Shelley H Moseley

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedJuly 22, 2025
Docket24-81498
StatusUnknown

This text of Shelley H Moseley (Shelley H Moseley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shelley H Moseley, (Ala. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

IN RE Case No. 24-81498-BPC Chapter 13 SHELLY H. MOSELEY, Debtor.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RULE 2004 MOTION Johnny Ray Jenkins, by and through Linda Gail Jenkins (“Creditor”), filed the Motion for Rule 2004 Discovery (the “Rule 2004 Request”) seeking the production of: all liability policies that cover the [D]ebtor, all declaration pages, and any coverage letters so that he can know (1) what is covered, (2) how much indemnity the [D]ebtor is entitled, (3) whether there is a deductible or self-insured retention, and if so how much, and (4) whether there are any coverage disputes between the [D]ebtor and the insurer.

(Doc. 34, ¶ 3). Creditor contends that the Rule 2004 Request is within the scope of Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Rule 2004”) because: (i) liability insurance is property of Debtor; (ii) there is good cause and the discovery is narrowly tailored; (iii) the Alabama Medical Liability Act (the “AMLA”) does not prohibit the discovery of the information that Creditor seeks in this Court; and (iv) Debtor waived the privilege afforded her under § 6-5-548(d) of the Alabama Code1 upon filing bankruptcy. (Doc. 43, p. 11). I. BACKGROUND Creditor’s claim (the “Claim”) arises from a pending lawsuit against Shelly H. Moseley (“Debtor”) and others in the Circuit Court of Talladega County, Alabama (the “State Court

1 § 6-5-548. Burden of proof; reasonable care as similarly situated health care provider; no evidence admitted of medical liability insurance. … (d) Notwithstanding any provision of the Alabama Rules of Evidence to the contrary, no evidence shall be admitted or received, whether of a substantive nature or for impeachment purposes, concerning the medical liability insurance, or medical insurance carrier, or any interest in an insurer that insures medical or other professional liability, of any witness presenting testimony as a “similarly situated health care provider” under the provisions of this section or of any defendant. The limits of liability insurance coverage available to a health care provider shall not be discoverable in any action for injury or damages or wrongful death, whether in contract or tort, against a health care provider for an alleged breach of the standard of care.

Ala. Code § 6-5-548(d). Litigation”),2 asserting a personal injury tort claim in the amount of $1,500,000 for alleged negligent and wanton activities engaged in by Debtor during her employment with Sylacauga Health Care Authority. (Doc. 30, ¶ 3). Debtor filed an objection to the Claim, inter alia, on the basis that it constituted, at best, an alleged contingent and unliquidated debt. (Doc. 22, ¶ 4). The Court sustained Debtor’s objection in part, and granted Creditor an allowed contingent, unsecured, disputed claim in the amount of $1.00 subject to amendment once it was liquidated. (Doc. 39). Creditor has not sought relief from the stay in this case to pursue the State Court Litigation against Debtor. However, Creditor asserts that “this Court may not liquidate, determine, estimate, or adjust personal injury claims against the [D]ebtor’s bankruptcy estate, unless the claimant consents, which [Creditor] does not.” (Doc. 30, ¶ 1) (internal citations omitted). In response to the Rule 2004 Request, Debtor argues that it is improper because there is pending litigation involving the parties in state court, and “Claim 8 remains a non-consumer, disputed, contingent, unliquidated debt.” (Doc. 37, ¶ 2-3). The Court finds it is not necessary to address each of Creditor’s separate arguments in support of the Rule 2004 Request because it is limited by the pending proceeding rule. II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Pursuant to Rule 2004, a bankruptcy court may order the examination or production of documents from any entity. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004. However, the “scope of [the] examination [or production] permitted . . . may relate only to the acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 840 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b)). Courts have understood the plain meaning of Rule 2004(a)—that “the court may order the examination of any entity”—as granting the bankruptcy court broad discretion to determine whether a Rule 2004 examination is appropriate. In re Gaime, No. 8:18-BK-05198- RCT, 2018 WL 7199806, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2018) (citing In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. at 840), clarified on denial of reconsideration, No. 8:18-BK-05198-RCT, 2019 WL 436749 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2019) (“The decision to grant or deny a request for Rule 2004 discovery rests in the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court.”). The burden of demonstrating good cause for seeking information under Rule 2004 is on the party seeking the information. See In re Defoor

2 Jenkins v. Sylacauga Health Care Authorities, et. al, Case No. 61-CV-20202-900381 (Cir. Ct. Talladega Cty. Ala. 2025) (pending). Ctr. LLC, 634 B.R. 630, 638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2021) (citing In re Gaime, 2018 WL 7199806, at *2). While the scope of a Rule 2004 examination is “unfettered and broad,” its availability is not unlimited. In re 3 Kings Constr. Residential LLC, No. 22-10965-PMB, 2024 WL 2264338, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 17, 2024) (“However, Rule 2004 examinations and requests for production are not without limits[.]”); In re No Rust Rebar, Inc., No. 21-12188-PDR, 2022 WL 17365810, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2022); In re Kelton, 389 B.R. 812, 820 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (“[T]here are limits to Rule 2004 examinations.”). The pending proceeding rule is one such limitation, as it limits the breadth of Rule 2004 examinations that may be typically afforded. In re Defoor Ctr. LLC, 634 B.R. at 639-40 (explaining that the pending proceeding rule limits otherwise broad Rule 2004 discovery). “Under the pending proceeding rule, Rule 2004 examinations are limited after . . . other litigation is filed because ‘a litigant might receive an unfair advantage in litigation because requests for production and examinations under Rule 2004 lack some of the procedural safeguards that exist for discovery conducted in pending litigation.’” In re Combs, 668 B.R. 896, 906 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2025) (citations omitted). When evaluating whether to permit Rule 2004 discovery in the face of parallel litigation, courts weigh a range of overlapping factors. See generally In re 3 Kings Constr. Residential LLC, 2024 WL 2264338; In re Kelton, 389 B.R. 812; In re Marathe, 459 B.R. 850 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836; In re Defoor Centre, LLC, 634 B.R. 630; In re SunEdison, 572 B.R. 482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re Sanomedics, Inc., No. 16-21659-RAM, 2018 WL 3816772 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 26, 2018). The relevant factors considered are discussed below. 1. Purpose of the Request and Its Relation to the Administration of the Bankruptcy Estate

Courts have denied Rule 2004 motions when the purpose of the request was to seek information unrelated to debtor’s financial affairs or the administration of the debtor’s estate. In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. at 840.

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