Shannon Bates, et al. v. County of Del Norte

Opinion

SHANNON BATES, et al., Case No. 25-cv-02604-RMI

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS v. Re: Dkt. No. 27 Defendant.

Now pending before the court is the Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant County of Del Norte (“Defendant Del Norte” or “County”). (Dkt. 27.) Plaintiffs Shannon Bates (“Ms. Bates”) and Grant Rickards (“Mr. Rickards”) have responded. (Dkt. 28.) Defendant Del Norte filed its reply. (Dkt. 29.) For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs plead two causes of action in their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”): one claim asserting that the County violated California Government Code § 835 (“Claim-1”), under which a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition; and one claim of negligence (“Claim-2”) based on the County’s alleged “failure to exercise reasonable care to protect others from foreseeable risks of harm.” (FAC ¶ 50–59, Dkt. 23.) By way of relief, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, general and special damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 13.) Both claims are based on an alleged vehicular incident that occurred on September 3, 2022. Del Norte County, California, she realized that she was not on the correct road, but she could not turn around because the road was “too narrow.” (FAC ¶ 24.) She then attempted to reverse her car back down the road. (Id.) While moving in reverse at a “very slow” rate, the pavement under the rear driver-side tire “crumbled,” sending the car sliding down a ten-foot embankment and into a roll before it came to rest with the passenger side on the ground. (Id.) Mr. Rickards was a passenger in the car during the incident. (FAC ¶ 23.) Both Plaintiffs sustained serious, life-altering injuries because of the accident, and Ms. Bates’s insurance company determined that the vehicle was a total loss. (FAC at 5–10.) Plaintiffs contacted county officials “[i]mmediately” after the accident to determine responsibility for the roadway on which they had crashed, and the County’s “agents and employees affirmatively represented to Plaintiffs that the roadway was owned and maintained by the [Yurok] Tribe, and that COUNTY had no responsibility.” (FAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs then timely filed their government tort claims on May 13, 2024, against the Yurok Tribe; the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Department of Interior ultimately denied the claims on September 19, 2024. (FAC ¶¶ 17–18.) Plaintiffs then filed this litigation against the Bureau of Indian Affairs on March 17, 2025. (Compl., Dkt 1.) Plaintiffs allege that, “during this litigation,” the federal government disclosed to Plaintiffs a 2006 agreement that assigned to the County all road maintenance responsibilities for the roadway at issue. (FAC ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint naming the County as defendant on October 8, 2025, (Dkt. 23); this Motion followed. (Dkt. 27.) Defendant Del Norte has moved to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Dkt. 27.) Defendant Del Norte argues that (1) Plaintiffs fail to allege compliance with the claims-presentation requirements under the California Government Claims Act (“CGCA”), thereby barring their causes of action; (2) Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded the elements of estoppel; (3) estoppel, even if properly pleaded, does not excuse noncompliance with the CGCA; (4) Plaintiffs’ Claim-1 fails to plausibly allege the necessary factual elements of a claim under California Government Code § 835; and (5) Plaintiffs’ Claim-2 cannot be brought against the County of Del Norte under common-law negligence. (Id. at 4.) inaccurate information to Plaintiffs—“directly caused Plaintiffs to (timely) file against the wrong Defendant and litigate against that Defendant beyond the claims deadline as against the County” and that estoppel is thus applicable. (Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. 28 at 3, 6.) They further argue that they have properly pled all elements of estoppel and all elements of a claim under California Government Code § 835, and that the “Common Law Negligence” title of Claim-2 is irrelevant because they properly pled the elements of a statutory negligence claim against the County. (Id. at 11–13.) Finally, they contend that any deficiencies in the FAC are curable and they should be given leave to amend. (Id. at 13–14.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may seek dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court “must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). Dismissal “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). California Government Claims Act Defendant Del Norte first argues that the FAC should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not complied with the California Government Claims Act regarding their claims against the County and did not adequately plead facts supporting an excuse of estoppel. (Dkt. 27 at 10–14.) In California, with certain exceptions not applicable here, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been EMC, 2013 WL 1747917, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (discussing CGCA claims presentation requirements). “The filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.” DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 888 (Cal. 2012) (quoting Del Real v. City of Riverside, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 709 (2002)) (emphasis in original)). For personal injury or property damage claims, plaintiffs must file an administrative claim form with the relevant government entity “no more than six months after the cause of action accrues.” Johnson v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 5:18-CV-06264-EJD, 2020 WL 870933, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2020) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950). However, a plaintiff that has not complied with the claim presentation requirements may still be granted relief where the public entity is equitably estopped from asserting plaintiff’s noncompliance as a defense. A party raising equitable estoppel against the government must first “establish ‘affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence,’” and “even then, ‘estoppel will only apply where the government’s wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and the public’s interest will not suffer undue damage by imposition of the liability.’” Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F. 2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Wagner v. Dir., FEMA, 847 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir.1988)). “Affirmative misconduct does require an affirmative misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a material fact by the government, although it does not require that the government intend to mislead a party.” Watkins, 875 F.2d at 707 (internal citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement” or the complaint will be subject to dismissal. State of California v. Superior Ct., 90 P.3d 116, 122 (Cal. 2004). Plaintiffs do not contest the fact that they did not timely comply with the claim presentation requirement in the CGCA, as they never submitted a claim to the County. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Del Norte should be equitably estopped from raising the presentation requirement as a defense. (E.g., Dkt. 28 at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Del Norte is estopped from asserting Plaintiffs’ noncompliance because the County’s applicable to the Yurok Tribe/Federal Government, with whom Plaintiffs timely filed their claims in reliance on the County’s representations. (Dkt. 28 at 10); see also John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1989) (“It is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act.”). The court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the County’s misrepresentations are insufficient to adequately allege that the County prevented Plaintiffs from filing a claim consistent with CGCA requirements. Plaintiffs’ only factual allegations surrounding the County’s misrepresentations are Plaintiffs’ assertion that “[i]mmediately after the subject accident, [they] contacted County officials,” and the general allegation that the County’s “agents and employees affirmatively represented to Plaintiffs that the roadway was owned and maintained by the Tribe, and that COUNTY had no responsibility.” (FAC ¶ 9.) However, “[t]he fact that an employee at a County office gave [Plaintiffs] incorrect information on its own does not establish the ‘affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence,’ necessary to equitably estop the County from raising the [CGCA] as a defense.” Bess v. Foy, No. 5:19-CV-02012-EJD, 2020 WL 2086560, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2020). More information is necessary to determine whether Plaintiffs have plausibly stated an excuse based on estoppel. For example, courts have rejected claims of estoppel where a plaintiff’s attorney filed a claim with the incorrect recipient based on the advice of a hospital records clerk,1 where a county employee failed to forward a claim to the proper party or inform the plaintiff that she had filed with the wrong recipient,2 where a plaintiff mistakenly filed a claim against a county instead of the county “hospital association” and the county failed to notify plaintiff of the difference,3 where a plaintiff’s attorney relied on the city’s incorrect assertion that it was not responsible for a sidewalk and filed a claim against the wrong entity,4 and where 1 Life v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 278 Cal. Rptr. 196, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“[I]t cannot be maintained that attorney Zuzga reasonably could rely on the advice of a medical records clerk to file a claim with the hospital’s legal department, so as to estop the County.”). 2 DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (2012). 3 Scott v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 1:24-CV-00423-CDB, 2025 WL 3034085, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). 4 Jordan v. City of Sacramento, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 641, 648–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), as modified (Apr. 11, plaintiffs mistakenly filed a claim against the wrong law enforcement agency, believing the officer to be a city employee rather than a county one.5 In the present case, there are no factual allegations regarding who was contacted at the County, when, how many times, what was said, or where the interaction occurred. Courts have consistently required plaintiffs to provide such details in their complaints in order to avoid dismissal. See, e.g., Bess, 2020 WL 2086560, at *4 (“Ms. Bess does not allege who she spoke to, what that person said, or even that she was at the right location to file a complaint.”); Jefferson 2013 WL 1747917 at *10 (“Nevertheless, there is insufficient information in the complaint as pled to make the second estoppel theory plausible. There are no allegations about what exactly Mr. Jefferson was told about the claim forms and by whom.”). Thus, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged “affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence” by the County to estop the County from raising noncompliance with the CGCA as a defense at this stage. Leave to Amend Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “should be freely granted when justice so requires,” as the purpose of the Rule is “to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Trial courts considering whether to grant leave to amend should consider bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and futility. In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, there is no evidence of bad faith by Plaintiffs or prejudice to Defendant, there will be no undue delay, and Plaintiffs have stated enough information to suggest that amendment is not futile.6 Given that leave to amend is to be liberally granted, the court will city’s incorrect representation that it was not liable, and thus the city was not estopped from asserting the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the CGCA as a defense). 5 Audrey G. v. City of Lafayette, No. 21-CV-03545-WHO, 2021 WL 5565839, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2021) (finding that a plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling “where a plaintiff misunderstands the parties’ agency relationship and does not properly file.”). 6 Defendant Del Norte argues that Plaintiffs cannot successfully amend the FAC because they never filed a claim with the County after learning the County was responsible for the road—it contends that estoppel may extend the deadline for filing a complaint under the CGCA but may not excuse the failure to file any claim at all. (Def.’s Mot., Dkt. 27, at 7–9.) However, the California Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is settled that the failure to file the required claim, in the proper circumstances, may be excused and the governmental 1 permit Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint.’ 3 Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the First Amended 4 } Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall have twenty-one (21) days from 5 the entry of this Order to file an amended complaint. 7 Dated: January 15, 2026 8 9 ROBERT M. ILLMAN 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 qa 12

