Sherita Everetts v. Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: April 2, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00869
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION SHERITA EVERETTS, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:26-cv-869-S-BN § KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL § OF TEXAS, § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Without paying the filing fee, Plaintiff Sherita Everetts filed this pro se action for violations of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 241, and 18 U.S.C. § 242 against Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, claiming that the Attorney General has stolen money taken through garnishment of her wages for child support under an order from the 304th District Court in Dallas County rather than using it to support children. See Dkt. No. 3. The presiding United States district judge referred this lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this lawsuit. Legal Standards A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis (that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per

curiam). A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted). “[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano

v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).

And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted). And, because “‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)), “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999) (citations omitted).

And, if the party invoking federal jurisdiction fails to establish it, the lawsuit must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633,

636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’ in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)). As to dismissal for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, just

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. “The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of

categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)). And, so, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that

the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). Analysis As always, the Court must first consider its jurisdiction. See Louisiana v. U.S.

Dep’t of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Jurisdiction is always first.” (citation omitted)). “Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not fully expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski v. Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 374, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)). That is, “‘[f]ederal courts are without jurisdiction over suits against a state, a

state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented by statute, and § 1983,” for example, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Moore v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014), then citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979)).

This jurisdiction-stripping immunity extends to the Office of Attorney General and its employees in their official capacity. See, e.g., El Bey v. Dominguez, 540 F. Supp. 3d 653, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (“The State of Texas and Texas Attorney General’s Office fall squarely within even the narrowest parameters the Supreme Court has imposed on the Eleventh Amendment since 1796.” (citation omitted)); Rodriguez v. Shamburger, No. 1:23-cv-117, 2023 WL 6466577, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2023) (“Relevant here, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity.” (cleaned up; collecting cases)), rec. adopted, 2023 WL 6465848 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2023).

There is a “narrow exception ... that allows certain private parties to seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). But Everetts has not alleged any facts to support applying this exception. And to the extent that Everetts seeks to allege her claim against Paxton in his individual capacity based on his supervisory role over prosecutors in the child support

division of the Office of Attorney General, “[u]nder § 1983, officials are not vicariously liable for the conduct of those under their supervision. Supervisory officials are accountable for their own acts of deliberate indifference and for implementing unconstitutional policies that causally result in injury to the plaintiff.” Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992)).

And a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity “for actions ‘initiating a prosecution and … presenting the State’s case’ and those ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). This immunity “shelters prosecutors even when they act ‘maliciously, wantonly or negligently.’” Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 248 (5th Cir. 1985)). This immunity also applies to prosecutors in the child support division of the Office of Attorney General. See Nixon v. Abbott, 589 F. App’x 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Ramirez v. Arteaga, No. 3:23-cv-

2617-X-BN, 2023 WL 11931496, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2023). Although a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity for certain administrative activities, see Van de Camp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009), the allegations relate to garnishment of Everetts’s wages pursuant to a court order obtained by prosecutors in the Office of Attorney General. So to the extent that Everetts brings claims against Ken Paxton in his individual capacity, those claims are barred by prosecutorial immunity.

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint before dismissal, but leave is not required when a plaintiff has already pled her “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Everetts’s complaint fails to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be inferred. Based on the most deferential review of her complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given another opportunity, Everetts could allege viable legal claims.

Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay. Recommendation The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice. A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. □□□□ P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: April 2, 2026

DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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