Shaun Jeff Snow v. The People of the State of Colorado

2025 CO 32

• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado
• Decided: May 27, 2025
• Docket: 23SC775
• Status: Published

Opinion

2025 CO 32

Shaun Jeff Snow, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent

No. 23SC775

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

May 27, 2025

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA2074

Judgment Reversed

Attorneys for Petitioner: Tillman Patrick Clark, LLC Tillman Clark Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Brock J. Swanson, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado

Justice Samour delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Márquez, Justice Boatright, Justice Hood, Justice Gabriel, Justice Hart, and Justice Berkenkotter joined.

OPINION

SAMOUR, JUSTICE

¶1 We granted certiorari in this case primarily to consider whether a Crim. P. 35(a) challenge regarding a post-sentencing order setting the amount of restitution is cognizable as an illegal sentence claim or an illegal manner claim. See Crim. P. 35(a) (allowing a defendant in a criminal case to file a postconviction claim to correct (1) an illegal sentence-i.e., "a sentence that was not authorized by law or that was imposed without jurisdiction"-or (2) "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner"). The answer matters: Although a trial court may correct a sentence not authorized by law or imposed without jurisdiction at any time, it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner only within 126 days after the sentence is imposed. See Crim. P. 35(a)-(b). A division of the court of appeals ruled that the Crim. P. 35(a) claim brought by the defendant, Shaun Jeff Snow, was an illegal manner claim that was time-barred. We agree with Snow that this was error.

¶2 At the sentencing hearing,^[1] the district court deferred the issue of restitution in its entirety for sixty days. Because, with one anomalous exception not relevant here, restitution is a component of every sentence, and because deferring the issue of restitution in its entirety at a sentencing hearing is not one of the restitution orders authorized by section 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. (2024) ("subsection (1)"), Snow is correct that his sentence was not authorized by law.

¶3 But that begs the question of the appropriate remedy to correct Snow's illegal sentence. We agree with Snow on this front as well.

¶4 Today, we stand firmly by our decision in People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, 498 P.3d 142. Accordingly, we conclude that the untimely restitution order entered by the district court after sentencing (the "post-sentencing restitution order") must be vacated.

¶5 Because the division erred in upholding the post-sentencing restitution order, we reverse. We remand with instructions to return the case to the district court so that it may enter an order reflecting that Snow owes no restitution.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶6 The prosecution charged Snow with one count of first degree murder, two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, four counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and a special offender sentence-enhancing count. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Snow pleaded guilty to an added count of second degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of all his original charges and a stipulated sentencing range of sixteen to twenty-four years in prison. The plea agreement did not mention restitution. Nor was there mention of restitution in the minute order summarizing the proceedings at the providency hearing.^[2]

¶7 At the sentencing hearing, the court honored the parties' plea agreement and imposed a prison sentence of twenty years in the Department of Corrections. As pertinent here, the prosecution did not request restitution or give any indication that it intended to seek restitution. Instead, it simply asked the court "to reserve restitution at this point in time." The court obliged and "reserve[d] restitution for [sixty] days."

¶8 Seventy-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution that included the restitution "information" required by section 18-1.3-603(2)(a)-i.e., the identity of the victim allegedly entitled to restitution and the amount of restitution requested.^[3] Specifically, the prosecution identified (1) the Crime Victim Compensation Board as the sole victim entitled to restitution and (2) $13,852.60 as the proposed amount of restitution. Thereafter-108 days after the sentencing hearing, to be precise-the district court entered the post-sentencing restitution order granting the prosecution's motion. It noted that Snow had neither responded nor objected to the prosecution's request for restitution.

¶9 Snow did not directly appeal his conviction or sentence. He did, however, seek reconsideration of his sentence through a Crim. P. 35(b) motion, which did not take issue with the post-sentencing restitution order. The district court denied that motion.

¶10 More than five years later, Snow filed a pro se motion to waive restitution, court costs, and fines. Snow contended that (1) he was indigent, (2) it was not clear whether the court had reserved restitution at sentencing for sixty or ninety-one days, and (3) the court had illegally denied him a hearing on the prosecution's request for restitution. He asked the court to "stop taking 20[%] of all future money, refund all past money that his family & friends gave him [and] which was illegal to begin with and also makes the 8% . . . interest on restitution illegal."

