Shalanda Marie Looney v. City of Surprise, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04004
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Shalanda Marie Looney, No. CV-25-04004-PHX-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 City of Surprise, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Shalanda Marie Looney’s Complaint (Doc. 1) 16 and Application to Proceed In Forma Paupers (Doc. 2). 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Ms. Looney is an attorney. (Doc. 1 at 1.) On or about October 11, 2024, she received 19 a letter from the City of Surprise Business Licensing Division “advis[ing] that a city 20 business license is required and must be obtained per City of Surprise Municipal Code.” 21 (Id. at 5.) The letter provides an excerpt of the applicable municipal code, a link to the 22 entire municipal code, a link to apply for a business license, and contact information. (Id.) 23 The letter says nothing more. (Id.) 24 Ms. Looney assumes, based on information and belief alone, “no similar letters have 25 been issued to non-Black attorneys.” (Id.) On October 28, 2024, by telephone, a city 26 employee reiterated to Ms. Looney “that she could not practice law in the City without a 27 business license.” (Id.) Ms. Looney also sent an email to the City requesting an explanation 28 of the letter. (Doc. 1-1 at 6-8.) The City responded that the letter was sent in error and 1 asking her to disregard it. (Id. at 6.) Beyond the letter and this brief correspondence, Ms. 2 Looney does not allege that the City took further action. 3 On October 15, 2025—nearly one year after the City indicated Ms. Looney could 4 disregard the letter—she sent a demand letter to the City, making several requests, 5 including compensatory damages, documentation that race played no role in its letter to 6 her, and a written public retraction or apology. (Id. at 4, 7-8.) Ms. Looney stated that if she 7 did not receive a satisfactory response, she would file suit. (Id. at 8.) She imposed a 8 deadline of October 30, 2026, for Defendants to respond. (Id.) Ms. Looney filed suit on 9 October 27, 2025. (Doc. 1.) Along with the Complaint, she filed an Application to Proceed 10 In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2.) Ms. Looney asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, 11 naming the City of Surprise and unidentified employees or agents of the City as defendants. 12 (Doc. 1 at 1, 4.) Ms. Looney alleges the defendants intentionally obstructed her federally 13 protected right to make and enforce contracts. (Id. at 1.) She requests nominal, 14 compensatory, and punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. (Id. at 15 16.) 16 Ms. Looney claims that despite the City’s statement that she should disregard the 17 letter, she is “still bound by the restrictions to make contracts and enjoy the benefits 18 thereof.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) She asserts that she has suffered reputational harm as well as 19 economic damages due to lost potential clients. (Doc. 1-1 at 6-7.) 20 II. IFP APPLICATION 21 A party may file a lawsuit without paying the filing fee if the Court grants leave to 22 proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Ms. Looney’s application indicates that she 23 has insufficient funds to prepay the filing fee for this action. Accordingly, the Court will 24 grant the application (Doc. 2). 25 III. STATUTORY SCREENING OF IFP COMPLAINTS 26 The Court is required to screen complaints brought in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a Complaint, or a portion thereof, if a plaintiff has 28 raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 1 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 2 such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 3 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 4 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed 5 factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- 6 harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals 7 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 8 suffice.” Id. 9 Further, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 10 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 11 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 12 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 13 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 14 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 15 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 16 allegations may be consistent with a claim, a court must assess whether there are other 17 “more likely” explanations for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 18 Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se 19 complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 20 pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation 21 modified), this same consideration is not granted to pro se attorneys. Huffman v. Lindgren, 22 81 F.4th 1016, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2023). Courts grant leeway to pro se parties because the 23 pro se litigant is “[p]resumably unskilled in the law” and “far more prone to making errors 24 in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel.” Id. at 1021 25 (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Because these 26 considerations do not apply to practicing attorneys, the Ninth Circuit has “declined to 27 extend the liberal pleading standard to pro se attorneys,” joining the other circuits that have 28 reached the issue. Id. at 1020. 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Count One: 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim 3 Ms. Looney brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against all defendants, 4 asserting that the letter from the City of Surprise and her phone call with the City employee 5 were acts of intentional discrimination because they obstructed her right to make and 6 enforce contracts. (Id. at 13.) But “Section 1981 creates federal rights but does not provide 7 an express cause of action . . . against state actors.” Yoshikawa v. Seguirant, 74 F.4th 1042, 8 1044 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Ms. Looney improperly purports to allege Count One 9 pursuant to Section 1981, so the Court will dismiss the claim. 10 B. Count Two: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim 11 Ms. Looney also brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants, 12 alleging a violation of her equal protection rights. (Doc. 1 at 14.) She alleges that, as a 13 member of a protected class, the city’s advising her of the city’s business license 14 requirement amounts to an unlawful denial of her right to make contracts and enjoy the 15 benefits thereof. (Id.) She alleges that she was subjected “to different licensing 16 requirements than White attorneys.” (Id.) She states that the city is liable for these 17 violations because they “resulted from its official policy, widespread custom, or failure to 18 train or supervise employees. (Id. at 15.) 19 “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection 20 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with 21 an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a 22 protected class.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021,1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation 23 modified) (rejecting equal protection claim where inmate failed to show that he was treated 24 differently than any other inmates in the relevant class). 