1 2 3 4 5 6 9 SHARON S. CHAND, 10 Case No. 21-cv-07773-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEE M. ZELDIN, JUDGMENT 13 Defendant. 14
15 Sharon Chand (Plaintiff), proceeding pro se, moves for relief from a partial grant of 16 summary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6). Plaintiff 17 contends she has uncovered new evidence of fraud by officials at the Environmental Protection 18 Agency (EPA), her former employer. Because she has failed to demonstrate that this new evidence 19 would have impacted the partial grant of summary judgment, the motion is denied. 21 The factual and procedural history of this case has been extensively documented and need 22 not be recounted here. See, e.g., Dkt. 27, at 2–3; Dkt. 46, at 2. In brief, Plaintiff was formerly a 23 probationary employee at the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights. She suffers from several medical 24 conditions—including deep vein thrombosis, inflammation, and major depressive disorder— 25 which necessitated certain accommodations at work. After filing a formal complaint against her 26 manager and taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, her employment was 27 terminated. She brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., 1 asserting five claims for relief: (1) disability discrimination based on disparate treatment, (2) 2 retaliation, (3) hostile work environment, (4) disability discrimination based on failure to provide 3 reasonable accommodations, and (5) ADA interference. 4 Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The motion was granted as to the 5 disability discrimination claim because Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether 6 Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating her employment was pretext for discrimination. See 7 Dkt. 94, at 6–8. The motion was granted as to the retaliation claim because she could not 8 demonstrate that certain actions constituted adverse employment actions under the law and 9 because she could not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether certain other adverse employment 10 actions were caused by her employer’s desire to retaliate against her. See id., at 8–11. The motion 11 was also granted as to Plaintiff’s ADA interference claim because she failed to oppose 12 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that claim. See id. at 17–18. 13 Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim yielded mixed results. She averred she was denied 14 a reasonable accommodation on four occasions, and summary judgment was granted for 15 Defendant as to only one of those occasions. As to the others, Plaintiff successfully raised a triable 16 question over whether Defendant satisfied its obligation to engage in the interactive process to 17 accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. See Dkt. 94, at 12–13. Finally, Plaintiff’s hostile workplace 18 claim survived summary judgment because Plaintiff produced enough evidence from which a 19 factfinder could conclude that she was harassed on account of her disability. See id., at 13–17. 20 Plaintiff now moves for relief from the partial grant of summary judgment. She claims to 21 have uncovered two new pieces of evidence which she asserts demonstrate fraud. The first piece 22 of evidence is an office-wide email provided to her by a former EPA employee in which someone 23 at EPA solicited annual leave donations for Plaintiff because she “[was] experiencing a medical 24 emergency and . . . exhausted all other paid leave.” Dkt. 126 (Mot.), Ex. B. Plaintiff argues that 25 this evidence would have helped her retaliation claim survive summary judgment because it 26 showed that Strauss, the EPA official who decided to terminate her employment, knew about her 27 leave at the time he terminated her. 1 The second piece of evidence comes from an anonymous EPA employee Plaintiff calls 2 “Jane Doe.” This employee gave Plaintiff her “reasonable accommodation paperwork,” which 3 Plaintiff claims made her aware of how the interactive process worked in her EPA region and how 4 it was “corrupted by the actions of Edwards and Wong,” two EPA officials. Mot., at 5. Plaintiff 5 specifically seems to take issue with the fact that Wong, who served as agency counsel, was 6 involved in her accommodation process but was not involved in Jane Doe’s. She also complains 7 that she was not offered the same accommodation paperwork as Jane Doe and that one of the 8 accommodations she received, a flexible start time, was not an accommodation at all but rather a 9 benefit available to all employees. 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) permits relief from a judgment or order for “fraud 12 . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” “To prevail, the moving party must 13 prove by clear and convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud, 14 misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented the losing party 15 from fully and fairly presenting the defense.” De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206 16 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir.2000). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) require[s] that fraud ... 17 not be discoverable by due diligence before or during the proceedings.” Pac. & Arctic Ry. and 18 Navigation Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.1991). 19 Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that permits relief from a judgment or order for “any 20 other reason that justifies relief.” “A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show 21 ‘extraordinary circumstances . . .’” Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 22 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)); see Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 23 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Rule is ‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 24 manifest injustice’ and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party 25 from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.’” (quoting United States v. 26 Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005))). 27 2 Neither piece of evidence warrants setting aside the partial grant of summary judgment. 3 Plaintiff argues that the office-wide email demonstrates that Strauss knew about her leave at the 4 time she made the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, but the grant of summary 5 judgment on the retaliation claim did not turn on whether Strauss knew about Plaintiff’s leave. 6 Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 7 framework. Under that framework, Defendant bore the burden of offering a legitimate, non- 8 discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. Because Defendant successfully offered such a 9 reason—that Plaintiff was terminated because of her job performance—the burden shifted to 10 Plaintiff to raise a triable question as to whether that proffered reason was pretextual. See Curley v. 11 City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014). 12 Plaintiff could not do so.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 9 SHARON S. CHAND, 10 Case No. 21-cv-07773-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEE M. ZELDIN, JUDGMENT 13 Defendant. 14
15 Sharon Chand (Plaintiff), proceeding pro se, moves for relief from a partial grant of 16 summary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6). Plaintiff 17 contends she has uncovered new evidence of fraud by officials at the Environmental Protection 18 Agency (EPA), her former employer. Because she has failed to demonstrate that this new evidence 19 would have impacted the partial grant of summary judgment, the motion is denied. 21 The factual and procedural history of this case has been extensively documented and need 22 not be recounted here. See, e.g., Dkt. 27, at 2–3; Dkt. 46, at 2. In brief, Plaintiff was formerly a 23 probationary employee at the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights. She suffers from several medical 24 conditions—including deep vein thrombosis, inflammation, and major depressive disorder— 25 which necessitated certain accommodations at work. After filing a formal complaint against her 26 manager and taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, her employment was 27 terminated. She brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., 1 asserting five claims for relief: (1) disability discrimination based on disparate treatment, (2) 2 retaliation, (3) hostile work environment, (4) disability discrimination based on failure to provide 3 reasonable accommodations, and (5) ADA interference. 4 Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The motion was granted as to the 5 disability discrimination claim because Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether 6 Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating her employment was pretext for discrimination. See 7 Dkt. 94, at 6–8. The motion was granted as to the retaliation claim because she could not 8 demonstrate that certain actions constituted adverse employment actions under the law and 9 because she could not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether certain other adverse employment 10 actions were caused by her employer’s desire to retaliate against her. See id., at 8–11. The motion 11 was also granted as to Plaintiff’s ADA interference claim because she failed to oppose 12 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that claim. See id. at 17–18. 13 Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim yielded mixed results. She averred she was denied 14 a reasonable accommodation on four occasions, and summary judgment was granted for 15 Defendant as to only one of those occasions. As to the others, Plaintiff successfully raised a triable 16 question over whether Defendant satisfied its obligation to engage in the interactive process to 17 accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. See Dkt. 94, at 12–13. Finally, Plaintiff’s hostile workplace 18 claim survived summary judgment because Plaintiff produced enough evidence from which a 19 factfinder could conclude that she was harassed on account of her disability. See id., at 13–17. 20 Plaintiff now moves for relief from the partial grant of summary judgment. She claims to 21 have uncovered two new pieces of evidence which she asserts demonstrate fraud. The first piece 22 of evidence is an office-wide email provided to her by a former EPA employee in which someone 23 at EPA solicited annual leave donations for Plaintiff because she “[was] experiencing a medical 24 emergency and . . . exhausted all other paid leave.” Dkt. 126 (Mot.), Ex. B. Plaintiff argues that 25 this evidence would have helped her retaliation claim survive summary judgment because it 26 showed that Strauss, the EPA official who decided to terminate her employment, knew about her 27 leave at the time he terminated her. 1 The second piece of evidence comes from an anonymous EPA employee Plaintiff calls 2 “Jane Doe.” This employee gave Plaintiff her “reasonable accommodation paperwork,” which 3 Plaintiff claims made her aware of how the interactive process worked in her EPA region and how 4 it was “corrupted by the actions of Edwards and Wong,” two EPA officials. Mot., at 5. Plaintiff 5 specifically seems to take issue with the fact that Wong, who served as agency counsel, was 6 involved in her accommodation process but was not involved in Jane Doe’s. She also complains 7 that she was not offered the same accommodation paperwork as Jane Doe and that one of the 8 accommodations she received, a flexible start time, was not an accommodation at all but rather a 9 benefit available to all employees. 