Shedrick Joseph Baptiste v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00504-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued May 6, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00504-CR ——————————— SHEDRICK JOSEPH BAPTISTE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 228th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1374819

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Shedrick Joseph Baptiste guilty of indecency with a child by

contact and assessed punishment of five years’ confinement. The trial court

entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and sentenced him accordingly. The trial

court also imposed a “Child Abuse Prevention Fine” and assessed court costs. Baptiste appeals. We modify the judgment by striking the Child Abuse Prevention

Fine and affirm the judgment as modified, including Baptiste’s conviction,

sentence, and court costs.

I. Background

Baptiste’s appellate issues involve procedural defects in the conduct of the

trial and the imposition of punishment. Therefore, a detailed recitation of the

underlying facts is unnecessary. It is sufficient to say Baptiste’s daughter testified

that he molested her on multiple occasions when she was a child.

II. Analysis

Baptiste raises seven issues on appeal. First, he contends the indictment was

invalid because it was not signed by the grand jury’s foreperson. Second, he

contends the judgment is void because an associate judge, and not the district

judge, conducted voir dire. Third, he contends he was deprived of the right to a

fair and impartial jury because the associate judge read the indictment to the venire

members during voir dire. Baptiste’s fourth, fifth, and sixth issues complain about

imposition of the $100 Child Abuse Prevention Fine. And Baptiste’s seventh issue

challenges the trial court’s assessment of court costs.

A. Signature on indictment

In his first issue, Baptiste claims the indictment is invalid because it was

signed by the assistant grand-jury foreperson, not its foreperson. According to

2 Baptiste, the lack of the foreperson’s signature renders the indictment insufficient

under article 21.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 21.02 lists a

series of “requisites” that an indictment must have to be “deemed sufficient,” one

of which is that the indictment “shall be signed officially by the foreman of the

grand jury.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02(9). Baptiste contends the

insufficiency of the indictment means the trial court never obtained personal

jurisdiction over him and the judgment against him is void.

Assuming Baptiste preserved this issue, the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals has rejected it. See Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000) (citing article 21.02 and holding the “lack of a signature is of no

consequence in this matter, and is, in fact, not essential to the validity of an

indictment”); Tatmon v. State, 815 S.W.2d 588, 589, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

(same); Owens v. State, 540 S.W.2d 324, 325–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (same);

see also Nwosoucha v. State, 325 S.W.3d 816, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (applying Riney and Owens).

Baptiste argues the Court of Criminal Appeals overlooked the 1966 changes

to article 27.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 27.09 provides in

relevant part, “Exceptions to the form of an indictment or information may be

taken for . . . want of any requisite prescribed by Articles 21.02 and 21.21.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 27.09(2).

3 But in Tatmon, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressly considered the 1966

changes to article 27.09 and nonetheless concluded that “the absence of [the grand

jury foreman’s] signature did not adversely affect the validity of the indictment.”

815 S.W.2d at 590. Accordingly, we hold the signature of the assistant grand-jury

foreperson on Baptiste’s indictment did not render it invalid. We overrule

Baptiste’s first issue.

B. Voir dire by associate judge

In his second issue, Baptiste argues his conviction is void because voir dire

was conducted by an associate judge. Baptiste acknowledges that two provisions

of the Government Code permit this practice. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

§§ 54A.006(d) (“An associate judge may select a jury.”), 54A.008(a)(15) (“Except

as limited by an order of referral, an associate judge to whom a case is referred

may . . . select a jury.”). He nonetheless contends these statutes are

unconstitutional because they violate article V, sections 1, 7, and 8 of the Texas

Constitution. Section 1 gives Texas district courts their “judicial power,” section 7

requires Texas to be divided into judicial districts, “with each district having one or

more Judges as may be provided by law or by this Constitution,” and section 8

grants district courts original jurisdiction over felony cases. TEX. CONST. art. V,

§§ 1, 7, 8.

4 Baptiste contends that, read together, these constitutional provisions give

district courts the power to “hear” felony cases and district judges the power to

preside over felony cases. He does not claim these provisions ban associate judges

altogether but argues, under the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Howard v.

State, they prohibit associate judges from making “ultimate judicial

determinations.” 690 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Baptiste cites

authorities recognizing the importance of voir dire, from which he gleans that voir

dire “appears to” involve “an ultimate judicial determination” and thus a judicial

power that an associate judge cannot exercise. We reject Baptiste’s argument.

