Sharon Lee, et al. v. Twin Hawks Airpark LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 26, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00514
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Sharon Lee, et al., No. CV-25-00514-PHX-KML

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Twin Hawks Airpark LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiffs Sharon Lee and Tommy Wessel are property owners and members of a 16 community administered by Twin Hawks Airpark, LLC (“Twin Hawks”). In 2022, Lee 17 filed a complaint against Twin Hawks with the Arizona Attorney General alleging housing 18 discrimination. In 2023, Twin Hawks sued plaintiffs in state court, allegedly in retaliation 19 for Lee’s previous complaint of housing discrimination. That suit prompted plaintiffs to 20 file the present suit, alleging three counts of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 21 3617. Because the complaint does not state any claim for relief, it is dismissed with leave 22 to amend. 23 I. Factual Background 24 Twin Hawks administers a property owners’ community in Pinal County, Arizona. 25 (Doc. 22 at 3.) All community property owners, including plaintiffs, are also members of 26 Twin Hawks. (Doc. 22 at 3.) Among Twin Hawks’s duties are managing an airstrip for 27 property owners’ use, collecting dues from property owners, and enforcing the 28 community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”). (Doc. 22 at 3.) Twin 1 Hawks’s daily work is conducted by a three-person Managing Committee which is elected 2 annually by the property owners. (Doc. 22 at 4.) During all relevant times, defendant 3 Harold Duane Lambeth was on the Managing Committee and was “entrusted with the 4 primary day-to-day responsibilities” like communicating with owners and contracting with 5 outside service providers. (Doc. 22 at 5.) 6 Plaintiffs allege Lee was the only southeast Asian and Malaysian Twin Hawks 7 member from 2020 until today and although there are other non-white property owners, 8 Lee is the community’s only non-white full-time resident. (Doc. 22 at 5.) Between 2020 9 and 2022, a dispute arose between plaintiffs and “a large number of the other 10 member/owners of the community.” (Doc. 22 at 6.) This dispute appears to involve 11 easements which defendants contend run through plaintiffs’ land. (Doc. 22 at 8, 10.) 12 Plaintiffs disagree and have evidently obstructed the land in question. (Doc. 24 at 4.) 13 On June 13, 2022, Lee filed a complaint of housing discrimination against Twin 14 Hawks with the Arizona Attorney General’s Civil Rights Division, which she prepared 15 with Wessel’s help. (Doc. 22 at 6-7.) That complaint alleged Twin Hawks discriminated 16 against her due to race and national origin. The Managing Committee became aware of the 17 complaint around July 3, 2022. (Doc. 22 at 7.) Plaintiffs allege “Lambeth began speaking 18 with other member/owners about the need to sue” plaintiffs in mid-2022 to enforce what 19 he believed was the community’s prescriptive easement permitting others to pass through 20 plaintiffs’ property. (Doc. 22 at 8.) Twin Hawks had committed financial resources to such 21 litigation by December 2022, around which time Lambeth also sought approval from 22 enough member/owners to authorize a suit against plaintiffs. (Doc. 22 at 8-9.) Lambeth did 23 not convene a meeting to obtain such approval or even note which members approved; 24 instead, he “unilaterally determined” he had a “quorum and majority approval.” (Doc. 22 25 at 9.) On February 13, 2023, Twin Hawks sued plaintiffs in state court to enforce four 26 prescriptive easements on plaintiffs’ property. (Doc. 22 at 9-10.) In June 2023, the Arizona 27 Attorney General dismissed Lee’s complaint of discrimination, concluding there was not 28 sufficient evidence to establish a violation. (Doc. 22 at 10-11.) 1 Plaintiffs allege Twin Hawks’s easement suit was filed in retaliation for Lee’s 2 discrimination complaint. (Doc. 22 at 10.) Plaintiffs do not explain the factual basis for 3 Lee’s June 2022 discrimination complaint, nor do they separately allege a discriminatory 4 motive on the part of either defendant. The only facts supporting retaliation arise from 5 Lambeth’s December 2023 deposition in the state-court easement litigation. During that 6 deposition, while acting as Twin Hawks’s designated representative, Lambeth stated: 7 [Lee] barricaded the road. She filed a harassment lawsuit,[1] which they 8 lost, and had to pay all of our attorney’s fees for. Then they filed a 9 discrimination lawsuit, which got thrown out by the State. So that’s why we’re here. 10

11 (Doc. 22 at 10). Plaintiffs also allege that in response to an attorney stating, “we need to 12 not discuss prior actions,” Lambeth responded, “the prior action is why we’re here.” (Doc. 13 22 at 10.) 14 In summary, plaintiffs believe Twin Hawks filed the easement litigation because of 15 the discrimination complaint Lee submitted to the Arizona Attorney General. In other 16 words, plaintiffs are suing Twin Hawks for initiating litigation in which Twin Hawks may 17 prevail.2 Plaintiffs allege three retaliation claims against both defendants. The first is under 18 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits private acts of discrimination in connection with making 19

