Sharon Sanders v. City of North Las Vegas, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00845
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Sharon Sanders, Case No. 2:24-cv-00845-CDS-NJK

5 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 6 v.

7 City of North Las Vegas, et al., [ECF No. 36]

8 Defendants

9 10 Plaintiff Sharon Sanders brings this action against the City of North Las Vegas, Officer 11 Anthony Malear and several Doe Defendants on behalf of Chris Smith Jr., who was fatally shot 12 by Officer Malear in 2022. Second am. compl., ECF No. 24. The plaintiff asserts five claims for 13 relief: (1) an excessive force claim against Officer Malear; (2) a denial of medical care claim 14 against Officer Malear; (3) a substantive due process claim against Officer Malear; (4) a battery 15 claim against the City and Officer Malear; and (5) a negligence claim against all defendants. Id. 16 Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Mot., ECF No. 36. 17 The motion is fully briefed. Resp., ECF No. 37; Reply, ECF No. 40. For the reasons stated herein, 18 I grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 claims, and I 19 dismiss without prejudice the state law claims. 20 I. Background 21 A. The evidence 22 This case concerns a shooting that occurred on October 10, 2022, at a park near the 23 Martin Luther King (MLK) Memorial and statute located in North Las Vegas. ECF No. 36 at 5; 24 ECF No. 27 at 4–5. The evidence shows that three different 911 calls were made regarding the 25 decedent. First Call, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 36-2; Second Call, Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 36-7; Third 26 Call, Defs.’ Ex. I, ECF No. 36-9. The first call reported that a male wearing a Halloween mask 1 had pulled a gun on the caller. Incident Details Report, Pl.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 37-1 at 2. Officer 2 Malear went to the location of the call but was unable to locate the caller or suspect, so he left 3 the area. Id.; ECF No. 36 at 5; ECF No. 37 at 4. He received the second and third calls a few 4 minutes later, describing the decedent as being armed, wearing a Michael Myers Halloween 5 mask, and threatening bystanders. See ECF No. 36-7 (expressing fear of getting shot and 6 explaining that a man wearing a Halloween mask was threatening and pointing his gun at the 7 caller and others); ECF No. 36-9 (detailing how the decedent was acting like “a wacko,” wearing 8 a “Freddy [Michael] Myers” Halloween mask, and pulling his gun on Mini Mart customers); see 9 also Incident Details Report, Pl.’s Ex. B, ECF No. 37-2 at 4. 10 Bodycam footage shows that when Officer Malear arrived at the park, the decedent was 11 approaching a group of bystanders while carrying a gun and wearing a Michael Myers 12 Halloween mask. Body worn camera, Pl.’s Ex. 11 at 00:35–00:53. The decedent continued to 13 approach the bystanders while Officer Malear shouted, “Hey! Police! Stop right there! Hey, stop! 14 Stop right there! It’s police! Put your hands up! Put your hands up! Dude, I’m not playin’ with 15 you!” Id. at 00:45–00:54. Then, the decedent began moving his arms toward his gun and running 16 toward the bystanders while Malear shouted, “Stop reaching! Don’t reach!” Id. at 00:53–55. 17 Officer Malear then rapidly fired eight shots at the decedent. Id. at 00:55. While the shots were 18 being fired, a gun is seen in the air. Id. at 00:55–00:56. Once the shooting concluded, Officer 19 Malear shouted, “Don’t reach! Do not reach!” Id. at 00:55–01:00. 20 Officer Malear kept his gun pointed toward the decedent while radioing in, “10-18. Shots 21 fired. Shots fired. We’re going to be at the MLK statute.” Id. at 01:00–01:11. When other officers 22 arrived on the scene, they instructed the bystanders to stand back. Id. at 01:14–01:25. Officer 23 Malear proceeded to tell an officer, “We need . . . additional units, supervisor, and we need 24 medical 10-18.” Id. at 01:25–01:30. Within minutes, an officer brought Malear a trauma kit and the 25 pair began examining the decedent. Id. at 01:20–3:20. They applied a tourniquet to the decedent’s 26 arm, rolled him onto his back, applied gauze to the wounds, and performed CPR. 03:20–8:00. All 1 the while, Officer Malear repeatedly said to the decedent, “Stay with us! Stay with me! Stay 2 awake! Keep breathing!” Id. at 01:20–7:40. 3 B. The dispute 4 The parties do not dispute that Officer Malear identified himself as police and 5 commanded the decedent to stop. ECF No. 37 at 4–5. Nor do they dispute that, despite Officer 6 Malear’s demands, the decedent proceeded to walk away from Officer Malear and reach for his 7 gun. ECF No. 37 at 4–5. Rather, they dispute the timing of when the decedent discarded his gun. 8 The defendants argue that Officer Malear fired the first shot before the discard. ECF No. 37 at 5. 9 In Officer Malear’s deposition, he states that the decedent’s discard of the firearm did not appear 10 to be intentional. Malear dep., Pl.’s Ex. G, ECF No. 37-3 at 4–5, 10–11, 26–28, 47. The plaintiff 11 argues that Officer Malear fired the first shot during or after the discard, and that the decedent 12 neither pointed the gun at anyone nor attempted to retrieve the gun after he discarded it. ECF 13 No. 37 at 5–6. 14 These facts, the plaintiff contends, show that Officer Malear used excessive force in 15 violation of the decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 6. According to the plaintiff, there 16 “were less lethal alternatives available to Officer Malear, including giving a verbal warning that 17 deadly force would be used, taking a position of cover, issuing additional commands and 18 additional time to comply with those commands.” Id. at 6. The plaintiff further contends that “a 19 reasonably jury could find that Officer Malear saw Decedent toss the gun and that Decedent 20 intentionally tossed the gun.” Id. at 8. 21 II. Legal standard 22 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and admissible evidence “show 23 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 24 as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 25 At the summary-judgment stage, the court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light 26 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts, summary judgment is 2 inappropriate because its purpose is to avoid unnecessary trials when the facts are undisputed; 3 the case must then proceed to the trier of fact. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 4 1995); see also Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). 5 Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56 by demonstrating the absence of any genuine 6 issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the party resisting summary judgment to “set forth 7 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 8 242, 256 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party 9 must produce evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.” 10 Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018). 11 III. Discussion 12 A. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims. 13 The defendants move for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Section 1983 14 imposes civil liability on any person who deprives another of his or her constitutional rights 15 while acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A person deprives another “of a 16 constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in 17 another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 18 causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 19 Cir. 1978). 20 21 22 The defendants argue they are entitled to judgment on the plaintiff’s excessive force 23 claim because Officer Malear’s force was objectively reasonable, and qualified immunity applies. 24 I agree. 25

