IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED
Sharon McLain, Sep 02 2026, 8:46 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
September 2, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-2562
Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court The Honorable Bradley B. Jacobs, Judge Trial Court Cause No.
10C02-2406-F2-20
Opinion by Judge May
Judges Pyle and Scheele concur.
May, Judge.
[1] As part of a traffic stop, a police officer discovered a large quantity of methamphetamine in several containers in the vehicle Sharon McLain was driving. After a jury trial, McLain was convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine over ten grams.1 On appeal, McLain argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted body camera footage in which officers commented on the veracity of McLain’s statements on scene; that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support her conviction; and that her seventeen-and-one-half-year sentence is inappropriate based on her character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On June 23, 2024, Indiana State Police Trooper Clay Boley 2 initiated a traffic
stop of a vehicle McLain was driving after he observed several traffic violations and an obscured temporary license plate. As Trooper Boley approached, he noted the driver, McLain, appeared nervous, and when he reached the car window, he noted the passenger, Tara Edwards, had a pill bottle with its label removed and a black wallet partially concealed beneath her leg. While Trooper Boley ran records checks, he noticed that McLain was moving side to side in her seat and that the two women were speaking without turning toward each
1 Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2) & 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1).
2 At the time of trial, Trooper Boley had been promoted to detective.
other. When he returned to the vehicle, he could no longer see the wallet or pill bottle that had been beneath Edwards’s leg.
[3] McLain told Trooper Boley that she had recently purchased the vehicle and had not yet transferred the title to her name, but the car’s registration did not list McLain, Edwards, or the woman McLain identified as the seller. A K-9 officer arrived on scene, and the K-9 gave a positive alert for drugs in the vehicle. Trooper Boley advised McLain and Edwards of their Miranda3 rights.
[4] Trooper Boley then searched the vehicle. He noticed McLain’s purse in the center console, immediately beside where she was sitting. In her purse, he found several pills and a zippered case containing 21.45 grams of methamphetamine. On the passenger side floorboard, he found an eyeglass case holding 4 small, pre-marked baggies, which held an additional 1.08 grams of methamphetamine.
[5] Over the course of the stop, McLain gave officers shifting accounts of the drugs’ origin – first denying any knowledge of them, then suggesting a mechanic or the vehicle’s prior owner may have left them, then telling Trooper Boley that an unknown caller had directed her to pick up items at a Louisville gas station and deliver them to a warehouse in the area. When another officer on scene, Trooper Justin Smith, remarked that “somebody told you to take that eye glass case somewhere.”, (Tr. Vol. II at 236.) McLain replied, “They left it. I picked
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
it up.” (Id.) Edwards, by contrast, told Trooper Boley that everything in the vehicle belonged to McLain and that the two women were driving to a friend’s house in Louisville to swim.
[6] The State charged McLain with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine,4 Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine,5 and Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. 6 The trial court scheduled a jury trial for July 22, 2025. Before trial, McLain moved to redact portions of the officers’ body camera footage in which they stated or implied that she was lying, and she argued the statements were inadmissible opinions on her truthfulness under Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b). The trial court denied the motion.
[7] At trial, Troopers Boley and Smith, who together had conducted roughly 400 drug investigations, explained to the trial court that even a heavy methamphetamine user consumes no more than 2 grams a day, that an ounce sells for $150 to $200 on the street, and that the quantity, packaging, and surrounding circumstances were consistent with intent to distribute rather than personal use. McLain renewed her Rule 704(b) objection when the State played the footage of the officers’ interactions on the scene for the jury at trial, and the
4 Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-6.1(a) & 35-48-4-6.1(c)(1).
5 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2).
6 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).
trial court denied the objection. The jury determined McLain was guilty as charged, and the trial court entered convictions accordingly.
[8] At the sentencing hearing on September 11, 2025,7 the trial court identified McLain’s limited criminal history and poor health as mitigators. The trial court sentenced McLain to seventeen-and-one-half years for the Level 2 felony, six years for the Level 4 felony, three years for the Level 5 felony, and one year for the Level 6 felony, to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of seventeen-and-one-half years. On September 30, 2025, the trial court issued an amended order merging all convictions into the Level 2 felony conviction and ordered McLain to serve seventeen-and-one-half years incarcerated.
