NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-3357-24 A-3412-24
SHAWN G. HOPKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF HUNTERDON, the RECORDS CUSTODIAN of the COUNTY OF HUNTERDON and HUNTERDON COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION,
Defendants-Respondents. ______________________________
Plaintiff-Respondent,
COUNTY OF HUNTERDON, the RECORDS CUSTODIAN of the COUNTY OF HUNTERDON and HUNTERDON COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION,
Defendants-Appellants. ______________________________
Submitted April 15, 2026 – Decided April 30, 2026
Before Judges Gummer and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. L-0041-25.
Shawn G. Hopkins, self-represented appellant in A- 3357-24 and self-represented respondent in A-3412-24.
Savo, Schalk, Corsini, Warner, Gillespie, O'Grodnick & Fisher, PA, attorneys for appellants in A-3412-24 and respondents in A-3357-24 (Matthew R. Flynn, of counsel and on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Shawn G. Hopkins and defendants County of Hunterdon, the
Records Custodian of the County of Hunterdon, and the Hunterdon County
Board of Taxation appeal from an order denying plaintiff's application for the
production of records under Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-
1 to -13.1 Plaintiff argues, among other things, the trial court erred in finding
the production of the records would violate County residents' reasonable
expectation of privacy under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Defendants contend the court
correctly denied plaintiff's application but erred in not applying OPRA's
1 We consolidate these back-to-back appeals for purposes of issuing a single opinion. A-3357-24 2 third-party-records exclusion under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1). Because the court
did not conduct an in camera review of the records before rendering its decision,
we vacate the order and remand with instructions for the court to conduct an in
camera review and consider its decision anew.
I.
On December 5, 2024, plaintiff filed an OPRA request with the County
seeking: "[a]ny electronic data files provided to BRT [T]echnologies by the
Hunterdon County Board of Taxation in relationship to the contract between
Hunterdon County Board of Taxation and BRT Technologies for [a]utomated
[d]ata [p]rocessing [s]ervices." Plaintiff also requested "[a] copy of [b]id
[s]pecifications entitled: Furnish Automated Data Processing Services for the
Board of Taxation, County of Hunterdon. Dated April 6, 2023."
In a December 12, 2024 email, County Counsel Katrina Doyle informed
plaintiff the County had "uploaded the Bid specification" but had not provided
the Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) data files he requested. Citing
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1), Doyle explained "[t]hose files are not the County's
records. They are the records of the individual municipalities ." She told
plaintiff he "should make [his] request for this data to the individual
municipalities."
A-3357-24 3 Responding to the email, plaintiff disputed the County's contention it did
not own the CAMA data at issue and made factual assertions based on his
understanding of the role and duties of the County Tax Administrator and his
interpretation of language in "[t]he bid contract." In reply, Doyle asserted the
County "does not create, maintain or store the data for any of the CAMA files"
and "does not have any authority to make any changes to the CAMA files."
According to Doyle, the County "as a service to its municipalities, ha[d]
enter[ed] a shared service agreement with [the] vendor to provide the software
necessary to maintain the municipality's CAMA files," thereby enabling "the
municipalities to all utilize the same vendor and get the best rate for the
software." Doyle interpreted the contract as requiring "the municipalities to
work directly with the vendor to make any changes to the municipality's dat a"
and authorizing the vendor "to work directly with the municipality, as it is their
data." She contended the County Tax Administrator's "supervis[ion of] the
performance of the municipal tax assessors . . . . d[id] not give [the
Administrator] any ownership rights over the municipal assessor's work
product."
In a December 16, 2024 post on the County's online OPRA portal, the
County confirmed it was providing a copy of the bid information but not the
A-3357-24 4 electronic data files because the County "d[id] not maintain" those files. The
County suggested plaintiff might "wish to contact the individual municipalities
directly to obtain th[at] information."
On January 20, 2025, plaintiff filed a verified complaint based on
defendants' denial of his OPRA request for access to the CAMA data files. He
subsequently filed an application for an order to show cause seeking a judgment
requiring defendants to produce the data files.
Defendants submitted a letter brief in opposition to plaintiff's application.
In the letter brief, defense counsel made factual assertions about the software
programs the vendor had provided, how individual municipal tax accessors work
with the vendor, and the transmission of the data. Counsel's factual assertions
were not supported by an affidavit or certification of someone with personal
knowledge about the records. See R. 1:6-6 (requiring "affidavits made on
personal knowledge" to support "facts not appearing of record, or not judicially
noticeable"). Defense counsel described the records sought by plaintiff as "[t]he
work product and data . . . of the individual municipalities, . . . created and
maintained by the individual municipal tax assessors and . . . only made
available to the County by way of remote access."
