Sherman v. Willis

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 30, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-01090
StatusUnknown

This text of Sherman v. Willis (Sherman v. Willis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sherman v. Willis, (M.D. Fla. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

KENNETH SHERMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1090-WWB-MCR

SERGEANT S.A. WILLIS, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff, Kenneth Sherman, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections, initiated this action by filing a pro se complaint for the violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1; Compl.). He is proceeding as a pauper. See Order (Doc. 4). Plaintiff names four Defendants for injuries he sustained at Columbia Correctional Institution on March 14, 2023: Sergeant Willis; Shift Officer-in-Charge Livi; Lieutenant Ashley; and Warden Polk. See Compl. at 2-3. He alleges Defendant Ashley sprayed him with chemical agents “for no reason,” or in “retaliation”; Defendants Willis and Livi “lied” by saying he was resisting; Defendant Willis “tampered with camera footage”; and Defendant Polk “knew of several accidents and refuse[d] to protect [him].” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff also asserts unnamed officers punched his head into the floor. Id. at 5. In addition to seeking compensatory damages, Plaintiff says he wants all officers fired and video footage preserved. Id.

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff must file an amended complaint if he desires to proceed with this case. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). All

averments of the claim should be made “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). To survive dismissal, a complaint must allege facts that, accepted as true, state a claim “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The standard asks for less than a probability but “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Though a plaintiff is not required to provide “detailed factual allegations,” he must offer more than “naked assertion[s] devoid of further

factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He should provide enough detail to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original). A court must hold a pro se plaintiff to a less

stringent standard than a lawyer, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but may not rewrite a deficient complaint for a pro

2 se plaintiff or otherwise serve as his de facto counsel, GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds

by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient because his allegations are vague and underdeveloped such that Defendants would have a difficult time drafting a responsive pleading. For instance, Plaintiff claims Defendant Ashley sprayed

him in retaliation, but he does not allege facts that, accepted as true, state a retaliation claim “plausible on its face.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To state a plausible retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) [he] suffered adverse action such that the … allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action … and the protected speech ….

O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff does not identify the form of constitutionally protected speech in which he engaged, nor does he allege facts showing a causal relationship between his speech and the “adverse action” against him. See Compl. at 4-5. Additionally, Plaintiff’s purported claim against Defendant Polk is similarly vague. He implies Defendant Polk should have known he was going to be assaulted and failed to protect him, but he alleges no facts permitting such an inference. To state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, a 3 plaintiff must allege: “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) . . . deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) a causal connection . . . .” Brooks v. Warden,

800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015). “Mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability.” Oliver v. Harden, 587 F. App’x 618, 620 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Moreover, liability under § 1983 may not be based on a theory of vicarious liability. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,

1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). In other words, a claim under § 1983 must be based on something more than “the mere fact that [a supervisor] employed [an] offending official.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 810 (1985).

A supervisor also cannot be held liable under § 1983 simply for having received and responded to a prisoner’s grievance. Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv- 375-Ftm-29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013) (“[F]iling a grievance with a supervisory person does not automatically make the

supervisor liable for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even when the grievance is denied.” (citing Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009))). Finally, with respect to his claims against Defendants Willis and Livi,

Plaintiff is advised that to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “a person” acting under the color of state law deprived him of a

4 right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Lying” and “tampering with camera footage” may be improper, but such

actions are not constitutional violations. If Plaintiff wants to proceed, he must file an amended complaint that complies with the standards discussed above, the instructions on the complaint form, and the instructions that follow.

1. The amended complaint must be marked, “Amended Complaint.”

2. The amended complaint must name as defendants only those who had been acting under color of state law and are responsible for an alleged constitutional violation.

3.

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Related

GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia
132 F.3d 1359 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
Tannenbaum v. United States
148 F.3d 1262 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle
471 U.S. 808 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Randall v. Scott
610 F.3d 701 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Gallagher v. Shelton
587 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Al-Amin v. Warden Hugh Smith
637 F.3d 1192 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
O'BRYANT v. Finch
637 F.3d 1207 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.
654 F.3d 1194 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Warren L. Oliver v. Officer Harden
587 F. App'x 618 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
Fred Dalton Brooks v. Warden
800 F.3d 1295 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Cottone v. Jenne
326 F.3d 1352 (Eleventh Circuit, 2003)

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Sherman v. Willis, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sherman-v-willis-flmd-2024.