Shash v. Biogen Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedSeptember 12, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-10479
StatusUnknown

This text of Shash v. Biogen Inc. (Shash v. Biogen Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shash v. Biogen Inc., (D. Mass. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

NADIA SHASH and AMJAD KHAN, * individually and on behalf of all others * similarly situated, * * Plaintiffs, * * Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-10479-IT v. * * BIOGEN INC.; MICHEL VOUNATSOS; * ALFRED W. SANDROCK, JR.; and * SAMANTHA BUDD HAEBERLEIN, * * Defendants. *

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

September 12, 2022 TALWANI, D.J. Plaintiffs Nadia Shash and Amjad Khan bring this securities fraud putative class action against Defendants Biogen Inc. (“Biogen”) and its executives Michel Vounatsos, Alfred W. Sandrock, Jr., and Samantha Budd Haeberlein. Plaintiffs allege Defendants misled investors about the efficacy of Biogen’s nascent Alzheimer’s drug, aducanumab, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and implementing regulations. Pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 60] the Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 58], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 65] and Plaintiffs’ two Requests for Judicial Notice [Doc. Nos. 71, 73]. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, Plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice are DENIED, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. I. Procedural Background This action was initiated in the Central District of California on behalf of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded Biogen securities between October 22, 2019, and November 6, 2020 (the “Class Period”). That court appointed Nadia Shash lead plaintiff and transferred the action to the District of Massachusetts. Order on Appointment [Doc. No. 30]; Mot. to Transfer [Doc. No. 34]; Dkt Minutes [Doc. No. 36]. Following transfer, Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint and, after Defendants

timely moved to dismiss, the operative Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 58]. Defendants responded with the pending Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 60] and in support submitted the Declaration of William Trach [Doc. No. 62] with twenty-three exhibits [Doc. Nos. 62-1 through 62-23]. Plaintiffs opposed and moved to strike certain of these exhibits. Opp’n [Doc. No. 63]; Mot. to Strike [Doc. No. 65]. Plaintiffs subsequently filed two requests for judicial notice. First, Plaintiffs sought judicial notice of a decision by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services regarding its coverage of aducanumab. First Request for Notice [Doc. No. 71]. Plaintiffs’ second request concerned a Biogen press release announcing upcoming leadership changes. Second Request for

Notice [Doc. No. 73]. Defendants opposed both requests. See Opp’ns to Requests for Notice [Doc. Nos. 72, 74]. The court heard oral argument on the pending motions. II. Factual Background as Alleged in the Second Amended Complaint A. Alzheimer’s Disease Alzheimer’s disease is a neurodegenerative disease defined by brain degeneration and progressive loss of cognitive function. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 52 [Doc. No. 58]. While the progression of the disease is well understood, the cause of Alzheimer’s remains largely unknown. Id. at ¶ 52. The leading theory, known as the amyloid hypothesis, posits that Alzheimer’s is caused by the build-up of amyloid plaque in the brain, which blocks neuron 2 pathways and damages the synaptic connections, causing the loss of cognition associated with the disease. Id. at ¶¶ 52–57. As a result, significant resources have been committed to the research and development of therapies aimed at targeting this potentially harmful plaque. Id. at ¶ 57. Despite these efforts, no successful amyloid related treatment had been developed. Id. B. Biogen and Aducanumab

Biogen is a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company focused on developing treatments for neurological and neurodegenerative diseases and autoimmune and hematologic disorders. Id. at ¶ 42. Biogen invested significant resources in the development of a highly anticipated Alzheimer’s treatment called aducanumab. Id. at ¶ 66, Ex. 1, Stat Article [Doc. No. 58-1]. Aducanumab is an amyloid beta targeting monoclonal antibody designed to delay clinical decline in patients with Alzheimer’s disease and if successful would be the first Alzheimer’s drug capable of slowing the progression of the disease. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 59–60. Biogen designed aducanumab to avoid the failures of other Alzheimer’s therapies. Id. at ¶¶ 57–58, 61. Unlike failed amyloid-based treatments, aducanumab targets only harmful

aggregated amyloid beta. Id. at ¶¶ 61–62. Biogen claimed that “[b]y more precisely targeting aggregated amyloid beta . . ., aducanumab can be given in doses high enough to be clinically effective” without confronting the toxicity concerns that constrained earlier treatments. Id. at ¶ 61. C. Aducanumab Clinical Trials To study the effects of aducanumab on Alzheimer’s patients and generate data necessary to seek full approval of the drug, Biogen submitted an investigational new drug application to the FDA in 2011 and began phase I clinical trials shortly thereafter. Id. at ¶ 66. What followed was the standard sequence of clinical trials aimed first at toxicity and then at safety and efficacy. Id. 3 at ¶¶ 77-78. In 2012, Biogen commenced Study 103 or PRIME, a Phase 1b/2 clinical trial to evaluate safety and tolerability. Id. at ¶¶ 68-69. Secondary and exploratory endpoints of the PRIME study also included aducanumab’s effect on amyloid plaque in the brain and the sensitivity of the study’s clinical efficacy measures. Id. at ¶ 75. The exploratory PRIME data showed “10 mg/kg as the most effective dose of aducanumab” and “a correlation between

removal of amyloid plaque and better clinical outcomes.” Id. at ¶ 199. These positive findings informed Biogen’s design of the phase III clinical trials. Id. at ¶¶ 76, 90. In 2015, Biogen commenced aducanumab’s phase III clinical trial, designed to evaluate aducanumab’s safety and efficacy using prespecified endpoints. Id. at ¶¶ 77, 81. The phase III trial was conducted as two independent but identically designed studies—Study 301 (ENGAGE) and Study 302 (EMERGE)—that started about one month apart, with ENGAGE beginning first and remaining ahead in enrollment throughout. Id. at ¶¶ 77, 81, 149–50. In addition to evaluating the effect of aducanumab on cognition, the studies tracked certain biomarkers to assess aducanumab’s effect on brain pathology, including on amyloid plaque reduction. Id. at ¶ 89.

About two thirds of the patients enrolled in the phase III trial had a protein producing gene called APOE4. Id. at ¶ 10. Individuals with APOE4 (“Carriers”) have an increased risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease and make up a disproportionate percentage of Alzheimer’s patients. Id. Carriers are also predisposed to developing Amyloid Related Imaging Abnormalities (“ARIA”), an aducanumab side effect that can cause serious neurological complications. Id. To minimize study participants’ risk, Biogen initially restricted Carriers to low doses of aducanumab. Id. at ¶ 91. Over the life of the phase III trial, Biogen altered the dosing protocols for the Carrier population twice, increasing the dosage available to Carriers each time. Id. at ¶ 96. After the second protocol amendment, all high dose patients—regardless of Carrier status— 4 received the proscribed 10mg/kg dose. Id. at ¶¶ 92–100.1 Because enrollment in EMERGE (Study 302) began later and proceeded at a slower pace than enrollment in ENGAGE (Study 301), more patients in EMERGE received the full dose and for a longer percentage of the trial period. Id. at ¶¶ 149–50. Pursuant to the Phase III pre-established protocol, an independent monitoring committee

conducted an interim futility analysis of data pooled from both studies once half the enrolled patients had reached week 78 of the trial. Id. at ¶ 101. The futility analysis showed that meeting the primary endpoints at the end of the trial was unlikely. Id. at ¶ 105.

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