In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-24-00052-CR ________________
SHANNON RENDELL HORACE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 22-02-01647-CR ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Shannon Rendell Horace appeals his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 481.112. In his sole issue, Horace complains the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his Motion to Suppress the evidence of a
warrantless search and seizure because his temporary detention was unduly
prolonged. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1 BACKGROUND
Horace moved to suppress evidence from a warrantless search and seizure that
he alleged was obtained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Horace
argued his prolonged detention involving the delay of a canine unit was unlawful
and the evidence seized should be suppressed because the facts and circumstances
of the stop were insufficient for the officer to reasonably suspect he was trafficking
narcotics.
The trial court conducted a suppression hearing, during which Horace
challenged his prolonged detention. Bruno Miauro testified he was a Trooper with
the Texas Department of Public Safety when he stopped Horace for speeding in
Montgomery County around 12:47 a.m. Miauro asked Horace for insurance
information and observed the passenger looking for paperwork. Miauro told Horace
he would give him a warning if everything checked out okay to reduce any anxiety
and asked him to come back to his patrol car. Miauro observed that Horace’s hand
was shaking when he handed him his driver’s license. Miauro testified that Horace
reported his girlfriend, who was the passenger in the car, owned the vehicle, which
had a Louisiana plate.
While waiting for the information to return on Horace’s license, Miauro asked
Horace about his trip, and Horace reported he was headed to Leesville, which was a
few hours away. Horace explained he traveled from Louisiana to Houston to eat at
2 Pappadeaux, but it was closed when they got there, so he sat in a parking lot, visited
with his brother, and headed back to Leesville because his girlfriend had to be at
work. Miauro testified that Horace’s story was difficult to follow, because someone
making a long trip late at night to go to a specific restaurant would check the
restaurant’s hours. Miauro stated he suspected there was more going on when he
observed Horace breathing harder and moving his hands a lot when he talked about
his trip’s purpose.
Miauro testified that when the check showed the vehicle was not registered to
Horace’s girlfriend, Horace stated it belonged to her stepdad. Miauro explained he
had special training in narcotics interdiction and that it was common practice for
someone trafficking drugs to use someone else’s vehicle. Miauro testified that when
he exited his patrol car to talk to Horace’s girlfriend about the vehicle’s insurance,
Horace got out in front of him and headed toward the vehicle.
Miauro explained that was a huge, red flag, and he thought Horace could try
to flee or that there could be a weapon or contraband in the vehicle. Miauro grabbed
Horace and pulled him back next to the patrol car for safety reasons because
Horace’s behavior was abnormal and made Miauro very uncomfortable. Miauro
explained that another red flag was that Horace said he was going to the vehicle to
get a lighter or his cigarettes, but the video shows Horace had both on his person.
Miauro testified that at that point, he had not confirmed that the vehicle was not
3 stolen, and he suspected that criminal activity was afoot and that something was not
right. Miauro explained he called for a second unit, because he needed to complete
the traffic stop and did not believe it was safe for him to leave Horace to talk with
Horace’s girlfriend. Miauro explained that he knew Horace was extremely nervous
because when he patted Horace down for weapons, he felt Horace’s chest pumping
hard. Miauro was on the border between Montgomery and Liberty County, and it
took backup about nineteen minutes to arrive.
Miauro proceeded to question Horace’s girlfriend about the vehicle’s
insurance and the trip and to check the vehicle’s VIN number. Miauro testified
Horace’s girlfriend reported they ate at the restaurant and did not talk to or see
anyone, which completely contradicted Horace’s story and raised Miauro’s
suspicions even more that criminal activity was taking place. Miauro asked Horace’s
girlfriend if he could search the vehicle, which he believed contained contraband,
and after she denied consent, Miauro requested a canine unit to check for narcotics
because he had reasonable suspicion. Miauro explained that when he requested the
canine, twenty-six and one-half minutes into the stop, he had not completed the
traffic stop because he had not issued the warning.
Miauro testified that it took about twelve minutes for the canine unit to arrive
on scene. Miauro explained that after the canine positively alerted on the vehicle, he
searched the vehicle and found two kilos of methamphetamine.
4 The trial court admitted and viewed Miauro’s body camera video of the traffic
stop, and the video supports Miauro’s testimony about the stop. The video shows
Miauro stopped Horace for speeding, obtained Horace’s driver’s license, and
requested insurance information. After two minutes and twenty-five seconds,
Miauro asked Horace to come back to the patrol car so he could see if everything
checked out, and Horace told him it was his girlfriend’s vehicle. After being in
Miauro’s patrol car for about two minutes, Horace told the story of traveling from
Louisiana to Houston to eat at Pappadeaux, which Horace claimed was closed. After
about three more minutes, Miauro and Horace exited the car so Miauro could ask
Horace’s girlfriend for insurance information, and Miauro had to stop Horace from
walking back to the vehicle by pulling on Horace’s arm. Miauro asked Horace to
wait by the patrol car and he stayed with Horace to make sure he did not flee.
