Shin v. Umeken USA Inc

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-2848
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIN SOOK SHIN, Individually and On No. 24-2848 Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, D.C. No. 8:17-cv-00315-CJC-SS Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v.

UMEKEN USA INC; BRIAN HAN; DOES, 1 through 10,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Cormac J. Carney, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 3, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, CALLAHAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Min Sook Shin (“Shin”) appeals the district court’s

denial of her motion to reopen her case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 60(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Shin filed this putative class action in February 2017, alleging various state

and federal claims against Defendant-Appellee Umeken USA for false advertising.

After twice dismissing Shin’s complaint with leave to amend, the district court

dismissed her suit with prejudice on October 26, 2017. In June 2019, we affirmed

the dismissal in a memorandum disposition. See Min Sook Shin v. Umeken USA,

Inc., 773 F. App’x 373 (9th Cir. 2019).

In February 2024, Shin filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, seeking to reopen her

case to seek attorney’s fees under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5. Shin contended

that she is entitled to her attorney’s fees as a “successful party” because she

discovered in September 2023 that Umeken had removed the alleged statements at

issue in her original complaint from its website. Shin argued that her lawsuit—

dismissed three times several years ago—was the “catalyst” for Umeken’s removal

of the allegedly false statements from its website. See Dep’t of Water Res. Env’t

Impact Cases, 79 Cal. App. 5th 556, 571-72 (2022).

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in treating Shin’s Rule

60(b)(6) motion as untimely. Shin asserted that she discovered the website

changes in September 2023 but provided no explanation of why she delayed filing

the motion for seven months thereafter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (“A motion

under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.”).

2 24-2848 2. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by finding that Shin

failed to show the “extraordinary circumstances” required for relief under Rule

60(b)(6). That “Rule is used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest

injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a

party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.”

Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations

and quotations omitted). Shin does not seek to correct the district court’s

judgment; rather, she seeks only attorney’s fees. See Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d

1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[P]urported deficiencies in the amount of and

procedures for attorneys fee awards clearly do not constitute a circumstance of

hardship that cries out for the unusual remedy of the reopening of a final judgment

under Rule 60(b)(6).”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the premise of Shin’s claim

to these fees—that her thrice-dismissed suit was the basis for Umeken’s actions

seven years later—is, as the district court concluded, “unreasonable.” See Dep’t of

Water Res. Env’t Impact Cases, 79 Cal. App. 5th at 572 (2022) (explaining that

“when a plaintiff seeks fees under a catalyst theory, courts generally must . . .

decide whether the lawsuit was a material factor or contributed in a significant way

to those results”).

Affirmed.

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