First, the Howard Court held that magistrates were permitted to preside over

matters allowed by statute: “simply because a part of the proceedings involve

ultimate judicial determination, a magistrate is not prohibited from acting upon

those matters authorized by [statute].” 690 S.W.2d at 255. Very recently, the

Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that “Howard supports a conclusion that the

associate judge is clearly authorized to pick a jury because Government Code

§ 54A.006(d) specifically provides that one of the matters that can be referred to an

associate judge in a criminal case is the selection of a jury.” Allen v. State, No.

14-23-00761-CR, 2025 WL 978216, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr.

1, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

5 Second, in Clifton v. State, we explained that article V, section 7 did not bar

associate judges from presiding over voir dire:

Although Article V, Section 7 of the Texas Constitution authorizes elected district court judges to preside over cases pending in district courts, Article V, Section 7 neither vests district court judges with the exclusive authority to do so nor expressly prohibits an unelected judge, including an associate judge, from presiding over any aspect of a felony trial, including voir dire. . . . Thus, contrary to [the defendant’s] arguments, the plain language of the Texas Constitution does not bar associate judges from conducting voir dire in criminal cases.

No. 01-22-00641-CR, 2023 WL 5437181, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Aug. 24, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The

Fourteenth Court also addressed this issue, holding “[we] reject appellant’s

argument that the Texas Constitution expressly provides that only district judges

have the power to preside over all aspects of a criminal case and conclude the

judgment here is not void.” Allen, 2025 WL 978216, at *7. Baptiste contends our

holding in Clifton is “radical” because it means “the Texas Constitution is no bar to

associate judges conducting entire trials.” But Clifton’s conclusion was limited to

the aspect of trial before us—voir dire. 2023 WL 5437181, at *12. Hence, there is

nothing in article V, section 7 of the Texas Constitution—by itself or in

combination with sections 1 and 8—barring associate judges from conducting voir

dire.

6 Baptiste also relies on the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius,

which is a statutory-construction aid that means “the expression of one thing

implies exclusion of other, unexpressed, things.” State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853,

866 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Williams v. State, 965 S.W.2d 506, 507

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). He asks us to apply this maxim to article V, section 7 of

the Texas Constitution to conclude its provisions that district judges preside over

district courts implicitly mean they do so to the exclusion of associate judges. We

decline to do so.

Assuming expressio unius can be applied to the Texas Constitution,1 it “is

not an inflexible rule but is merely an aid in construction.” Ex Parte Campbell,

267 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Expressio unius “applies only when

the statute under consideration is intended to serve as a comprehensive treatment

of a topic or when it relates to a specific exception to a general rule.” Ford v.

State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 537 n.27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Zapata v. State,

707 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (recognizing expressio unius “must

be applied with great caution, since its application depends so much on context,”

and the “maxim does not mean that anything not required is forbidden”).

Article V, section 7 of the Texas Constitution is not an exception to the

general rule, and there is no indication in the text to suggest it is intended to be the

1 See Ex Parte Hart, 41 Tex. Crim. 581, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900) (“The doctrine of ‘expressio unius est exclusion alterius’ does not apply to state constitutions.”). 7 sole and comprehensive treatment of district courts or district judges. Therefore,

expressio unius does not apply to article V, section 7 to require that only district

judges may preside over matters in district courts to the exclusion of all other

judicial officers. See Allen, 2025 WL 978216, at *6–7; see also Clifton, 2023 WL

5437181, at *12. If Baptiste’s application of expressio unius were correct, then the

Texas Constitution would allow no place for associate judges. But as Baptiste

concedes, “[t]he fact that associate judges exist . . . is not a constitutional

problem.” As we stated in Clifton, “[t]he Texas Legislature may enact any laws

not expressly or inferentially prohibited by the Texas Constitution or the United

States Constitution.” 2023 WL 5437181, at *10 (citing Jones v. Williams, 45

S.W.2d 130, 137 (Tex. 1931)). Because “the Texas Constitution does not bar

associate judges from conducting voir dire in criminal cases,” the Legislature was

free to empower them to do so in Texas Government Code sections 54A.006(d)

and 54A.008(a)(15). Id. at *12.

We overrule Baptiste’s second issue.

