1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHERENA LOUISE CRAWFORD, No. 2:26-cv-00753-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. and 14 COUNTY OF BUTTE, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Crawford, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending 18 before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and motion for 19 temporary restraining order, ECF No. 3. The District Judge referred the motion for temporary 20 restraining order to the undersigned. See ECF No. 4. 21 A. Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2 22 Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing that 23 Plaintiff is unable to prepay fees and costs or give security therefor. See ECF No. 2. Accordingly, 24 the undersigned will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s complaint, 25 and service thereof by the United States Marshal if appropriate, will be addressed separately. The 26 Clerk of the Court shall not issue summons or set this matter for an initial scheduling conference 27 unless specifically directed by the court to do so. 28 / / / 1 B. Screening of Original Complaint, ECF No. 1 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been 3 granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this screening 4 provision, the Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 5 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 6 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B) and 7 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this Court 8 must dismiss an action if the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because 9 Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will screen the complaint 10 pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). 11 As noted by the District Judge, Plaintiff Crawford, who is proceeding pro se, 12 attempts to bring claims on behalf of her son, Plaintiff Christopher Shayne Almodova. See ECF 13 No. 1. However, “[i]t is well established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by 14 § 1654 is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities.” Simon v. 15 Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff asserts a number of claims on 16 behalf of herself, which is proper as a pro se litigant. Thus, the undersigned will dismiss 17 Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend and provide Plaintiff with 30 days to file an amended 18 complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an amended complaint within the time 19 provided may result in dismissal of the action for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with 20 court rules and orders. See Local Rule 110. 21 C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 3 22 A temporary restraining order (TRO) is an extraordinary remedy. The legal 23 principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a temporary restraining order or 24 preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the moving party must show that 25 irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 26 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365 27 (2008)). To prevail on a motion for injunctive relief, “there must be a relationship between the 28 injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying 1 complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2 2015). Thus, there must be a nexus between the claims raised in the motion and the claims in the 3 underlying complaint itself. See id. This nexus is satisfied where the preliminary injunction 4 would grant “relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” See id. (quoting 5 De Beers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). 6 Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, requesting the Court direct 7 Defendants to:
8 (1) Immediately return all confiscated legal materials to Plaintiff’s son; (2) Immediately release Plaintiff’s vehicle from impound without payment of any 9 fees; (3) Immediately return Plaintiff’s personal iPhone; 10 (4) Cease all retaliatory conduct; (5) Restore Plaintiff’s access as court-ordered legal runner; 11 (6) Cease all cruel and unusual punishment; (7) Set an expedited hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 12 ECF No. 3, pg. 3. 13 Plaintiff contends that absent such order, Plaintiff suffers irreparable harm because 14 Plaintiff’s mother “is battling Stage 4 lung cancer and requires regular transportation to life- 15 sustaining medical treatments.” ECF No. 3, pg. 2. According to Plaintiff, “Defendants unlawfully 16 seized Plaintiff’s vehicle on February 27, 2026, without warrant or probable cause, and have 17 impounded it, demanding over $1,200 in fees that Plaintiff cannot pay. Each day the vehicle 18 remains unavailable, Plaintiff’s mother is denied access to critical medical care.” Id. 19 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order fails to 20 establish the necessary elements and will therefore recommend the District Judge deny the 21 motion. Specifically, Plaintiff’s request for relief on behalf of her son, returning legal materials 22 and to cease all cruel and unusual punishment, suffers the same flaw as the claims Plaintiff 23 improperly seeks to bring on behalf of her son – a pro se litigant cannot seek relief on behalf of 24 another. As to Plaintiff’s request for her vehicle to be released immediately without payment of 25 fees, the undersigned finds that it is not clear from the complaint that Defendants continue to 26 deprive Plaintiff of her vehicle. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that “Defendants 27 unlawfully seized and impounded [Plaintiff’s] vehicle. [Plaintiff] was forced to pay over $800 to 28 1 get it back.” ECF No. 1, pg. 5. Given that, according to the complaint, Plaintiff’s vehicle was 2 returned to her, Plaintiff cannot be likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a temporary restraining 3 order. 4 As to Plaintiff’s request to “cease all retaliatory conduct,” the undersigned finds 5 that Plaintiff fails to establish irreparable injury is likely as the motion for temporary restraining 6 order does not identify what conduct from which she specifically seeks relief. As to Plaintiff’s 7 request for her iPhone to be returned and to restore Plaintiff’s access as court-ordered legal 8 runner, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff fails to show the nexus between the allegations in the 9 complaint and this request. The only mention of Plaintiff’s iPhone is in her motions for injunctive 10 relief but Plaintiff’s complaint does not mention her iPhone. Additionally, it is not clear to the 11 Court how, and whether, Defendants’ alleged conduct has resulted in Plaintiff not being able to 12 continue as a court-ordered legal runner.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHERENA LOUISE CRAWFORD, No. 2:26-cv-00753-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. and 14 COUNTY OF BUTTE, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Crawford, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending 18 before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and motion for 19 temporary restraining order, ECF No. 3. The District Judge referred the motion for temporary 20 restraining order to the undersigned. See ECF No. 4. 21 A. Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2 22 Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing that 23 Plaintiff is unable to prepay fees and costs or give security therefor. See ECF No. 2. Accordingly, 24 the undersigned will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s complaint, 25 and service thereof by the United States Marshal if appropriate, will be addressed separately. The 26 Clerk of the Court shall not issue summons or set this matter for an initial scheduling conference 27 unless specifically directed by the court to do so. 28 / / / 1 B. Screening of Original Complaint, ECF No. 1 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been 3 granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this screening 4 provision, the Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 5 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 6 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B) and 7 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this Court 8 must dismiss an action if the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because 9 Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will screen the complaint 10 pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). 11 As noted by the District Judge, Plaintiff Crawford, who is proceeding pro se, 12 attempts to bring claims on behalf of her son, Plaintiff Christopher Shayne Almodova. See ECF 13 No. 1. However, “[i]t is well established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by 14 § 1654 is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities.” Simon v. 15 Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff asserts a number of claims on 16 behalf of herself, which is proper as a pro se litigant. Thus, the undersigned will dismiss 17 Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend and provide Plaintiff with 30 days to file an amended 18 complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an amended complaint within the time 19 provided may result in dismissal of the action for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with 20 court rules and orders. See Local Rule 110. 21 C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 3 22 A temporary restraining order (TRO) is an extraordinary remedy. The legal 23 principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a temporary restraining order or 24 preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the moving party must show that 25 irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 26 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365 27 (2008)). To prevail on a motion for injunctive relief, “there must be a relationship between the 28 injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying 1 complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2 2015). Thus, there must be a nexus between the claims raised in the motion and the claims in the 3 underlying complaint itself. See id. This nexus is satisfied where the preliminary injunction 4 would grant “relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” See id. (quoting 5 De Beers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). 6 Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, requesting the Court direct 7 Defendants to:
8 (1) Immediately return all confiscated legal materials to Plaintiff’s son; (2) Immediately release Plaintiff’s vehicle from impound without payment of any 9 fees; (3) Immediately return Plaintiff’s personal iPhone; 10 (4) Cease all retaliatory conduct; (5) Restore Plaintiff’s access as court-ordered legal runner; 11 (6) Cease all cruel and unusual punishment; (7) Set an expedited hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 12 ECF No. 3, pg. 3. 13 Plaintiff contends that absent such order, Plaintiff suffers irreparable harm because 14 Plaintiff’s mother “is battling Stage 4 lung cancer and requires regular transportation to life- 15 sustaining medical treatments.” ECF No. 3, pg. 2. According to Plaintiff, “Defendants unlawfully 16 seized Plaintiff’s vehicle on February 27, 2026, without warrant or probable cause, and have 17 impounded it, demanding over $1,200 in fees that Plaintiff cannot pay. Each day the vehicle 18 remains unavailable, Plaintiff’s mother is denied access to critical medical care.” Id. 19 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order fails to 20 establish the necessary elements and will therefore recommend the District Judge deny the 21 motion. Specifically, Plaintiff’s request for relief on behalf of her son, returning legal materials 22 and to cease all cruel and unusual punishment, suffers the same flaw as the claims Plaintiff 23 improperly seeks to bring on behalf of her son – a pro se litigant cannot seek relief on behalf of 24 another. As to Plaintiff’s request for her vehicle to be released immediately without payment of 25 fees, the undersigned finds that it is not clear from the complaint that Defendants continue to 26 deprive Plaintiff of her vehicle. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that “Defendants 27 unlawfully seized and impounded [Plaintiff’s] vehicle. [Plaintiff] was forced to pay over $800 to 28 1 get it back.” ECF No. 1, pg. 5. Given that, according to the complaint, Plaintiff’s vehicle was 2 returned to her, Plaintiff cannot be likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a temporary restraining 3 order. 4 As to Plaintiff’s request to “cease all retaliatory conduct,” the undersigned finds 5 that Plaintiff fails to establish irreparable injury is likely as the motion for temporary restraining 6 order does not identify what conduct from which she specifically seeks relief. As to Plaintiff’s 7 request for her iPhone to be returned and to restore Plaintiff’s access as court-ordered legal 8 runner, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff fails to show the nexus between the allegations in the 9 complaint and this request. The only mention of Plaintiff’s iPhone is in her motions for injunctive 10 relief but Plaintiff’s complaint does not mention her iPhone. Additionally, it is not clear to the 11 Court how, and whether, Defendants’ alleged conduct has resulted in Plaintiff not being able to 12 continue as a court-ordered legal runner. Finally, given Plaintiff failed to meet the burden for a 13 temporary restraining order, expediting a hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction based on 14 the same relief Plaintiff requests in the temporary restraining order is improper at this time. 15 Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order, 16 ECF No. 2, be denied without prejudice. 17 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED that: 18 1. It is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 19 No. 2, is GRANTED. 20 2. It is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed with 21 leave to amend. 22 3. It is ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 23 days of the date of this order. 24 4. It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining 25 order, ECF No. 3, be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 26 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 27 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 28 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 1 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 2 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 3 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 4 5 6 | Dated: March 11, 2026 Svc 7 DENNIS M. COTA 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28