Shehadeh v. City of Taylorville

2024 IL App (5th) 220829-U

Opinion

2024 IL App (5th) 220829-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 03/22/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0829 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

JAMAL SHEHADEH, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Christian County. ) v. ) No. 22-MR-34 ) THE CITY OF TAYLORVILLE, ) Honorable ) Douglas C. Gruenke, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint under the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020)) because his categorical request for all communications between two police chiefs on any topic was unduly burdensome (id. § 3(g)) where the public body provided an affidavit attesting that most or all of these communications would be exempt from disclosure and where the plaintiff either would not or could not articulate a more focused request. Because the request amounted to a fishing expedition, the public body’s burden of compliance outweighed any public interest in disclosure.

¶2 The plaintiff, Jamal Shehadeh, filed a complaint against the defendant, the City of

Taylorville (City), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West

2020)), alleging that the City violated FOIA when it denied his request for copies of all the

communications between the Taylorville chief of police and the chief of police for the Village of

Kinkaid after January 1, 2022. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff

appeals pro se, arguing that (1) communications between the two police chiefs are public records 1 subject to disclosure under FOIA; (2) the exemption for requests that are unduly burdensome (id.

§ 3(g)) does not apply; (3) the City was required to redact any information that was exempt and

provide the remaining information to the plaintiff (id. § 7(1)); (4) the trial court erred in failing to

conduct an in camera review of the requested records to determine which were exempt and which

were subject to disclosure (id. § 11(f)); and (5) civil penalties were warranted (id. § 11(j)). We

affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On March 1, 2022, the plaintiff sent the FOIA request at issue in this appeal to the city

clerk of Taylorville. The record indicates the request was received on March 8, 2022. In it, the

plaintiff requested paper copies of “all communications to and all communications from Dwayne

Wheeler and D.J. Mathon since” January 1, 2022. Wheeler is the Taylorville chief of police and

Mathon is the chief of police of the Village of Kincaid. In his request, the plaintiff stated that under

the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Opinion Number 16-006, issued in an unrelated case

involving other parties on August 9, 2016, the City was required to search Wheeler’s work and

personal phones, email accounts, and social media accounts for communications that were

responsive to his FOIA request. He requested that such a search be performed.

¶5 On April 5, 2022, the City’s FOIA officer sent the plaintiff a letter denying that request.

She explained that (1) communications sent to or from Wheeler are not “public records” within

the statutory definition under FOIA (see 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2020)); (2) such communications

are exempt from disclosure under several provisions (see id. § 7(1)(b), (1)(d)(i), (1)(d)(iv),

(1)(d)(v), (1)(d)(vi), (1)(d)(vii), (1)(e)); (3) the plaintiff’s request was unduly burdensome because

the plaintiff failed to identify which specific communications he sought that were not covered by

his previous FOIA requests and because conducting the requested search would require the City’s

2 police department to expend time and resources to review “numerous” communications, a burden

that outweighed “any public interest for such information” (see id. § 3(g)); and (4) complying with

the request would require the creation of a new record not ordinarily kept by the City (see Hites v.

Waubonsee Community College, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶ 75). The FOIA officer further noted

that the Public Access Opinion letter cited by the plaintiff involved different parties in another case

and was not binding on the City in this case. See Thomas v. County of Cook, 2023 IL App (1st)

211656, ¶ 18.

¶6 On May 2, 2022, the plaintiff filed a pro se motion for leave to file a FOIA complaint.1

The court granted that motion on May 12, and the plaintiff’s complaint was filed that day. In it, he

asserted that (1) none of the City’s claimed exemptions were applicable; (2) the City failed to

redact any exempt material pursuant to statute (see 5 ILCS 140/7(1) (West 2020)); and (3) the City

did not provide a detailed legal and factual basis for its denial of his request (see id. § 9(a), (b)).

He requested (1) a declaration that the City’s withholding of the requested information was

unlawful, willful, intentional, and in bad faith (see id. § 11(a)); (2) an order directing immediate

production of the requested documents (see id.); (3) costs (see id. § 11(i)); and (4) civil penalties

(see id. § 11(j)).

¶7 On June 15, 2022, the City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the requested

communications were not public records and were exempt from disclosure under the various

exemptions listed in the FOIA officer’s letter. The City further argued that FOIA does not create

an obligation for a public body to create records it does not ordinarily keep.

1 In October 2021, a Christian County judge entered an order finding the plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant and requiring that he obtain leave of the court before filing any new cases in Christian County. 3 ¶8 Attached to the City’s motion was the affidavit of Wheeler. In it, he attested that the City

does not maintain or store communications between himself and Mathon sent to or from his

personal devices other than any such communications that appear on the City’s website. He stated

as follows:

“Upon information and belief, Jamal Shehadeh is attempting to retrieve private ***

communications from my private or work issued devices to acquire information concerning

suspected or pending criminal investigations and prosecutions of persons *** and to obtain

the identity of all informants and complainants that [are] used by the City’s Police

Department or by Kincaid’s Police Department to identify, monitor, and investigate actual

or potential criminal persons or activities.”

Wheeler stated that releasing this type of information to jail inmates awaiting prosecution

jeopardizes security in the Christian County Correctional Center. He explained that providing this

information to inmates would disclose to them the identification, investigation, and observation

procedures related to such inmates or the identities of informants or complainants providing

information about them, thereby “perpetuating the risk of retaliation by inmates.” He further

explained that releasing such information to any individual under criminal investigation or facing

prosecution would enable the suspect to anticipate police response times and otherwise reveal to

the suspect information concerning the police department’s investigation, identification, and

observation procedures.

¶9 Wheeler went on to state that releasing information about individuals who serve as

informants or complainants to third parties would increase the risk of harm to those individuals as

well as the employees of both police departments who receive information from informants and

complaints. Finally, Wheeler noted that the plaintiff had submitted FOIA requests to the City

4 regularly since his incarceration began in March 2021 and that both Wheeler and Mathon were

involved in the investigation and criminal prosecution of the plaintiff. He stated that disclosing

their communications “could obstruct or interfere with” a pending federal prosecution of the

plaintiff.

¶ 10 On December 16, 2022, the court held a motion hearing. In support of its motion to dismiss,

the City first argued that communications between the two police chiefs were not public records

that were ordinarily kept by the City. Counsel explained that FOIA does not require public bodies

to create documents with information sought by a requestor; it only requires the disclosure of

existing documents. Second, the City argued that the records were exempt from disclosure under

section 7(e) (5 ILCS 140/7(e) (West 2020)) for security reasons.

¶ 11 The City’s attorney then called the court’s attention to Shehadeh v. Downey, 2020 IL App

(3d) 170158-U (Downey) as persuasive authority in support of the City’s second argument. That

case involved multiple FOIA requests made by the plaintiff in this case while he was an inmate in

Kankakee County, including copies of all text messages sent to or from the sheriff’s personal or

work cell phones, paper copies of all emails concerning the plaintiff that were sent to or from

certain corrections officials, and copies of all emails or other correspondence between Kankakee

County Sheriff’s Department employees concerning the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 8. The court ultimately

affirmed a decision of the trial court dismissing his FOIA complaint because the requested records

were exempt from disclosure under various provisions of FOIA. Id. ¶¶ 51-53. Counsel for the City

in this case argued that the unpublished decision in Downey was the law of the case and that it

5 could be cited as persuasive authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) after July 1,

2021. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023). 2

¶ 12 The plaintiff argued that the content of the requested documents, rather than their format,

was controlling. He stated, “The public body cannot escape its obligation to have transparent

business by using private phones and devices.” The plaintiff went on to argue that the statements

in Wheeler’s affidavit concerning the security risks involved in disclosing the communications

were speculative because Wheeler used “language like may or could.”

¶ 13 The court asked the plaintiff to explain how his request in this case differed from the

requests he made in Downey. In response, the plaintiff argued that section 7(e-10) was involved in

that case, an exemption applicable to requests by incarcerated individuals for records that relate to

other people. See 5 ILCS 140/7(e-10) (West 2020). (We note, parenthetically, that multiple

exemptions were at issue in Downey, including many of the exemptions at issue in this case.

