Mr. Justice Garwood
delivered the opinion of the Court.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing the opinion handed down on April 16, 1958, is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor. .
By this direct appeal pursuant to Article 1738a, Vernon’s Texas Civ. Stats., and Rule 499a, Texas Rules Civil Procedure, the appellants Shannon et ah, licensed practitioners of optometry, attack a temporary injunction issued by the trial court against certain professional advertising on their part, the injunction being based entirely upon an amendment to Art. 4565g, Vernon’s Texas Civ. Stats., and issued over the appellants’ plea that the portion of the amendment alleged to prohibit such advertising is void by reason of defectiveness of the caption under Art. Ill, Sec. 35, Vernon’s Texas Const. Our holding is that, while the particular provision is constitutional, the injunction must be dissolved.
The appellees-plaintiff, Rogers et ah, are licensed competitors of the appellants in the practice of optometry, a profession or occupation somewhat elaborately regulated by Chapter 10, Arts. 4552-4566, inc., of Title 71, Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, to Art. 4565g, of which the provision now in question was added in 1957, the amending act being Ch. 240, Acts 55th Leg., Reg. Sess., p. 501, and known as S. B. No. 104. Both the original Art. 4565g and the amending act and caption thereof are rela[31]*31lively short, and accordingly both the former1 and the latter2 are fully copied as footnotes. Since the amending act deals also with paragraph (1) of Art. 4565d, the original of the latter is copied in a third footnote.3
[32]*32It will be noted that the critical provision in the amending act is the last sentence of Art. 4565g as rewritten, reading as follows:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation in this state * * * * to publish * * * * any statement or advertisement concerning ophthalmic lenses, frames, eyeglasses, spectacles or parts thereof which is fraudulent, deceitful, misleading, or which in any manner whatsoever tends to create a misleading impression, including statements or advertisements of bait, discount, premiums, price, gifts, or any statements or advertisements of a similar nature, import or meaning.”
The case was evidently heard below on the pleadings, the reference in the decree to the hearing of evidence apparently having to do with a hearing on venue and other matters not going to merits.
[33]*33According to the verified original petition of the appellants-defendant, the factual basis of the suit is an advertisement published on and after January 1, 1958, by the appellants-: defendant, a substantially correct description thereof being as follows:
“SINGLE VISION GLASSES * * AS LOW AS $12.50
COMPLETE OPTICAL SERVICE
• Eyes Examined
• Glasses Fitted
• Lenses duplicated
• Choice of many frame styles
E - A - S - Y CREDIT
(Picture of a man wearing glasses)
)
)
)
) (Picture of
) eyeglasses)
No Money Down
Pay just $1 weekly DOUGLAS
499 Pearl St. Optical
Offices at ZALES Jewelers”
The appellees-plaintiff alleged that said advertisement, and such similar advertisements as would thereafter be published but for legal restraint, were in violation of the above quoted portion of amended Art. 4565g, the sense of the pleading being that the advertisements were illegal because they “included a statement as to the price of spectacles by the respondents.”
The decree of the trial court, after reciting that the appellants-defendant “began * * * to advertise the price of spectacles or eyeglasses which included therein statements of the price thereof” and “That the said advertisements * * * constituted a violation of Article 4565g * * * as amended * * proceeded to enjoin the appellants-defendant “from the further violation of Article 4565g (otherwise known as Senate Bill No. 104, Acts 55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957), by publishing, causing, or allowing to be published any statement or advertisement concerning ophthalmic lenses, frames, eyeglasses, spectacles or parts thereof which include therein any statements or advertisements of price or any statements or advertisements of a similar nature, import or meaning, either in newspapers, by radio broadcast, television, billboard signs, or otherwise * *
Although undoubtedly the caption is irregularly drawn, we [34]*34do not consider the variances between it and the particular provision in question sufficiently grave to warrant our declaring the latter invalid, especially in the light of the liberal view customarily indulged by this Court in respect of captions. See Central Education Agency v. Independent School Dist., 152 Texas 56, 254 S.W. 2d 357.