¶11 The district court denied Snow's postconviction motion without a hearing. It found that it lacked "jurisdiction to waive or change" the restitution ordered, "[n]o [timely] objection to the request for restitution [had been] made," and the restitution had been "properly entered."

¶12 Snow appealed, arguing, for the first time, that his sentence was illegal under Weeks, which we announced about seven weeks before he filed his notice of appeal. He noted that the district court had set the restitution amount 108 days after sentencing, which was well beyond the deadline in section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) ("subsection (1)(b)"). Under that subsection, a trial court may enter a finding of restitution liability at sentencing while postponing the determination of the amount of restitution for up to ninety-one days or, upon a finding of good cause, for any longer period set by the court ("ninety-one-day deadline" or "subsection (1)(b) deadline").^[4] Snow asked the court of appeals to correct his illegal sentence by replacing the post-sentencing restitution order with an order requiring no restitution.

¶13 A division of the court of appeals disagreed with Snow and affirmed the post-sentencing restitution order in an unpublished, unanimous opinion. People v. Snow, No. 21CA2074, ¶ 1 (Aug. 24, 2023). Drawing guidance from the decision by a different division in People v. Tennyson, 2023 COA 2, 528 P.3d 185 ("Tennyson I"), it concluded that Snow's Crim. P. 35(a) claim was an illegal manner claim, not an illegal sentence claim. Snow, ¶ 10. The division cited Tennyson I for the proposition that when "a defendant collaterally challenges the amount of restitution on grounds that the district court did not comply with the procedures outlined in [subsection (1)(b)] and Weeks, the issue is cognizable as an illegal manner claim under Crim. P. 35(a)." Id. (quoting Tennyson I, ¶ 33, 528 P.3d at 191).

¶14 Although acknowledging that there is no preservation requirement for a Crim. P. 35(a) claim, see Fransua v. People, 2019 CO 96, ¶ 13, 451 P.3d 1208, 1211, the division pointed out that illegal manner claims are nevertheless subject to the 126-day deadline in Crim. P. 35(b).^[5] Snow, ¶ 11. And because Snow had filed his Crim. P. 35(a) claim more than 126 days after the imposition of his sentence, the division concluded that the claim was time-barred. Id.

¶15 Snow sought our review, and we granted his petition. We agreed to consider two issues: (1) "Whether a postconviction challenge to the timeliness of a restitution order is cognizable as an illegal sentence claim under Crim. P. 35(a)"; and (2) whether the division "erred in relying on [Tennyson I], instead of [Weeks], in denying Snow's restitution claim."^[6]

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

¶16 Subject to constitutional limitations, "it is the prerogative of the legislature to . . . prescribe sentences." Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 577 (Colo. 2008). Our General Assembly has long required that, with one rare exception not pertinent here, every criminal sentence must reflect consideration of restitution.^[7] Id. Restitution orders in criminal prosecutions in this jurisdiction are governed by statute and rule. See § 18-1.3-603; Crim. P. 32(b)(1) ("When imposing sentence, the court shall consider restitution as required by section 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S."); Crim. P. 32(b)(3)(I) (indicating that "[a] judgment of conviction" must include "an order or finding regarding restitution as required by section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S.").

¶17 Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo. Weeks, ¶ 24, 498 P.3d at 151. In construing a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. at ¶ 25, 498 P.3d at 151. The first step in this endeavor is to give the statute's "words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning." Id. (quoting McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10, 463 P.3d 254, 257). We "presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Id. (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). Consequently, if a statute is unambiguous, we apply it as written without resorting to tools of statutory construction. People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, ¶ 13, 452 P.3d 759, 762.

¶18 The same principles that apply to statutory interpretation apply when we construe our rules of criminal procedure, which we have plenary authority to promulgate and interpret. Id. at ¶ 14, 452 P.3d at 762. Just as with questions of statutory interpretation, questions of rule interpretation are legal in nature and subject to de novo review.^[8] Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83, ¶ 16, 500 P.3d 1110, 1114 (relying on People v. Bueno, 2018 CO 4, ¶ 18, 409 P.3d 320, 325).