Discussion and Decision 1. Admission of Body Camera Footage [9] McLain contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting unredacted
body camera footage containing statements by the troopers that she was not being truthful because doing so violated Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b).8 We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion and will
7 At the same hearing, the trial court accepted McLain’s guilty plea to offenses committed while she was on bail in the instant case. 8 McLain also raises arguments regarding the unredacted body camera footage under Indiana Evidence Rules 401, 402, and 403 for the first time on appeal. A party may not advance a different basis for exclusion on appeal than the one it presented to the trial court. Benjamin v. State, 233 N.E.3d 506, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. McLain’s arguments regarding Rules 401, 402, and 403 are waived.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2562 | September 2, 2026 Page 5 of 14 reverse only when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017).
[10] McLain characterizes the officers’ statements on the body camera video as “negative vouching.” (Appellant’s Br. at 26.) Indiana courts do not use that term. Rule 704(b) already prohibits opinions concerning “the truth or falsity of allegations” and “whether a witness has testified truthfully[,]” and we analyze an officer’s statements made during an interrogation under the framework set out in Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213 (Ind. 1999) – asking whether a given statement is a factual assertion of guilt or an investigative prompt designed to elicit a response – rather than as a distinct category of “vouching.”
[11] In Smith, our Indiana Supreme Court evaluated a videotaped police interview and identified two distinct categories of officer statements. Id. at 216. One category – a detective’s direct assertion, “I thought it was you” – was an “assertion of fact” that violated Rule 704(b) because it conveyed an opinion of guilt rather than a question and the trial court had given no limiting instruction. Id. at 216. The other category – the same detective’s open-ended questions about the defendant’s reputation, including “How does it feel to be, have that kind of reputation? Everybody wants you” – was admissible because those statements were “obviously” designed to elicit a response rather than to assert facts. Id. The operative question is therefore not whether an officer expressed doubt about a defendant’s account, but whether the statement was a factual assertion of guilt or untruthfulness or an investigative prompt designed to generate a response.
[12] Here, some of the challenged statements are plainly investigative prompts. Trooper Smith’s statement – “I’m not calling you a liar, I’m just saying I don’t believe you” – and his request that McLain “[j]ust tell me a story that makes sense,” (Tr. Vol. II at 226-27), are invitations to provide a coherent account, not assertions that she was untruthful. Other challenged statements, including repeated characterizations of McLain’s changing accounts as lies, more closely resemble the factual-assertion category Smith found problematic. However, we need not resolve exactly where each statement falls on that spectrum, because any error in admitting them was harmless.
[13] An error in the admission of evidence is harmless when it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Ind. Appellate R. 66(A); Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491 (Ind. 2023). The body camera footage the jury watched contained McLain’s own admissions: she acknowledged receiving a call directing her to pick up items at a gas station, acknowledged picking up the eyeglass case herself, and acknowledged that she was to deliver those items to a Louisville warehouse. Whatever a juror thought of the troopers’ expressions of doubt, McLain’s own words on those same recordings supplied the most significant evidence against her and therefore any error in the admission of the troopers’ expressions was harmless. See Lampkins v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (Ind. 2002) (admission of officer’s statement regarding defendant’s guilt was harmless because defendant admitted guilt in the same recording).
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence [14] McLain contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her
conviction of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. We consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict and will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Id.
[15] To obtain McLain’s conviction of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, the State was required to prove she knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine weighing at least ten grams with the intent to deliver it. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2) & (e)(1). McLain first argues the evidence was insufficient because the State did not prove she completed delivery. That argument fails at the threshold: Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2) criminalizes possession with intent to deliver and does not require proof that a delivery occurred. We examine her other arguments below.
2.1 Possession [16] McLain argues the State did not present sufficient evidence she possessed methamphetamine because no methamphetamine was found on her person and there was no evidence that she knew what was in her purse, the zippered wallet, or on the passenger floor, where the methamphetamine was found. Trooper Boley found 21.45 grams of methamphetamine inside a zippered case in McLain’s purse. She was driving a vehicle she claimed had been recently purchased, though she had not yet transferred the title to her name. She also admitted on the body camera footage that she picked up the eyeglass case and placed it in the vehicle. Actual possession requires only that the defendant have direct physical control over the item. Smith v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A person who drives a vehicle, carries a purse inside it, and admits placing an object in that vehicle exercises direct physical control over the contents.
[17] The evidence also supported constructive possession. Where a vehicle’s occupancy is not exclusive, the State may prove constructive possession by demonstrating additional circumstances showing the defendant’s intent to maintain dominion and control over the contraband. Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. 1999). Such circumstances include incriminating statements, furtive gestures, proximity of the contraband to the defendant, and contraband commingled with the defendant’s own belongings. Id. Each of those factors is present here. McLain made furtive movements as Trooper Boley first approached and again as he reviewed records in his patrol vehicle. Trooper Boley found the bulk of the methamphetamine in McLain’s purse, commingled with her own personal property, immediately beside her in the driver’s seat. Further, McLain related that she received a call directing her to pick up items, picked up the eyeglass case herself, and was to deliver those items to a Louisville warehouse. Whether actual or constructive, McLain possessed the methamphetamine in question.