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) permits relief from a judgment or order for “fraud 12 . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” “To prevail, the moving party must 13 prove by clear and convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud, 14 misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented the losing party 15 from fully and fairly presenting the defense.” De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206 16 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir.2000). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) require[s] that fraud ... 17 not be discoverable by due diligence before or during the proceedings.” Pac. & Arctic Ry. and 18 Navigation Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.1991). 19 Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that permits relief from a judgment or order for “any 20 other reason that justifies relief.” “A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show 21 ‘extraordinary circumstances . . .’” Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 22 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)); see Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 23 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Rule is ‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 24 manifest injustice’ and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party 25 from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.’” (quoting United States v. 26 Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005))). 27 2 Neither piece of evidence warrants setting aside the partial grant of summary judgment. 3 Plaintiff argues that the office-wide email demonstrates that Strauss knew about her leave at the 4 time she made the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, but the grant of summary 5 judgment on the retaliation claim did not turn on whether Strauss knew about Plaintiff’s leave. 6 Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 7 framework. Under that framework, Defendant bore the burden of offering a legitimate, non- 8 discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. Because Defendant successfully offered such a 9 reason—that Plaintiff was terminated because of her job performance—the burden shifted to 10 Plaintiff to raise a triable question as to whether that proffered reason was pretextual. See Curley v. 11 City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014). 12 Plaintiff could not do so. She argued that she was “fully successful” in her role, but that 13 assessment did not entitle her to continued employment under the regulations which governed 14 Plaintiff’s employment. See Dkt. 94, at 6; 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u)(6). Plaintiff also failed to offer 15 any direct or circumstantial evidence that the EPA officials, including Strauss, did not genuinely 16 believe that Plaintiff’s performance did not merit continued employment, even if that genuine 17 belief was wrong. See id. at 7. This failure doomed her retaliation claim. Evidence that Strauss 18 knew about her leave would have made no difference. 19 Plaintiff’s reliance on new evidence regarding the way EPA conducted the interactive 20 accommodation process with another former employee is equally confounding. As Defendant 21 points out, Plaintiff’s request for an accommodation and EPA’s response to that request are 22 directly relevant to only the failure to accommodate claim1—a claim which largely survived 23
24 1 Evidence about the interactive process could theoretically be relevant to the ADA interference 25 claim as well. However, summary judgment on that claim was granted to Defendant because Plaintiff “failed to present any evidence in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary 26 judgment.” Dkt. 94, at 18. Plaintiff does not specifically address the ADA interference claim in the present motion. There is, therefore, no basis on which to upset the grant of summary judgment on 27 that claim. ] summary judgment. Summary judgment was only granted insofar as the claim related to an 2 || incident in which Plaintiff's supervisor requested that she turn up for work at 7:45AM even 3 || though she was approved to start work at 8:30AM. See Dkt. 94, at 12. However, that portion of the 4 || claim was not deficient because Plaintiff failed adequately to demonstrate that EPA did not engage 5 in an interactive accommodation process; it failed because Plaintiff never requested the 6 || accommodation. See id. Thus, more information about how EPA engaged in the interactive 7 || accommodation process with other employees could not have changed the result. 8 It is similarly unclear what the import is of Plaintiffs assertion that a flexible schedule was 9 || a benefit provided to all employees, not a disability accommodation. Plaintiff averred three 10 || instances in which she requested some change to her schedule or working conditions to 11 accommodate her disability. Summary judgment to Defendant was denied as to two of those 12 || instances, and—to reiterate—it was granted as to the other only because there was no evidence 13 || that Plaintiff actually made the request. IV. CONCLUSION 3 15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for relief from the partial grant of summary a 16 || judgment is denied.
Z 18 19 20 || ITISSO ORDERED. 21 22 || Dated: February 23, 2026 23 / RICHARD SEEBORG 24 Chief United States District Judge 25 26 27 98 ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTION CasE No. 21-cv-07773-RS