EDMONDS, J.
Arthur W. Sherman and his wife are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the assessor of Los Angeles County to assess to them real property being purchased by them under a contract of conditional sale in order that he may claim his tax exemption as a veteran. The appeal from the judgment, entered upon an order sustaining the assessor’s demurrer to the petition without leave to amend, presents for decision a question different from that determined in Eisley v. Mohan, ante, p. 637 [192 P.2d 5], as here the vendor is a private party and not a state agency.
The amended petition alleges that Sherman is a veteran of World War II and was honorably discharged from the service. He and his wife, both residents of California, have purchased from Witmer Building Company, a corporation, under a contract of conditional sale, a lot, improved with a residence, for a total purchase price of $8,850. Approximately $3,000 was paid in cash and the contract provides for monthly, payments of $40 on account of "principal and interest.
The petitioners further plead that the property is assessed to the vendor who holds the legal title. Sherman demanded of the assessor that the assessment to the vendor be canceled and the.property assessed to him and his wife in order that he might claim his veteran’s exemption from taxation under section 1% of article XIII of the Constitution. This demand was rejected upon the ground that it is the policy of the assessor to assess real property being purchased under a conditional sales contract, to the vendor. ' There is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner concludes, and any other procedure would involve a multiplicity of suits.
[663]*663The assessor demurred to the petition upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. One of the points relied upon in support of his position was that mandamus is not the proper remedy.
Section l 1/2 of article XIII of the Constitution reads: "The property to the amount of one thousand dollars of every resident of this State who has served in the Army [and other branches of the service] . . . and . . . has received an honorable discharge therefrom, . . . shall be exempt from taxation; provided, this exemption shall not apply to any person named herein owning property of the value of five thousand dollars or more, . . . The allegations of the petition bring Sherman within this provision. It is alleged that he and his wife are residents of California, that he is “ a veteran of World War II and was on active duty with the United States Army Air Forces prior to and on March 1, 1946, and was honorably released from active duty on or about March 23,1946.” Neither Sherman nor his wife, nor the two together, own property greater than $5,000 in value. It is also alleged that the affidavit required by section 252 of the Revenue and Taxation Code was timely filed.
The principal question for decision is whether the quoted provision of the Constitution exempts only property of a veteran to which he holds the legal title. Certainly it must be construed to give full effect to the purpose of the enactment, which is to minimize the burden of taxation upon those persons who honorably served our country, and do not own property of a value greater than that specified. There is nothing in the language of the provision which indicates an intention to restrict its application to those who hold the full legal title to their property. On the contrary, article XIII, section 1, relating to taxation, defines property as used in its provisions, to exclude the security title of a contract vendor. (Eisley v. Mohan, ante, p. 637 [192 P.2d 5].)
The vendee in possession under a conditional sale contract, or one who holds the land subject to a deed of trust, is as much entitled to the exemption as a veteran who has title in fee simple. “In a conditional sale, the title in the seller is for security only, to assure the payment of the purchase price. It carries with it none of the ordinary incidents of ownership. The buyer has the possession and use of the property to the complete exclusion of the seller, subject only to the seller’s remedies in case of default. Both in a practical and a legal sense the buyer is the beneficial owner.” (County [664]*664of San Diego v. Davis, 1 Cal.2d 145, 147 [33 P.2d 827]; Elliott v. McCombs, 17 Cal.2d 23 [109 P.2d 329]; and see Walker v. Houston, 215 Cal. 742 [12 P.2d 952, 87 A.L.R. 937].)
Petitioner Arthur Sherman is therefore entitled to the exemption allowed by section 1 1/4 of article XIII of the Constitution. But the writ of mandamus will issue only where a legal duty is established and no other sufficient means exist for its enforcement. (Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye, 10 Cal.App. 534, 537 [102 P. 677].) The legal duty sought to be compelled must be one which the law specially enjoins. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085; City of Napa v. Rainey, 59 Cal. 275, 278; Albori v. Smith, 18 Cal.App.2d 615, 618 [65 P.2d 81]; see 16 Cal.Jur. 808.)
