Shen v. Exela Technologies Inc

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 21, 2022
Docket3:20-cv-00691
StatusUnknown

This text of Shen v. Exela Technologies Inc (Shen v. Exela Technologies Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shen v. Exela Technologies Inc, (N.D. Tex. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION BO SHEN, et al., § § Plaintiffs, § § Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-0691-D VS. § § EXELA TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., § § Defendants. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In this putative class action alleging claims for securities fraud and control person liability under §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a), and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b- 5 (“Rule 10b-5”), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder, defendants move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, on the grounds that plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendants and scienter. Concluding that plaintiffs have satisfied the heightened pleading requirements of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) and the PSLRA concerning at least one theory of liability, the court denies the motion. I The general background facts and procedural history of this case are set out in the court’s prior memorandum opinion and order and need not be repeated. See Shen v. Exela Techs., Inc. (Shen I), 2021 WL 2589584, at *1-3 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.). Because the parties are familiar with the record and the contents of the briefing, the court will confine its discussion to what is necessary for the parties to understand this decision.1 In

Shen I plaintiffs relied on four theories to plead a plausible securities fraud claim. They now assert three. Like their prior complaint, their current second amended complaint (“SAC”) rests on the theory that defendants misrepresented Exela’s revenue “by telling investors that Exela had 90% visibility into its revenue”—i.e., that 90% of the company’s revenue was

predictable— “because [the revenue] was recurring in nature due to long-term or auto- renewal customer contracts.” SAC ¶ 10. These representations were misleading, according to the SAC, “because approximately 20% of Exela’s revenue came from billing customers for pass-through postage costs, which Defendants later admitted was inconsistent and highly unpredictable.” Id.; see also id. ¶ 12 (“Defendants misled investors about the predictability

of Exela’s revenue, often stating that 90% of the Company’s revenue was predictable when Defendants later admitted that approximately 20% of its revenue was unpredictable, nonrecurring, low margin postage revenue.”); id. ¶ 166 (“Throughout the Class Period, Defendants repeatedly assured investors that the Company had over 90% visibility in revenue.”).

1Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the definition of “written opinion” adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, this is a “written opinion[] issued by the court” because it “sets forth a reasoned explanation for [the] court’s decision.” It has been written, however, primarily for the parties, to decide issues presented in this case, and not for publication in an official reporter, and should be understood accordingly. - 2 - In Shen I the court rejected plaintiffs’ 90% revenue visibility theory based on their failure to adequately plead scienter. Shen I, 2021 WL 2589584, at *14.2 In sum, the court noted that plaintiffs relied on misrepresentations made between March 2018 and March 2019,

but they failed to plead any specific facts establishing that, at the time defendants represented that Exela had 90% revenue visibility, defendants knew that approximately 20% of Exela’s revenue for 2018 and 2019 came from unpredictable postage and postage handling. Id. And the court rejected plaintiffs’ other reasons for maintaining that they had adequately pleaded

scienter with respect to the 90% revenue visibility representations. Id. at *14-16. Although in Shen I the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, it also granted plaintiffs leave to replead. Plaintiffs have amended their complaint via the SAC, and defendants move anew to dismiss under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) and the PSLRA. The court has heard oral argument.

II The elements of a private securities fraud claim based on violations of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and [Rule 10b-5] are: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation. 2The court assumed arguendo that defendants’ visibility statements were not forward- looking statements protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor and that defendants’ visibility statements constituted misrepresentations of material fact. Shen I, 2021 WL 2589584, at *14. In the present memorandum opinion and order, the court concludes that defendants’ visibility statements are neither protected under the PSLRA safe harbor as forward-looking statements nor are statements protected by the “bespeaks caution” doctrine. See infra note 3. - 3 - Spitzberg v. Hous. Am. Energy Corp., 758 F.3d 676, 683 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S.Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011)).

Because plaintiffs bring a private lawsuit for securities fraud under the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, they must comply with the PSLRA and “conform the allegations in their [second amended] complaint to the heightened pleading requirements set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4.” Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 679.

[T]he PSLRA heightened the pleading standards for private claims of securities fraud “in two ways.” That is, plaintiffs must also, first, allege with particularity why each one of defendants’ representations or omissions was “misleading” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) and, second, allege with particularity those facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with the required state of mind under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). Id. at 683 (citing Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 532-33 (5th Cir. 2008)). To qualify as “strong,” “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007). “In this circuit, the required state of mind for scienter is an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud or severe recklessness.” Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 684 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

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Related

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.
565 F.3d 228 (Fifth Circuit, 2009)
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
551 U.S. 308 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.
131 S. Ct. 2179 (Supreme Court, 2011)
In Re Securities Litigation BMC Software, Inc.
183 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. Texas, 2001)
Spitzberg v. Houston American Energy Corp.
758 F.3d 676 (Fifth Circuit, 2014)
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Bluebook (online)
Shen v. Exela Technologies Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shen-v-exela-technologies-inc-txnd-2022.