Shelton Lamont Powell v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Opinion filed September 10, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-25-00111-CR

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SHELTON LAMONT POWELL, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4 Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1733770

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N1 Appellant, Shelton Lamont Powell, appeals from the trial court’s judgment adjudicating his guilt and revoking his community supervision. Appellant originally pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-

1 Pursuant to Misc. Docket Order No. 25-9016 issued by the Texas Supreme Court on April 2, 2025, this appeal was transferred to us from the Second Court of Appeals. Therefore, as the transferee court, we must decide the issues raised in this appeal in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals if its precedent conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2026). The trial court also made an affirmative family violence finding, which Appellant confirmed was true and correct. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement between Appellant and the State, the trial court accepted Appellant’s plea and placed him on deferred adjudication community supervision for five years. The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate Appellant’s guilt and to revoke his community supervision, alleging that Appellant committed three violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision. After a hearing, the trial court found two allegations in the State’s motion to be “true,” adjudicated Appellant guilty of the charged offense, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See PENAL § 12.33 (West 2019).

On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that he committed two violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision because the evidence is insufficient to support its findings that Appellant (1) committed a new offense, and (2) intentionally or knowingly failed to report to his probation officer. We affirm.

I. Background

In its motion to adjudicate, the State alleged that Appellant violated the following terms and conditions of his community supervision: (1) he intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to Shayolanda Powell, a family member, by punching her in the head, chest, and stomach; (2) he failed to report to his probation officer at any time during the month of June 2024, as instructed by the trial court or the supervision officer; and (3) he tested positive for marihuana or cannabinoids on November 6, 2024.

At the adjudication/revocation proceeding, the State’s evidence consisted of the testimony of Detective William Hutson of the Cedar Hill Police Department, a

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recording of Shayolanda’s 9-1-1 call, a Ring camera video recording of the incident, and the testimony of Monica Zaiger, a court liaison with the Tarrant County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD).

Detective Hutson testified that he reviewed the report of the officer who responded to the assault, then spoke with Shayolanda—Appellant’s sister—and found her description of the incident to be consistent with the report: both the report and Shayolanda described that Appellant had punched her. Detective Hutson reviewed the recording of the 9-1-1 call that Shayolanda placed and found the 9-1-1 call to be consistent with the report and the statements that Shayolanda made to him. He also reviewed the Ring camera video recording. The video was recorded at night and showed that (1) Shayolanda struck the window of a vehicle that was pulling away from her, (2) the vehicle then immediately stopped, and (3) someone exited the vehicle and ran onto a driveway, off camera. Shayolanda is then heard yelling, “Stop” and “What are you doing?” and her children also yelling, “Stop.” Detective Hutson testified that it was difficult to identify the person who exited the vehicle in the recording, and he conceded on cross-examination that it is possible Shayolanda was screaming but not assaulted while the video was recording. However, he testified that the video recording was consistent with the other evidence he reviewed. According to Detective Hutson, the case had been filed in Dallas County, but no disposition had yet been reached.

In accordance with the terms and conditions of his community supervision, Appellant was required to report for an office appointment at the Tarrant County CSCD “no less than monthly.” Zaiger testified that Appellant was not permitted to travel outside the boundaries of Tarrant County without prior authorization from his supervising probation officer. Despite this, in June 2024, Appellant not only left Tarrant County, but the State of Texas. Because Appellant missed this appointment, he failed to report, as instructed, in June 2024.

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According to Zaiger, Appellant traveled to New York, purportedly for work, without obtaining prior authorization to leave Tarrant County or this state. He called his supervising probation officer and left a voicemail indicating that he would not be able to attend his scheduled office appointment that day because he was out of town. Appellant later told his supervising probation officer: “I’m not about to be coming up here or trying to call to ask for permission when I got to leave for work. This is ridiculous.” Because he did not report as required, Appellant received a sanction of an additional eight hours of community service, but he failed to complete them. In August 2024, Appellant admitted to his supervising officer that he had again left Tarrant County and the state without permission and traveled to Mississippi, where he received a speeding ticket, which he reported to his supervising officer.

Zaiger also testified that Detective Hutson later advised her that Appellant had assaulted his sister (Shayolanda) on September 12, 2024. Although Appellant was required to surrender to the Tarrant County jail the next day, Zaiger testified that, on September 13, Appellant instead self-admitted to a hospital to receive treatment for sickle cell anemia.

II. Standard of Review

Given the unique nature of an adjudication/revocation proceeding and the trial court’s broad discretion in the proceeding, the general standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence do not apply. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864– 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Miles v. State, 343 S.W.3d 908, 912–13 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). Instead, we review a trial court’s decision to revoke a probationer’s community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The trial court abuses its discretion by revoking a probationer’s community supervision if the State failed to

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meet its burden to prove that the probationer violated certain terms and conditions of his community supervision. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94; Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).

We review the evidence presented at an adjudication/revocation proceeding in the light most favorable to the trial court’s rulings. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In this setting, the trial court, as the trier of the facts, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be afforded their testimony, and may resolve any inconsistencies in their testimony. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Naquin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).