The variance most heavily attacked by the appellants-defendant is that whereby the caption indicates that amended Art. 4565g is to contain only certain provisions (specifying particular activities as being permissible to ophthalmic dispensers) whereas the article as written (rewritten) in the body of the act contains not only these provisions, but also the provision with which we are here concerned and which is a prohibitory provision having no close relationship to the permissible activities stated. Our reason for not regarding this obvious variance as fatal to the provision in question is that the caption actually does contain a reference to that provision. The caption thus having announced that the body of the act (bill) would contain such a provision, the fact that the body of the act puts it in a place (rewritten 4565g) where the caption indicates it would not be put, does not, in our opinion, constitute a failure to state the subject matter of the provision in the caption, which is all the constitution requires.
The constitutional provision is, of course, directed at pending legislation. Doeppenschmidt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 100 Texas 532, 101 S.W. 1080, 1081. In so far as it deals with aptions of bills, as distinguished from the matter of multiple ubjects thereof, itr MAect is to facilitate and protect the legisAive process by ople a ready and rea=,. •e contents of bills wit'■ legislators and other interested . accurate means of knowledge of leir having to read the full text. The Constitution pla> ption will be read; ant 3 bill to contain a pahere is no requiremen mged in the particular ion so as to avoid a p ne caption indicates if ation that, although tl the bill’s) title,” and a-, s thereby told that th reader may, nevertheless Mil, properly assume thi ¿sumes, however, that the entire ch a reading necessarily discloses »r provision, no more is required, the body of the bill shall be ar<-r sequence indicated by the capar provision being placed where not be placed.
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Mr. Justice Garwood
delivered the opinion of the Court.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing the opinion handed down on April 16, 1958, is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor. .
By this direct appeal pursuant to Article 1738a, Vernon’s Texas Civ. Stats., and Rule 499a, Texas Rules Civil Procedure, the appellants Shannon et ah, licensed practitioners of optometry, attack a temporary injunction issued by the trial court against certain professional advertising on their part, the injunction being based entirely upon an amendment to Art. 4565g, Vernon’s Texas Civ. Stats., and issued over the appellants’ plea that the portion of the amendment alleged to prohibit such advertising is void by reason of defectiveness of the caption under Art. Ill, Sec. 35, Vernon’s Texas Const. Our holding is that, while the particular provision is constitutional, the injunction must be dissolved.
The appellees-plaintiff, Rogers et ah, are licensed competitors of the appellants in the practice of optometry, a profession or occupation somewhat elaborately regulated by Chapter 10, Arts. 4552-4566, inc., of Title 71, Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, to Art. 4565g, of which the provision now in question was added in 1957, the amending act being Ch. 240, Acts 55th Leg., Reg. Sess., p. 501, and known as S. B. No. 104. Both the original Art. 4565g and the amending act and caption thereof are rela[31]*31lively short, and accordingly both the former1 and the latter2 are fully copied as footnotes. Since the amending act deals also with paragraph (1) of Art. 4565d, the original of the latter is copied in a third footnote.3
[32]*32It will be noted that the critical provision in the amending act is the last sentence of Art. 4565g as rewritten, reading as follows:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation in this state * * * * to publish * * * * any statement or advertisement concerning ophthalmic lenses, frames, eyeglasses, spectacles or parts thereof which is fraudulent, deceitful, misleading, or which in any manner whatsoever tends to create a misleading impression, including statements or advertisements of bait, discount, premiums, price, gifts, or any statements or advertisements of a similar nature, import or meaning.”
The case was evidently heard below on the pleadings, the reference in the decree to the hearing of evidence apparently having to do with a hearing on venue and other matters not going to merits.
