Shirley Ann Monk v. State

Mississippi Supreme Court

Shirley Ann Monk v. State

116 So. 2d 810, 238 Miss. 658, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 452

CourtMississippi Supreme Court

DecidedJanuary 11, 1960

Docket41319

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 116 So. 2d 810 (Shirley Ann Monk v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Shirley Ann Monk v. State, 116 So. 2d 810, 238 Miss. 658, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Mich. 1960).

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Opinions

Roberds, P. J.

The Chancery Court of Scott County, Mississippi, by judgment dated April 7, 1959, ordered that Shirley Ann Monk, a minor female, not quite sixteen years of age, be committed to the custody of the Mississippi Industrial Training School until she should become twenty-one years of age, or be previously paroled. Prom that order the infant and her parents prosecute this appeal. They raise a number of questions on the appeal but we deem it necessary to decide only two of them.

They first say the court had no jurisdiction of the minor. They draw that conclusion from these circumstances: No personal notice of this hearing was had upon the parents or the minor. They did appear in court, but nowhere in the record is it shown that the appearance of the minor was voluntary. Section 7185-06, Miss. Code of 1942, Annotated, requires that, in the absence of personal service of process, the appearance of the minor and the parents shall be voluntary. It is recited in the committal order that the court had jurisdiction of the parties, but in this proceeding that is a conclusion [660]*660and the facts showing jurisdiction of the minor should be affirmatively stated. The Youth Court is a court of statutory and limited jurisdiction and the facts vesting jurisdiction should be shown affirmatively. Bryant, et al v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928). While such a proceeding is not criminal, it is quasi-criminal. Bryant, et al. v. Brown, supra. Grave and permanent derogatory and condemning charges are made and adjudicated and placed of public record against this young lady. It is important that compliance with the law be had to bring her into court under such charges. Immaturity and susceptibility of minors to command, or desire of officials and parents and other adults, impress upon courts a special caution to see that their personal rights are guarded and protested. This may explain, to some extent, the reason the Legislature provided that, if no personal service of process was had, the appearance of the minor in court at such a hearing should be voluntary. It might be added that, as a precaution, personal service can usually be had with little trouble. Usually an officer apprehends the delinquent anyway. By our holding herein we do not mean to decide that a minor can confer jurisdiction by appearance and consent. That question is not before us. We are passing on the issue presented and are assuming, without deciding, that this may be done.

The second contention which we decide is that the chancellor had no authority to confine the minor in the Industrial Training School until she becomes twenty-one years of age; that the limit of time vested in the court by the statute is the twentieth birthday of the infant. The contention is well taken, Section 7185-09 so limits the confinement.

Reversed and remanded.

McGehee, G. J., and Hall, Lee, Kyle, Holmes and Gillespie, JJ., concur.

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Roberds, P. J.

The Chancery Court of Scott County, Mississippi, by judgment dated April 7, 1959, ordered that Shirley Ann Monk, a minor female, not quite sixteen years of age, be committed to the custody of the Mississippi Industrial Training School until she should become twenty-one years of age, or be previously paroled. Prom that order the infant and her parents prosecute this appeal. They raise a number of questions on the appeal but we deem it necessary to decide only two of them.

They first say the court had no jurisdiction of the minor. They draw that conclusion from these circumstances: No personal notice of this hearing was had upon the parents or the minor. They did appear in court, but nowhere in the record is it shown that the appearance of the minor was voluntary. Section 7185-06, Miss. Code of 1942, Annotated, requires that, in the absence of personal service of process, the appearance of the minor and the parents shall be voluntary. It is recited in the committal order that the court had jurisdiction of the parties, but in this proceeding that is a conclusion [660]*660and the facts showing jurisdiction of the minor should be affirmatively stated. The Youth Court is a court of statutory and limited jurisdiction and the facts vesting jurisdiction should be shown affirmatively. Bryant, et al v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928). While such a proceeding is not criminal, it is quasi-criminal. Bryant, et al. v. Brown, supra. Grave and permanent derogatory and condemning charges are made and adjudicated and placed of public record against this young lady. It is important that compliance with the law be had to bring her into court under such charges. Immaturity and susceptibility of minors to command, or desire of officials and parents and other adults, impress upon courts a special caution to see that their personal rights are guarded and protested. This may explain, to some extent, the reason the Legislature provided that, if no personal service of process was had, the appearance of the minor in court at such a hearing should be voluntary. It might be added that, as a precaution, personal service can usually be had with little trouble. Usually an officer apprehends the delinquent anyway. By our holding herein we do not mean to decide that a minor can confer jurisdiction by appearance and consent. That question is not before us. We are passing on the issue presented and are assuming, without deciding, that this may be done.

The second contention which we decide is that the chancellor had no authority to confine the minor in the Industrial Training School until she becomes twenty-one years of age; that the limit of time vested in the court by the statute is the twentieth birthday of the infant. The contention is well taken, Section 7185-09 so limits the confinement.

Reversed and remanded.

McGehee, G. J., and Hall, Lee, Kyle, Holmes and Gillespie, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

116 So. 2d 810, 238 Miss. 658, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shirley-ann-monk-v-state-miss-1960.

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