Shawn C. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 Jul 06, 2026

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 SHAWN C.,1 No. 1:26-cv-3009-EFS

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING THE 9 v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS, AND REMANDING FOR 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, MORE PROCEEDINGS Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12

13 Plaintiff Shawn C. and the Commissioner of Social Security agree 14 that the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of disability benefits 15 should be remanded based on consequential errors, but they disagree 16 17

18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 as to whether the decision should be remanded for further proceedings

2 or for an award of benefits. As is explained below, essential issues 3 remain for the ALJ to resolve and crediting the challenged evidence 4 does not compel a finding of disability, so this matter is remanded for

5 further proceedings. 6 I. Background 7 Plaintiff filed her Titles 2 and 16 applications for benefits in 2020,

8 alleging disability beginning May 30, 2011, due to several mental 9 impairments.2 An ALJ issued an unfavorable decision in May 2022.3 10 On appeal, in December 2023, the Court reversed and remanded for

11 further proceedings because the ALJ did not give adequate reasons for 12 discounting Plaintiff’s symptom reports and a medical expert needed to 13 testify whether Plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment was intentional or

14 a result of her mental illness.4 15 16

17 2 Administrative Record (AR) 216, 223, 234. 18 3 AR 15–30. 19 4 AR 588–619. See E.D. Wash. Case No. 1:23-cv-3040-EFS. 20 1 On remand, Plaintiff appeared for two hearings before a different

2 ALJ, Cecilia LaCara.5 Plaintiff testified that she could not work 3 because of frequent, severe panic attacks that made it difficult for her 4 to leave her house and worsened around groups of people.6 A medical

5 expert, Dr. Billings Fuess, testified that because Plaintiff had major 6 depressive disorder, “there is the likelihood of there being a waxing and 7 waning of symptoms. The symptoms can worsen some days . . . .”7 A

8 vocational expert testified that a hypothetical individual limited to 9 occasional interactions with others could likely not complete the 10 approximately 30-day training/probationary period for the jobs of

11 cleaner II, hand packager, and hospital cleaner, because: 12 the things you do in the beginning period, the interaction with the supervisor, probably more than occasional. And so . 13 . . that could be . . . problematic if the person has to walk away or leave or has some other type of situation where . . . 14

15 5 AR 518–40 (November 5, 2024, Plaintiff and vocational expert 16 testimony), 541–58 (October 14, 2025, Plaintiff, vocational expert, and 17 medical expert testimony). 18 6 AR 524–28, 531. 19 7 AR 552. 20 1 they have to remove themselves from interacting with this person. You know, again, it would . . . intervene with the 2 training process and that person getting ramped up to the job.8 3 On November 14, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision finding 4 Plaintiff not disabled.9 The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s alleged 5 symptoms because “mental status exams primarily show intact 6 cognitive and social functioning.”10 The ALJ found Dr. Fuess’s hearing 7 testimony persuasive without discussing his testimony regarding 8 waxing and waning symptoms.11 The ALJ found the opinion of Thomas 9 Genthe, PhD, who examined Plaintiff in June 2020 and opined that she 10 had moderate limitations in attendance and punctuality, and marked 11 limitations in communicating and behaving appropriately and 12 13 14

15 8 AR 557; see AR 557–58. 16 9 AR 496–510. Per 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)–(g), 416.920(a)–(g), a five- 17 step evaluation determines whether a claimant is disabled. 18 10 AR 505; see AR 505–06. 19 11 AR 507. 20 1 completing a workday,12 “not fully persuasive” because Dr. Genthe did

2 not review Plaintiff’s complete record and his opinion was inconsistent 3 with the mental status exams in the record.13 4 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found:

5 • Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through March 6 31, 2014. 7 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

8 activity since May 30, 2011, the alleged onset date. 9 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 10 severe impairments: depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,

11 ADHD, and personality disorder. 12 • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 13 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the

14 severity of one of the listed impairments. 15 • RFC: Plaintiff had the RFC to: 16 perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she can 17

18 12 AR 428. 19 13 AR 507. 20 1 understand, remember, and carry out simple routine tasks with occasional interaction with the public, 2 coworkers, and supervisors; she is limited to occasional changes in the workplace; and she is limited to non-quota 3 and no highly pa[c]ed assembly line type work.