Downey, 2020 IL App (3d) 170158-U, ¶¶ 47-48, 51-53, 55, 59.) The plaintiff argued, “This is

different because in Downey, I was requesting records between administrators while I was in

custody of the jail. Here, I’m requesting something outside the walls of the jail.”

¶ 14 The court noted that the request at issue in this case was “even more broad” than the

requests at issue in Downey. The court inquired, “What information could you specifically ask for

between [Wheeler and Mathon]? What types of communication would be allowed to be disclosed

to you? Give me an example.” The plaintiff responded as follows:

2 We note that under Rule 23(e)(1), only unpublished orders issued on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited as persuasive authority. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023). The Downey decision was issued on February 5, 2020. As such, it may not be cited as persuasive authority. Although the case could have been cited to support allegations of collateral estoppel, the City never cited it for this purpose. Nevertheless, the Downey decision does not play a role in our resolution of the questions before us in this appeal. 6 “Um, let’s say the, the police chief was of one jurisdiction was conveying to the police

chief of another jurisdiction a citizen’s complaint about the conduct of one of their officers

or somebody in the community saying, hey, you know, I saw this, this police officer cut

me off in traffic and didn’t use his turn signal, or I filed a complaint about some criminal

conduct and nobody to showed up to investigate what I was complaining about.”

The court noted that those types of documents would be held by the clerk. The plaintiff

acknowledged, “They are supposed to.”

¶ 15 The court then noted, “Well, it seems to me there would be more things that would be

exempt than are not exempt.” The court asked the plaintiff why he could not narrow his request.

The court told the plaintiff, “You are struggling to tell me what information might actually be

allowed to be sent to you based on your current situation and the content that you are requesting.”

The plaintiff replied, “That doesn’t fall on my shoulders to assert and prove, Your Honor.” He

emphasized that he did not know what was in the communications between the two police chiefs,

and he acknowledged that at least some of the communications between them were exempt from

disclosure.

¶ 16 In ruling from the bench, the court stated, “I find that the *** request in this situation based

on the situation of the requestor and the nature of the records being requested is most closely

parallel [to] the Shehadeh v. Downey case.” The court thus concluded that the records requested

were not public records or were exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, the court indicated that the

City’s motion to dismiss would be granted. In a docket entry that day, the court stated that the

plaintiff “has not filed a counter-affidavit; the request is similar to Shehadeh v. Downey and as a

result, the motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice.” This timely appeal followed.

7 ¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 The plaintiff argues that the court erred in dismissing his complaint because (1) the

requested communications between the two police chiefs are public records under FOIA; (2) the

exemption for unduly burdensome requests (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2020)) does not apply; (3) the

City was required to redact any information that was exempt and provide the remaining

information to the plaintiff (id. § 7(1)); and (4) the trial court did not conduct an in camera review

of the requested records to determine which were exempt and which were subject to disclosure (id.

§ 11(f)). The plaintiff also contends that civil penalties were warranted (id. § 11(j)), an issue not

reached by the trial court. We reject the plaintiff’s contention that the unduly burdensome

exemption is inapplicable. Because we find that the court’s ruling was correct on this basis alone,

we need not address his remaining contentions. See Mullins v. Evans, 2021 IL App (1st) 191962,

¶ 25 (stating that a reviewing court may affirm the trial court’s judgment on any basis appearing

in the record, regardless of whether the court relied upon that basis and regardless of whether its

reasoning was correct).

¶ 19 This appeal comes to us after the court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section

2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)). In ruling on section 2-619

motions, courts must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint, and we must view those

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kucinsky v. Pfister, 2020 IL App (3d)

170719, ¶ 33. A section 2-619 motion admits (or assumes) the legal sufficiency of the complaint,

but it asserts the existence of an affirmative defense or another matter that defeats the plaintiff’s

claim. Wilson v. Quinn, 2013 IL App (5th) 120337, ¶ 11. Our review is de novo. Neppl v. Murphy,

316 Ill. App. 3d 581, 583 (2000).

8 ¶ 20 The legislative purpose underlying FOIA is to make public records open to public scrutiny.

Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th)

130427, ¶ 20; see 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2020). As such, the records of public bodies are presumed

to be subject to disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2020). With certain enumerated exceptions,

public bodies must make “all public records” available for inspection or copying. Id. § 3(a).

Importantly, however, FOIA is not intended “ ‘to unduly burden public resources, or to disrupt the

duly-undertaken work of any public body.’ ” Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law,

Inc. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 171846, ¶ 18 (Shriver Center)

(quoting 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2016)). To that end, FOIA expressly provides that public bodies are

not required to comply with requests that are unduly burdensome. 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2020).

¶ 21 As noted previously, the parties in this case disputed whether the communications between

police chiefs requested by the plaintiff are “public records.” In pertinent part, FOIA defines public

records as “all records, ***, writings, [and] electronic communications *** pertaining to ***

public business” that are in the possession or under the control of a public body as that term is

defined under FOIA. Id. § 2(c). Although the statutory definition of a public body is broad (see id.

§ 2(a)), it does not include individuals such as police chiefs (see City of Champaign v. Madigan,

2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶ 30). However, police departments are public bodies within the

meaning of FOIA. See Carter v. Meek, 322 Ill. App. 3d 266, 269 (2001) (holding that a sheriff’s

department is a public body under FOIA). Here, Wheeler attested in his affidavit that the City of

Taylorville does not maintain copies of his communications that are sent to or from his personal

electronic devices. This statement was uncontradicted.

¶ 22 We recognize that other districts of the Illinois Appellate Court have found that

communications between individual public officials on their personal cell phones or other

9 electronic devices can become public records subject to disclosure under FOIA, at least under

some circumstances. See Better Government Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038,

¶¶ 19, 24; City of Champaign, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶¶ 41-43. We need not decide in this

case whether we will follow these holdings of our sister courts. We also need not decide whether

any of the communications at issue here would constitute public records subject to disclosure under

Better Government Ass’n or City of Champaign. This is because, as noted earlier, we find that the

court properly dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff’s request was overly broad and unduly

burdensome, and we affirm on that basis. As we will explain later, however, the fact that the

plaintiff’s request is for documents or records not ordinarily kept or maintained by the City is

pertinent to our analysis of the burden compliance with the request would place on the City.

¶ 23 Under section 3(g) of FOIA, a public body may refuse to comply with a request for records

if doing so “would be unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is no way to

narrow the request and the burden on the public body outweighs the public interest in the

information.” 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2020). A request imposes an undue burden on a public body

if it is overly broad and requires the public body to locate and review large quantities of documents

that are largely unnecessary to the requestor’s purpose. Shehadeh v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th)

120742, ¶ 25 (Shehadeh) (citing National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police

Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2010)).

¶ 24 To invoke the “unduly burdensome” exemption of section 3(g) of FOIA, a public body

must show three things: (1) that it received a categorical request calling for all records that fall

within a category, (2) that there is no way to narrow the request, and (3) that the burden of

compliance on the public body outweighs the public interest in the requested information. Shriver

Center, 2018 IL App (1st) 171846, ¶ 28 (citing 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2016)). The public body

10 must also give the requestor an opportunity to confer with it in an effort to narrow the scope of the

request. Id. If the requestor refuses to do so, the requirement that there be no way to narrow the

request may be deemed satisfied. See id.

¶ 25 Here, we find that all three requirements are satisfied. First, the plaintiff’s request for all

communications between the two police chiefs was unquestionably categorical and “patently broad

on its face.” See Shehadeh, 2013 IL App (4th) 120742, ¶ 28. The plaintiff did not even request

communications related to any specific investigation or topic.

¶ 26 Second, although it does not appear that the City asked the plaintiff to narrow or clarify his

request in its response, 3 when asked by the court why he could not narrow his request, the plaintiff

indicated that it was not his burden to do so and that he had no way to know what information was

in the communications unless the City provided him with an index listing the communications it

was withholding. This is tantamount to an admission that there is no way to narrow or clarify his

request.