¶19 We also review de novo the legality of a sentence. Veith v. People, 2017 CO 19, ¶ 12, 390 P.3d 403, 406. Thus, the denial of a Crim. P. 35(a) claim asserting that a sentence was either not authorized by statute or imposed without jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review.

B. Colorado's Restitution Statute (Section 18-1.3-603)

¶20 Subsection (1) provides in pertinent part that every sentence must include at least one of four enumerated restitution orders: (1) an order pursuant to section 18-1.3-603(1)(a) ("subsection (1)(a)") requiring payment of an amount of restitution; (2) an order pursuant to subsection (1)(b) obligating the defendant to pay restitution but indicating that the amount of restitution will be determined within the ninety-one-day deadline; (3) an order pursuant to section 18-1.3-603(1)(c) ("subsection (1)(c)"), in addition to or in place of an order requiring payment of an amount of restitution, directing the defendant to pay restitution covering the actual costs of future treatment for any victim; or (4) an order pursuant to section 18-1.3-603(1)(d) ("subsection (1)(d)") stating that no payment of restitution is required because no victim suffered a pecuniary loss.

¶21 An order that is not authorized by at least one of these four subsections fails to satisfy the restitution component of a sentence. Weeks, ¶ 3, 498 P.3d at 147-48. Correspondingly, a sentence that fails to include one or more of the four enumerated restitution orders in subsection (1) is a sentence not authorized by law (i.e., an illegal sentence) that may be corrected at any time. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 2, ___P.3d___ ("Tennyson II"); Crim. P. 35(a).

C. The District Court Imposed an Illegal Sentence During the Sentencing Hearing

¶22 We agree with Snow that, at the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence not authorized by law because the mere reservation of the issue of restitution in its entirety failed to adhere to subsection (1). See Weeks, ¶ 2, 498 P.3d at 147. Stated differently, the court's order at sentencing related to restitution did not satisfy the restitution component of Snow's sentence and judgment of conviction. See Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23, ¶¶ 13-14, 415 P.3d 303, 307-08.

¶23 Nowhere does subsection (1) authorize a trial court to simply defer the issue of restitution in its entirety. Because restitution is a component of every sentence, and because the district court failed to enter at least one of the four restitution orders authorized by subsection (1), Snow received an illegal sentence. Tennyson II, ¶ 2.

¶24 Of course, an illegal sentence is correctable at any time. As we observed in a different context in Whiteaker v. People, 2024 CO 25, ¶ 28, 547 P.3d 1122, 1128, Colorado jurisprudence allows-and, in fact requires-courts to correct an illegal sentence without any time limitation.

¶25 That leaves the question of the proper remedy to correct Snow's illegal sentence. We turn our attention to that issue next.

D. Snow's Sentence Must Be Corrected by Vacatur of the Post-Sentencing Restitution Order and Entry of an Order of No Restitution

¶26 Snow contends that, because the post-sentencing restitution order failed to comply with the subsection (1)(b) deadline, he's entitled to have it vacated pursuant to Weeks. Although we ultimately agree with Snow on the remedy to correct his illegal sentence, we disagree with his rationale in arriving at that result.

¶27 It is true, as Snow contends, that the district court entered the post-sentencing restitution order 108 days after sentencing-i.e., after expiration of the subsection (1)(b) deadline. It is also true, as Snow reminds us, that vacatur of restitution was the remedy we granted in Weeks for the trial court's violation of the subsection (1)(b) deadline. ¶ 47, 498 P.3d at 157. But the subsection (1)(b) deadline is inapposite here because the district court never entered a subsection (1)(b) order. Rather, at sentencing, the court merely reserved the issue of restitution in its entirety, an order not authorized by subsection (1). Thus, this is plainly not a subsection (1)(b) case.

