Shaoshan Feng v. Rachel Dombrowski, Clerk of the Appellate Court of Maryland, in her official capacity, and Gregory Wells, Chief Judge of the Appellate Court of Maryland, in his official capacity

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT . _ DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

SHAOSHAN FENG, □ Plaintiff, |

RACHEL DOMBROWSKI, Clerk of the Appellate Court of Maryland, ~ Civil Action No. 25-0710-TDC in her official capacity, and □ GREGORY WELLS, . Chief Judge of the Appellate Court of Maryland, in his official capacity, Defendants. . . .

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Shaoshan Feng; who is self-represented and proceeding in forma pauperis, has filed this civil action against Defendants Rachel Dombrowski and Gregory Wells in their official _ capacities’as, respectively, the Clerk and Chief Judge of the Appellate Court of Maryland. In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Feng asserts a claim for a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution arising out of the dismissal of her appeal of a state court divorce judgment based on her failure to supply the required - transcripts, which she did not obtain because she could not afford the transcript fees. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion for . . Summary Judgment, which is fully briefed. Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, ~ Motion will be|GRANTED.

BACKGROUND Feng was ‘a party in a divorce proceeding, Chen v. Feng, No. C-15-FM-22-2132, in the. Cirouit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland (“the Circuit Court”), in which a merits hearing. occurred in July 104 After issuing an oral ruling on September 8, 2023, the Circuit Court entered a judgment of absolute divorce on September 15, 2023 that also “address[ed] property distribution”

between Feng and het ex-husband, Shaomin Chen. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) 7 14, ECF No. 23. In addition to granting the divorce, the court ordered Chen to pay $2,750.00 to Feng and to return all of Feng’s personal property within 30 days of the judgment. On October 16,2023, □□□□ = filed a Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland (“the Appellate Court”). In the Civil Appeal Information Report, Feng: stated that the “judge made his decision based on [an] assumption,” and she referenced an “agreement which is disputable [and] extremely unfair” to Feng, which she claimed was “falsified” by Chen. Civil Appeal Information Report at 2, Mot. Dismiss Ex. 2, ECE No. 26-4. On that form, Feng also noted that she was not appealing an order relating to “adoption, termination of parental rights, guardianship of the ‘person, custody, or visitation.” Id. / . On February 6, 2024, at the direction of Chief Judge Gregory Wells, Rachel Dombrowski, the Clerk of the Appellate Court, entered an order granting Feng’s motion to waive the appellate filing fee. The order further stated, however, that the filing fee waiver “does not waive the requirement for the appellant to order and pay for any transcripts required for this appeal.” Order at 1 n.1, Mot. Dismiss Bx. 3, ECF No. 26-5. The Maryland Rules require appellants to order certain transcripts. Specifically, Maryland Rule 8-413 provides that the “record on appeal shall

include . . . the transcript required by Rule 8-411.” Md. Rule 8-41 3(a)(2). In turn, Maryland Rule 8-411 states that: ! □□

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Unless a cory of the transcript is already on file, the appellant shall order in writing from the court reporter a trariscript containing ...a transcription of (A) all. the testimony or (B) that part of the testimony that the parties agree, by written stipulation filed with the clerk of the lower court, is necessary for the appeal _ or (C) that part of the testimony ordered by the Court. Md. Rule 8-411 (a)(1). The Maryland Rules also provide that the Appellate Court “may dismiss an appeal if... the contents of the record do not comply with Rule 8-413.” Md. Rule 8-602(c)(4). The Appellate Court subsequently entered several Orders directing Feng to obtain the required transcripts. On May 1, 2024, the Appellate Court ordered Feng to show cause for why

her appeal should riot be dismissed based on a failure to obtain the transcripts from her divorce proceedings. After Feng filed a response to the Order to which she attached only the transcript of the September 8, 2023 hearing, on May 20, 2024, the Appellate Court directed Feng to order the . transcripts from the three-day divorce merits trial conducted on July 10, 11, and 12, 2023. Then, . after Feng filed a‘response to that Order in which she “ask[ed] that the Court excuse the requirement that she provide the relevant transcripts,” on June 14, 2024, the Appellate Court again ordered her to provide the remaining transcripts and stated that if Feng failed to do so within 20 days of the date of the Order, her appeal would be dismissed. Order at 2, Mot. Dismiss Ex. 6, ECF No. 26-8. oe On July 17, 2024, after the deadline had passed, Chief Judge Wells dismissed F eng’s appeal pursuant to Rule 8--602(c)(4) based on the failure to provide the transcripts. On July 26, 2024, Feng filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which she referenced her inability to pay the estimated

