Sheldon v. Commissioner

6 T.C. 510, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 259
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMarch 19, 1946
DocketDocket Nos. 6203, 6204, 6205
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 6 T.C. 510 (Sheldon v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheldon v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 510, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 259 (tax 1946).

Opinion

OPINION.

Opper, Judge:

The parties appear to be in agreement that the exchange of stock of the old company for stock and debentures of the new was a tax-free reorganization under section 112. The controversy concerns a distribution of cash and other property received by petitioners as stockholders of the old company immediately prior to the merger. The purpose of this distribution, its place in the sequence of events, and the surrounding circumstances, lead to but one conclusion. They all demonstrate that it was an integral part of the reorganization transaction as a whole and must be treated in connection with it. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U. S. 179, 185.

We accordingly concur in petitioners’ assertion that this is a proper case for application of the principle that reorganization transactions are not to be broken down into their separate phases, but should be viewed as a whole.1 We also agree that the substance of the transaction rather than its form, the ultimate result reached rather than the mechanics used, are significant. Nevertheless, both parties resort to section 115 for their respective positions and rely upon one or another of its subsections to support their divergent views. We think that both err in this respect, and that the inescapable characterization of this transaction as one covered by the reorganization provisions requires that it be dealt with under section 112 and limits any applicability of section 115 accordingly. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U. S. 283. It follows that neither respondent’s attempt to characterize the entire distribution as a taxable dividend, under subsection (a) of section 115, nor petitioners’ to limit the transaction to a distribution in partial liquidation under subsection (c) of the same section can succeed. Cf. Sidney S. Munter, 5 T. C. 108; Spirella Co., 5 T. C. 876.

Since there is no issue as to the exchange of securities and the controversy limits itself to the cash and other property not permitted to be received without the recognition of gain, it is subsection (c) of section 1122 which is applicable. Both the language of subdivision (2) of that subsection and its legislative history3 require that it be applied to the present facts. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, supra.

Petitioners insist that the transaction amounted to no more in substance than a purchase by their corporation of the stock of other stockholders. They rely for this conclusion upon Fox v. Harrison (C. C. A., 7th Cir.), 145 Fed. (2d) 521. There are at least two reasons why this approach seems inadmissible. Unlike the facts in the Fox case, these petitioners retained the shares which were purchased and did not turn them in to the corporation. It is scarcely logical to view their purchase as a step toward eventual acquisition by the corporation when the ultimate outcome was their retention of the property purchased or its proceeds. Moreover, the distribution of cash and other property was not solely to the stockholders who had purchased the stock, but was a ratable division among them all according to the proportions of stock ownership; and the amount which petitioners did receive was considerably less than the purchase price paid out by them. The factual consequence was precisely that of the distribution of a taxable dividend and not even approximately what would have resulted had these petitioners in fact been acting for the corporation as they now claim to have been.

We think it clear that on the facts the distribution was for the purpose of equalizing the assets of the two merging corporations, not to reimburse petitioners for the purchase of the stock; that they purchased and retained the stock for themselves and not for the corporation nor for the other stockholders; and that the final result was, on the one hand, the acquisition and retention by them of a larger proportional interest in the old corporation, and, on the other, the receipt by them and the other stockholders of a distribution of the corporation’s profits which was in all respects the equivalent of a taxable dividend. See William E. Fulton, 15 B. T. A. 1018; affd. (App. D. C.), 47 Fed. (2d) 436.

There seems no doubt that there were post-1913 earnings and profits which would have been available to cover the entire amount of the distribution — a premise in which the parties apparently concur. The taxable portion, however, is limited by the gain received by the respective petitioners from the transaction. The figures appear in our findings from which these amounts can be computed.

Petitioners’ contribution to the Jamestown Fire Department Association should be allowed as a charitable contribution under section 23 (o) (2). See S. [M.] 1202, 1 C. B. 148; Roy C. McKenna, 5 T. C. 712.

Decision will be entered under Buie 50.

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Related

Johnson v. Commissioner
6 T.C.M. 633 (U.S. Tax Court, 1947)
Sheldon v. Commissioner
6 T.C. 510 (U.S. Tax Court, 1946)

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Bluebook (online)
6 T.C. 510, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheldon-v-commissioner-tax-1946.