Approximately a minute-and-a-half later, Miauro told Horace to stop putting his
hands in his pockets to get cigarettes and a lighter, patted Horace down for weapons,
and requested a second unit. Approximately twenty-five minutes after the initial
stop, the second unit arrived, which allowed Miauro to talk with Horace’s girlfriend
about the vehicle’s registration and insurance. When Horace’s girlfriend provided
contradictory information about the trip, Miauro asked for permission to search her
vehicle. After she denied consent, Miauro requested a canine unit about twenty-six
minutes after the stop, and the canine unit arrived about forty minutes after the stop
5 and positively alerted on the vehicle. Miauro searched the vehicle and found two
kilos of methamphetamine.
The trial court denied Horace’s Motion to Suppress and found the evidence
was admissible. The trial court found that Horace’s prolonged detention was justified
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-24-00052-CR ________________
SHANNON RENDELL HORACE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 22-02-01647-CR ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Shannon Rendell Horace appeals his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 481.112. In his sole issue, Horace complains the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his Motion to Suppress the evidence of a
warrantless search and seizure because his temporary detention was unduly
prolonged. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1 BACKGROUND
Horace moved to suppress evidence from a warrantless search and seizure that
he alleged was obtained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Horace
argued his prolonged detention involving the delay of a canine unit was unlawful
and the evidence seized should be suppressed because the facts and circumstances
of the stop were insufficient for the officer to reasonably suspect he was trafficking
narcotics.
The trial court conducted a suppression hearing, during which Horace
challenged his prolonged detention. Bruno Miauro testified he was a Trooper with
the Texas Department of Public Safety when he stopped Horace for speeding in
Montgomery County around 12:47 a.m. Miauro asked Horace for insurance
information and observed the passenger looking for paperwork. Miauro told Horace
he would give him a warning if everything checked out okay to reduce any anxiety
and asked him to come back to his patrol car. Miauro observed that Horace’s hand
was shaking when he handed him his driver’s license. Miauro testified that Horace
reported his girlfriend, who was the passenger in the car, owned the vehicle, which
had a Louisiana plate.
While waiting for the information to return on Horace’s license, Miauro asked
Horace about his trip, and Horace reported he was headed to Leesville, which was a
few hours away. Horace explained he traveled from Louisiana to Houston to eat at
2 Pappadeaux, but it was closed when they got there, so he sat in a parking lot, visited
with his brother, and headed back to Leesville because his girlfriend had to be at
work. Miauro testified that Horace’s story was difficult to follow, because someone
making a long trip late at night to go to a specific restaurant would check the
restaurant’s hours. Miauro stated he suspected there was more going on when he
observed Horace breathing harder and moving his hands a lot when he talked about
his trip’s purpose.
Miauro testified that when the check showed the vehicle was not registered to
Horace’s girlfriend, Horace stated it belonged to her stepdad. Miauro explained he
had special training in narcotics interdiction and that it was common practice for
someone trafficking drugs to use someone else’s vehicle. Miauro testified that when
he exited his patrol car to talk to Horace’s girlfriend about the vehicle’s insurance,
Horace got out in front of him and headed toward the vehicle.
Miauro explained that was a huge, red flag, and he thought Horace could try
to flee or that there could be a weapon or contraband in the vehicle. Miauro grabbed
Horace and pulled him back next to the patrol car for safety reasons because
Horace’s behavior was abnormal and made Miauro very uncomfortable. Miauro
explained that another red flag was that Horace said he was going to the vehicle to
get a lighter or his cigarettes, but the video shows Horace had both on his person.
Miauro testified that at that point, he had not confirmed that the vehicle was not
3 stolen, and he suspected that criminal activity was afoot and that something was not
right. Miauro explained he called for a second unit, because he needed to complete
the traffic stop and did not believe it was safe for him to leave Horace to talk with
Horace’s girlfriend. Miauro explained that he knew Horace was extremely nervous
because when he patted Horace down for weapons, he felt Horace’s chest pumping
hard. Miauro was on the border between Montgomery and Liberty County, and it
took backup about nineteen minutes to arrive.