_ several thousand dollars in transcript fees due to financial hardship, including because Chen □ retairied approximately $200,000 of their marital property in the divorce. After that motion was denied, Feng filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Maryland, On November 26, 2024, the Maryland Supreme Court granted the petition,

vacated the Appellate Court’s dismissal of Feng’s appeal, and remanded the case for a determination on whether a “newly created program established to provide payment for transcripts for qualifying self-represented litigants is able to cover the cost of [Feng’s] transcripts.” Order at 3, Compl. Ex. 2, adr No. 1-2. On remand to the Appellate Court, on November 27, 2024, Chief Judge Wells conchided that Feng was ineligible for financial assistance through the program because it was “limited to appeals involving custody issues,” and Feng’s appeal was of “a judgment that does not relate t custody.” Order at 2, Compl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 1-3. Accordingly, Chief Judge Wells again dismissed Feng’s appeal pursuant to Rule 8—602(c)(4).. On December 9, 2024, in the Maryland Supreme Court, Feng filed a Motion to Enforce the □ Maryland Supreme Court’s November 26, 2024 Order. On December 20, 2024, the Maryland Supreme Court denied Feng’s motion because “the Appellate Court’s November 27 order did not violate this Court’s November 26 remand order.” Order at 1, Compl. Ex. 4, ECF No. 1-4. On March 3, 2025, Feng filed the original Complaint in this case, naming the “State of Maryland Judiciary System” as the defendant. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1. After the Court dismissed the Complaint parshant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 based on sovereign immunity and granted Feng leave to amend the Complaint to name individuals as defendants, Feng filed an Amended Complaint naming Clerk Dombrowski and Chief Judge Wells as defendants. In the presently operative □ Second Amended Complaint, Feng asserts one claim for a violation of the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth, Amendment based on the “rigid enforcement of transcript payment requirements, without provision of a reasonable alternative mechanism allowing her to proceed despite inability tol pay,” which “resulted in denial of meaningful appellate access.” SAC § 28. She seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the enforcement of transcript fee requirements in this

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case violates due process and injunctive relief requiring Defendants to permit her to proceed with her appeal without paying for transcripts. DISCUSSION In their’ Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to □ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a valid due process claim. Alternatively, Defendants seek

summary judgment, under Rule 56. Specifically, Defendants assert that (1) this case should be dismissed because Feng’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution; and (2) her claims fail because due process does not require that transcript fees be waived for an indigent party in Feng’s position: . I. Legal Standards In relation to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(0)(1), it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Evans v. B.F Perkins Co., Div. of Standex Int’l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). Rule 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move for dismissal when it believes that the plaintif has failed to make that showing. When. defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true under the same standard as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and “the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). When a defendant asserts that facts outside of the complaint deprive the court of jurisdiction, the court “may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.”

Velasco v. Gov t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); Kerns, 5 85 F.3d at 192. Acourt . should grant a Rae 12(b)(1) motion based on a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.

