restrictions. As one commentator notes:
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence provide many exceptions to Rule 802’s general prohibition of hearsay, Rule 703 is not such an exception. The danger exists, however, that Rule 703 can be used as a “back door” hearsay exception — a crafty litigant could give hearsay to its expert for the purpose of having the expert refer to it as a basis for the expert’s opinion. The jury may well disregard any instruction that it consider the hearsay only for evaluating the expert’s basis and not as substantive evidence.
David J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 33 Ga. L.Rev. 699, 775 (1998).7
We recognize that Rule 703’s “reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field” language is broad and arguably ambiguous. But, at a minimum, where a timely objection is made on hearsay grounds, the trial judge must determine the admissibility of the underlying data. A reliability analysis under Rule 703 is not a substitute for a hearsay ruling or a balancing exercise under Rule 403.8 See In Re Paoli R.R. Litig., 3d Cir., 35 F.3d 717, 747-750 (1994). Indeed, it is present[1188]*1188ly proposed that a balancing requirement be incorporated into Rule 703 to insure against “back-door” hearsay.9
It is no answer that the disclosure of the contested data during discovery eliminated the risk of surprise at trial. Here, the defendants filed numerous objections to the use of the underlying data and the trial court was not free to admit such data simply by a literal application of Rule 703. Nor was Stapleford’s use of unadmitted earnings data a mere technical deficiency. Dr. Kanaga relied upon two witnesses to provide a pattern of earnings against which to measure the effect of the libel from the time of its publication in 1992 to the end of her life work expectancy. D’Amato’s testimony, proffered originally as causation evidence, consisted essentially of a discussion of Dr. Kanaga’s earning trends in comparison with other unidentified medical practitioners. D’Amato’s mere identification of the Schedule Cs did not render them substantive evidence either for his use or, later, by Stapleford.10 In sum, D’Amato was not permitted to testify as to the specifics of Dr. Kanaga’s earning history and Stapleford disclaimed any direct knowledge of it. The result was that the earnings data came into evidence without the benefit of cross-examination of any fact witness as to its accuracy. The earnings data formed the premise for Sta-pleford’s income loss projections. Moreover, the projection of future loss income was, in itself, highly speculative since it assumed that Dr. Kanaga’s practice would never recover from the effect of the libel so long as she continued to practice her speciality.
Once liability is established, a plaintiff seeking recovery of damages in a tort action must establish causation and consequential damage. While the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of reasonable inferences from established facts, the jury cannot supply any omission by speculation or conjecture. See Henne v. Balick, Del. Supr., 146 A.2d 394, 396 (1958). The nature and extent of future consequences must be established with “reasonable probability” or “there can be no recovery for that item of damages.” Drozdov v. Webster, Del.Supr., 345 A.2d 895, 896 (1975).
Given the magnitude of the jury’s award in this case, it is obvious that it accepted the opinion of the only witness who assigned a dollar amount to Dr. Kanaga’s claim for lost earnings. The record demonstrates that Dr. Kanaga suffered some drop in earnings following the publication of the article, but the jury rendered the compensatory damages in one lump sum, presumably representing damages for humiliation and loss of professional income. We are, thus, unable to segment that portion of the award attributed to Dr. Kanaga’s past and future earnings. Because the evidence directed to that portion of the award failed to establish her actual injury with reasonable probability under required standards for admissibility, the damages award must be reversed.
Due to the fact that our reversal of the damages portion of the jury verdict in this case may occasion a retrial as to that portion of the damages award assessed against Gannett, we offer the following additional observations. D.R.E. 705 pro[1189]*1189vides a procedural framework for identifying and dealing with disputes over an expert’s use of inadmissible factual information.11 Under D.R.E. 705, if there is an objection to the proposed opinion testimony of an expert witness, the expert must disclose the facts and data upon which he or she relies. If the offering party, with the court’s approval, agrees to introduce the necessary data later but fails to do so, the objector may move to strike the expert’s opinion just as it would have moved to strike the answer to a hypothetical question if the assumed facts were never introduced. Although a voir dire of Stapleford occurred here, the trial court admitted the underlying data without focusing on its hearsay nature and, thus, there was no legal basis for a motion to strike at the conclusion of the expert’s testimony.