20 1 Plaintiffs do not explain this “harassment lawsuit” in the complaint. However, the briefing explains plaintiffs previously filed a “state-law injunction against harassment,” which was 21 distinct from “the type of sex-based or race-based harassment common in federal discrimination lawsuits.” (Docs. 26, 27.) Defendants explain plaintiffs first filed this 22 petition for an injunction against harassment, which they lost; next, filed the discrimination complaint that was dismissed the following year; and finally filed the present action. (Doc. 23 25 at 3-4.) 2 Plaintiffs’ focus on defendants’ lawsuit may implicate the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 24 which provides immunity from statutory liability for litigants who seek governmental redress, for instance by filing a lawsuit. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th 25 Cir. 2006) (citing E.R.R. Presidents Corp. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129 (1961) and United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)). It appears 26 defendants may have immunity because plaintiffs’ statutory claims are based entirely on defendants’ lawsuit, which is protected First Amendment activity under this doctrine. See 27 id. But the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is an affirmative defense, Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 711 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013), which is waived when not 28 addressed in the pleadings (as is the case here). Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005). 1 and enforcing contracts; the second is under § 1982, which prohibits private acts of 2 discrimination in connection with holding personal property; and the third is under § 3617, 3 part of the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) which prohibits retaliation in response to the 4 exercise of a FHA right. (Doc. 22 at 11-16.) Twin Hawks and Lambeth filed separate 5 motions to dismiss all claims. 6 II. Legal Standard 7 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 8 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 9 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 10 (internal citations omitted)). This is not a “probability requirement,” but a requirement that 11 the factual allegations show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 12 unlawfully.” Id. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 13 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 14 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 15 relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 16 judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 17 III. Motions to Dismiss 18 A. Wessel’s Retaliation Claims 19 All three statutes allow claims where the plaintiff suffers retaliation because he 20 aided or assisted a different person in the exercise of the statute’s rights. See CBOCS W., 21 Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 452 (2008) (§ 1981 permits claims where plaintiff 22 “suffers retaliation because he has tried to help a different individual”); Sullivan v. Little 23 Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Ziglar v. 24 Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017) (plaintiff has standing under § 1982 “for trying to vindicate 25 the rights of minorities”); Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 26 2004) (§ 3617 prohibits interference with person aiding or encouraging another person in 27 the exercise of FHA rights). But these claims usually involve a direct harm to that plaintiff, 28 like expulsion from a corporation, Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 234, receiving harassing pre- 1 eviction notices, Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1060, or employment termination, CBOCS W., Inc., 2 553 U.S. at 445. Here, the complaint alleges defendants targeted Wessel due to his 3 assistance with Lee’s complaint. But it does not include facts showing defendants even 4 knew Wessel had assisted Lee. Though plaintiffs argue Wessel “advocated” for Lee (Doc. 5 26 at 12), and that advocacy may have been public, to show defendants were motivated by 6 Wessel’s assistance with the complaint, plaintiffs must allege defendants were aware of 7 that advocacy—or, at the very least, that defendants intended to harm Lee by acting against 8 Wessel. See Armstrong v. WB Studio Enters., Inc., No. 24-5049, 2025 WL 3002614, at *1 9 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025) (relevant decision-maker must be aware of protected activity); see 10 also Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173 (2011) (reprisals against 11 uninvolved significant others can constitute retaliation). They do not. Accordingly, all 12 claims on Wessel’s behalf are dismissed with leave to amend. 13 B. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 claims 14 Plaintiffs asserting § 1981 claims “must initially identify an impaired contractual 15 relationship [] under which the plaintiff has rights.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 16 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (simplified). Similarly, § 1982 claims require plaintiffs to show 17 their right to hold property was impaired. 42 U.S.C. § 1982; see CBOCS W., Inc., 553 U.S. 18 at 447 (§§ 1981 and 1982 construed similarly). “The plaintiff must also plausibly allege 19 that the defendant impaired that relationship [or right] on account of intentional 20 discrimination” or intentional retaliation. Astre v. McQuaid, 804 F. App’x 665, 666 (9th 21 Cir. 2020); see also Kwesele v. King Cnty., 804 F. App’x 726, 727 (9th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff 22 must show defendants “acted with intent to discriminate or retaliate against him” 23 (quotations omitted)). Allegations of intentional retaliation may be supported by direct 24 evidence or specific and substantial circumstantial evidence. Kwesele, 804 F. App’x at 727- 25 28. 26 Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to plausibly establish intentional 27 retaliation. Showing intentional retaliation under §§ 1981 and 1982 requires a plaintiff to 28 “initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the loss 1 of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 2 U.S. 327, 341 (2020). Racial animus or retaliation need not be “the sole reason” for an 3 adverse action and a defendant may have “mixed motives—i.e., legitimate and illegitimate 4 reasons for an alleged act.” Sharifi Takieh v. Banner Health, 515 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1045- 5 46 (D. Ariz. 2021), aff’d sub nom. Takieh v. Banner Health, No. 21-15326, 2022 WL 6 474170 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022). Still, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter 7 to show that racial prejudice [or retaliation] was a necessary condition” of the harm, which 8 would not have occurred without the discrimination. Id. at 1045. A complaint may be 9 dismissed if a “plausible alternative explanation is so convincing that [the] plaintiff’s 10 explanation is implausible.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 Plaintiffs allege only two facts supporting retaliation: (1) defendants learned of 12 plaintiffs’ discrimination complaint in mid-2022, around when Lambeth began mobilizing 13 members for a lawsuit eventually filed in December 2022 (Doc. 22 at 8); and (2) Lambeth 14 stated in a deposition “we are here” because of plaintiffs’ prior action and obstruction of 15 the relevant property (Doc. 22 at 10). Temporal proximity on its own is not typically 16 enough to state a plausible claim of retaliation. “Even cases involving very close temporal 17 proximity have generally featured independent evidence of discrimination or retaliation,” 18 Kama v. Mayorkas, 107 F.4th 1054, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2024) (collecting cases), and courts 19 do not find events three or four months apart to be sufficiently proximate. Garcia v. City 20 of Everett, 728 F. App’x 624, 628 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, the lawsuit was launched over six 21 months after defendants allegedly learned of plaintiffs’ complaint and continued after that 22 complaint was dismissed. (Doc. 22 at 8.) And the temporal proximity is joined only with 23 vague, out-of-context quotes from a deposition; even plaintiffs acknowledge Lambeth’s 24 statements may refer to plaintiffs’ discrimination complaint or to separate legal 25 proceedings. (Doc. 26 at 16.) Plaintiffs do not allege any discriminatory or racial statements 26 or views were shared between Lambeth and the Twin Hawks members, nor do they allege 27 any circumstantial evidence similarly-situated white members were or would have been 28 treated differently than plaintiffs. 1 This is not enough to plausibly allege Twin Hawks’s lawsuit would not have 2 occurred without intentional race-based retaliation, particularly in the face of a convincing 3 alternative nonretaliatory explanation plaintiffs themselves offer. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. 4 Plaintiffs allege a dispute arose between them and “a large number of other 5 member/owners” which was unrelated to race or discrimination: the broader Twin Hawks 6 community contested the existence of easements on plaintiffs’ land. (Doc. 22 at 6, 10; see 7 Doc. 24 at 4.) After years of escalating disagreements, Twin Hawks’s Managing 8 Committee reached a quorum of members to take legal action against plaintiffs and began 9 litigation to enforce the easements. (Doc. 22 at 8.) This nonretaliatory reason for the lawsuit 10 is supported by deposition testimony (Doc. 22 at 10 (“[s]he barricaded the road”)), by the 11 fact that the suit continued after plaintiffs’ complaint of discrimination was dismissed (Doc. 12 22 at 10-11), and by the allegations that a “large number” of member/owners believed there 13 were easements on plaintiffs’ property (Doc. 22 at 6, 10). Courts have dismissed claims 14 based on these types of alternative explanations even where plaintiffs pleaded 15 discrimination in far more detail than here. Sharifi Takieh, 515 F. Supp. 3d at 1048 16 (nondiscriminatory alternative explanation convincing compared to allegations of 17 discriminatory remarks and hospital policy); Astre, 804 F. App’x at 667 (§ 1981 claims 18 “implausible” where plaintiff alleged termination due to sufficiently-pleaded 19 discrimination but also suggested termination due to loss of community support). 20 The complaint itself convincingly alleges Twin Hawks’s lawsuit would have 21 occurred regardless of plaintiffs’ protected activity. The §§ 1981 and 1982 causes of action 22 are therefore dismissed with leave to amend. 23 C. Fair Housing Act claims 24 The FHA protects against discrimination in housing and prohibits retaliation against 25 an individual who has “exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected” by the 26 statute. 42 U.S.C. § 3617; see also Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2004). Section 27 3617 plaintiffs must show a defendant’s actions affected their exercise of an FHA right. 