“only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Evans, 166 F.3d at 647 (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). To defeat a notion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Jd. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint ad true, and construe the factual allegations in. the light most favorable to the plaintift Albright v Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson - Cnty, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A selftrepresented party’s complaint must be construed liberally. Erickson v Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction does not mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir, 2020). □□ Typically, sien deciding‘ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers only the complaint and any attached documents. Sec ’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F 3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007) Courts are permitted, however, to consider documents

_ attached to a motion to dismiss “when the document is integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint, and when the plaintiffs do not challenge the document’s authenticity.” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd, 780 F.3d 597, 606-07 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting ‘Am. Chiropractic Ass’n □□ Trigon Healthcare; Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004)). Here, both parties have attached: certain filings from the state court proceedings. Where Feng does not challenge the authenticity -

. of any of the documents attached to the Motion, and where these filings are referenced in the _

‘Second Amended Complaint and are plainly integral to Feng’s due process claim, the Court may: consider them in ruling on the Motion. The Court therefore will treat the Motion as a Motion to Dismiss only. . Il. Eleventh Amendment Defendants first argue that they are immune from any claims against them in their official capacities pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, under which, absent consent, a State, its agencies, □

and departments are immune from suits in federal court brought by their citizens or the citizens of another State. See bennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims against State official in their official capacities are claims against the State itself. Will v. Mich. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). There are, however, three exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition on a suit against a State:

. First, Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it ‘both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority .... Second, the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal _ law.... Third, a State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in‘a federal court. . homas v. Prince George ’s Cnty. Pub. Schs., 666 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). | Feng argues that the second exception, derived from Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-

60 (1908), applies here Under that exception, a plaintiff may advance a claim in federal court against State officials to enjoin them from “engaging in future conduct that would violate the Constitution ora federal statute.” Indus. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Dobson, 68 F.4th 155, 163 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting tnt toa v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2002)). The exception applies when the “complaint allexes an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as. prospective.” fron Mad., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ma., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)

Poy 7

(quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene ‘Tribe of Idaho, 521 US. □ 261, 296 (1997) (O’Connor, J

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In the Second Amended Complaint, Feng alleges an ongoing due process violation, does not seek monetary damages, and expressly seeks forward-looking declaratory and injunctive relief “to prevent continued application of transcript ‘requirements to her without reasonable alternative accommodation.” SAC { 29.

_ Defendants nevertheless contend that because Feng’s state court appeal of the divorce. □ judgment has already been dismissed, Feng necessarily seeks “to retroactively modify state court decisions,” and her requested rélief is thus “not prospective,” such that she cannot proceed under

. the Ex parte Young, exception. Mot. Dismiss at 10, ECF No. 26-1. However, to plead “the type of continuing violation for which a remedy may permissibly be fashioned” under Ex parte Young, | a plaintiff must merely allege a “present, and presumably ongoing” harm stemming from the violation, even if that harm was inflicted by “past actions of the State.” Coakley v. Welch, 877 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 282 (1986)). Feng has done

- so here by alleging that she is presently barred from proceeding with her state court appeal and seeking equitable lief to permit her to proceed with that appeal even without having paid for the required transcripts. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Feng’s claims pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment based on the asserted failure to seek prospective relief. Defendants, referencing Whole Woman 5 Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 532 (2021), further assert that the Eleventh Amendment bars Feng’s claims because this case “concerns judicial acts,” and the Ex parte Young exception generally does not provide a basis to permit the entry of . injunctions against’ state court judges or clerks. Reply at 3, ECF No. 31. In Whole Woman □□ Health, the United State Supreme Court held that plaintiffs challenging a Texas abortion statute known as SB 8 inl federal court could not, pursuant to the Ex parte Young exception, obtain an

‘injunction barring “all state-court clerks from docketing SB. 8 cases and all state-court judges from hearing them.” Whole Woman ’s Health, 142 S. Ct. at 532. In so ruling, the Court stated that □

Ex parte Young “ddes not normally permit federal courts to issue injunctions against state-court judges or clerks” den they “Tul sually ...do not enforce state laws as executive officials might” but rather “work to resolve disputes between parties,” and that “Lif a state court errs in its rulings, too, the traditional remedy has been some form of appeal, ... not the entry of an ex ante injunction preventing the state court from hearing cases.” Jd. The Court identified another □□□□ associated with suits against state court judges and clerks : that where Article III of the Constitution grants to federal cots “the power to resolve only actual controversies arising between adverse