Miauro proceeded to question Horace’s girlfriend about the vehicle’s
insurance and the trip and to check the vehicle’s VIN number. Miauro testified
Horace’s girlfriend reported they ate at the restaurant and did not talk to or see
anyone, which completely contradicted Horace’s story and raised Miauro’s
suspicions even more that criminal activity was taking place. Miauro asked Horace’s
girlfriend if he could search the vehicle, which he believed contained contraband,
and after she denied consent, Miauro requested a canine unit to check for narcotics
because he had reasonable suspicion. Miauro explained that when he requested the
canine, twenty-six and one-half minutes into the stop, he had not completed the
traffic stop because he had not issued the warning.
Miauro testified that it took about twelve minutes for the canine unit to arrive
on scene. Miauro explained that after the canine positively alerted on the vehicle, he
searched the vehicle and found two kilos of methamphetamine.
4 The trial court admitted and viewed Miauro’s body camera video of the traffic
stop, and the video supports Miauro’s testimony about the stop. The video shows
Miauro stopped Horace for speeding, obtained Horace’s driver’s license, and
requested insurance information. After two minutes and twenty-five seconds,
Miauro asked Horace to come back to the patrol car so he could see if everything
checked out, and Horace told him it was his girlfriend’s vehicle. After being in
Miauro’s patrol car for about two minutes, Horace told the story of traveling from
Louisiana to Houston to eat at Pappadeaux, which Horace claimed was closed. After
about three more minutes, Miauro and Horace exited the car so Miauro could ask
Horace’s girlfriend for insurance information, and Miauro had to stop Horace from
walking back to the vehicle by pulling on Horace’s arm. Miauro asked Horace to
wait by the patrol car and he stayed with Horace to make sure he did not flee.
Approximately a minute-and-a-half later, Miauro told Horace to stop putting his
hands in his pockets to get cigarettes and a lighter, patted Horace down for weapons,
and requested a second unit. Approximately twenty-five minutes after the initial
stop, the second unit arrived, which allowed Miauro to talk with Horace’s girlfriend
about the vehicle’s registration and insurance. When Horace’s girlfriend provided
contradictory information about the trip, Miauro asked for permission to search her
vehicle. After she denied consent, Miauro requested a canine unit about twenty-six
minutes after the stop, and the canine unit arrived about forty minutes after the stop
5 and positively alerted on the vehicle. Miauro searched the vehicle and found two
kilos of methamphetamine.
The trial court denied Horace’s Motion to Suppress and found the evidence
was admissible. The trial court found that Horace’s prolonged detention was justified
because it occurred before Miauro completed the tasks associated with the stop, and
during that valid detention, Miauro developed reasonable suspicion that Horace was
engaged in criminal activity other than the traffic violation. The trial court found
Miauro diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to quickly
confirm or dispel his suspicions, which included requesting backup for safety
reasons eight and a half minutes after initiating the stop and requesting a canine unit
after consent for a search was denied twenty-five minutes into the stop. The trial
court also found the time Miauro spent waiting on backup and the canine unit was
not unreasonable under the circumstances.
Horace pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony offense of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the trial court accepted Horace’s plea,
found him guilty and assessed his punishment at twelve years of confinement.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, Horace complains the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his Motion to Suppress because there was no separate justification beyond
the purpose of the original stop for Miauro to prolong his detention and wait for a
6 canine unit to dispel his suspicions that criminal activity was afoot. Specifically,
Horace argues his temporary detention was unduly prolonged by Miauro’s lack of
diligence in requesting the canine unit after he formed additional reasonable
suspicion during the stop.
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated
standard for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2023). “We defer to a trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
the record.” Id. We review de novo legal questions and mixed questions that do not
turn on credibility and demeanor, such as the facts of a case that would establish
probable cause. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The
evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling, and the trial court’s ruling must be upheld if it is reasonably
supported by the record and is correct under a theory of law applicable to the case.
Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Under the Fourth Amendment, a person can be detained no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of a valid traffic stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983). In investigating a traffic violation, an officer is to use the least
intrusive means reasonably available to the officer to verify or dispel the suspicion
that led to the stop. Id. Thus, the reasonableness of the duration of a stop does not
7 depend solely on the time needed to determine whether a traffic offense occurred.
See Love v. State, 252 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d).
If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting a person committed a traffic
offense, he may legally initiate a traffic stop. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted). “A seizure for a traffic violation
justifies a police investigation of that violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348, 354 (2015). A routine traffic stop is analogous to a Terry stop, during
which “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop context is
determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’ — to address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns[.]” Id. (internal citations
omitted). Because addressing the traffic violation is the purpose of the traffic stop,
authority for the seizure ends when the tasks tied to the traffic violation are
completed or reasonably should have been completed. Id.