[33]*33According to the verified original petition of the appellants-defendant, the factual basis of the suit is an advertisement published on and after January 1, 1958, by the appellants-: defendant, a substantially correct description thereof being as follows:
“SINGLE VISION GLASSES * * AS LOW AS $12.50
COMPLETE OPTICAL SERVICE
• Eyes Examined
• Glasses Fitted
• Lenses duplicated
• Choice of many frame styles
E - A - S - Y CREDIT
(Picture of a man wearing glasses)
)
)
)
) (Picture of
) eyeglasses)
No Money Down
Pay just $1 weekly DOUGLAS
499 Pearl St. Optical
Offices at ZALES Jewelers”
The appellees-plaintiff alleged that said advertisement, and such similar advertisements as would thereafter be published but for legal restraint, were in violation of the above quoted portion of amended Art. 4565g, the sense of the pleading being that the advertisements were illegal because they “included a statement as to the price of spectacles by the respondents.”
The decree of the trial court, after reciting that the appellants-defendant “began * * * to advertise the price of spectacles or eyeglasses which included therein statements of the price thereof” and “That the said advertisements * * * constituted a violation of Article 4565g * * * as amended * * proceeded to enjoin the appellants-defendant “from the further violation of Article 4565g (otherwise known as Senate Bill No. 104, Acts 55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957), by publishing, causing, or allowing to be published any statement or advertisement concerning ophthalmic lenses, frames, eyeglasses, spectacles or parts thereof which include therein any statements or advertisements of price or any statements or advertisements of a similar nature, import or meaning, either in newspapers, by radio broadcast, television, billboard signs, or otherwise * *
Although undoubtedly the caption is irregularly drawn, we [34]*34do not consider the variances between it and the particular provision in question sufficiently grave to warrant our declaring the latter invalid, especially in the light of the liberal view customarily indulged by this Court in respect of captions. See Central Education Agency v. Independent School Dist., 152 Texas 56, 254 S.W. 2d 357.
The variance most heavily attacked by the appellants-defendant is that whereby the caption indicates that amended Art. 4565g is to contain only certain provisions (specifying particular activities as being permissible to ophthalmic dispensers) whereas the article as written (rewritten) in the body of the act contains not only these provisions, but also the provision with which we are here concerned and which is a prohibitory provision having no close relationship to the permissible activities stated. Our reason for not regarding this obvious variance as fatal to the provision in question is that the caption actually does contain a reference to that provision. The caption thus having announced that the body of the act (bill) would contain such a provision, the fact that the body of the act puts it in a place (rewritten 4565g) where the caption indicates it would not be put, does not, in our opinion, constitute a failure to state the subject matter of the provision in the caption, which is all the constitution requires.
The constitutional provision is, of course, directed at pending legislation. Doeppenschmidt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 100 Texas 532, 101 S.W. 1080, 1081. In so far as it deals with aptions of bills, as distinguished from the matter of multiple ubjects thereof, itr MAect is to facilitate and protect the legisAive process by ople a ready and rea=,. •e contents of bills wit'■ legislators and other interested . accurate means of knowledge of leir having to read the full text. The Constitution pla> ption will be read; ant 3 bill to contain a pahere is no requiremen mged in the particular ion so as to avoid a p ne caption indicates if ation that, although tl the bill’s) title,” and a-, s thereby told that th reader may, nevertheless Mil, properly assume thi ¿sumes, however, that the entire ch a reading necessarily discloses »r provision, no more is required, the body of the bill shall be ar<-r sequence indicated by the capar provision being placed where not be placed. There is no impli¡ect actually is “expressed in its i the reader of the title (caption) contains a given provision, the out reading the whole body of the 3 caption reference was false and [35]*35that the body of the bill contains no such provision because he could only find it in a place where the caption indicated it would not be.
We know of no decision which we consider contrary to our foregoing view. Decisions such as Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Texas 535, 273 S.W. 799, and Texas-Louisiana Power Co. v. City of Farmersville, Texas Comm. App., 67 S.W. 2d 235, contemplate situations in which the caption fails to mention a particular provision that is in the bill or in which the caption, while containing general language that might include the provision in question, yet contains also specific language affirmatively indicating that no such provision is to be included. In the instant case, the caption expressly asserts the provision in question to be in the body of the act, contains no language at variance with that assertion, and is consistent with the body of the act to the extent that the latter does contain such a provision.