litigants,” litigants in state court and the judges and clerks who handle their cases “generally are □ not” adverse to one another, so “no case or controversy exists” between them. /d. (citations omitted), : Since Whole Woman’s Health, some courts have applied the general principle that the Ex. parte: Young exception does not apply to claims against a state court judge or clerk. See, e.g., . Jackson v. Mason, No. 24-3131, 2025 WL 2528310, at *1, *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 3, 2025) (concluding that, under Ex parte’ Young, a self-represented plaintiff could not sue a state judge or clerk to assert’ constitutional challenges to the dismissal of a case based on previously imposed filing restrictions against the plaintifp, Others, however, have allowed a claim. against a state court judge or clerk to proceed pursuant to Ex parte Young and found an Article Il controversy between the parties, usually when the case involved a plaintiff who was not a party in the state court case, or where there was a challenge to administrative rather than adj udicatory action. See, eB, Courthouse News Serv. v. Gilmer, 48 F.4th 908, 912-13 (8th Cir. 2022) (concluding that a news agency could sue a. court clerk and administrator over the delays in public access to filings caused by a new electronic

. system); Argen v. Att’y.Gen., No. 21-2571, 2022 WL 3369109, at *5 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2022)

(concluding that a thember of the media could sue a family court judge to challenge the judge’s_ □ gag order against a party) - . The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not decided whether Ex parte

Young specifically bars a claim against a state court judge or clerk, but it has applied the related principle, as stated in Whole Woman’s. Health, that there is no casé or controversy arising from a litigant’s dispute with a ruling by a state court judge. In Frazier v. Prince George ’s County, 140 F.4th 556 (4th Cir. 2025), a putative class of pretrial detainees filed suit against state court judges to challenge as a violation of their due process rights the judges’ practice of referring bail review matters to the Pretrial Division of the Prince George’s County Department of Corrections for a decision on pretrial release. See id. at 560-61. The court held that when state court judges are sued by litigants in cases before them, “Article III’s requirement of a justiciable controversy is not satisfied where a judge acts in [an] adjudicatory capacity, rather than as an enforcer or administrator,” and that “a judge’s role is adjudicative when the judge acts as they would in any other case by finding facts and determining law in a neutral and impartial judicial fashion.” Id. at □

562 (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims did not satisfy Article III’s requirement of a “justiciable controversy between the plaintiffs and the judicial defendants” because the judges were “adjudicating [the plaintiffs’] request[s] for bail” by

evaluating their requests, considering certain criteria prescribed in the Maryland Rules, □□□ deciding whether ttley should be detained, released immediately, ot released only if the Pretrial’ Division could supervise them. Id. at 562-63. Such actions are “

further concluded that the plaintiffs’ proper “remedy against potentially unlawful judicial conduct” is either an appeal of; where an appeal may be unavailable and the plaintiffs were detained, through a petition for a wi of habeas corpus. Id. Another circuit has reached a similar conclusion in a in which a state court litigant sued a state court judge in relation to adjudicatory actions taken by the judge. See Kellogg v. Nichols, 170 F4th 20, 26-31 (2d Cir. 2025) (concluding that, under □

Article III, litigants could not sue the state court judge who: adjudicated and denied their applications for firearm licenses). . Here, Feng is similarly situated to the plaintiffs in Frazier in that she has sued a state court judge and clerk for an alleged due process violation arising during the adjudication of: her state □

court case. Chief judge Wells exercised an adjudicatory function in evaluating her request to proceed without the transcripts required under Rules 8411 and 8-413 and acting pursuant to Rule 8-602(c)(4) to disiniss her appeal based on the failure to submit the transcripts. These are “functions normally performed by a judge” and therefore “do not create an Article III case ot

controversy” between Chief Judge Wells and Feng. See Frazier, 140 F.4th-at 563. Although the plaintiffs in Frazier sued judges while Feng has sued both a judge and the Clerk of the Appellate

the Court finds no persuasive basis to distinguish between a judge and clerk in this case. See Whole Woman's Health, 142 S. Ct. at 532 (treating judges and clerks alike for purposes of determining whether a justiciable controversy existed), ‘ Thus, without deciding whether Feng’s claim against a state court judge and clerk may □

proceed under the ix parte Young exception, the Court finds that the claim fails based on a lack of subject matter alisdition because there is no case or controversy. See Frazier, 140 F.4th at 566. :