¶ 27 Turning our attention to the final requirement—a showing that the burden of compliance

on the City outweighs the public interest in disclosure—we find guidance in the First District’s

decision in Shriver Center. That case involved requests by the Shriver Center to the Board of

Education of the City of Chicago (Board) for documents related to police conduct in Chicago

public schools. Shriver Center, 2018 IL App (1st) 171846, ¶ 1. The first request sought all

complaints the Board received about police officers and security guards inside Chicago public

schools between 2012 and 2016. Id. ¶ 4. The Board responded by explaining that compliance

would be unduly burdensome because (1) it did not maintain electronic databases of such

3 It is worth noting that this is one of numerous FOIA cases involving the same parties and that in at least one prior case, the plaintiff refused to narrow or clarify his request when a public body offered him the opportunity to do so. See Shehadeh, 2013 IL App (4th) 120742, ¶¶ 6, 32. 11 complaints and (2) the records of any such complaints would be in the form of paper files, emails,

and other records that could be located at “ ‘any or all of the District’s administrative offices

and/or’ ” at more than 600 individual schools. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. The Board invited the Shriver Center to

narrow or clarify its request. Id. ¶ 6.

¶ 28 The Shriver Center sent a second, narrower FOIA request before it received the Board’s

response to its first request. This time, it requested all reports involving alleged misconduct by “in-

school security officers” that were entered into the VERIFY system in 2014. Id. ¶ 7. The Board

again denied the request on the basis that compliance would be unduly burdensome. It explained

that because the VERIFY system did not have a field identifying which reports involved “in-school

police officers,” compliance would require review of the narrative descriptions in over 600 reports.

Id. The Board noted that it would also be required to redact any responsive reports to remove

students’ personal information and other information that was exempt from disclosure. Id.

¶ 29 In response to the Board’s invitation to further narrow or clarify its request, the Shriver

Center requested all reports of alleged employee misconduct entered into the VERIFY system

during 2014. Id. ¶ 8. The Board denied this request as well, explaining that reviewing all 635

responsive reports and redacting information in them that was exempt from disclosure would be

unduly burdensome. Id.

¶ 30 After the third denial, the Shriver Center filed a FOIA complaint against the Board. Id. ¶ 9.

The trial court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss the complaint, agreeing with the Board that

the Shriver Center’s requests were unduly burdensome. Id. ¶¶ 9-11.

¶ 31 In reviewing this ruling on appeal, the First District noted that there was no dispute that the

Shriver Center’s requests were categorical or that the Shriver Center refused to narrow or clarify

its requests further after the Board’s third denial. The court thus framed the question before it as

12 “whether the burden of compliance outweighed the public interest in the records sought.” Id. ¶ 28.

The court noted that the Board “provided a detailed written response” to each of the three FOIA

requests (id. ¶ 35) and concluded that these responses provided “a clear and convincing showing

of the burden compliance would place on the Board” (id. ¶ 39). The court went on to consider

whether the trial court “erred in concluding that burden outweighed the public’s interest in the

records that [the] Shriver [Center] sought.” Id.

¶ 32 In addressing this question, the Shriver Center argued that the public interest in the records

it requested stemmed from “ ‘an alarming national trend’ whereby ‘primarily children of color are

funneled out of public schools and into the juvenile justice system.’ ” Id. The court agreed that this

was a “matter[ ] of great public concern.” Id. However, the court found that the burden of

compliance “outweigh[ed] the possibility that such a broad search would yield material that is

necessary to [the] Shriver [Center]’s stated purpose.” Id. ¶ 40. The court went on to explain that if

the Shriver Center had requested records related to misconduct it had reason to suspect had

occurred at a particular school or by a specific officer “or if it had focused its requests on the

schools with the highest student arrest rates, the burden would be lower and the public interest

higher.” Id. ¶ 41. However, the court found that the broad requests made instead amounted to a

request for “an opportunity to engage in a fishing expedition through the Board’s files, in the hopes

of finding that some officer or guard, in some school, engaged in some sort of misconduct that

may have contributed to a school-to-prison pipeline.” Id. The court thus affirmed the trial court’s

dismissal of the Shriver Center’s complaint. Id. ¶¶ 41, 43.

¶ 33 Here, the plaintiff’s request likewise amounts to a fishing expedition in hopes of finding

any records that might constitute public records within the meaning of FOIA that are not exempt

from disclosure. Unlike the Shriver Center, however, the plaintiff here does not even point to a

13 specific issue about which he hopes to discover information through the records he is seeking,

much less an issue that is a matter of public interest. As we have discussed, when asked by the

court to narrow his request, the plaintiff stated that he was not required to do so.

¶ 34 We recognize that the City did not explain the burden that compliance would impose on it

in as much detail as the Board did in Shriver Center. Nevertheless, in the face of a request that is

so vague it does not even identify a purpose for which the records are being sought, we find its

explanation to be more than adequate. The City pointed out that it would need to sift through a

large number of communications between two police chiefs—communications that it does not

ordinarily maintain as records. It is worth noting that, because the City does not maintain copies

of its police chief’s communications with other police chiefs, it would first need to obtain the

records, something that would obviously add to its burden of compliance. The City also stated that

many or most of the communications would come within the numerous statutory exemptions

applicable to law enforcement records. See 5 ILCS 140/7(1) (West 2020). Thus, much of the

material would be unnecessary towards his purpose. See Shehadeh, 2013 IL App (4th) 120742,

¶ 25 (citing National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 17).

¶ 35 It would have been preferable for the City to provide at least an estimate of the number of

records, or the amount of time involved in obtaining and sifting through them and redacting exempt

information. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff has not identified a purpose for his request or any

public interest that would be served by complying with it, and because much of the material would

be exempt from disclosure, we find that the City has carried its burden of demonstrating that the

burden on it outweighs any nominal public interest that might, theoretically, be served by

complying with the plaintiff’s request.

14 ¶ 36 In support of his claim that the unduly burdensome requirement does not apply, the plaintiff

addresses only the last of the three requirements. He contends that the record contains “no

information to weigh the alleged burden against public interest of disclosure.” While we agree that

the City should have provided more detailed information concerning the burden of compliance,

we cannot accept this argument. As we have just explained, the plaintiff’s request amounts to a

request to go on a fishing expedition for any information on any topic that might be subject to

disclosure.

¶ 37 Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the City erroneously “conflate[d] the § 3(g) unduly

burdensome and § 3.6 voluminous requests provisions.” See 5 ILCS 140/3(g), 3.6 (West 2020).

We note that sections 3(g), governing the exemption for unduly burdensome requests, and section

3.6, governing voluminous requests, have overlapping application. Section 3.6 allows a public

body to treat a request as a voluminous request whether the public body ultimately decides to

comply with the request, assert specific statutory exemptions, or deny the request because it is

unduly burdensome. See id. § 3.6(c)(ii), (iii), (iv). The statute simply allows a responding public

body that invokes this provision to extend its deadline for response by 10 business days (id.

§ 3.6(d)), rather than the 5 days normally allowed (see id. § 3(e)), and to charge a fee to the

requestor before copying the requested documents (id. § 3.6(c)(i)). Here, the City’s response

clearly addressed the requirements for claiming that compliance with a request is unduly

burdensome. It is unclear how the plaintiff believes the City “conflated” the two provisions.

¶ 38 The plaintiff asserts, however, that the difference between sections 3.6 and section 3(g) of

FOIA is “the public body’s ability to identify precisely what records the request seeks,” although

he cites no authority in support of this proposition. He further asserts that courts have found

15 requests for public records to be unduly burdensome “when a public body would not know where

to begin when it comes to identifying and locating the records.”

¶ 39 In support of this contention, the plaintiff cites Shriver Center and Greer v. Board of

Education of the City of Chicago, 2021 IL App (1st) 200429. However, neither case contains any

such language, much less any language that a request is only unduly burdensome if the public body

“would not know where to begin” identifying or locating requested records. Rather, as we

explained earlier, the undue burden exemption applies when a request is overly broad and requires

the public body to locate and review large quantities of documents that are largely unnecessary to

the requestor’s purpose (Shehadeh, 2013 IL App (4th) 120742, ¶ 25 (citing National Ass’n of

Criminal Defense Lawyers, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 17) and where the three requirements we discussed

earlier are satisfied. For the reasons we have already discussed, we find that the exemption is

applicable here. As such, we conclude that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 42 Affirmed.