Sherwin-Williams Co. v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund

969 F. Supp. 465, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344, 1997 WL 370870
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 31, 1997
DocketNo. 1:94 CV 0493
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 969 F. Supp. 465 (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 969 F. Supp. 465, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344, 1997 WL 370870 (N.D. Ohio 1997).

Opinion

[467]*467MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

NUGENT, District Judge. •

This matter comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge of this Court submitted on February 29, 1996 (Document #45). The Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and the decision of the Arbitrator is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff, Sherwin-Williams Company (“Sherwin-Williams”), filed this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2), seeking to vacate that portion of an arbitration award favorable to defendant, New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund (“Teamsters Fund”) and to enforce another portion favorable to Plaintiff. In his ruling, the Arbitrator found that a principal purpose of Plaintiff’s sale of the stock of one of its subsidiaries was to evade or avoid withdrawal liability under the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980 (MPPAA), and thus confirmed Defendant’s assessment of withdrawal liability to Plaintiff when its former subsidiary withdrew from the Teamsters Fund by reason of its bankruptcy. The Arbitrator also ruled in Sherwin-Williams’ favor that the Teamsters Fund was not entitled to “gap year” interest. Now pending before the Court is the motion of the Teamsters Fund to dismiss the Complaint and to enforce, in part, the arbitration award (Document #20); and the motion of Sherwin-Williams for summary judgment on its Complaint (Document # 21).

Statement of Facts

Sherwin-Williams is engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of coatings and related products. The Teamsters Fund is a multiemployer benefit plan as defined in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) and is regulated by ERISA as amended by MPPAA Lyons Transportation Lines, Inc. (“Lyons”) was a less-than-truckload (“LTL”) regional motor carrier founded in 1928 in Erie, Pennsylvania. Lyons was a participating employer in the Teamsters Fund and was a signatory to a participation agreement which provided the obligation to contribute to the Teamsters Fund. Lyons was also a participating employer in two other Teamster sponsored multiemployer pension plans.

In January, 1987, Sherwin-Williams, through one of its subsidiaries, purchased 100% of the outstanding stock of Lyons for $14,204,765.79. Plaintiff acquired Lyons because it recognized that transportation costs were a significant factor in an economic environment where the final customer would resist further price increases, thereby favoring local producers with lower distribution costs. Further, Plaintiff knew that its customers refused to carry high levels of inventory but continued to demand a high level of service response, resulting in Plaintiff’s local and regional competitors enjoying a geographic service facility advantage. Sherwin-Williams determined that acquiring a regional LTL carrier would enable it to lower distribution costs, to improve service, and provide competitive freight costs. Sherwin-Williams developed a “rolling warehouse” where inventory could be maintained in trucks and be available for prompt delivery to local customers. Finally, after evaluating trends in the motor carrier industry, Plaintiff believed that acquisition of a regional LTL carrier could prove to be a profitable investment.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s projections, with the exception of a few months, Lyons incurred substantial losses and failed to meet the objectives for which it was acquired. SherwinWilliams was forced to subsidize Lyons each year of its ownership in order to sustain Lyons’ operations. Lyons financial position was known to people inside and outside the trucking industry due to publicly available information. In 1989, Sherwin-Williams began to receive unsolicited offers for the purchase of Lyons’ stock. Several parties expressed interest in purchasing Lyons’ stock, including the eventual purchaser, J.R.C. Acquisition Corporation (“JRC”).

Following the contacts regarding acquisition of Lyons, Sherwin-Williams reevaluated its acquisition of Lyons’ stock and determined that the benefits it anticipated had not accrued. In or around May of 1989, the President and General Manager of SherwinWilliams Transportation Services Division, [468]*468Robert Kinney, asked W.D. James, Lyons’ President, to investigate and report on alternative operational and organizational means of making Lyons profitable. Mr. James reported that it would take at least three years to turn Lyons around and make it profitable. Unwilling to spend the time and additional money it would take to keep Lyons for another three years, Sherwin-Williams’ Board of Directors authorized the sale of Lyons in October, 1988.

Mr. Kinney received a letter dated January 12,1990, from JRC, submitting a proposal to acquire Lyons. The JRC proposal identified JRC as a company formed by Jonathan M. Tendler and Robert M. Castello, the principal officers of Commons Brothers, Inc., one of the largest distributors of pharmaceuticals in the tri-state New York metropolitan area, with sales in excess of $200,000,000. Following this communication, Sherwin-Williams provided the principals of Commons Brothers, Inc. and JRC with confidential information relating to the operations of Lyons.

During this time period, Sherwin-Williams also received proposals for the purchase of Lyons from other groups. Mr. Kinney met with individuals on behalf of R.J.M. Associates, Inc. and received an offer to purchase all of the shares of Lyons for $6,000,000, subject to due diligence and negotiation of a definitive agreement. That offer was later amended to $8,000,000.

Sherwin-Williams also received an offer form Baytree Investors, Inc., offering to buy all outstanding shares of Lyons for $8,500,-000 consisting of § 2,000,000 cash and the balance as preferred stock, redeemable in 24 months; subject to due diligence and execution of a definitive purchase agreement.

Sherwin-Williams also negotiated with Arrow Carrier Corporation (“Arrow”), a large northeastern motor carrier headquartered in New Jersey. Sherwin-Williams cut off negotiations with Arrow when it learned of the financial difficulties of Arrow and its president.

After making inquiries with respect to the bidding parties and evaluating each offer, Sherwin-Williams decided to focus on JRC as the most likely bidder for Lyons. Sherwin-Williams proposed that the stock be sold to a wholly owned subsidiary of Commons Brothers, Inc. formed for the acquisition. Mr. Castello and Mr. Tendler insisted that Commons Brothers, Inc. not be the purchaser since it was involved in a concurrent transaction to acquire a French pharmaceutical company.

In its due diligence requests, JRC requested a schedule of current pension liabilities calculated as of December 31, 1989. In response, Lyons sent letters to Defendant and the other funds to which Lyons contributed requesting information with respect to potential withdrawal liability in the event of a complete or partial withdrawal in 1990. The Teamsters Fund provided Lyons with some basic fund data and indicated that for a fee of $500 the Teamsters Fund would calculate the potential withdrawal liability figure. Lyons requested the calculation and received the computations from the Teamsters Fund sometime after May 16,1990.

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969 F. Supp. 465, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344, 1997 WL 370870, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sherwin-williams-co-v-new-york-state-teamsters-conference-pension-ohnd-1997.