¶28 Because Weeks was a subsection (1)(b) case, it is not dispositive. While our opinion there touched on the impropriety of reserving the issue of restitution in its entirety at sentencing, our discussion reflected that the trial court had invoked subsection (1)(b), which permits a finding of restitution liability at sentencing and postponement of the determination of the amount of restitution until after sentencing. See Weeks, ¶¶ 1-3, 11, 16, 498 P.3d at 147-50. Specifically, at sentencing, the prosecution in Weeks advised that it had already decided it would be requesting restitution and that it intended to identify the proposed amount of restitution after sentencing. Id. at ¶ 11, 498 P.3d at 149. Further, the trial court had previously granted the prosecution's request for an amount of restitution in the codefendant's case based on the same pecuniary losses suffered by the same victim in the same incident. Id. at ¶ 11 n.6, 498 P.3d at 149 n.6. And, following the sentencing hearing, the court confirmed that, at sentencing, it had entered an order allowing the prosecution ninety-one days to submit the restitution information.^[9] See id. at ¶ 16, 498 P.3d at 150.

¶29 By contrast, here, the record of the district court proceedings is barren of an explicit or implicit finding of restitution liability either before or during the sentencing hearing. Rather, the issue of restitution was conspicuously absent from the plea agreement and the providency hearing, and the colloquy between the court and the prosecution at the sentencing hearing left no doubt that everyone intended to defer until after sentencing the issue of restitution in its entirety. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for us to infer that the only issue the district court deferred until after the sentencing hearing was the determination of the amount of restitution.

¶30 We nevertheless agree with Snow that, under Weeks, he's entitled to vacatur of the post-sentencing restitution order and entry of an order of no restitution. While Weeks is not on all fours, it is at least on twos. The remedy we granted there, as well as the reasons for it, provide guidance here.

¶31 We chose the remedy of vacatur in Weeks because we could conceive of no other appropriate remedy when, on direct appeal, a court concludes that the trial court, after entering a subsection (1)(b) order finding restitution liability at sentencing, fails to comply with the ninety-one-day deadline and thus acts without authority in determining the amount of restitution. See Weeks, ¶ 47, 498 P.3d at 157. Directing the trial court in that situation to correct the illegal sentence by reissuing the untimely order setting the restitution amount or issuing a subsection (1)(a) order to accomplish the same thing would have knocked out all the deadline's teeth.^[10] ¶32 That rationale applies with equal force here. The prosecution maintains that the post-sentencing restitution order qualified as a subsection (1)(a) order (i.e., an order simultaneously finding restitution liability and determining the amount of restitution) that corrected Snow's illegal sentence. And, since a subsection (1)(a) order is not subject to the subsection (1)(b) deadline, the prosecution asserts that the post-sentencing restitution order was timely. However, were we to approve the post-sentencing restitution order as a subsection (1)(a) order that corrected Snow's illegal sentence, it would render portions of section 18-1.3-603 meaningless.

¶33 First, the prosecution's suggested methodology would disregard subsection (1)'s requirement that, at sentencing, trial courts must enter one or more of the four enumerated restitution orders. Allowing trial courts to correct their failure to adhere to this requirement by simply entering a subsection (1)(a) order at any time would make the requirement pointless.

¶34 Second, the analytical framework championed by the prosecution would permit untimely restitution orders. We realize that, as the prosecution observes, there is no deadline in subsection (1)(a). But that's because orders under subsection (1)(a) must enter at or before the sentencing hearing. See § 18-1.3-603(1)(a) ("Every order of conviction . . . shall include one or more of the following: . . . An order of a specific amount of restitution . . . ." (emphases added)). Therefore, subsection (1)(a) orders entered after the sentencing hearing are necessarily untimely.^[11]

¶35 The acceptance of such untimely orders would directly contravene some of the declarations our General Assembly included as part of the restitution amendments enacted in 2000. Ch. 232, sec. 1, § 16-18.5-101, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 1030, 1030-31 (Section 16-18.5-101 was relocated to section 18-1.3-601 in 2002. See Ch. 318, sec. 2, § 18-1.3-601, 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1365, 1419). Our General Assembly pronounced, in no uncertain terms, that (1) "[a]n effective criminal justice system requires timely restitution to victims of crime and to members of the immediate families of such victims"; (2) the former procedures for the assessment of restitution had "proven to be inadequate and inconsistent from case to case"; and (3) the purpose of the amendments was to facilitate both "[t]he establishment of programs and procedures to provide for . . . full restitution for victims of crime in the most expeditious manner," as well as "[t]he effective and timely assessment . . . of restitution" through "the cooperation and collaboration of all criminal justice agencies and departments." § 18-1.3-601(1)(e)-(g), C.R.S. (2024) (emphases added).

