Shipman v. District of Columbia

18 Ct. Cl. 291, 1883 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 67, 1800 WL 1264
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 2, 1883
DocketNo. 122
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 18 Ct. Cl. 291 (Shipman v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shipman v. District of Columbia, 18 Ct. Cl. 291, 1883 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 67, 1800 WL 1264 (cc 1883).

Opinion

OPINION.

Davis, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

It is but simple justice to the counsel on both sides to say at the outset that the court has derived the greatest assistance from their able and full discussion of the complicated issues-involved in this case, both in their briefs and in their oral arguments.

The items in the claimant’s bill of particulars depend, in some-measure, upon the force to be given to a contract known as-contract No. 561.

In the autumn of 1871 the claimant offered to put the Canal road between Aqueduct and Chain Bridge in order. Apparently his terms were not acceptable, for no -notice was taken of them.

A year later the Board ordered that a contract should be awarded him for this work, and directed that he be notified of its action.

An attempt was made to connect this act with the claimant’s-acts of the previous year; but the findings show no such connection, and in our opinion there was none.

[327]*327The secretary of the Board at once wrote to the claimant, but instead of notifying him of the real doings of the Board, he notified him that a contract had been awarded him “ at Board rates,” which had not been: alluded 'to by the Board in their action.

~~ The claimant before commencing work saw the defendant’s officers in relation to the work and the contract, but what took place can only be inferred from subsequent acts of both parties.

The claimant did work to the-amount of a few thousand dollars in the autumn of 1872, for which he was paid in part. In the spring of 1873 he resumed work and continued at it until the autumn, when a final measurement was had of the work done to that time. For all this work he was paid at Board rates with two exceptions. 1st. He was paid for stone masonry at $5 per cubic yard, while the Board rate was $6.50 per perch. 2d. He was paid nothing for haul. So far as we can gather from the findings, his bills were rendered at the rates at which they were paid, and the payments were received without any intimation that the amounts allowed were too small.'

During the progress of the work the claimant had put macadam on the road by direction of one of the Board of Public Works. This was formally recognized as a part of his contract in November, 1873, and in December, 1873, the contract, No. 561, under which all the work was supposed to have been done, was formally executed.

The findings show that both parties intended to embody in this formal instrument, and supposed-they had embodied in it, all the agreements under which the one had been doing work and the other had been paying money. The instrument was antedated for the purpose, as the findings further show, of making it operative during the whole period of the work.

The claimant now, however, makes two objections to this instrument:

In the first place it was signed on behalf of the Board of Public Works by Henry D. Cooke, Alexander R. Shepherd, and James A. Magruder. Cooke was a member of the Board in October, 1872, when the contract with the claimant was actually. made, but he had ceased to bé a member in December, 1873, when the formal evidence of it was actually signed. Shepherd and Magruder were members throughout. The total num[328]*328ber of the Board was five. The claimant maintains that the instrument, not having been signed by a majority of the Board, is invalid.

It is unnecessary for us to decide whether he is correct in this contention, for the findings show that the claimant signed that paper for the purpose of showing what his own understanding of the contract was. If, notwithstanding the written instrument, the contract still rested in parol, the court could have no stronger evidence to show what the claimant intended it to be. If, on the other hand, the -written contract is valid, the practical result on the issues in this suit is the same.

In the second place, the claimant maintains that he engaged to do the work at Board rates; that when the written contract varied from Board rates by excluding haul, and paying masonry at only $5 a cubic yard, it was a variation made without his knowledge, and against the intent of both parties, and that these provisions of the contract having been inserted by mistake, the court should reform the contract by restoring Board rates as th§ measure of compensation.

This theory rests for its support upon — 1st. The letter of the secretary informing the claimant that a contract had been awarded him at Board rates; 2d. The testimony of the claimant that he supposed the rates stated in the written instrument were Board rates.

We have already seen that the letter of the secretary was not justified or authorized by the action of the Board. The claimant’s contention therefore rests mainly upon his own unsupported testimony. On the other hand, it is contradicted by his own consistent conduct, from October, 1872, when he began work under the original contract, to January, 1876, when he finished under the last extension of the contract. During all this time he rendered accounts and received pay for masonry at $5, and for grading without claiming haul. We cannot shut our eyes to these practical acts of construction. We think that before he began work he must have known that the secretary had made a mistake. We are also of opinion that when he signed the contract, in December, 1873, he knew what its purport was, and that it expresses the agreement as he understood it.

Having disposed of this general question, we will take up ■the items of the claim and counter-claim in detail.

[329]*329Tbe claimant’s bill of. particulars consists of fourteen items, thirteen of which are in the original petition and one in the amended petition.

Four of these were abandoned at the trial, namely:

•Stone excavation, 1,661.53 cubic yards of haul, as above, at 20.621 cents per cubic yard. $342 CO
114 cubic yards of masonry, at $5 per cubic yard. (See Exhibits No. 7,8, and 9).. 570 00
^Repairing road at above point. 41 00
120 cubic yards of cobble-stone used by overseer of ropairs, at 75 cents per cubic yard. 90 00

The item “Balance due on Conduit road, $325.67,” was amended at the trial so as to make it a claim for a receiving basin, $71.25. We do not find this claim to be sustained. •(Finding XXX.) '

There was also a claim made in the original petition for $33,679.54 for difference between the face value of certificates ■and the cash price for the work. In view of previous decisions, this claim was not pressed, and it is unsupported by proof. (Finding XXXVII.)

There was also a claim set up in the original petition for $1,328.47 for difference between the amount audited to the •claimant and the amount paid to him. We have disposed of .this by finding XVÍII, which states in substance that it is not sustained by proof.

We will take up the remaining items in classified chronological order, and consider them when pertinent to do so in connection with the counter-claims.

The following items stand by themselves and have no relation to the counter-claims:

33,232 cubic yards of haul 1,650 feet over 200 feet, at .011 cents per hundred feet, =.20.621 cents per cubic yard. |6,854 10

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Related

Barnes v. District of Columbia
22 Ct. Cl. 366 (Court of Claims, 1887)
Mellen v. Ford
28 F. 639 (U.S. Circuit Court, 1886)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Ct. Cl. 291, 1883 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 67, 1800 WL 1264, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shipman-v-district-of-columbia-cc-1883.