Sharpe v. Wilson

181 Iowa 753
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJanuary 20, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 181 Iowa 753 (Sharpe v. Wilson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharpe v. Wilson, 181 Iowa 753 (iowa 1917).

Opinion

Gaynor, G. J.

Susan M. Parriott died on February 19, 1912, intestate, leaving a large estate. She was a widow, [754]*754without issue. Her only heirs were her brothers and sisters and the children of a dead sister. She left surviving her 3 brothers and 2 sisters, and the children of a dead sister, 7 in number. One of the brothers, James J. Sharpe, Sr., known hereafter in this record as Joe Sharpe, soon after her death transferred all his interest in her estate to his children, 4 in number, known in this record as Eva, Henry, James J., Jr., and Luke.

This action was originally commenced by James J. Sharpe, Jr., one of the assignees of the interests of the brother Joe Sharpe, and Moore I. Sharpe, one of the brothers of decedent, against the other brothers and sisters and the heirs of the dead sister, to partition the real estate left by the deceased, making Luke, Eva and Henry Sharpe also defendants as assignees of Joe. In this suit, the brothers and sisters claimed their individual right as heirs; the children of the dead sister as the heirs' of the dead sister; James J. Sharpe, Jr., Luke, Eva and Henry, as the assignees of the brother Joe. A hearing was had upon this petition, and a decree rendered on the 11th day of February, 1914. However, before the decree was executed, a petition was filed by two of the assignees of Joe Sharpe, James J. Sharpe, Jr., and Luke Sharpe, praying that the decree be set aside and the case re-opened. Upon this application a new trial was granted, and on the 11th day of November, 1914, James J. Sharpe, Jr., plaintiff in the original suit, and Luke Sharpe, defendant in the original suit, filed their amended and substituted petition, in which they allege that they are the absolute and unqualified owners of all the property described in the original petition, and of all personal property and all other property of whatsoever kind, whether real or personal, of which the said Susan M. Parriott was the owner at the time of her death. They based their claim upon the following allegations :

“That these petitioners became the owners thereof bv [755]*755virtue of the fact that, in the latter part of 1908, J. J. Sharpe, their father, known as Joe Sharpe, surrendered and gave them into the charge of Susan M. Parriott; that they were, at that time, minors; that their father surrendered them to Susan M. Parriott on that date, under an oral contract and agreement entered into between J. J. Sharpe, Sr., their father, for and in their behalf, with Susan M. Parriott, in which it was agreed that said J. J. Sharpe, Sr., should surrender these petitioners to the said Susan M. Parriott, who should have full and exclusive control of them, the same as if they were her own children, until they became of age; that Susan M. Parriott on her part promised that she would take and receive them as her own, and educate and treat them as her own children, and at her death would give to them whatever property she might then own and be possessed of; that, in pursuance of this agreement, Susan M. Parriott took complete and exclusive control of these petitioners and received them as members of her family, educated them, and treated them as her own children until her death; that they did not learn of this fact until after the institution of the original suit, and not until the 12th day of April, 1914.”

They pray that they be declared the owners of all the property of which Susan M. Parriott died seized or possessed, whether the same be real or personal property. An issue ■ was tendered on this claim, the cause tried to the court, and a decree entered dismissing this petition. From this, James J., Jr., and Luke appeal.

The right of these plaintiffs to recover 'upon proof of the allegations made is no longer a mooted question in this state. See Stiles v. Breed, 151 Iowa 86; Horner v. Maxwell, 171 Iowa 660; Finger v. Anken, 154 Iowa 507. The disposition of this case, therefore, involves no unsettled question of law. It resolves itself into a fact controversy alone. This question presents itself: Have these plaintiffs established [756]*756the rights claimed by them by such a quantum of proof as the law requires of them in cases of this kind? It is the holding of this court that such an agreement as here sought to be enforced, resting as it does on parol, must be established by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. Some courts hold that such a contract is looked upon with suspicion; and is only sustained when established by the clearest and strongest evidence. Other courts hold that the proof of such a contract must be so cogent, clear and forcible as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the chancellor as to its terms and character. Our latest pronouncements approving this rule are Boeck v. Milke, and cases therein cited, 141 Iowa 713, at 717; Stiles v. Breed, 151 Iowa 86, at 91.

The ingenuity of the human mind is sometimes astonishing, especially when called into service by the exigencies of its own contrivance. The mind, responding to the things that are, usually gives active recognition to the things that are. In giving expression to the human mind, the things that are find first and readiest recognition and expression. The normal man, possessing a knowledge which, asserted, brings profit to himself, usually does not conceal that knowledge when the bringing of it into active use will redound to his own advantage. Usually, when men make contracts involving great interests to themselves or to those they love, they do not conceal the existence of the contract when the time arrives for the harvest.

In this case, we have the following facts disclosed by the record, and n'ot disputed:

Susan M. Parriott, the decedent, was a woman of considerable business ability. Her husband died in 1875. She never remarried. On his death, she became the owner of a large estate. So far as this record shows, she managed and controlled the estate herself up to the time of her death. She had brothers and sisters with whom she was on the very [757]*757best of terms, for whom she entertained most kindly feeling. In no part of the record can we discover that she entertained any more kindly feeling towards Joe Sharpe and his children than she entertained towards her other brothers and sisters and their children. All were welcome at her home. Many of them were entertained there, and she at theirs. She was more abundantly supplied with this world’s goods than most of her brothers and sisters. She never had any children. Her brothers and sisters seemed to be abundantly supplied in this way. As said before, her husband died in 1875. After the death of her husband, she made her home a great deal of the time with her sisters, Mrs. Wilson and Mrs. Stockdale.

For some years before moving to her home in Hampton, she made her home with her sisters. She moved to Hampton in 1897. It is at about this time that the contract is alleged to have been made between Joe Sharpe and Mrs. Parriott under wiiich these plaintiffs are claiming all her jiroperty. At this time, Joe Sharpe was living on a farm in Hamilton Township, in Franklin County. He' had five children. His first wife died in 1896. At that time, the youngest child was an infant. This youngest child was born in March of that year and died the following September. The plaintiffs in this suit are two of his children. After his wife died, Mrs. Parriott came to his home and cared for these children. Prior to this time, Mrs. Parriott had been living with her sisters; some part of the time had a home in Ackley.

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Bluebook (online)
181 Iowa 753, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharpe-v-wilson-iowa-1917.