25 Although § 1983 applies to municipalities, they may not be held responsible for the 26 acts of their employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Benavidez v. 27 Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A] municipality cannot be held 28 liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be 1 held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 2 Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). In order to impose liability on a municipality under 3 § 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was an underlying constitutional violation that was 4 caused by action pursuant to an official municipal policy or custom. Connick v. Thompson, 5 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); see also Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 6 1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2021) (“To establish Monell liability under § 1983, the constitutional 7 violation must be caused by a municipality’s ‘policy, practice, or custom’ or be ordered by 8 a policy-making official.”). 9 “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the 10 acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to 11 practically have the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. A plaintiff seeking to impose 12 municipal liability must identify the specific policy that caused her injury. Bd. of Cnty. 13 Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997) (“Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a 14 municipality is held liable only for those deprivations [or] . . . acts [which] may fairly be 15 said to be those of the municipality.”). 16 In the absence of a written policy, a plaintiff may still be able to establish municipal 17 liability by showing the violation arose out of a widespread, permanent, and well-settled 18 custom. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (“[T]he Court has 19 long recognized that a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread practice 20 that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent 21 and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” (citation omitted) 22 (internal quotations omitted)). Allegations of sporadic incidents or a single instance of 23 misconduct are not sufficient to establish such a policy or custom. Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. 24 Cmty. Coll. Dist., 44 F.4th 867, 884 (9th Cir. 2022). 25 A municipality’s failure to train its employees may constitute an official government 26 policy for purposes of § 1983 but only in limited circumstances where deliberate 27 indifference can be shown. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. The plaintiff’s failure to train claim 28 must include facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference of a municipal training 1 policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights and that the injury 2 would not have resulted with proper training. Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153-54. Deliberate 3 indifference is a “stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor 4 disregarded a known or obvious consequence of [its] action.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. 5 1. Claim Against the City of Surprise 6 “A single constitutional deprivation ordinarily is insufficient to establish a 7 longstanding practice or custom,” so the letter by itself is not enough to sustain a claim 8 under § 1983. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 9 plaintiffs’ allegations that a county official singled them out for unique treatment was 10 insufficient to establish the required practice or custom). Beyond the letter, Ms. Looney 11 makes other general allegations of discriminatory practices in Arizona, but she does not tie 12 these allegations to a specific city policy. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04. 13 The general allegations are insufficient to establish a municipal custom that would 14 give rise to liability. Ms. Looney raises a number of incidents that, by virtue of their 15 existence alone, do not implicate racial discrimination—notwithstanding her conclusory, 16 self-serving statements that they do. (See generally Doc. 1 at 10-13.) For example, Ms. 17 Looney raises an example where she arrived early to a hearing and was asked by the 18 Courtroom Assistant to wait outside the courtroom. (Docs. 1 at 10, 1-1 at 11.) Although 19 the court admitted she was asked to leave in error, Ms. Looney does not allege any facts 20 suggesting that this was due to racial discrimination beyond an observation that she was 21 the only black person in the courtroom. (Docs. 1 at 10, 1-1 at 11, 13.) 22 Moreover, many of the incidents presented do not implicate any defendant at all, 23 such as a pending racial discrimination lawsuit against the Town of Quartzite. (Doc. 1 at 24 11.) Ms. Looney fails to mention the fact that this lawsuit was filed by her son. Gates v. 25 Town of Quartzite, No. CV-25-3627-PHX-SHD (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2026). Determinatively, 26 Ms. Looney does not identify any other instance in which the alleged policy or custom 27 resulted in a constitutional violation. Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th 28 Cir. 2021). These allegations are “little more than isolated or sporadic incidents that are 1 insufficient to establish Monell liability.” Sabra, 44 F.4th at 884 (citation modified). 2 Likewise, Ms. Looney cannot establish municipal liability based on failure to train 3 because she does not allege sufficient facts that would support a reasonable inference of a 4 constitutional violation caused by a municipal training policy that would amount to 5 deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153. Looney only 6 raises a single instance of allegedly unlawful conduct, does not demonstrate the City’s 7 deliberate indifference, and does not cite any training policy. 8 2. Claim Against Individual Defendants 9 Ms. Looney does not allege facts in support of her claim that the individual 10 defendants imposed the city’s license requirement on her, but not non-black attorneys. She 11 supplies a naked inference that no similar letters were issued to non-Black attorneys, but 12 no particularized facts to support the inference. (Doc. 1 at 5.) The Court need not accept 13 her conclusory allegation as true. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 14 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the Court has not found any facts to suggest that any of the 15 defendants knew Ms. Looney was Black prior to her self-identification on the October 28, 16 2024, phone call, over two weeks after she had received the letter in question. Ms. Looney’s 17 allegations are not sufficient to sustain a claim against the individual defendants. 18 In sum, the allegations in Ms. Looney’s complaint are speculative and conclusory, 19 failing to allege a short and plain statement of her claims as required under Rule 8 of the 20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Her claims must therefore be dismissed. The Court will 21 dismiss this claim with leave to amend. See Myers-Armstrong v. Actavis Totowa, LLC, 382 22 F. App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim in part 23 because the complaint gave “no notice of the alleged illegal act and, therefore, fail[ed] to 24 satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), because it [did] not set forth ‘a short plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”). 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . V. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2-1) is GRANTED. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1). 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must file an amended complaint no 7|| later than March 18, 2026. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the || Clerk of Court shall not issue summons until the Court screens the amended complaint and 10 || orders service consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 11 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that, if Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, || the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, dismiss this case on March 19, 2026. 13 Dated this 18th day of February, 2026. 14 Michal T. hurdle Michael T. Liburdi 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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