The assessor, annually, “shall assess all the taxable property in his county ... to the persons owning, claiming, possessing, or controlling it. . . .” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 405.) Ordinarily, the legal title and ownership are in the same person and in such case the duty of paying taxes rests upon the person who holds legal title (Three G Distillery Corp. v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal.App.2d 498 [116 P.2d 143]), but where security title and ownership are in different parties, as in a conditional sale transaction, the one who actually is to pay the taxes is determined by the contract. In the case of personal property it has been held that the assessment is not invalid if assessed to a conditional vendee (Houser etc. Mfg. Co. v. Hargrove, 129 Cal. 90 [61 P. 660]), nor to a consignee for sale. (S. & G. Gump Co. v. San Francisco, 18 Cal.2d 129 [114 P.2d 346, 135 A.L.R. 595].) Section 405 of the Revenue and Taxation Code applies to real and to personal property, and the assessment to either the vendee or the vendor under a conditional sale contract of land is not invalid. (Cf. County of San Diego v. Davis, supra, wherein it was held that the legal owner of an automobile, registered in the name of the conditional vendee, was not personally liable for the tax imposed on the automobile.) Moreover, assessment to the veteran is not a prerequisite to the application of the constitutional provision. It is the property of the veteran to the Specified amount which is exempted from taxation, and the form of the assessment is of no consequence.
On the basis of the allegations of their petition, it is clear that the Shermans are entitled to the benefit of the exemption provided by the Constitution.
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EDMONDS, J.
Arthur W. Sherman and his wife are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the assessor of Los Angeles County to assess to them real property being purchased by them under a contract of conditional sale in order that he may claim his tax exemption as a veteran. The appeal from the judgment, entered upon an order sustaining the assessor’s demurrer to the petition without leave to amend, presents for decision a question different from that determined in Eisley v. Mohan, ante, p. 637 [192 P.2d 5], as here the vendor is a private party and not a state agency.
The amended petition alleges that Sherman is a veteran of World War II and was honorably discharged from the service. He and his wife, both residents of California, have purchased from Witmer Building Company, a corporation, under a contract of conditional sale, a lot, improved with a residence, for a total purchase price of $8,850. Approximately $3,000 was paid in cash and the contract provides for monthly, payments of $40 on account of "principal and interest.
The petitioners further plead that the property is assessed to the vendor who holds the legal title. Sherman demanded of the assessor that the assessment to the vendor be canceled and the.property assessed to him and his wife in order that he might claim his veteran’s exemption from taxation under section 1% of article XIII of the Constitution. This demand was rejected upon the ground that it is the policy of the assessor to assess real property being purchased under a conditional sales contract, to the vendor. ' There is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner concludes, and any other procedure would involve a multiplicity of suits.
[663]*663The assessor demurred to the petition upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. One of the points relied upon in support of his position was that mandamus is not the proper remedy.
Section l 1/2 of article XIII of the Constitution reads: "The property to the amount of one thousand dollars of every resident of this State who has served in the Army [and other branches of the service] . . . and . . . has received an honorable discharge therefrom, . . . shall be exempt from taxation; provided, this exemption shall not apply to any person named herein owning property of the value of five thousand dollars or more, . . . The allegations of the petition bring Sherman within this provision. It is alleged that he and his wife are residents of California, that he is “ a veteran of World War II and was on active duty with the United States Army Air Forces prior to and on March 1, 1946, and was honorably released from active duty on or about March 23,1946.” Neither Sherman nor his wife, nor the two together, own property greater than $5,000 in value. It is also alleged that the affidavit required by section 252 of the Revenue and Taxation Code was timely filed.