A-3357-24 5 Based on that information, defense counsel contended defendants were
not in possession of the records pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1). Defense
counsel also asserted "the CAMA data may contain references to bedroom size
and layout, the location of burglar alarms, safes, panic rooms, or security
systems and may contain notes from the individual assessor." Defense counsel
argued "[t]he private nature of that information create[d] minimally a colorable
claim of privacy."
The court heard argument. In a May 16, 2025 oral decision and May 19,
2025 order, the court denied plaintiff's order-to-show-cause application and
request for an order requiring the production of the CAMA data files.2 The court
appeared to reject defendants' argument based on the third-party-records
exclusion set forth in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1). The court quoted the statutory
language and stated, "That's not the case here." The court described the
information stored in the CAMA data files as "tax assessors' information after
inspections of premises." The court found the data "does or might contain . . .
clearly private information" and, thus, fell within the privacy exception of
2 In the order, the court did not expressly dismiss the complaint with prejudice. However, given that the court resolved the issues raised by plaintiff in the complaint, we understand the order to be a final judgment and appealable pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(1). A-3357-24 6 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. The court held "plaintiff has no need of access because the
plaintiff could go to each individual municipality and let them fight it out there."
On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in allowing defendants to raise
the privacy exception under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, finding it applied and not finding
defendants were collaterally estopped from denying access to the records. In
their appeal, defendants argue the court erred in not applying the
third-party-records exclusion under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1).
II.
A trial court's factual findings are "binding on appeal when supported by
adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Horne v. Edwards, 477 N.J. Super.
302, 312 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of
Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); see also C.E. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist., 481
N.J. Super. 172, 179 (App. Div. 2025) (finding our review of a trial court's
"supported factual findings" is deferential). "A trial court's interpretation of the
law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled
to any special deference." Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 216 (2014) (quoting
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995)). "We review questions of law de novo." T.L. v. Goldberg, 238 N.J.
218, 228 (2019) (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386
A-3357-24 7 (2016)).
Because the meaning of a statute is a question of law, we review a trial
court's statutory interpretation de novo. Fuster v. Twp. of Chatham, 259 N.J.
533, 546 (2025). Thus, "determinations about the applicability of OPRA and its
exemptions are legal conclusions . . . subject to de novo review." Id. at 547
(omission in original) (quoting In re N.J. Firemen's Ass'n Obligation, 230 N.J.
258, 273-74 (2017)). In performing that de novo review, we are guided by the
well-established principles of statutory construction.
When interpreting a statute, we "determine and give effect to the
Legislature's intent." In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020) (quoting N.J. Dep't
of Child. & Fams., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20 (2013)).
"[S]tatutory construction begins with an examination of the plain language of
the statute, 'ascrib[ing] to the . . . words their ordinary meaning and
significance.'" State v. Higginbotham, 257 N.J. 260, 280 (2024) (omission and
second alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492
(2005)). "We 'may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature
nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed
by way of the plain language.'" Ibid. (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484,
488 (2002)). "[W]e 'strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of the
A-3357-24 8 statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous,
void or insignificant.'" Fuster, 259 N.J. at 547 (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of Hum.
Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 172 (1999)). To determine legislative intent, we "look not
only at the particular statutory language but also to the design of the statute as a
whole." Est. of DeMartino v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 373 N.J.
Super. 210, 219 (App. Div. 2004).
"The Legislature passed OPRA in 2001 to replace the then-existing Right
to Know Law, L. 1963, c. 73, which 'did not keep pace with the vast
technological advances that changed the ways citizens and public officials
communicate and store information.'" Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24, 38
(2021) (quoting Paff v. Galloway Twp., 229 N.J. 340, 352 (2017)). "Our state
boasts 'of a long and proud tradition[] of openness and hostility to secrecy in
government.'" Id. at 37 (alteration in original) (quoting Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J.
Dep't of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 283 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"To further enhance government transparency, OPRA was enacted 'to maximize
public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry
and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process.'" Id. at 37-38 (quoting
Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008)).
"OPRA is designed to provide the public with 'ready access to government
A-3357-24 9 records.'" Libertarians for Transparent Gov't v. Cumberland Cnty., 250 N.J. 46,
54 (2022) (quoting Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009)). "The
law declares at the outset that 'all government records shall be subject to public
access unless exempt.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1); see also Gannett
Satellite Info. Network, LLC v. Twp. of Neptune, 254 N.J. 242, 248 (2023)
(finding the Legislature "designed [OPRA] to give members of the public ready
access to government records unless the statute exempts them from disclosure."
(quoting Rivera v. Union Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 250 N.J. 124, 140-41 (2022))
(internal quotation marks omitted)). "Plus 'any limitations on the right of access
. . . shall be construed in favor of the public's right of access.'" Libertarians for
Transparent Gov't, 250 N.J. at 54 (omission in original) (quoting N.J.S.A.
47:1A-1). "The statute broadly defines the term 'government record.'" Ibid.
"The phrase includes any documents 'made, maintained or kept on file in the
course of . . . official [government] business.'" Ibid. (alteration and omission
in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1).
"Although OPRA favors broad public access to government records, it is
'not intended [to be] a research tool [that] litigants may use to force government
officials to identify and siphon useful information.'" Simmons, 247 N.J. at 38
(alterations in original) (quoting In re N.J. Firemen's Ass'n Obligation, 230 N.J.
A-3357-24 10 at 276). "The public's right to disclosure, while broad, is not unlimited." Bozzi
v. City of Jersey City, 248 N.J. 274, 284 (2021). "OPRA itself makes plain that
'the public's right of access [is] not absolute.'" Kovalcik v. Somerset Cnty.
Prosecutor's Off., 206 N.J. 581, 588 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
Educ. Law Ctr., 198 N.J. at 284).
While providing for public access to government records, the Legislature
in enacting OPRA also "declare[d] that a public agency must 'safeguard from
public access a citizen's personal information with which it has been entrusted
when disclosure thereof would violate the citizen's reasonable expectation of
privacy.'" Brennan v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 233 N.J. 330, 337 (2018)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1); see also Burnett, 198 N.J. at 423 (finding OPRA
"imposes an obligation on public agencies to protect against disclosure of
personal information which would run contrary to reasonable privacy
interests"). Thus, OPRA "calls for a careful balancing of competing interests --
the right of access to government records versus the need to protect personal
information." Libertarians for Transparent Gov't, 250 N.J. at 54.
To balance those interests, courts examine the following factors when a
records custodian "present[s] a colorable claim that public access to the records
requested would invade a person's objectively reasonable expectation of
A-3357-24 11 privacy," Brennan, 233 N.J. at 342:
(1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized public interest militating toward access.
[Id. at 340 (quoting Burnett, 198 N.J. at 428).]
Plaintiff argues the court should not have considered defendants'
privacy-interest argument under the doctrines of judicial, promissory, and
collateral estoppel. We disagree.
"[J]udicial estoppel is an 'extraordinary remedy,' which should be invoked
only 'when a party's inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage
of justice.'" C.P. v. Governing Body of Jehovah's Witnesses, 477 N.J. Super.
129, 143 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal
Prods., 334 N.J. Super. 596, 608 (App. Div. 2000)). Under the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, "[i]n order to protect the integrity of the court system, '[w]hen
a party successfully asserts a position in a prior legal proceeding, that party
cannot assert a contrary position in subsequent litigation arising out of the same
A-3357-24 12 events.'" Id. at 142-43 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kress v. LaVilla,
335 N.J. Super. 400, 412 (App. Div. 2000)).
"[T]o be estopped a party must have convinced the court to accept its
position in the earlier litigation." Hanisko v. Billy Casper Golf Mgmt., Inc., 437
N.J. Super. 349, 356 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Ali v. Rutgers, 166 N.J. 280,
288 (2000)). "Because the doctrine of judicial estoppel only applies when a
court has accepted a party's position, a party ordinarily is not barred from taking
an inconsistent position in successive litigation if the first action was concluded
by a settlement." Kimball Int'l, 334 N.J. Super. at 607; Hanisko, 437 N.J. Super.
at 356. "[A] settlement neither requires nor implies any judicial endorsement of
either party's claim or theories, and thus a settlement does not provide the prior
success necessary for judicial estoppel." Com. Ins. Co. of Newark v. Steiger,
395 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Kimball Int'l, 334 N.J.
Super. at 608).
"Promissory estoppel is made up of four elements: (1) a clear and definite
promise; (2) made with the expectation that the promisee will rely on it; (3)
reasonable reliance; and (4) definite and substantial detriment." Goldfarb v.
Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 339-40 (2021) (quoting Toll Bros. v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders of Burlington, 194 N.J. 223, 253 (2008)).
A-3357-24 13 "Collateral estoppel is an equitable remedy that bars re-litigation of any
issue that was determined in a prior action." In re Borough of Englewood Cliffs,
473 N.J. Super. 189, 202 (App. Div. 2022). Collateral estoppel applies when:
(1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [Ibid. (quoting Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 85 (2012)).] In support of his estoppel arguments, plaintiff relies on a prior production
of CAMA data that occurred as a result of a 2023 settlement of a matter before
the Government Records Council, statements made in that matter, and a 2015
initial decision by an administrative law judge in a matter involving Monmouth,
Sussex, and Morris counties, but not Hunterdon County. Those items do not
support application of any of the preclusionary doctrines cited by plaintiff. The
production was a result of a settlement, the statements do not constitute a "clear
and definite" promise made with the expectation of reliance, and defendants
were not involved in the 2015 administrative-law matter. Toll Bros., 194 N.J.