26 1 An excessive force claim is adjudicated under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective 2 reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “Whether a use of force 3 was objectively reasonable demands ‘careful attention to the facts and circumstances’ relating to 4 the incident, as then known to the officer.” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025) (citation 5 omitted). Courts consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an 6 immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [was] actively resisting 7 arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. Further, the “calculus of 8 reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make 9 split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving— 10 about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396. And where “the 11 officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, 12 either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by 13 using deadly force.” Id. at 103. 14 Here, Officer Malear’s use of force was objectively reasonable. First, the decedent was 15 threatening to shoot people, carrying a gun, and wearing a Halloween mask. The nature of the 16 crimes at issue were therefore violent and severe. Second, the decedent posed an immediate 17 threat to the safety of the officers and the numerous bystanders because he was charging toward 18 them while carrying a gun after making numerous threats of violence. Third, the decedent was 19 actively resisting arrest. Officer Malear repeatedly identified himself as police, demanded that 20 the decedent stop fleeing, and warned the decedent to not reach for his gun. The decedent 21 ignored these commands and started running away from Officer Malear toward a group of 22 bystanders. Therefore, in light of the totality of the circumstances, Officer Malear’s split-second 23 decision to use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. 24 Even if Officer Malear’s use of force was excessive, he would still be entitled to summary 25 judgment because qualified immunity shields him from liability. The doctrine of qualified 26 immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly 1 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 2 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quotation omitted). An officer “cannot be said to have 3 violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any 4 reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” 5 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014). Stated otherwise, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but 6 the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. 7 at 12). And it “protects actions in the ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.’” Id. 8 at 18 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)). 9 For example, in Kisela v. Hughes, the Supreme Court held that an officer who shot and 10 killed a woman who was acting erratically with a knife was entitled to qualified immunity. 584 11 U.S. 100 (2018). There, the woman’s erratic behavior prompted a bystander to call 911. Id. at 105. 12 Upon arriving at the scene, an officer commanded the woman to drop the knife twice. Id. She 13 refused, so the officer shot her. Id. The officer said that “he shot [the woman] because, although 14 the officers themselves were in no apparent danger, he believed she was a threat to [a 15 bystander].” Id. The officer was concerned because “[h]e was confronted with a woman who had 16 just been seen hacking a tree with a large kitchen knife and whose behavior was erratic enough 17 to cause a concerned bystander to call 911.” Id. The whole situation “unfolded in less than a 18 minute.” Id. at 107. In turn, the Court found that qualified immunity applied to the officer’s split- 19 second judgment to use deadly force because the circumstances were “far from an obvious case 20 in which any competent officer would have known that shooting [the woman] to protect [the 21 bystander] would have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 105–06. 22 The same is true here. Like the woman in Kisela whose erratic behavior prompted a 911 23 call, the decedent’s behavior here—that is, threatening bystanders while wearing a Michael 24 Myers mask and carrying a gun—was so erratic that it prompted three 911 calls. These calls were 25 relayed to Officer Malear, so he was aware of the decedent’s erratic behavior before he 26 encountered him at the park. Further, like the officer in Kisela, Malear had to make a split- 1 second decision. And the circumstances surrounding that decision were even more egregious 2 than those in Kiselar: The decedent here was carrying a gun rather than a knife, and there were 3 numerous bystanders rather than one. Compared to the facts of Kisela, the facts here are even 4 further from an obvious case in which any competent officer would have known that shooting 5 the decedent to protect the bystanders would violate the Fourth Amendment. As such, qualified 6 immunity shields Officer Malear from liability. 7 8 9 The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires 10 “the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to persons . . . who 11 have been injured while being apprehended by the police.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 12 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (finding that the City fulfilled its constitutional obligation by seeking that 13 the injured party was “was taken promptly to a hospital that provided the treatment necessary 14 for his injury”). The Ninth Circuit maintains that “a police officer who promptly summons the 15 necessary medical assistance has acted reasonably for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, even 16 if the officer did not administer CPR.” Tatum v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 441 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 17 2006). 