¶36 The legislature could not have been clearer: The stakeholders in the criminal justice system must follow the procedures adopted in 2000 and work together to ensure the effective, timely, and most expeditious assessment of restitution. Yet, when we decided Weeks, more than two decades after the amendments, litigants and trial courts were still engaging in the "longstanding practice" that failed to adhere to those amendments. ¶ 2, 498 P.3d at 147. That's precisely what animated our decision in Weeks: We sought to buck the stubborn trend. Id. Despite the prosecution's fervent pleas to backtrack now, we see no reason to reverse course.

¶37 Importantly, were we to acquiesce and embrace the prosecution's position, it would permit a trial court to correct an illegal sentence like the one Snow received by simply requiring payment of an amount of restitution many years or even decades after the sentencing hearing. We decline the invitation to be led down this primrose path. We are as unwilling to ignore our legislature's intent today as we were when we announced our decision in Weeks.

¶38 Here, as in Weeks, the sole remedy consistent with the legislative intent behind subsection (1) is vacatur of the untimely restitution order and entry of an order pursuant to subsection (1)(d) that there is no restitution owed. Under the circumstances of this case, a subsection (1)(d) order, unlike an order pursuant to subsections (1)(a)-(c), honors the legislature's overhaul of our restitution system to (1) require the entry of at least one of the four enumerated restitution orders at sentencing and (2) ensure the effective, timely, and most expeditious assessment of restitution.^[12] Absent ramifications for a trial court's failure to comply with section 18-1.3-603, there is no way to effectuate our legislature's intent in revamping our restitution scheme.^[13] Otherwise, section 18-1.3-603's requirements might as well not exist.

¶39 The prosecution nevertheless protests that a subsection (1)(d) order of no restitution is improper because the victim in this case actually suffered pecuniary losses. In other words, the prosecution posits that a court may enter a subsection (1)(d) order of no restitution only when there is a factual basis for a finding that no victim suffered pecuniary losses. But no such limitation exists in subsection (1)(d). Besides, were we to take that view, it would lead to an absurd result-a trial court would be required to order restitution in a case with a factual basis for a victim's pecuniary losses, even though it failed to timely determine those losses. And the same result would presumably obtain in a case in which the prosecution presented the restitution information decades after it was due.

¶40 Furthermore, the prosecution's logic would leave defendants without a remedy for a trial court's untimely entry of a restitution order. Nothing in the statute suggests that the legislature intended such a result. Thus, reading the statute as a whole, a subsection (1)(d) order of no restitution is justified not only when there is no factual basis that a victim suffered pecuniary losses but also when the court fails to timely determine them. In this case, the district court performed its statutory responsibilities in an untimely fashion, so a subsection (1)(d) order is justified to correct Snow's illegal sentence.^[14]

III. Conclusion

¶41 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the division's judgment. We remand with instructions to return the case to the district court so that it may vacate the post-sentencing restitution order and enter an order of no restitution pursuant to subsection (1)(d).

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^[1] We refer to a "sentencing hearing" or "sentencing" when describing a hearing during which the sentence is imposed and the judgment of conviction enters.

^[2] The transcript of the providency hearing is not part of the appellate record.

^[3] Before us, Snow does not take issue with the fact that the prosecution's motion was submitted outside of the court's sixty-day deadline.

^[4] When we refer to restitution "liability," we mean a general obligation to pay restitution without a determination yet of the amount of restitution. And when we refer to the "amount of restitution" or the "restitution amount," we mean the final amount of restitution.