We recognize that the trial judge was acting against the background of what had occurred during discovery in the course of which he made several rulings. The trial judge apparently believed that it was sufficient that the defendants could have cross-examined Stapleford regarding the accuracy of the earnings data during deposition and at trial. But discovery practices are not a substitute for the proper admission of evidence at trial where the rules of evidence apply with greater force. The participation of a jury requires rigorous adherence to standards designed to prevent the receipt of inadmissible evidence.
Finally, we note that expert testimony improperly admitted is not cured through jury instructions that authorize the disregarding of expert opinions if the jury rejects the factual basis. Inadmissible facts that form the basis for an expert’s opinion are not simply elements of proof subject to the jury’s “weighing” option.
IV
The reversal of the compensatory damages award requires that we consider Dr. Kanaga’s cross-appeal from the Superior Court’s refusal to permit evidence of Gannett’s financial condition in connection with the punitive damages award. There must be a retrial on punitive damages, in any event, however, because of- the requirement of proportionality between compensatory damages accompanied by an award of punitive damages. See Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, Del.Supr., 523 A.2d 518, 528 n. 6 (1987).
[25] In a pretrial ruling, the Superior Court held that Gannett did not have to produce evidence of its financial condition, because the financial condition of a defendant was irrelevant to an award of punitive damages in actions for defamation. The court relied upon two Superior Court decisions which, while “old,” were considered deserving of adherence in the absence of a definitive ruling by this Court. See Naylor v. Ponder, Del.Super., 41 A. 88, 89 (1895) (the jury “may take into consideration the position, rank, and influence of the defendant in the community. But ... not ... his pecuniary condition.”); Mac-Donough v. A.S. Beck Shoe Corp., Del.Super., 15 A.2d 436, 438 (1940) (following the holding in Naylor but noting that the great weight of authority is in support of [1190]*1190the rule “that the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant in an action for defamation are admissible... ”).
In the context of a medical malpractice action, this Court has held that “[e]vidence of the defendant’s wealth is admissible to enable the jury to assess a penalty which will appropriately punish and deter.” Strauss v. Biggs, Del.Supr., 525 A.2d 992, 1000 (1987). Further in Jardel v. Hughes, we noted that “the defendant’s financial well being” is one of the factors to be considered by the jury in assessing punitive damages. 523 A.2d at 528 n. 6. The “vast majority of courts which have considered the issue of whether the trier of fact may ... consider the wealth of the defendant in fashioning a punitive award have determined that the defendant’s wealth is an appropriate consideration because the degree of punishment or deterrence is to some extent proportionate to the means of the wrongdoer.” Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defendant’s Wealth as Factor in Determining Propriety of Award, 87 A.L.R.4th 141, 151 (1991).
In our view, there is no logical basis for distinguishing between punitive damages in defamation cases and other tort causes of action. The relevancy of a defendant’s wealth is the same. Any concern that the imposition of punitive damages may be excessively applied against a wealthy defendant is alleviated by the trial court’s duty to insure that such damages have the required factual showing of recklessness and that any award of punitive damages be proportionate to the award of compensatory damages. See Jardel, 523 A.2d at 528-31.
V
Upon a complete review of the record, we conclude that the jury’s determination of liability for defamation is fully supported by the evidence and the law of the case. Accordingly, the liability portion of the judgment is AFFIRMED. The award of actual damages, however, is not supported by admissible evidence and must be REVERSED. The punitive damages award is also REVERSED because of the exclusion of evidence regarding the defendants’ wealth. The matter is REMANDED for a new trial limited to compensatory and punitive damages as to the media defendants.
EXHIBIT
NET INCOME
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NET LOST PAST NET INCOME $688,070
[1191]*1191EXHIBIT
Dr. Kanaga Year Actual Kanaga As Average a % of the Estimated OB/GYN * Difference Average Estimated Discounted Loss To PV
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice, Center for Health Policy Research, selected years