The principal question for decision is whether the quoted provision of the Constitution exempts only property of a veteran to which he holds the legal title. Certainly it must be construed to give full effect to the purpose of the enactment, which is to minimize the burden of taxation upon those persons who honorably served our country, and do not own property of a value greater than that specified. There is nothing in the language of the provision which indicates an intention to restrict its application to those who hold the full legal title to their property. On the contrary, article XIII, section 1, relating to taxation, defines property as used in its provisions, to exclude the security title of a contract vendor. (Eisley v. Mohan, ante, p. 637 [192 P.2d 5].)
The vendee in possession under a conditional sale contract, or one who holds the land subject to a deed of trust, is as much entitled to the exemption as a veteran who has title in fee simple. “In a conditional sale, the title in the seller is for security only, to assure the payment of the purchase price. It carries with it none of the ordinary incidents of ownership. The buyer has the possession and use of the property to the complete exclusion of the seller, subject only to the seller’s remedies in case of default. Both in a practical and a legal sense the buyer is the beneficial owner.” (County [664]*664of San Diego v. Davis, 1 Cal.2d 145, 147 [33 P.2d 827]; Elliott v. McCombs, 17 Cal.2d 23 [109 P.2d 329]; and see Walker v. Houston, 215 Cal. 742 [12 P.2d 952, 87 A.L.R. 937].)
Petitioner Arthur Sherman is therefore entitled to the exemption allowed by section 1 1/4 of article XIII of the Constitution. But the writ of mandamus will issue only where a legal duty is established and no other sufficient means exist for its enforcement. (Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye, 10 Cal.App. 534, 537 [102 P. 677].) The legal duty sought to be compelled must be one which the law specially enjoins. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085; City of Napa v. Rainey, 59 Cal. 275, 278; Albori v. Smith, 18 Cal.App.2d 615, 618 [65 P.2d 81]; see 16 Cal.Jur. 808.)
The assessor, annually, “shall assess all the taxable property in his county ... to the persons owning, claiming, possessing, or controlling it. . . .” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 405.) Ordinarily, the legal title and ownership are in the same person and in such case the duty of paying taxes rests upon the person who holds legal title (Three G Distillery Corp. v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal.App.2d 498 [116 P.2d 143]), but where security title and ownership are in different parties, as in a conditional sale transaction, the one who actually is to pay the taxes is determined by the contract. In the case of personal property it has been held that the assessment is not invalid if assessed to a conditional vendee (Houser etc. Mfg. Co. v. Hargrove, 129 Cal. 90 [61 P. 660]), nor to a consignee for sale. (S. & G. Gump Co. v. San Francisco, 18 Cal.2d 129 [114 P.2d 346, 135 A.L.R. 595].) Section 405 of the Revenue and Taxation Code applies to real and to personal property, and the assessment to either the vendee or the vendor under a conditional sale contract of land is not invalid. (Cf. County of San Diego v. Davis, supra, wherein it was held that the legal owner of an automobile, registered in the name of the conditional vendee, was not personally liable for the tax imposed on the automobile.) Moreover, assessment to the veteran is not a prerequisite to the application of the constitutional provision. It is the property of the veteran to the Specified amount which is exempted from taxation, and the form of the assessment is of no consequence.
On the basis of the allegations of their petition, it is clear that the Shermans are entitled to the benefit of the exemption provided by the Constitution. Clarification of this point should suffice to assure petitioners and other veterans in similar circumstances that the exemption will be allowed. [665]*665However, should an assessor deny the exemption to a veteran, an adequate procedure is provided by statute whereby taxes erroneously levied and collected may be refunded, together with interest thereon, upon a claim therefor. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 5096 et seq.) This form of procedure, widely used in the tax field, is based upon the principle that “delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.” (Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 [20 L.Ed. 65].) The veteran, therefore, has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and mandamus is not available. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) “The prompt payment of taxes is always important to the public welfare. It may be vital to the existence of a government. The idea that every tax-payer is entitled to the delays of litigation is unreason.” (Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 [26 L.Ed. 253]; cited with approval in People v. Skinner, 18 Cal.2d 349, 355 [115 P.2d 488, 149 A.L.R. 299].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.