28 Morris v. W. Hayden Ests. First Addition Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 104 F.4th 1128, 1143 1 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1127 (2025). Claims for retaliation and interference 2 under the FHA require plaintiffs allege “(1) [they were] engaged in protected activity; (2) 3 [they] suffered an adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.” Ohio 4 House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645, 670 (9th Cir. 2025) (simplified); see 5 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 14 F.4th 1030, 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2021) (FHA 6 claims must meet proximate cause standard which requires “some direct relation” between 7 harm and conduct). 8 The first element is satisfied by plaintiffs’ allegation Lee submitted a complaint of 9 discrimination to the Arizona Attorney General. (Doc. 22 at 7.) But the adverse action is 10 not clearly alleged because plaintiffs have not pleaded facts suggesting their right to be free 11 from racial discrimination was affected at all, or that any interference took place beyond a 12 lawsuit contemplated by the CC&Rs (Doc. 26 at 8 (conceding the CC&Rs allow “a 13 homeowners’ association to enforce a perceived violation against one of its members”)). 14 Cf. Morris, 104 F.4th at 1142 (enforcing § 3617 due to disparate treatment which did not 15 follow CC&R procedures and affected plaintiffs’ use of property). And plaintiffs do not 16 even meet the lower causation standard for FHA claims for the same reasons they do not 17 meet the “but-for” causation standard for §§ 1981 and 1982 claims. 18 This claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 19 D. Motion for Sanctions 20 Twin Hawks also filed a motion for sanctions arguing the first amended complaint 21 lacked a factual and legal basis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) requires attorneys to conduct a 22 reasonable inquiry into prospective lawsuits and determine legally-tenable claims exist 23 before filing. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “In analyzing 24 whether a complaint is sanctionable under Rule 11, [the court] employ[s] an objective 25 standard of reasonableness and [does] not consider the attorney’s subjective good faith.” 26 Lake v. Gates, 130 F.4th 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2025). 27 Twin Hawks contends the first amended complaint is sanctionable because it is 28 frivolous and no competent attorney, having made a reasonable inquiry into the facts, could 1 have reasonably believed retaliation took place. (Doc. 30 at 2-4, 11.) Plaintiffs’ counsel 2 contests this, arguing he “conducted an adequate pre-filing inquiry.” (Doc. 32 at 1.) 3 Examining the record, a competent attorney could have believed it permissible to excerpt 4 facts most relevant to the claims alleged here and interpreted some deposition testimony as 5 hinting that protected activity played a role in the state lawsuit against plaintiffs. After all, 6 as Twin Hawks concedes, “[i]t is completely unclear from [Lambeth’s quotes] what Mr. 7 Lambeth was referring to with the statements ‘why we’re here.’” (Doc. 30 at 5.) 8 Accordingly, Twin Hawks have not sufficiently shown Mr. Gattone failed to make a 9 reasonable inquiry into the facts. 10 As is true in the cases cited by Twin Hawks (Doc. 30 at 3), factual errors and shoddy 11 inquiries which result in sanctions are typically egregious and undermine the litigant’s 12 entire case. See Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987) (collecting cases 13 where litigant error or prior admission contradicted dispositive facts); see also Townsend 14 v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990) (motion frivolous where 15 “competent reading of our rules and precedent would very quickly have made” procedural 16 issues clear). Ultimately, “a complaint based on reasonable inquiry should not be found to 17 be factually frivolous unless some clear authority or a litigant’s own clear admission erases 18 the factual underpinning from some essential element of the litigant’s pleading.” 19 Greenberg, 822 F.2d at 887. Twin Hawks has not met that standard here. Accordingly, the 20 motion is denied. Attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party are also denied. 21 E. Conclusion 22 Plaintiffs did not allege facts supporting a plausible claim of retaliation and all three 23 of their claims are dismissed with leave to amend. The complaint does not rise to the level 24 of frivolity required for sanctions and the motion for sanctions is denied. If plaintiffs choose 25 to amend, they should clearly state which actions may be imputed to Lambeth or Twin 26 Hawks LLC and why Lambeth may be liable as an individual defendant. 27 / 28 / 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 24, 25) are GRANTED 3|| WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. No later than February 11, 2026, plaintiffs shall file an 4|| amended complaint. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a judgment of dismissal with 5 || prejudice if no amended complaint is filed by that date. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants’ motion for sanctions (Doc. 30) is 7\| DENIED. 8 Dated this 26th day of January, 2026. 9

Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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