HI. DueProcess Claim

. In the alternative, even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Feng’s claim,

the Court finds that it is also subject to dismissal because she has not alleged facts to support a due process beim, Feng asserts that where she could not afford to pay the cost of the transcripts from her divorce proceedings, the dismissal of her appeal based on her failure to supply the necessary transcripts violated het right to due process of law. The United States Supreme Court has held that, in a criminal case, if a state provides appellate review, it may not “do so ina way that □□ discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty,” and it specifically must provide appellate review to an indigent criminal defendant even if that defendant cannot afford to pay for the required transcripts. Griffin y. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956); see Mayer v. City of Chicago, 4o4 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971) (stating that, for criminal cases, Griffin imposes “a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be

_ available to others, abe to pay their own way”). In contrast, in most civil cases, there is no constitutional right to access the. courts without fees. Specifically, the Supreme Court has found

no such constitutional requirement for indigent litigants seeking to appeal welfare benefit determinations by state agencies, see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1 973), or to obtain a discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding, see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 438, 443-45 (1973). In both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ primarily financial interests did not rise to a high enough “constitutional level” to overcome the court systems” “rational justification” in secking to offset costs by imposing fees. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60; Kras, 409 US. at 445-47. In light of this distinction between criminal and civil cases, the Supreme

“Court has stated that “3 constitutional requirement to waive court fees in’ civil cases is the exception, not the general rule.” MLB. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 114 (1996). □ Feng argues that her claim aligns with the rare exceptions to that rule in which the Supreme Court held that asa matter of due process, indigent litigants who could not afford to pay filing fees ‘could not be barred from accessing the courts for the purpose of obtaining a dissolution of a matriage, Boddie v. \Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971), or to appeal a decree terminating a party’s parental status, ML.B., 519 U.S. at 124, 128. In both instances, the Supreme Court’s

_ decisions turned on the fundamental constitutional interests in marriage and familial relations, which, Feng asserts, are also present in her case. See Boddieé, 401 US. at 374; ML.B., 519 US. 119. Boddie, however, did not establish a right to appeal a divorce judgment even absent the ability to pay the filing fee; rather, it held only that indigent litigants must “be afforded an opportunity to go into court to obtain a divorce” in the first instance. See Boddie, 401 USS. at 382. Feng has had that opportunity. . Although MLB. established that an indigent party has a right to appeal a decree to. -

terminate parental status even absent the ability to pay the filing fee, the Court emphasized that □□□ _ ruling would not “open floodgates” because parental status termination decrees are distinct “from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as divorce, paternity, and child custody,” in dart based on the fact that such decrees “wor|k] a unique kind of deprivation” and .are “among the most severe forms of state action.” ML.B., 519 US. at 127-28 (citation omitted). The Court further found that “the stakes for petitioner. . . forced dissolution of her

- parental rights —are large, ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.”” Id. at 121 (quoting - Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)).

Here, in the absence of the ability to appeal, Feng will not lose the ability to dissolve her marriage. That has already occurred. Significantly, as Feng noted in submitting her Notice of Appeal, her appeal does not relate to issues of parental rights or child custody and instead relates only to the division of property. Her appeal therefore is akin to the civil disputes relating to money and property for which the Supreme Court has declined to find a due process right to litigate even absent the ability to pay fees and costs. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60; Kras, 409 U.S. at 444— 45. Where M.L.B. expressly limited its holding to the narrow and unique category of cases involving the termination of parental rights, and Feng’s appeal does not relate to parental rights or even to child custody and instead relates only to the division of property, the Court finds that Feng has failed to state a valid claim that Defendants violated her due process rights by dismissing her appeal from the divorce judgment based on her failure to submit the required transcripts due to indigency. The Motion will therefore be granted on this basis as well. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, construed as a Motion to Dismiss, will be GRANTED, and the Second Amended Complaint will be DISMISSED. A separate Order shall be issued.

Date: August 18, 2026 SS THEODORE D. CHUANG United States District Jud