Sharma v. Caesar

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 9, 2024
DocketCivil Action No. 2024-1406
StatusPublished

This text of Sharma v. Caesar (Sharma v. Caesar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharma v. Caesar, (D.D.C. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEHUL SHARMA,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-cv-1406 (TSC)

ANGELA D. CAESAR,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se plaintiff Mehul Sharma alleges that the Clerk of Court for the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia and unnamed individuals in the Clerk’s Office

engaged in “high-level corruption” to delay the issue of summonses in cases he filed in this

court. Compl. at 5–6, ECF No. 1. 1 The court will sua sponte dismiss the complaint because it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court will deny each of

Plaintiff’s “Motion[s] to Request Judge to Investigate Why Summons Has Not Been Issued Yet,”

ECF Nos. 3 and 5 (“Motions to Investigate”), as moot.

While the court recognizes that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less

stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), even pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (citations omitted). In

the D.C. Circuit, a district court “may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

1 Page numbers throughout this memorandum opinion refer to those that the Court’s electronic filing system assigns.

Page 1 of 4 without notice where it is ‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail based on

the facts alleged in the complaint.” Jafari v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 277, 279 (D.D.C.

2015), aff’d, 621 F. App’x 676 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703

F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Tate v. Burke, 131 F.R.D. 363, 365 (D.D.C. 1990)

(courts may act sua sponte when the complaint “indisputedly” contains “no factual and legal

basis for the asserted wrong”).

Plaintiff alleges that he waited “more than five months to receive the summonses for

either of my cases,” and that once he received them, “two important summonses [Merrick

Garland & Matthew M. Graves] were missing.” Compl. at 5. He indicates that he

communicated with the Clerk’s Office, but claims—without any evidence—that the “Clerk’s

Office had purposefully not answered in order to allow the defendants to get their way and get

me to submit to their wishes.” Id. at 6. He concludes that unnamed individuals in the Clerk’s

Office are “criminals operating openly at influential positions without the fear of doing unlawful

and illegal acts detrimental to the lives of the people, businesses and the unity of the nation.” Id.

The Complaint requests $1,000,000,000 in damages and “a thorough investigation into this

matter and [to] have the same federal criminal codes as requested in my cases 1:23-cv-02583-

TSC and 1:23-cv-02913-TSC be applied to all guilty parties including those orchestrating it

behind the scenes.” Id. at 6–7. 2

Plaintiff fails to establish any legal basis for his claims or the court’s jurisdiction to hear

them. Plaintiff indicated that the basis for the court’s jurisdiction is a federal question, but when

directed to “[l]ist the specific federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United

2 The court has separately addressed the facts underlying these allegations. See Sharma v. Austin, No. 23-cv-2913-TSC (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2023), ECF No. 20.

Page 2 of 4 States Constitution that are at issue in this case,” Plaintiff wrote, “[s]tatutes requesting

reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery in relevance to the complaint.” Id.

at 3. Later, the Complaint asks for a “thorough investigation” and to “have the same federal

criminal codes as requested in my cases 1:23-cv-02583-TSC and 1:23-cv-02913-TSC be

applied.” Id. at 6. One of those cases alleges “an elaborate . . . conspiracy to enshackle and take

over the United States of America” that involves agreements between the United States and India

that constitute “acts of conspiracy, sabotage and enmity” against the United States and seeks an

investigation under the U.S. Criminal Code. See Sharma v. Austin, No. 23-cv-2913-TSC

(D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2023), ECF No. 1. Again, no specific statutes are listed.

Plaintiff’s other case alleges “15+ years of harassment and torture” by the Department of

Defense and other intelligence agencies, which allegedly maintain “project file or files” about

Plaintiff because they seek access to a software program he developed. Sharma v. Austin et al.,

No. 23-cv-2583-TSC (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2023), ECF No. 1 at 7–8. It lists seven criminal statutes

as the basis for jurisdiction, including: definitional provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2340; an anti-

stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A; provisions barring trade secret theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1832; an

anti-terrorism statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b; a provision of the Wiretap Act criminalizing

unauthorized interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2511; and

statutes criminalizing civil-rights violations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. Plaintiff states no plausible

claim under the first five statutes— the Complaint provides no factual or legal basis for alleged

wrongdoing by the Clerk’s Office related to stalking, trade secret theft, terrorism, or wiretapping.

And while allegations of “high-level corruption” and conspiracy “to allow the defendants to get

their way” may implicate the subject matter of sections 241 and 242, Plaintiff cannot state a

claim under those provisions because they “are criminal statutes that do not provide a private

Page 3 of 4 cause of action.” Boling v. United States Parole Comm’n, No. 17-5285, 2018 WL 6721354, at

*1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2018).

Accordingly, it is “patently obvious” that Plaintiff cannot prevail based on the facts

alleged in the complaint, and the complaint will be DISMISSED without prejudice. Rollins, 703

F.3d at 127. Plaintiff’s Motions to Investigate will be DENIED as moot by virtue of this

dismissal and the fact that a summons was issued on May 30, 2024. See Clerk’s Entry, May 30,

2024. A separate Order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this opinion to:

MEHUL SHARMA The Lodge, Ballysallagh Lower Hacketstown, IE R93CT80

Date: August 9, 2024

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 4 of 4

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Sharon Rollins v. Wackenhut Services, Inc.
703 F.3d 122 (D.C. Circuit, 2012)
Jarrell v. Tisch
656 F. Supp. 237 (District of Columbia, 1987)
Jafari v. United States
83 F. Supp. 3d 277 (District of Columbia, 2015)
Tate v. Burke
131 F.R.D. 363 (District of Columbia, 1990)

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Sharma v. Caesar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharma-v-caesar-dcd-2024.