2.2 Intent to Deliver [18] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1(b), to be convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, the State had to prove that McLain either possessed at least twenty-eight grams of methamphetamine or that there was evidence in addition to the weight of the drug to prove she intended to deal it. Because McLain possessed 21.45 grams of methamphetamine, the State could obtain a conviction of possession with intent to deliver only if there was “evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that [she] intended to deliver[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(b). That additional evidence is present here.
[19] Troopers Boley and Smith, who together had conducted roughly 400 drug investigations, testified that a personal-use quantity of methamphetamine is about 1 gram in a single small baggie and that a heavy user consumes no more than 2 grams per day. McLain, by contrast, possessed 21.45 grams in a zippered case in her purse and another 1.08 grams in four pre-marked baggies in the eyeglass case. Evidence that a defendant possessed a large quantity of a controlled substance is circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver. Davis v. State, 791 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. The greater the quantity, the stronger the inference. Id. The quantity and packaging, combined with McLain’s recorded admissions that an unknown caller directed her to pick up items and deliver them to a Louisville warehouse, permitted the jury to infer intent to deliver rather than personal use.
3. Inappropriateness of Sentence [20] McLain argues her seventeen-and-one-half-year sentence is inappropriate in
light of her character. We may revise an otherwise authorized sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we conclude the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense9 and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate R. 7(B). That authority exists to “leaven the outliers,” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008), and the question is not whether another sentence might be more appropriate, but whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015). McLain bears the burden of demonstrating her sentence is inappropriate. See Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). When, as here, the trial court imposed the advisory sentence, that burden is especially heavy. Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. The advisory sentence for a Level 2 felony is seventeen-and-one-half-years, with a minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35- 50-2-4.5.
[21] McLain grounds her inappropriateness argument entirely in five mitigating circumstances she contends the trial court gave insufficient weight: that the circumstances resulting in her conviction were unlikely to recur; that she
9 McLain does not address the nature of her offense, and that argument is therefore waived. See Day v. State, 898 N.E.2d 471, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (nature of the offense argument under Appellate Rule 7(B) was waived for failure to make an argument regarding that prong of the analysis).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2562 | September 2, 2026 Page 11 of 14 maintained a largely law-abiding life for a substantial period; that she is likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment based on the presentence investigation report; that imprisonment would impose undue hardship given her serious health conditions; and that she sought and completed substance abuse treatment before sentencing.
[22] The trial court expressly recognized two mitigating circumstances– that McLain’s criminal history, though not insignificant, included no felony convictions, and that her poor health made a period of incarceration a hardship – and, balancing them, imposed the advisory sentence. McLain’s contention is not that the court overlooked her proffered mitigators but that it should have given them more weight. The relative weight assigned to mitigating evidence does not state a claim for revision under Appellate Rule 7(B) – the question is only whether the advisory sentence is inappropriate in light of her character.
[23] McLain’s strongest character argument is that her circumstances are unlikely to recur; however, the record refutes this. At the sentencing hearing, McLain described how she came to possess methamphetamine a second time: someone offered her drugs at a favorable price while she was on bond awaiting trial in this case, and she accepted. A defendant who commits a nearly identical drug offense while on bond awaiting trial – because drugs were available and affordable – has not shown that the circumstances prompting her criminal conduct are unlikely to repeat.
[24] McLain’s remaining circumstances do not individually or collectively overcome the weight of the record as a whole. Her prior misdemeanor convictions include a 2018 conviction of trafficking with an inmate, which reflects a prior willingness to help move contraband. She also committed a new Level 4 felony drug offense while on bond in this case. Her health issues, while genuine and serious, were considered by the trial court and credited as a mitigator. McLain has not met her burden of demonstrating the advisory sentence was inappropriate based on her character.
Conclusion [25] Any error in admitting the body camera footage was harmless in light of
McLain’s own admissions on those same recordings, which were admissible. The State presented sufficient evidence to support McLain’s conviction of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine over ten grams. Finally, McLain’s advisory sentence is not inappropriate based on her character. Accordingly, we affirm.
[26] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Ralph E. Dowling Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Jennifer B. Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana