Shell v. Shell

819 S.E.2d 566, 261 N.C. App. 30
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedAugust 21, 2018
DocketCOA17-990
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 819 S.E.2d 566 (Shell v. Shell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shell v. Shell, 819 S.E.2d 566, 261 N.C. App. 30 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

STROUD, Judge.

*31 Plaintiffs and defendant Shell appeal a custody modification order changing primary physical custody from defendant Shell to defendant Green. Because the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the best interest of the children and that modification would be in their best interest, we affirm.

I. Background

This appeal arises from the modification of a 2012 custody order. Plaintiffs, David and Donna Shell, are the paternal grandparents of the children, Sam and Kim. 1 Defendant David Shell is the son of plaintiffs and father of Sam and Kim. Defendant Nicole Green is the children's mother and has married since the prior order and is now Nicole McKiernan. We will identify all parties by their relation to Sam and Kim. Therefore, *32 plaintiffs will be referred to as the "Grandparents," defendant Shell as "Father" and defendant Green as "Mother." Although both parents are "defendants," the interests of defendant Father are aligned with plaintiff Grandparents and are opposed to the interests of defendant Mother.

The prior custody order was entered in May 2012. Father was granted sole legal and physical custody of the children and Mother had visitation rights. At the time of the prior order, Father and the children resided with Grandparents; they still lived with Grandparents at the time of the hearing on the motion to modify custody. Father "has limited education and intelligence[,]" struggles with literacy, and "relies heavily on his parents." In 2011, Mother had admitted to Father she was using marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol to excess. She was also "spending time" with a man who later went to prison for selling methamphetamine. She had moved four times in the ten months prior to the hearing because she could not afford rent or utilities. She also could not keep a job, and she was fired or quit jobs several times. At the time of the 2012 hearing, the children were ages five and two. Mother's home was 45 minutes away from the older child's school. In August 2011, Grandmother went to her home and found it was strewn with trash and empty alcohol containers. One child had cut her foot on glass on the floor, and Grandmother took her away from Mother's home. In September 2011, Mother had posted nude photos on the internet, was drinking heavily, and was not making good decisions. Father was living with his parents in a stable home.

On 3 June 2016, Mother moved to modify custody alleging that since the prior custody order there had been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children because she had remained sober for several years, maintained a job for over two years, and gotten remarried. She also alleged *570 that Father had become more difficult to deal with regarding visitation. He refused to send the children's homework so the children could complete it during visits with Mother, and he denied Mother information about the children's school activities and would not allow her to participate.

On 17 and 30 January 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to modify custody. The trial court entered an order modifying custody on 6 February 2017, which determined there had been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children and modified custody, granting Father and Mother joint legal custody, with Mother receiving primary physical custody. Father and Grandparents appeal. 2

*33 II. Modification of Custody

Father first contends that "the trial court erred in finding that there were substantial changed circumstances since the entry of the last custodial order in May 2012 when little, if anything, had changed [and] any changes that did occur did not affect the welfare of the children" and even "assuming arguendo that there was a substantial change in circumstance materially affecting the children, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion by 'flipping' the previous custody arrangement and disrupting the children's stability and routine." (Original in all caps).

A. Standard of Review

It is well established in this jurisdiction that a trial court may order a modification of an existing child custody order between two natural parents if the party moving for modification shows that a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child warrants a change in custody. The party seeking to modify a custody order need not allege that the change in circumstances had an adverse effect on the child. While allegations concerning adversity are acceptable factors for the trial court to consider and will support modification, a showing of a change in circumstances that is, or is likely to be, beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody.
As in most child custody proceedings, a trial court's principal objective is to measure whether a change in custody will serve to promote the child's best interests. Therefore, if the trial court does indeed determine that a substantial change in circumstances affects the welfare of the child, it may only modify the existing custody order if it further concludes that a change in custody is in the child's best interests.
The trial court's examination of whether to modify an existing child custody order is twofold. The trial court must determine whether there was a change in circumstances and then must examine whether such a change affected the minor child. If the trial court concludes *34 either that a substantial change has not occurred or that a substantial change did occur but that it did not affect the minor child's welfare, the court's examination ends, and no modification can be ordered. If, however, the trial court determines that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of the child, the court must then examine whether a change in custody is in the child's best interests. If the trial court concludes that modification is in the child's best interests, only then may the court order a modification of the original custody order.
When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for the modification of an existing child custody order, the appellate courts must examine the trial court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Our trial courts are vested with broad discretion in child custody matters. This discretion is based upon the trial courts' opportunity to see the parties; to hear the witnesses; and to detect tenors, tones, and *571 flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
819 S.E.2d 566, 261 N.C. App. 30, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shell-v-shell-ncctapp-2018.