C. Reading indictment during voir dire

Baptiste’s third issue complains that the associate judge read the indictment

to the full venire panel during voir dire. He contends Texas law requires an

indictment to be read to the petit jury at the beginning of trial, after it has been

empaneled, and not to the venire panel during voir dire. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

8 PROC. art. 36.01(a). Baptiste argues the trial court’s failure to follow this

procedure means “the entire voir dire process was based on facts peculiar to the

case on trial,” thus depriving him of an impartial jury. Baptiste concedes he “did

not complain of [the associate judge’s] reading of the indictment when it occurred”

but contends this is fundamental error under article I, sections 10 and 15 of the

Texas Constitution that he can raise for the first time on appeal. See TEX. CONST.

art. I, §§ 10 (providing for “speedy trial by an impartial jury”), 15 (providing “right

of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”).

In Allen, our sister court rejected the argument that the trial court’s reading

the indictment during voir dire was fundamental error involving the right to be

tried by an impartial jury that could be raised for the first time on appeal. 2025

WL 978216, at *8; see also White v. State, Nos. 01-02-00420-CR,

01-02-00421-CR, 2003 WL 22413405, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct.

23, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (appellant waived

argument “he was denied a fair trial because the trial court abused its discretion in

reading the indictments during voir dire”). We agree and conclude that Baptiste’s

failure to object means the issue is not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a).

We overrule Baptiste’s third issue.

9 D. Child Abuse Prevention Fine

In his fourth, fifth, and six issues, Baptiste contends the trial court

improperly assessed a $100 Child Abuse Prevention Fine under Code of Criminal

Procedure art. 102.0186. The State expressed this fine should be stricken from the

judgment because it was assessed under article 102.0186 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, which states that a person “shall pay a fine of $100 on conviction of

[certain offenses],” one of which is indecency with a child. TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 102.0186(a). But Article 102.0186 took effect on January 1, 2020. See

Act of June 15, 2019, 86th Leg. R.S., 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 1352 § 5.01.

Baptiste committed the offense involved here in 2005, well before the effective

date of article 102.0186. The State thus observes that article 102.0186 is

inapplicable to Baptiste’s offenses and asks us to strike the fine from the trial

court’s judgment. Baptiste agrees.

Accordingly, we strike the $100 Child Abuse Prevention Fine from the

judgment. We overrule Baptiste’s fourth, fifth, and sixth issues as moot.

E. Court costs

In his seventh issue, Baptiste argues the trial court erred by assessing $290

in court costs. He points out that these costs were imposed under provisions of the

Texas Local Government Code that took effect on January 1, 2020, whereas he

committed the offenses involved here in 2005. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE

10 §§ 133.102(a), 134.101(a) (collectively, the “Cost Act”). Baptiste thus asks that

we remand the case to the trial court for a correct assessment of court costs. And

the State initially agreed the assessment of court costs was incorrect.

But after briefing concluded, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided

Bradshaw v. State, 707 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). Bradshaw considers

the effect of Texas Government Code § 51.608 on the Cost Act. Id. at 416–20.

Section 51.608 provides, “[n]otwithstanding any other law that establishes the

amount of a court cost collected . . . the amount of a court cost imposed on the

defendant in a criminal proceeding must be the amount established under the law

in effect on the date the defendant is convicted of the offense.” TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 51.608 (emphasis added). The Bradshaw Court held that, under this provision of

the Government Code, when a defendant commits an offense prior to January 1,

2020, but is convicted of that offense after January 1, 2020, he is subject to the

current version of the Cost Act. 707 S.W.3d at 418–20. Based on Bradshaw, the

State asks that we affirm the trial court’s imposition of $290 in court costs under

the current version of the Cost Act.

We agree. Under Bradshaw, the trial court’s imposition of $290 in court

costs under the current version of the Cost Act was correct because Baptiste was

convicted in 2023, even though he committed the offense in 2005. Id.; see also

TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 133.102(a), 134.101(a); Joseph v. State, No.

11 01-23-00937-CR, 2025 WL 714982, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

6, 2025, no pet.) (en banc, per curiam) (holding based on Bradshaw that while the

offense at issue was committed prior to January 2020, the current version of the

Cost Act applied because the appellant was convicted after January 1, 2020). We

overrule Baptiste’s seventh issue.

III. Conclusion

We modify the trial court’s judgment by striking from it the $100 Child

Abuse Prevention Fine. We affirm the remainder of the modified judgment,

including Baptiste’s conviction, sentence, and court costs.

Andrew Johnson Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).