The fact that the act in question adds the provision here under attack to original Art. 4565g, which latter dealt with a somewhat different subject, may, indeed, be defective draftsmanship. But it does not follow, in our opinion, that the caption to the amendatory act has failed to meet the constitutional requirement that the provision be “expressed” therein. As explained in Board of Water Engineers v. City of San Antonio, 155 Texas 111, 283 S.W. 2d 722, a particular provision in the body of an amendatory bill (act) does have to be germane to the original act in order to uphold the caption of the amendatory bill in those cases wherein the caption states merely that the original act is being amended without specifying what the amendment is. The reason for that rule is that the caption in effect tells the reader that the bill contains nothing except what is germane to the original act. The rule has no application to a situation like the present, in which the caption of the amendatory act expressly states that the body of the act includes the new provision in question, although it also states, in effect, that the new provision will be in a different place in the act than that in which it is actually found.
It is argued further that the caption described the bill (act) as one regulating “ophthalmic dispensers,” and them only, whereas the corresponding provision of the act itself applies to “any person, firm or corporation in this state,” including thereby “optometrists.” The difficulty with this argument, as we see it, is that the caption does not refer exclusively to ophthalmic dispensers. The fact that the caption starts with the words, “An [36]*36Act relating to ophthalmic dispensers;” does not settle the matter. As before stated, we think the constitution assumes that the reader will read the entire caption. Even considering the quoted words apart from the rest of the caption does not necessarily exclude the idea that the act may bear on others besides ophthalmic dispensers. For illustration, an act might not unreasonably be said to “relate to” ophthalmic dispensers, when all it provides is a prohibition of the public from dealing with ophthalmic dispensers who are not licensed. Moreover, when the rest of the caption is considered, as it must be, we think it still clearer that its reference to misleading statements does not necessarily mean misleading statements made by only those dispensers of glasses and similar goods who do not qualify as optometrists. Neither the caption nor the body of the act necessarily means that a person who is an optometrist cannot be at the same time an ophthalmic dispenser when he sells glasses and similar goods. We think that a person interested in any phase of the activity of supplying such goods, who might read the caption, would probably go on to read the body of the act.
It is finally contended that if the act prohibits all price advertising, the caption is insufficient, because the latter refers only to advertising that is misleading, whereas, on the other hand, if the act prohibits price advertising only when it is misleading, the injunction is erroneous on its face, since in effect it enjoins all price advertising.
In this behalf, it is the opinion of the court that the act must be construed as prohibiting only such price advertising as is misleading. Such is clearly the sense of those more general words of the act immediately preceding the clause, “including * * * advertisements of * * * price * * *;” and this clause, it is believed, being subordinate to the general language, is at least reasonably susceptible of the construction of merely mentioning, for greater certainty, certain particular aspects of advertising which, if misleading, would fall within the scope of the general language. This interpretation is felt to be strongly supported by the language of the caption, which clearly refers only to statements that are misleading, and, where interpretation is required, may properly be looked to as evidence of the legislative intent. The interpretation is believed to be supported also by the consideration that, had the legislature intended such a drastic prohibition as one against all price advertising, it would normally have used language more positively evidencing its intent. The act itself thus prohibiting only such price advertising [37]*37as may be misleading, there is no fatal variance in this particular between the act and its caption.
While the effect of the foregoing is to uphold the constitutionality of the particular provision of the act involved, it also gives that provision a narrower interpretation than that upon which the trial court evidently proceeded in granting the temporary injunction. This being so, it is the further opinion of the court, that the injunction was erroneous and that accordingly our action should be to reverse the judgment of the trial court and here render judgment that the temporary injunction be dissolved. It is so ordered.4
Opinion delivered June 25, 1958.
Associate Justice Greenhill not sitting.