18 Here, Officer Malear is entitled to summary judgment on the denial of medical care claim 19 because he did in fact promptly summon medical assistance. Seconds after shooting the 20 decedent, Officer Malear radioed for medical attention. Within minutes, an officer brought 21 Malear a trauma kit and the pair began medically examining the decedent. They applied a 22 tourniquet to the decedent’s arm, rolled him onto his back, applied gauze to the wounds, and 23 performed CPR. All the while, Officer Malear repeatedly said to the decedent, “Stay with us! 24 Stay with me! Stay awake! Keep breathing!” Considering the nature of the wounds and the 25 prompt manner in which medical care was summoned, I find that Officer Malear acted 26 reasonably as a matter of law for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. And assuming arguendo 1 he did not act reasonably, qualified immunity shields him from liability because he did not 2 violate a clearly established constitutional right. See, e.g., Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1099. As such, he is 3 entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 4 5 6 The plaintiff argues that Officer Malear’s conduct during the incident violated her 7 Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right “to be free from unlawful state 8 interference with [her] family relations.” ECF No. 24 at 9–10. To establish a substantive due 9 process violation, “a plaintiff is ordinarily required to prove that a challenged government action 10 was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, 11 safety, morals or general welfare.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996). 12 “However, where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of 13 constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not 14 the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a 15 plaintiff’s claims.” Id. The Supreme Court has held that “all claims that law enforcement officers 16 have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 17 ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 18 ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.” Graham, 490 19 U.S. at 395. 20 Here, the plaintiff recasts the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim brought on 21 behalf of the decedent as a substantive due process claim brought on behalf of herself. But 22 regardless of which due process framework is applied, the outcome is the same: Officer Malear is 23 entitled the summary judgment because his conduct was reasonable for the reasons set forth 24 above. And, relevant to the substantive due process framework, it bore a substantial relation to 25 public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Numerous 911 calls were made by bystanders 26 and victims of the decedent’s erratic and threatening behavior. The threat the decedent posed to 1 the public’s safety was overwhelming, especially when he ignored Officer Malear’s commands 2 and charged toward a group of bystanders while carrying a gun. In light of the decedent’s erratic 3 behavior, blatant disregard for public safety, and persistent disobedience of Officer Malear’s 4 instructions, it was objectively reasonable for Malear to use deadly force in this situation. 5 B. The court dismisses the plaintiff’s state law claims for lack of jurisdiction. 6 Finally, having granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to 7 the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the court lacks original jurisdiction over the remaining state law 8 claims for battery and negligence. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district “may decline to exercise 9 supplemental jurisdiction” inter alia where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which 10 it has original jurisdiction.” Typically, “when federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . pendent 11 state claims should also be dismissed.” Religious Tech. Ctr v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367–68 (9th 12 Cir. 1992). Indeed, “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, 13 the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 14 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 15 jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 16 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 17 Accordingly, in its discretion, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 18 over the remaining state law claims. See City of Colton v. Am. Promo. Events, Inc.-W., 614 F.3d 998, 19 1008 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that district court acted within its discretion in declining to 20 exercise supplemental jurisdiction after granting summary judgment on all federal claims). As a 21 result, claims four and five are dismissed without prejudice. 22 IV. Conclusion 23 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 24 136] is granted with respect to claims one, two, and three. 25 26 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that claims four and five are dismissed without prejudice. 2 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants on the 3}| first three claims, to dismiss claims four and five without pr fdice, and to close this case. 4 Dated: March 24, 2026 □□

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