A-3357-24 14 at 253. Accordingly, the court did not err in considering defendants'
privacy-interest argument.
But in deciding that issue, the court should not have rendered factual
findings unsupported by certifications or affidavits in the record or absent an in
camera review of the requested records. We are unable to discern from the
record before us the basis of the court's factual findings regarding the contents
of the requested records or the collection of the information contained in them.
See In re D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. 397, 416 (App. Div. 2021) (addressing Rule
1:7-1(a), court finds "[a] judge's fact-finding must explain 'how and why the
ultimate conclusion was drawn.'" (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
H.P., 424 N.J. Super. 210, 230 (App. Div. 2011))). We are not bound by a trial
court's factual determinations that are unsupported "by adequate, substantial and
credible evidence." Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484.
Moreover, this court has held that "in an OPRA action, . . . the [trial] court
is obliged when a claim of confidentiality or privilege is made by the public
custodian of the record, to inspect the challenged document in-camera to
determine the viability of the claim." MAG Ent., LLC, v. Div. of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 551 (App. Div. 2005); see also Hartz
Mountain Indus., Inc. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 369 N.J. Super. 175,
A-3357-24 15 183 (App. Div. 2004) (same). An in camera review provides the parties with an
"opportunity . . . to address general principles relative to the claim of
confidentiality and privilege" and "the government custodian" with "an
opportunity . . . to argue specifically, as part of the in camera review, why the
document should be deemed privileged or confidential or otherwise exempt from
the access obligation." Hartz Mountain, 369 N.J. Super. at 183.
We are not saying the court had an obligation to review in camera each
line of the requested data. But under the circumstances of this case, with no
certifications or affidavits from which the court could have determined the
confidential and private nature of the information contained in the records, we
conclude the court should have conducted in camera review to fulfill its
obligation to carefully balance the "competing interests" of "the right of access
to government records" and "the need to protect personal information."
Libertarians for Transparent Gov't, 250 N.J. at 54. Accordingly, we are
constrained to vacate the May 19, 2025 order and remand, directing the court to
conduct an in camera review of the requested records.
Next, we turn to defendants' appeal. We recognize "appeals are taken
from judgments, not opinions" and that generally parties do not have a right to
appellate review of an order in their favor. Price v. Hudson Heights Dev., LLC,
A-3357-24 16 417 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 2011). Given our remand, however, we
deem it appropriate to address defendants' argument regarding OPRA's
third-party-records exclusion.
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1) provides, in relevant part:
A public agency shall not be considered to be in possession of a public record that is created, maintained, or received by another public agency and made available to the public agency either by remote access to a computer network or by distribution as a courtesy copy, unless the agency that created, maintained, or received the record resides within the judicial branch of the State Government. A records custodian of a public agency that receives a request for a record created, maintained, or received by another public agency shall not be obligated to provide the record to the requestor. In the event the custodian does not provide the record, the custodian shall direct the requestor within seven business days to the public agency that, to the best of their knowledge, created, maintains, or received the requested record, at which time the request shall be considered completed. [N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1).]
Addressing defendants' argument based on that exclusion, the court said
only, "That's not the case here." That single sentence failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 1:7-4(a). "[A] trial court must 'find the facts' in its oral or
written opinion." In re D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at 416 (quoting R. 1:7-4(a)).
"Failure to make explicit findings and clear statements of reasoning constitutes
A-3357-24 17 a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys, and the appellate court." Id. at
416-17 (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court's insufficient factual findings on this issue also
requires a remand. See id. at 416 (court was "constrained to reverse and remand
because the trial court did not consider all relevant evidence or make sufficient
factual findings").
In sum, we vacate the May 19, 2025 order and remand, directing the court
to conduct an in camera review of the requested records and only then determine
whether the records are exempt under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 or N.J.S.A.
47:1A-5(i)(1). See, e.g., Hartz Mountain, 369 N.J. Super. at 180, 184-85
(remanding for an in camera review and "reconsideration of the OPRA issues").
If after conducting the in camera review and hearing the parties' arguments, the
court concludes the privacy exemption but not the third-party-records exemption
applies, the court should determine whether the records can be disclosed in part,
with the exempted portions redacted. See Libertarians for Transparent Gov't,
250 N.J. at 54 (finding "if part of a record is exempt from public access, the
records custodian is authorized to redact that portion of the document and must
then 'promptly permit access to the remainder of the record'" (quoting N.J.S.A.
47:1A-5(g))). We take no position on the ultimate outcome of those analyses.
A-3357-24 18 To the extent we have not expressly addressed any arguments presented
by the parties, we note that we have considered the arguments and determined
they are not of sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
A-3357-24 19