Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet Co.

63 So. 2d 264, 1953 Fla. LEXIS 1085
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedFebruary 6, 1953
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 63 So. 2d 264 (Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet Co., 63 So. 2d 264, 1953 Fla. LEXIS 1085 (Fla. 1953).

Opinion

63 So.2d 264 (1953)

SHAW et ux.
v.
DEL-MAR CABINET CO., Inc. et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

February 6, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 9, 1953.

*265 Schonfeld, Greenberg & Heller, Miami Beach, for appellants.

Miller & Podell, Miami Beach, for Del-Mar Cabinet Co., Inc., and Weitzman & Ravitz.

Durant & Durant, Miami, for Bond Millworks, Inc.

Pace, Sigman & Gilbert, Miami Beach, for Walton Flooring Co. and John N. Kohnen & Co.

DREW, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final decree, adverse to the owners, in a proceeding instituted by the owners against certain subcontractors and materialmen under the provisions of Section 84.23(4), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A.

On December 15, 1950, appellants, Murray A. Shaw and his wife Lillian H. Shaw, as owners, entered into a contract with Allied Construction Company, as general contractor, to erect certain buildings for a contract price of $50,000. The contract provided for progress payments. Such progress payments were made by the owners to the general contractor from time to time as the work progressed. It is admitted that all such progress payments were "properly made" under Section 84.05, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A.

The buildings were completed on April 7, 1951.

On April 13, 1951 the owners made the final payment to the general contractor of $10,025, as was agreed to be made under Article 5 of the contract, the first sentence of which is:

"Final payment shall be due ten days after substantial completion of the work provided the work be then fully completed and the contract fully performed."

It was not until April 18, 1951, five days after final payment was made, that the general contractor furnished the owners a general release. This general release was in the usual form and did not refer in any manner to the contract between the parties.

The owners did not demand nor did the general contractor furnish, either at or before the time final payment was made nor at any time subsequent thereto the statement under oath referred to in Section 84.04(3), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A.

Although no materialman or subcontractor had before or at any time during the progress of the work served upon the owners the cautionary notice provided for in Chapter 84, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., the appellees here, subcontractors and materialmen, beginning on or about May 7, *266 1951 (within 90 days after completion of the contract) filed their respective notices of liens for services or materials incorporated in the building covered by the contract. The subcontractors and materialmen contend their liens are valid to the extent of the amount of the final payment of $10,025. The lower court agreed with the subcontractors and entered an appropriate decree. We are asked to reverse that decree.

We have been materially aided in the preparation of this opinion and in our study and analysis of the Mechanics' Lien Law, Chapter 84, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., by the excellent article thereon by George O. Pringle, Esq., which appears in Volume I, page 423 of the Florida Law Review.

From what we have related above, it is apparent that the sole question we have to decide is whether money paid by the owner to the general contractor as a final payment on a contract for improvements on real property is "properly made", under Section 84.05, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., if paid without first securing from the contractor the sworn statement referred to in Section 84.04(3), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A. One of the appellees succinctly poses the question as follows:

"Where owner makes final payment to the General Contractor without previously demanding and obtaining from the said General Contractor a sworn statement or affidavit stating that all lienors had been paid in full or showing the name and amount due each lienor not paid, and where the materialmen and subcontractors who furnish labor, services or materials which were incorporated into the improvements on the subject real property served no cautionary notices upon the owner but did file for record their claims of lien and did cause copies of the same to be delivered to the owner subsequent to the date of the said final payment and within three months from the date of furnishing the last items of services and/or materials upon the subject real property, under the Mechanics' Lien Law of the State of Florida, do the said subcontractors and materialmen have valid liens to the extent of the aforementioned final payment?"

The pertinent portions of the Mechanics' Lien Law on the particular question under consideration are Sections 84.04(1) (b); subd. 8, 84.04(3), 84.05(5), 84.05(8), 84.05 (11) and 84.05(12), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A.

There is another Section of the Mechanics' Lien Law that, for the reasons hereinafter pointed out, has a bearing on the subject and that is Section 84.08, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., which provides that "Any person who, with intent to defraud", furnishes the owner the sworn statement referred to in the above-mentioned Sections of the Mechanics' Lien Law, knowing, subject to certain limitations, that such statement is false, shall be guilty of perjury and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished accordingly.

Mr. Pringle, in his article supra, appropriately points out, in speaking of the Mechanics' Lien Law:

"This law imposes on the owner of real property on which improvements are being made the duty of disbursing the money due on the direct contract with the contractor in such a way as to furnish the greatest possible amount of protection to laborers, materialmen and others who perform services or furnish materials for the improvement. Provisions are included, however, for the protection of the owner; and he can, by properly paying the money due on the direct contract, avoid having any mechanics' liens enforced against his property. * * *"

The appellees admit that because they failed to observe the requirements of the statutes with reference to cautionary notice they are not entitled to a lien on the owners' property except to the extent of the amount of $10,025, which was the final payment to the contractor. They do contend, however, that there was a corresponding duty on the owners to adhere to the requirements of the statute and that when they failed to require of the General Contractor the sworn statement required by the statutes before they made the final payment, *267 such payment was not "properly made" under the statute and that their liens were not affected thereby except to the extent above noted. With this contention we agree.

A careful study of the statute alone leads us to this conclusion. While the statute is somewhat complicated, it is dealing with a complicated subject. It was drafted with the idea in mind of affording adequate protection to the owner, laborers, the general contractor, subcontractors, materialmen and others contributing some tangible thing to the visible improvement of real property.

We have repeatedly held that mechanics' liens are pure creatures of the statute and that for a subcontractor or materialman to acquire one the statute must be strictly complied with. Curtiss-Bright Ranch Co. v. Selden Cypress Door Co., 91 Fla. 354, 107 So. 679, and the cases there referred to. There is a corresponding duty on the owner to comply with the statute in order to protect his property from liens.

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Bluebook (online)
63 So. 2d 264, 1953 Fla. LEXIS 1085, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaw-v-del-mar-cabinet-co-fla-1953.