Sherry Julian-Robinson v. Lafayette Parish School Board

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 2, 2011
• Docket: CA-0011-0712
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 11-712

SHERRY JULIAN-ROBINSON

VERSUS

LAFAYETTE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

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APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20110363 HONORABLE THOMAS R. DUPLANTIER, DISTRICT JUDGE

BILLY HOWARD EZELL JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell, and J. David Painter, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Brian Francis Blackwell Blackwell & Associates 9270 Siegen Lane, Suite 201 Baton Rouge, LA 70810 (225) 769-2462 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Sherry Julian-Robinson

Dawn L. Morris Law Office of Dawn L. Morris 512 Johnston St. Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 704-2094 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Lafayette Parish School Board Ezell, Judge.

Sherry Julian-Robinson appeals the decision of the trial court granting an

exception of no cause of action in favor of the Lafayette Parish School Board (LPSB).

The trial court held that Mrs. Julian-Robinson was not able to state a cause of action

under La.R.S. 17:444 in her action seeking a writ of mandamus against the LPSB.

We disagree and, for the following reasons, reverse and remand this matter back to the

trial court below.

Mrs. Julian-Robinson is a tenured teacher in the Lafayette Parish school system.

She was promoted to assistant principal of Live Oak Elementary in 2006 and has

remained in that position ever since. Her initial promotional contract was for two

years as required under La.R.S. 17:444. Her contract was renewed in 2008, again for

the proper two-year time period. However, during the 2009-2010 school year, her

superintendent recommended that her second renewal contract be for only one year, as

a result of several areas listed as “need[ing] improvement” on her performance

evaluation for that year. The LPSB accepted the superintendent’s recommendation,

renewing her contract for only one year.

Mrs. Julian-Robinson subsequently filed a writ of mandamus, claiming that the

LPSB was legally obligated to renew her contract for a minimum of two years under

La.R.S. 17:444. In response, the LPSB filed an exception of no cause of action,

claiming that La.R.S. 17:444 is so ambiguous that a writ of mandamus could not be

ordered. The exception was granted. From that decision, Mrs. Julian-Robinson

appeals.

Mrs. Julian-Robinson asserts three assignments of error on appeal. She claims

that the trial court erred in granting LPSB’s exception of no cause of action; that the

trial court erred in finding that La.R.S. 17:444(B)(4)(a)(i) did not apply to renewal

contracts, but initial promotional contracts only; and that the trial court erred in failing to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the LPSB to issue her a renewal contract for a

term of no less than two years.

Because the proper interpretation of a statute is necessarily a question of law,

we apply a de novo standard of review. See Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St.

Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-582 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037.

A writ of “mandamus is to be used only when there is a clear and specific legal

right to be enforced or a duty that ought to be performed.” Bonvillian v. Dep’t of Ins.,

04-332, p.4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/16/05), 906 So.2d 596, 599, writ not considered, 05-

776 (La. 5/6/05), 901 So.2d 1081. Further:

A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3863. However, a writ of mandamus may only be issued in cases where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where the delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3862. In mandamus proceedings against a public officer involving the performance of official duty, nothing can be inquired into but the question of duty on the face of the statute and the ministerial character of the duty he is charged to perform. Plaisance v. Davis, 2003-0767, p. 11 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/07/03), 868 So.2d 711, 718, writ denied, 2003-3362 (La.2/13/04), 867 So.2d 699.

Id. at 598. Mandamus will not lie in matters in which discretion and evaluation of

evidence must be exercised. Allen v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 96-938

(La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97), 690 So.2d 150, 153, writ denied, 97-599 (La. 4/18/97), 692

So.2d 455.

The trial court ruled that La.R.S. 17:444 was ambiguous as to the length of

renewal contracts, thereby precluding it from issuing a writ of mandamus against

LPSB in an area wherein it may be afforded discretion. We disagree.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:444 states in pertinent part (emphasis added):

(4)(a)(i) Except as provided otherwise by R.S. 17:54(B), relative to the maximum term of a superintendent of schools elected by a city or parish school board, the employment provided for in this Section shall be for a term of not less than two years, except when such employment is for a temporary position, nor more than four years, and said term shall be specified in a written contract, which shall contain performance objectives.

2 While the statute goes on to state that “[t]he board and the employee may enter

into subsequent contracts of employment” and that “[t]the board shall negotiate and

offer a new contract at the expiration of each existing contract,” that language in no

way negates the prior dictate that all contracts shall be for a minimum of two years.

While the LPSB may have discretion in negotiating contract lengths for terms

between two and four years, that discretion simply does not extend to allow it to offer

a contract for a term of less than two years. Any new, renewal, or other following

contract should have been for two to four years as mandated by La.R.S. 17:444. See

Smith v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 29,873 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/24/97), 702 So.2d 727,

733, writ denied, 97-2721 (La. 1/16/98), 706 So.2d 978.

Accordingly, Mrs. Julian-Robinson has clearly stated a cause of action against

LPSB and the trial court was incorrect in ruling otherwise. Therefore, we hereby

reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings in

accordance with our rulings. For the above reasons, the ruling of the trial court is

hereby reversed. These proceedings are remanded to the trial court. Costs of this

appeal are assessed against the LPSB in the amount of $361.72.