4 • Step four: Plaintiff had no past relevant work. 5 • Step five: considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work 6 history, Plaintiff could perform work that existed in significant 7 numbers in the national economy, such as cleaner II, hand 8 packager, and hospital cleaner.14 9 Plaintiff did not file written exceptions to the ALJ’s decision with 10 the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council did not assume

11 jurisdiction on its own, so the ALJ’s decision became the 12 Commissioner’s final decision.15 Plaintiff now appeals to district 13 court.16

14 15 16

17 14 AR 501–09. 18 15 See AR 496–97; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.984, 416.1484. 19 16 ECF No. 1. 20 1 II. Standard of Review

2 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by 3 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”17 and such error 4 impacted the nondisability determination.18 Substantial evidence is

5 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 6 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 7 support a conclusion.”19

9 17 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. 10 § 405(g). 11 18 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on 12 other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may 13 not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is 14 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 15 19 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 16 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 17 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 18 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 19 detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion,” not simply the evidence 20 1 III. Analysis

2 Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed the following errors, and the 3 Commissioner either concedes or does not contest each error: 4 1. Not providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons to

5 discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony because the ALJ 6 discounted her allegations regarding panic attacks and 7 social limitations based on normal mental-status exams.

8 2. Crediting Dr. Fuess’s testimony but failing to explain or add 9 RFC limitations corresponding to his opinion that Plaintiff 10 would experience waxing and waning symptoms.

11 3. Failing to reconcile the inconsistency between the 12 vocational expert testimony and the step-five findings 13 because the vocational expert testified that someone limited

14 to occasional interaction with others could likely not 15 16

17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 complete the training/probationary period for the cleaner II,

2 hand packager, and hospital cleaner jobs. 3 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erroneously discounted Dr. Genthe’s 4 opinion, which the Commissioner disputes.

5 Plaintiff contends that remand for an award of benefits is the 6 proper remedy because all requirements of the “credit-as-true” rule are 7 met and further proceedings would unnecessarily delay benefits. The

8 Commissioner disagrees, arguing that further proceedings are 9 necessary. 10 When a harmful error occurs in the administrative proceeding,

11 remand for further administrative proceedings is the usual course.20 12 However, the court may remand for an award of benefits where: 13 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; 14 (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or 15 medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required 16 17

18 20 Treichler v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th 19 Cir. 2014). 20 1 to find the claimant disabled on remand . . . .21

2 When these three elements are satisfied, the decision whether to 3 remand for benefits or further proceedings is within the court’s 4 discretion, as it “is a fact-bound determination that arises in an infinite

5 variety of contexts.”22 6 Here, the Court agrees with the parties as to all conceded or 7 uncontested errors. First, the routine mental-status exams considered

8 by the ALJ23—completed in controlled clinical environments, with 9 findings largely irrelevant to social functioning in the workplace, and 10 not considered in light of the overall diagnostic record—are

11 unconvincing reasons to discount Plaintiff’s allegations.24 12

13 21 Ortiz v. Bisignano, --- F.4th ----, No. 24-5407, 2025 WL 4947035, at 14 *11 (9th Cir. June 24, 2026) (citation modified). 15 22 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100 (citation modified). 16 23 AR 297–98, 306, 313, 325–26, 352, 399–400, 441–42. 17 24 See Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he ALJ 18 can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms 19 only by offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.” 20 1 Second, the ALJ credited Dr. Fuess’s medical-expert testimony

2 but did not include any limitations in the RFC corresponding to his 3 testimony of waxing and waning depressive symptoms,25 which would 4

5 (citation modified)); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 6 2014) (emphasizing that treatment records must be viewed considering 7 the overall diagnostic record, and finding the ALJ erred by rejecting 8 the claimant’s symptoms resulting from anxiety, depressive disorder, 9 and PTSD on the basis that claimant performed cognitively well during 10 examination and had a generally pleasant demeanor); Garrison v. 11 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Cycles of improvement and 12 debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence, and in such 13 circumstances it is error for an ALJ to pick out a few isolated instances 14 of improvement over a period of months or years and to treat them as a 15 basis for concluding a claimant is capable of working.”); id. 16 (“[I]mproved functioning while being treated and while limiting 17 environmental stressors does not always mean that a claimant can 18 function effectively in a workplace.”). 19 25 See AR 502, 507, 552. 20 1 seemingly impact Plaintiff’s functioning and/or absenteeism at work,

2 and did not explain why such limitations were not included.26 3 Third, the ALJ did not explain the inconsistency between the 4 step-five findings and vocational expert testimony, as the vocational

5 expert testified that someone limited to occasional interaction with 6 others would likely not complete the training/probationary period for 7 the three jobs identified at step five based on an RFC with a limitation