^[5] A trial court may reduce a sentence under Crim. P. 35(b) if an appropriate motion is filed within 126 days after (1) imposition of the sentence, (2) receipt of the remittitur following either (a) an affirmance of the sentence or judgment of conviction or (b) dismissal of the appeal, or (3) entry of an appellate court's order or judgment denying review or having the effect of upholding the sentence or the judgment of conviction. A trial court may also reduce a sentence at any time pursuant to a limited remand ordered by an appellate court during the pendency of a direct appeal. Crim. P. 35(b). Snow did not appeal his judgment of conviction, so the 126-day deadline started running upon the imposition of his sentence.

^[6] The answer brief advances contentions that exceed the scope of the issues we agreed to review. By way of example, the prosecution urges, for the first time in these proceedings, that defendants lack standing to challenge the timeliness of the restitution component of their sentences, which would mean that defendants who are subjected to a restitution order that is unauthorized by law would be precluded from contesting the legality of their sentences. Even assuming without deciding that the prosecution is entitled to raise this standing contention, we reject it as devoid of merit. "Any losing person or entity may appeal a lower court's decision if she was a party to the action in that court. There is no independent requirement that a party to a proceeding establish standing to appeal." Arapahoe Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. People in Int. of D.Z.B., 2019 CO 4, ¶ 7, 433 P.3d 578, 580 (citations omitted). We decline to address any other arguments not properly before us.

^[7] The one exception, which has no relevance here, is a sentence imposed following a "conviction for a state traffic misdemeanor offense issued by a municipal or county court in which the prosecuting attorney is acting as a special deputy district attorney pursuant to an agreement with the district attorney's office." § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. (2024). For the sake of convenience, we omit any mention of this anomalous exception when discussing Colorado law on restitution in this opinion.

^[8] Although Crim. P. 32(b) includes a couple of references to restitution, it doesn't add anything substantive to section 18-1.3-603. Therefore, this opinion focuses on the statute.

^[9] Consistent with the trial court proceedings, the appeal in Weeks revolved around subsection (1)(b). Weeks, ¶¶ 18-20, 498 P.3d at 150-51. The defendant challenged the judgment entered on the post-sentencing determination of the restitution amount. People v. Weeks, 2020 COA 44, ¶¶ 1-2, 490 P.3d 672, 673. Accordingly, before us, the parties briefed issues exclusively related to the procedures and deadlines applicable when, at sentencing, a trial court enters a subsection (1)(b) order finding restitution liability and deferring the determination of the restitution amount. Weeks, ¶ 32, 498 P.3d at 153.

^[10] Even before Weeks, we'd sanctioned the automatic vacatur or reversal of post-sentencing orders determining the restitution amount without statutory authority. See Tennyson II, ¶ 59. Weeks simply followed in its predecessors' footsteps.

^[11] Subsection (1)(b) and (1)(c) orders are not in play here. At the time of the post-sentencing restitution order, there was no basis to enter a subsection (1)(b) order and/or a subsection (1)(c) order-and, understandably, the prosecution doesn't rely on either of these types of orders as providing an appropriate remedy to correct Snow's illegal sentence. In any event, like subsection (1)(a) orders, subsection (1)(b) and (1)(c) orders must enter before or during the sentencing hearing. See § 18-1.3-603(1).

^[12] We acknowledge that orders pursuant to subsection (1)(d), just like orders under its three sister subsections, ought to enter at or before the sentencing hearing. But courts must have a way to correct an illegal sentence like the one imposed on Snow. And a subsection (1)(d) order is the only restitution order in the statutory list that does that without violating our General Assembly's intent in revising our restitution paradigm.

^[13] We should not be understood as suggesting that the district court is the lone culprit in this case. As we discussed, the court reserved the issue of restitution in its entirety during sentencing at the prosecution's request. In fact, as mentioned, the prosecution didn't request restitution, or even so much as inform the court and Snow that it intended to seek restitution, until it submitted the restitution information some two-and-a-half months after the sentencing hearing.

^[14] Given this outcome, we can dispose of the second issue on which we granted certiorari (whether the division erred in relying on Tennyson I instead of Weeks) in short order. As we make clear in Tennyson II, ¶¶ 17, 50-53, 57-59, today, we do not view the division's decision in Tennyson I to be at odds with our decision in Weeks.