A traffic stop becomes unlawful when it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete the mission of the traffic stop, which includes
ordinary inquiries incident to the stop. Id. at 354-55. Typical inquiries include,
among other things, checking the driver’s license, inspecting the vehicle’s proof of
insurance, and requesting information about the ownership of the vehicle, the
driver’s destination, and purpose of the trip. Id. at 355; Veal v. State, 28 S.W.3d 832,
8 835 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref’d). An officer may conduct a computer
verification of the person’s license and insurance, and the traffic-stop investigation
is not complete until the check is complete, and the officer confirms that the person
has a valid license and insurance. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63-64 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004); see Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003,
pet. ref’d). Because traffic stops can be dangerous, an officer may need to take
certain safety precautions to complete his mission safely, including on-scene
investigations into other crimes. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63-64.
In gathering the types of information typically associated with a traffic stop,
an objectively reasonable officer may form a reasonable suspicion that some crime
other than a traffic violation is afoot. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86
(1985). If so, the focus in determining whether the detention is prolonged shifts to
evaluating whether those suspicions were objectively reasonable, and whether they
were investigated in a manner designed to quickly confirm or dispel them. Belcher
v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). In evaluating
a complaint about an allegedly prolonged detention, courts are allowed to consider
whether legitimate law enforcement purposes are served by any delays that arose
during the investigation. Id. In reviewing complaints about allegedly prolonged
detentions, we look at the totality of the circumstances developed during the stop to
determine whether there is evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s
9 conclusion that reasonable suspicions existed justifying the defendant’s detention
while the officer investigated matters that extended beyond the initial reason for the
stop. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989); Woods v. State, 956
S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Although a detention that follows a traffic
stop may become unduly prolonged, there is no rigid, bright-line rule governing the
time that detentions should take. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685.
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch, and it exists if the officer
has specific articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those
facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude the person is, has been, or soon
will be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2022) (citing Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)); Delafuente v. State, 414 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). These
facts must show unusual activity, some evidence that connects the detainee to the
unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to a crime.
State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Martinez v.
State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Nervousness is a factor that an
officer may consider in establishing reasonable suspicion for an investigative
detention. Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
An officer may also ask the driver if he possesses any illegal contraband and
solicit voluntary consent to search the vehicle. Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491. If a valid
10 traffic stop evolves into an investigative detention for a drug-related offense, the
temporary detention may continue for a reasonable time, and one reasonable method
of dispelling the reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains drugs is to have a
trained drug dog perform an “open air” search by walking around the vehicle.
Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Increasing
nervousness, conflicting or implausible information, and other factors can raise a
reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging a detention to wait on a canine unit. Haas
v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 54 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d); Neuwirth v. State,
No. 09-18-00248-CR, No. 09-18-00249-CR, 2019 WL 3937997, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Aug. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
There is no requirement that a canine unit must arrive at the location of the
traffic stop within a certain period. State v. Martinez, 638 S.W.3d 740, 752 (Tex.
App.—Easland 2021, no pet.). That said, the timing of the canine unit’s arrival must
not be unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. Here, the video of the stop shows
the canine unit arrived about forty minutes after the initial stop, which was only
fourteen minutes after it was requested. Our sister courts have found that detentions
awaiting a canine unit that were similar in length to Horace’s were not unreasonable
under the circumstances. See Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at 752 (thirty-eight-minute
detention not unreasonable); Parker v. State, 297 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d) (seventy-minute detention not unreasonable); Willis v.
11 State, 192 S.W.3d 585, 589-90, 592 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, pet. ref’d) (twenty-
nine-minute detention not unreasonable); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (seventy-
five-minute detention not unreasonable). Considering the totality of the
circumstances developed during the stop and the deceptive behaviors and statements
made by Horace, on balance we cannot say that the detention was unreasonable.
The evidence developed in the suppression hearing shows that Horace’s
detention was supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Thus, Miauro’s investigatory detention of Horace was lawful. The evidence also
shows Miauro was diligent in requesting backup for his safety and a canine unit to
confirm or dispel his suspicion that there were narcotics in the vehicle. Based on the
totality of the circumstances developed during the stop, we conclude that the
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Horace’s temporary
detention was not unduly prolonged and that the length of time between the initial
stop and the arrival of the canine unit was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that Horace’s detention was not unduly prolonged or
unreasonable under the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not err by
denying Horace’s Motion to Suppress. We overrule Horace’s sole issue and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
12 AFFIRMED.
JAY WRIGHT Justice
Submitted on July 18, 2025 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2025 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.