8 to occasional interactions with others.27 9

10 26 See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006) 11 (“[A]n ALJ is not free to disregard properly supported limitations.”); cf. 12 Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) 13 (explaining that the RFC must incorporate only credible limitations 14 supported by substantial evidence). 15 27 AR 557. See Wischmann v. Kijakazi, 68 F.4th 498, 505 (9th Cir. 2023) 16 (recognizing the ALJ has a duty to resolve probative and significant 17 inconsistencies in the step-five evidence); Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 18 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The ALJ’s failure to resolve an apparent 19 inconsistency may leave us with a gap in the record that precludes us 20 1 Further proceedings are necessary because the ALJ must resolve

2 conflicts in the record and crediting the challenged evidence as true 3 would not compel a finding of disability. The ALJ must translate 4 Dr. Fuess’s testimony of waxing and waning depressive symptoms into

5 vocational abilities; while such symptoms would seemingly impact 6 workplace attendance and behavior, it is not clear that they would be 7 fully disabling. The vocational expert testimony is not per se disabling

8 because he only testified that “interaction with the supervisor” during 9 the probationary period for the step-five jobs would be “probably more 10 than occasional,”28 and the ALJ must have the opportunity to consider

11 this testimony and explain any inconsistency. While crediting 12 Dr. Genthe’s opinion would seemingly be disabling, the opinion 13 contradicts parts of Dr. Fuess’s opinion29 and the prior administrative

15 from determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by 16 substantial evidence.”). 17 28 AR 557. 18 29 See AR 550 (Dr. Fuess testified that Plaintiff would have moderate, 19 rather than marked, limitations in interacting with others.). 20 1 medical findings,30 so this is an outstanding conflict among the

2 evidence that the ALJ must resolve. 3 The closer call as to remedy is the error with respect to Plaintiff’s 4 allegations. In its order remanding the first ALJ decision, the Court

5 explained that the ALJ’s reliance on “findings on examination that 6 Plaintiff had normal cognition” was flawed because treatment records 7 “consistently reported abnormality in mood, affect, concentration, and

8 behavior, as well as poor judgment and insight,” and: 9 As courts have repeatedly noted, the treatment records must be viewed in light of the overall diagnostic record, and 10 a claimant’s reports of suffering from severe depression and/or anxiety are not necessarily inconsistent with that 11 claimant also presenting with normal cognitive abilities, such as good eye contact, organized and logical thought 12 content, and focused attention. The ALJ improperly focused on Plaintiff’s cognitive abilities while ignoring other more 13 relevant and serious symptoms.31

15 30 See AR 107–08 (Renee Eisenhauer, PhD, reviewed the records at the 16 reconsideration level and opined that Plaintiff would have moderate 17 interaction limitations but could interact with a supervisor and ask 18 and accept simple instructions.). 19 31 AR 612–13 (citation modified). 20 1 On remand, a new ALJ issued a second decision that provided mostly

2 the same faulty reasons.32 The Court declines to remand for an award 3 of benefits based on the other issues discussed above, but a third 4 decision with similar explanation will demonstrate that further

5 proceedings would not be useful. 6 IV. Conclusion 7 As the parties agree, the ALJ erred. The Court finds that remand

8 for reevaluation is the appropriate remedy. The ALJ is to develop and 9 update the record, offer Plaintiff the opportunity for a new hearing, 10 and reevaluate—with meaningful articulation and evidentiary

11 support—the sequential process. In doing so, the ALJ must provide 12 explanation that adequately addresses the issues identified in this 13 opinion: (1) the routine mental-status exams with many irrelevant

14 findings are not by themselves specific, clear, and convincing reasons to 15 discount Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling depressive and social-panic 16 symptoms; (2) if the ALJ credits medical-expert testimony that

17 Plaintiff experiences waxing and waning depressive symptoms, the 18

19 32 See AR 505–06. 20 1 ALJ must translate such testimony into vocational limitations in the

2 RFC or explain why the testimony does not change the RFC; and (3) if 3 the ALJ identifies the same jobs at step five, the ALJ must explain the 4 inconsistency between those jobs and the vocational expert testimony

5 regarding the training periods for them. In addition, the ALJ must 6 meaningfully articulate the supportability and consistency of each 7 medical opinion.

8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 9 4. The ALJ’s nondisability decision is REVERSED, and this 10 matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social

11 Security for further proceedings pursuant to 12 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 13 5. The Clerk’s Office shall TERM the parties’ briefs, ECF

14 Nos. 8 and 12, enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, 15 and CLOSE the case. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to file this

17 order and provide copies to all counsel. 18 // 19 //

20 1 DATED this 6th day of July 2026. awd | ew 3 EDWARD F.SHEA | Senior United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 DISPOSITIVE ORDER - 17