In an adjudication/revocation proceeding, the State must prove a violation of the terms and conditions of a probationer’s community supervision by a preponderance of the evidence, and proof of any of the alleged violations is sufficient to uphold the trial court’s decision to adjudicate and/or revoke. Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“proof of a single violation will support revocation”); Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). A preponderance of the evidence is the greater weight of credible evidence that would create a reasonable belief that the probationer violated a term or condition of his community supervision. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Scamardo, 517 S.W.2d at 298; Guillory v. State, 652 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d).

III. Analysis

A. Appellant Committed a New Offense In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it made a finding of “true” on the allegation that he committed a new offense because (1) he was not convicted of an offense, and (2) the evidence that he

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committed the offense is insufficient. The State responds that, for adjudication/revocation purposes, (1) it was not required to obtain a final conviction to prove that Appellant committed a new offense, and (2) sufficient evidence— specifically, law enforcement testimony, the 9-1-1 call, and the video recording of the incident—establishes that Appellant committed the alleged offense.

To convict a person of the offense of assault, the State must establish, in relevant part, that the person intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to another. PENAL § 22.01(a)(1). “Bodily injury” as defined in the Penal Code includes “physical pain.” PENAL § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2025). “Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily injury.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Further, the term has been broadly interpreted to include “even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute more than mere offensive touching.” Clark v. State, 461 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)); Wingfield v. State, 282 S.W.3d 102, 105 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d). In addition to direct evidence that a victim experienced pain, the trier of fact “may infer that a victim actually felt or suffered physical pain because people of common intelligence understand pain and some of the natural causes of it.” Wingfield, 282 S.W.3d at 105; see also Clark, 461 S.W.3d at 248.

The State is correct that a final conviction—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—is not necessary to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant committed the offense of assault as alleged in its motion. See Beck v. State, 492 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Malveaux v. State, 482 S.W.2d 872, 873–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Carr v. State, 476 S.W.2d 329, 329–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). In fact, a defendant may be acquitted of a criminal offense, or the charge may be dismissed, and his community supervision may still be revoked

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based on the same underlying conduct. See Black v. State, 411 S.W.3d 25, 30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Polk v. State, 729 S.W.2d 749, 750 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)); Dickerson v. State, No. 11-18-00268-CR, 2020 WL 6373274, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Beck, 492 S.W.2d at 537).

Appellant’s remaining arguments that the State failed to prove he committed the alleged assault by a preponderance of the evidence are that (1) the 9-1-1 recording was “not under oath” and therefore unreliable, (2) the video recording was too dark to identify the person who purportedly committed the assault, (3) there was no medical or physical proof of an assault, and (4) he was hospitalized with sickle cell anemia the next day.

Notably, Appellant did not object to the admission of the 9-1-1 recording or the video recording, and they were, according to Detective Hutson, consistent with the responding officer’s offense report and Shayolanda’s statements to him that Appellant punched her several times, which caused her to experience pain. Although the assault occurs off camera in the video recording, the audio portion of the recording captures Shayolanda and her children yelling for the person who exited the vehicle to “stop.” Detective Hutson testified that he believed, based on all the available evidence, that Appellant had assaulted Shayolanda in the manner she described. As we and our sister court have said, physical or medical evidence of an assault is not required; pain, and therefore bodily injury may be inferred. See Clark, 461 S.W.3d at 248; Wingfield, 282 S.W.3d at 105. Furthermore, Appellant self- admitted to a hospital the day after the assault occurred.

The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be afforded their testimony, and may resolve any inconsistencies in their testimony. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Naquin, 607 S.W.2d at 586. Viewing the evidence presented at the adjudication/revocation hearing in the light most

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favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude its finding that Appellant committed a new offense—assaulting his sister—is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Garrett, 619 S.W.2d at 174.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. Although proof of only one of the alleged violations is sufficient to uphold the trial court’s decision to adjudicate/revoke, we turn now to the second alleged violation. Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26.

B. Appellant Failed to Report In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it made a finding of “true” on the allegation that he failed to report to his supervising probation officer in June 2024 because he informed the officer on the day of the appointment that he was in New York for work, he explained why he was not able to report in person, and he reported by phone, all of which show that he did not intentionally or knowingly fail to report.

Despite Appellant’s contention, a probationer’s community supervision may be revoked if he violates any term or condition, including a violation of any “technical” condition, such as a probationer’s failure to report. Worley v. State, No. 11-24-00106-CR, 2026 WL 1096919, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Nurridin v. State, 154 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)).

The terms and conditions of Appellant’s community supervision require that he report “no less than monthly.” As the State points out, the evidence shows that Appellant did not arrange or obtain permission from his supervising probation officer to report for the month of June 2024 in the manner in which he claims he did, and he was neither physically present in Tarrant County nor the State of Texas (without prior authorization, a separate violation) on the day of his required inperson appointment.

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The evidence presented was sufficient for the trial court to find that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant failed to report for the month of June 2024. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Naquin, 607 S.W.2d at 586. Thus, viewing the evidence presented at the adjudication/revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that this finding is also supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Garrett, 619 S.W.2d at 174.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

IV. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE

September 10, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.