A 16 assert estoppel in circumstances like this case, where the plaintiffs never filed a claim and instead amended their existing complaints in court to add the appropriate entity as a defendant. See, e.g., Fredrichsen, 491 © 17 P.2d at 805-807 (plaintiff who was misinformed by the city clerk that the city was not responsible for a = defective sidewalk could amend complaint despite CGCA noncompliance); Santos v. Los Angeles Unified 18 Sch. Dist., 226 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (public entity was estopped from asserting noncompliance with claims presentation requirements where there was evidence that agents of that entity had 19 both concealed the entity’s involvement and affirmatively misrepresented the requirements to plaintiffs; plaintiffs never filed a claim but could move forward with amended complaint); Jefferson, 2013 WL 20 1747917, at *10 (granting leave to amend on estoppel issue where claim was never filed). CfArd v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 888-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the California Government Code allows courts to waive claim presentation requirements so plaintiffs may file a lawsuit, but not so plaintiffs may file a late claim). Defendant Del Norte’s reliance on Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. 22 Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), is unavailing. Ortega concerned whether the public entity’s actions delayed the plaintiffs from filing a claim such that the statute of limitations was tolled and the 23 untimeliness of their claims was excused—this is fundamentally different from the posture of this case, where Plaintiffs were already in court in pursuit of a claim against the wrong entity based on the defendant’s alleged 24 affirmative misrepresentations. Moreover, Ortega is a decision of a California Court of Appeal and is not controlling, particularly as the California Supreme Court and other Courts of Appeal have allowed similarly 25 situated plaintiffs to amend their complaints against the proper entity in court without a prior administrative claim. As such, the court finds that Plaintiffs may successfully amend their complaint to allege the elements 26 of estoppel without having filed a claim against the County. 7 Because the court is dismissing the FAC, the court will not address Defendant’s additional arguments that 27 Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under California Government Code § 835 and that Claim-2 for negligence cannot be brought against the county under common law. Should Plaintiffs file an amended complaint to 28 address the insufficiency of the estoppel allegations, they might consider whether there are other changes to be made that could cure these potential defects as well.