Shariff A. Jamison v. ABM Aviation Taxi Dispatch

• Court: District Court, E.D. New York
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-05483
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SHARIFF A. JAMISON, Plaintiff, 25-CV-7756 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER ABM AVIATION TAXI DISPATCH, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Shariff Jamison, of Brooklyn, Kings County, New York, filed this pro se action asserting claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and under state law. Plaintiff filed this complaint against his former employer, ABM Aviation Taxi Dispatch, which is located in Elmhurst, in Queens County, New York. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under the venue provision for claims brought under Title VII, such claims may be brought: in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). With respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state law, such claims may be brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For purposes of Section 1391(b), a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff alleges that his former employer is located in Queens County, and that the events that are the bases for his claims occurred there. This court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, therefore, are proper venues for his claims under Title VII. See § 2000e-5(f)(3). As to Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1981 and state law, Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred in Queens County, where Defendant is located, which is within the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(c).1 Accordingly, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York is clearly a proper venue for those claims under Section 1391(b)(2). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In

1 This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. 28 U.S.C. § 112(b). The Eastern District of New York is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) Kings (New York City Borough of Brooklyn); (2) Queens (New York City Borough of Queens); (3) Richmond (New York City Borough of Staten Island); (4) Nassau; and (5) Suffolk. 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative

means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less deference where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate for this action. The underlying events allegedly occurred, and the Defendant is located, in Queens County, in the Eastern District of New York, and it is reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would

also be located there. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Moreover, Plaintiff does not reside in this district, and thus his choice of forum is accorded less deference. See Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case in this court.

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: September 22, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge