Shala Malek v. Valentia Apartments, LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-02076
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHALA MALEK, Case No.: 25cv2076-LL-BLM

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 14 VALENTIA APARTMENTS, LLC, et al.,

15 Defendants. [ECF No. 21] 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is Defendants Valentia Apartments, LLC, Shea Properties 19 Management Company, Inc., and Danielle Harris’ (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to 20 Dismiss Plaintiff Shala Malek’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 18 21 (“FAC”)] pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(e) (the “Motion”). ECF No. 21. Plaintiff 22 opposed the Motion and Defendants replied. The Court finds this matter suitable for 23 determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. 24 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 25 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 26 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiff is a 62-year-old lessor of Valentia Apartments who suffers from several 28 disabilities, including “multiple chemical sensitivities (‘MCS’); osteoarthritis, of multiple 1 joints, osteoporosis, chronic neck/back pain, unsteady gait, chronic fatigue, chronic 2 fibromyalgia, severe anxiety, allergy contact dermatitis, and neuropathy . . .” and requires 3 an oxygen tank to assist her breathing. FAC ¶¶ 4–5, 15. She first signed a lease agreement 4 with Defendants for rental unit 336 on October 31, 2019. Id. ¶ 13. Prior to signing the lease, 5 Plaintiff informed Defendants that it was necessary for her and her son to “reside in an 6 environment that was completely free from mold, hazardous chemicals, dust, and 7 allergens” due to her and her son’s asthma. Id. ¶ 15. 8 Upon moving into unit 366, Plaintiff noticed several water leaks around the 9 apartment which led to “damp, moist and wet conditions” that were “hazardous” to her 10 health. Id. ¶ 20. Because of this, Plaintiff requested transfer to unit 242 in November 2019. 11 Unfortunately, unit 242 had similar conditions, including “defective weather stripping at 12 the front door” and “defectively installed” rain gutters, which allowed water to accumulate 13 in and around the unit and exacerbated Plaintiff’s respiratory illnesses. Id. ¶¶ 27–29, 37. 14 On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant Harris, the on-site property 15 supervisor of Defendants, with a list of items that needed repair. Id. ¶¶ 8, 25. Defendants 16 either ignored Plaintiff’s requests or “ma[d]e faulty and unprofessional attempted repairs.” 17 Id. ¶ 37. 18 That same year, Defendants attempted to evict Plaintiff, alleging she was failing to 19 pay her rent. Id. ¶ 31. Towards the end of 2020, Defendants “forced” Plaintiff to sign an 20 agreement that allowed her to remain in the unit for an additional six months as an 21 accommodation for her disabilities. Id. ¶ 33. On February 5, 2021, Defendants served 22 Plaintiff with a 60-day notice of termination containing “false allegations of violations of 23 the lease agreement” and “unsubstantiated allegations of creating disturbances” in unit 242. 24 Id. ¶ 35. 25 From 2022 to 2023, Plaintiff continued informing Defendants of defects and 26 hazardous chemicals in her unit that were negatively impacting her health, some of which 27 Defendants failed to repair. Id. ¶¶ 40–41, 43, 53, 54, 55. On October 2, 2023, one of 28 Defendants’ employees showed Plaintiff a two-bedroom “disability accessible” rental unit. 1 Id. ¶ 45. Defendant Harris told Plaintiff that the employee should not have done so and told 2 other employees in the rental unit they were not to have any contact with Plaintiff without 3 her authorization. Id. ¶ 46. On October 5, 2023, Defendant Harris informed Plaintiff she 4 was not eligible for transfer to another unit because Plaintiff “supposedly” owed 5 Defendants money from a “COVID-19 rent dispute.” Id. ¶ 48. That same day, Plaintiff 6 hired a mold inspection specialist who determined that there were “elevated moisture levels 7 in the kitchen, living room, both bedrooms and both bathrooms” and “elevated humidity 8 levels above 80%” in Plaintiff’s unit. Id. ¶ 56. The inspector’s findings also indicated mold 9 growth under the kitchen sink and “the possibility of [s]tachybotrys or black mold” present 10 inside the unit’s walls Id. ¶ 61. The inspector recommended Plaintiff’s personal items be 11 sterilized and moved to prevent further contamination. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. Defendants refused to 12 sterilize or move Plaintiff’s items and agreed to remediate the kitchen area only. Id. ¶ 64. 13 Plaintiff’s sensitivity to these conditions grew worse as she remained in the unit, and as a 14 result, she relocated to a hotel on October 29, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 65, 69. Plaintiff then filed the 15 current suit on November 5, 2024. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is 18 appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally 19 cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 20 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff only needs to plead 21 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 22 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible 23 “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 24 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 25 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 26 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 27 party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 Nevertheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 1 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Defendants claim that all of Plaintiff’s ten causes of action are barred by statute of 5 limitations and must be dismissed. Mot. at 2. 6 A. Statute of Limitations 7 1. Fair Housing Act and Fair Employment Housing Act 8 Under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), a plaintiff must file suit within two years after 9 “the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice.” 42 10 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). However, where a plaintiff “challenges not just one incident of 11 conduct violative of the Act, but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitation 12 period, the complaint is timely when it is filed within [two years] of the last asserted 13 occurrence of that practice.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 14 (1982). Congress has since codified this continuing violation doctrine by amending the 15 FHA to include both “the occurrence [and] the termination of an alleged discriminatory 16 housing practice” as events triggering the two-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 17 3613(a)(1)(A). Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 461–62 (9th Cir. 2008). 18 Defendants argue that all allegations occurring before November 5, 2022, are time- 19 barred because the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims. Mot. 20 at 7–8. First, Defendants argue that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to 21 “continual ill effects from an original violation.” Id. at 8–9 (citing Garcia, 526 F.3d at 462– 22 63). However, the FAC clearly details a series of conduct dating back to 2019, not a series 23 of ill effects from one violation. See generally FAC. As such, Court is not persuaded by 24 this argument. 25 Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations describe “separate and distinct 26 incidents” rather than a “series of related and continuing discriminatory acts.” Mot. at 9. 27 As support, Defendants claim that vacating a unit terminates all violations relating to that 28 unit. Id. at 9–11. However, Plaintiff’s claim arises out of Defendants’ conduct, which 1 Plaintiff alleges has continued despite transferring units. See generally FAC. 2 Here, Plaintiff has alleged numerous related incidents throughout 2019 to 2023, 3 including an attempt to charge Plaintiff additional rent for her initial transfer in 20191 (FAC 4 ¶ 22), harassment and threats of eviction during the COVID-19 moratorium in 2020 (FAC 5 32), serving Plaintiff with a 60-day notice to terminate tenancy with “false allegations of 6 violations of the lease agreement” in 2021 (FAC ¶ 35), failure to successfully repair a water 7 leak despite repeated complaints from Plaintiff in 2022 (FAC ¶¶ 39–40), refusal to transfer 8 Plaintiff to a “disability accessible” unit in 2023 (FAC ¶ 48), illegal rent increases from 9 2021 to 2023 (FAC ¶ 42), and prohibiting other employees from assisting Plaintiff in 2023 10 (FAC ¶ 46). Accordingly, a complaint is timely when “based not solely on isolated 11 incidents . . . but a continuing violation manifested in a number of incidents—including at 12 least one . . . that [wa]s asserted to have occurred within the [limitations] period. Garcia, 13 526 F.3d at 462. Thus, we find that the FAC has at least minimally detailed a series of 14 discriminatory conduct from 2019 to 2023 to give the Defendants “fair notice” and for this 15 Court to apply the continuing violation. See Patton v. Hanassab, No. 14CV1489 AJB 16 WVG, 2015 WL 589460, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015) (finding notices to vacate, tenancy 17 termination notices, and particular comments made by defendants to plaintiff were enough 18 to “detail a series of discriminatory conduct” where the continuing violation doctrine would 19 apply); see also Baker v. City of San Diego, 463 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1096, 1101–02 (S.D. 20 Cal. 2020) (applying the continuing violation doctrine where allegations of new zoning 21 policies, development of the “Live Well Center,” and a voucher system that 22 disproportionally concentrates low-income minorities was enough to constitute a “a pattern 23

24 25 1 Defendants argue that the attempt to charge additional rent cannot be a continuing violation since Plaintiff was not ultimately charged the $450. Mot. at 9. Nonetheless, we 26 find this attempt can constitute discriminatory conduct even if it was never realized. See 27 San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The Supreme Court has long held that claims brought under the [Fair Housing] Act are to be 28 1 and practice of alleged discrimination of concentrating majority of the low-income housing 2 in minority neighborhoods . . .”). 3 Similarly, we decline to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fair Employment and Housing Act 4 (“FEHA”) claim because its statutory language mirrors that of the FHA. See Hanassab, 5 2015 WL 589460, at *7 (applying the continuing violation doctrine to both FHA and FEHA 6 claims under the same facts); see also Alcaraz v. KMF Oakland LLC, No. 18-CV-02801- 7 SI, 2020 WL 4539099, at *8 (applying the continuing violation doctrine to FEHA claims 8 because the FEHA’s statutory language mirrors the FHA’s). 9 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA 10 claims. 11 2. Unruh Civil Rights Act 12 The Unruh Civil Rights Act, as codified in California Civil Code Section 51, states: 13 “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their 14 sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic 15 information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal 16 accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 17 establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). Because the Unruh Act 18 does not have its own statute of limitations, courts must borrow statutes of limitations from 19 other laws. Gatto v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 753 (2002). Generally, a two- 20 year statute of limitations applies to claims that derive from the common law (Cal. Civ. 21 Proc. Code § 335.1), and a three-year statute of limitations applies to liability created by 22 statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338). Id. at 759. 23 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide her with reasonable 24 accommodation for housing. FAC ¶¶ 105–07. We are aware of no duty requiring 25 affirmative accommodation for those with disabilities that existed in common law. Rather, 26 early common law doctrine only required “a few, particularly vital, public enterprises . . . 27 to serve all members of the public without arbitrary discrimination.” Gatto, 98 Cal.App.4th 28 at 756 (citing West Shield Investigations & Sec. Consultants v. Superior Ct., 82 Cal. App. 1 4th 935, 953 (2000)). Thus, we hold that Plaintiff’s claim does not derive from common 2 law principles and is therefore subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, 3 all allegations relating to Plaintiff’s Unruh Civil Rights Act claim that occurred before 4 November 5, 2021 are time-barred. 5 3. California Civil Code § 54.1 6 Similar to claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 7 54.1 (“Section 54.1”) does not have its own statute of limitations. Courts must borrow 8 statutes of limitations from other laws, and the applicable limitation depends on whether 9 the claim’s liability existed in common law or if it was created by statute. 10 The Court agrees with both parties that the applicable statute of limitations for 11 Section 54.1 claims is three years. See Indep. Hous. Servs. of San Francisco v. Fillmore 12 Ctr. Assocs., 840 F. Supp. 1328, 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that Section 54.1 claims 13 do not derive from the common law and are therefore subject to a three-year statute of 14 limitations); see also Gatto, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 759 n. 11 (noting, in dicta, that the court 15 in Independent Housing Services may have been correct in holding that liability under 16 Section 54.1 “was a type that did not exist at common-law.”); Kemp v. Regents of Univ. of 17 Cal., No. C-09-4687 PJH, 2010 WL 2889224, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) 18 (analogizing Title II ADA claims to Section 54.1 claims and holding that they are subject 19 to a three-year statute of limitations because they do not derive from the common law). 20 Thus, all allegations relating to Plaintiff’s Section 54.1 claim that occurred before 21 November 5, 2021 are time-barred. 22 4. Negligence 23 The statute of limitations for most negligence claims is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. 24 Code § 335.1. The statute of limitations for exposure to hazardous materials and toxic 25 substances is also two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.8. A negligence claim generally 26 accrues upon occurrence of the last act necessary to complete the cause of action. See Fox 27 v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 806–07 (2005). 28 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s entire negligence claim should be dismissed 1 because her causes of action for negligence are based on events outside the statute of 2 limitations. Mot. at 8. However, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is based in part on events that 3 occurred after November 5, 2022, such as the Defendants’ failure to correct a water leak 4 after Plaintiff complained for the second time on December 20, 2022 (FAC ¶¶ 40–42), 5 Defendants’ failure to advise Plaintiff of the use of hazardous chemicals in or around her 6 unit in 2023 (FAC ¶ 44), and Defendants’ refusal to remediate anything other than the 7 kitchen area of Plaintiff’s unit after a mold inspector recommended it so in 2023. (FAC ¶¶ 8 62–64). As such, only the allegations that occurred before November 5, 2022 are time- 9 barred for Plaintiff’s negligence claim. 10 5. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”) 11 The statute of limitations for a NIED claim is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 12 § 335.1. The cause of action for a NIED claim accrues “once the plaintiff suffers severe 13 emotional distress as a result of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant.” 14 Wassmann v. S. Orange Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 24 Cal. App. 5th 825, 852–53 (2018) 15 (internal quotations omitted). 16 Again, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s NIED claim should be dismissed because 17 her NIED claim is based on events outside the statute of limitations. Mot. at 8. However, 18 Plaintiff’s NIED claim is based in part on events that occurred after November 5, 2022, 19 such as Defendants’ harassment of Plaintiff whenever she requested repairs to her rental 20 unit (FAC ¶ 66), several of which were made after 2022 (See generally FAC) and Plaintiff’s 21 relocation to a hotel room after the mold inspection findings, where she has been “forced 22 to pay exorbitant hotel bills, transportation costs, meals, and other expenditures . . . 23 [having] the effect of bankrupting her of her retirement funds” in 2023 (FAC ¶¶ 69–70). 24 Thus, only the allegations that occurred before November 5, 2022 are time-barred for 25 Plaintiff’s NIED claim. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 6. Breach of Warranty of Habitability and Breach of Covenant of Quiet 1 Enjoyment 2 Breach of the implied warranty of habitability and implied covenant of quiet 3 enjoyment claims are contract claims which are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. 4 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337(a) (contract claims must be brought within four years); see 5 also Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Est. Grp., Inc., 3 Cal. App. 5th 1155, 1169 (2016) (noting 6 that claims for breach of implied warranty of habitability and the implied covenant of quiet 7 enjoyment are contract claims); Adams v. Cmty. Hous. P'ship, No. 23-CV-06073-WHO, 8 2024 WL 1643682, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2024) (holding that a four-year statute of 9 limitations applies to claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and implied 10 covenant of quiet enjoyment). Thus, all allegations relating to the breach of implied 11 warranty of habitability and breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment claims that 12 occurred before November 5, 2020 are time-barred. 13 7. Private Nuisance 14 The limitations period for private nuisance claims depends on the nature of the harm 15 caused by the nuisance. A three-year statute of limitations applies to private nuisance 16 actions based on injury to real property. Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield 17 Co., 20 Cal. App. 4th 732, 743–45 (1993). A two-year statute of limitations applies to 18 private nuisance actions based on personal injury. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. 19 Plaintiff alleges personal injury to herself, not to real property. See generally FAC. 20 Thus, a two-year statute of limitations applies here. Accordingly, all allegations relating to 21 Plaintiff’s private nuisance claim that occurred before November 5, 2022 are time-barred. 22 8. Retaliatory Eviction 23 Plaintiff brings her retaliatory eviction claim under California Civil Code section 24 1942.5 (“Section 1942.5”). Because Section 1942.5 does not have its own statute of 25 limitations, courts must borrow statutes of limitations from other laws. Here, California 26 Code of Civil Procedure section 340(a)’s one-year statute of limitations applies to “[a]n 27 action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture . . .” Since Section 1942.5 allows for 28 punitive damages, which are “designed to punish or penalize” and because Plaintiff also 1 seeks punitive damages in conjunction with this claim, Plaintiff’s Section 1942.5 claim is 2 subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See FAC ¶ 159; Altamirano v. Matsu, LLC, No. 3 CV1206023GAFAJWX, 2013 WL 12404713, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013). 4 Neither party disputes the statute of limitations is one year. However, Defendants 5 still argue that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred because “Plaintiff voluntarily vacated the 6 unit on October 29, 2023” and because “the FAC is patently unclear regarding how 7 Defendants allegedly engaged in retaliatory eviction . . .” Mot. at 10. In response, Plaintiff 8 claims that she was served with a “retaliatory” Notice of Termination on October 30, 2024. 9 Opp’n at 16. However, nowhere in her FAC does she make any mention of this notice. See 10 generally FAC. Rather, she cites to her Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and 11 Preliminary Injunction, which falls outside of the pleadings. Because Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure 12(d) mandates that we cannot consider facts outside the pleadings unless we 13 treat this motion as one for summary judgment, we only consider Plaintiff’s vacating of 14 the unit in 2023. Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s retaliatory eviction claim is time- 15 barred. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s retaliatory 16 eviction claim. 17 9. California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) 18 The statute of limitations for UCL claims is four years. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 19 17208. “Any action on any UCL cause of action is subject to the four-year period of 20 limitations created by that section.” Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 21 4th 163, 179 (2000) (emphasis in original). Thus, all allegations relating to Plaintiff’s UCL 22 claim that occurred before November 5, 2020 are time-barred. 23 10. Motion for a More Definite Statement 24 Defendants also move for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 25 Procedure 12(e) as to any surviving causes of action. Mot. at 16–19. Under Rule 12(e), a 26 party may move for a more definite statement if the pleading “is so vague or ambiguous 27 that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Evid. 12(e). “A motion for 28 more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) attacks the unintelligibility of the complaint, 1 not simply the mere lack of detail . . .” Beery v. Hitachi Home Elecs. (Am.), Inc., 157 F.R.D. 2 477, 480 (C.D. Cal. 1993). “[M]otions for more definite statement are viewed with 3 disfavor, and are rarely granted.” C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1191 4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citations omitted). 5 Defendants move for a more definite statement, characterizing the FAC as a 6 “shotgun pleading” because it “group[s] defendants together without identifying what the 7 particular defendants specifically did wrong,” and because it “incorporates by reference” 8 Plaintiff’s whole collection of allegations in each cause of action. Mot. at 12. However, 9 from our reading of the FAC, we find it is “specific enough to apprise the defendant of the 10 substance of the claim asserted against him or her.” San Bernardino Pub. Emples. Ass’n v. 11 Stout, 946 F. Supp. 790, 804 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 12 Here, every Defendant and their respective conduct is referenced under every cause 13 of action. For example, under Plaintiff’s first cause of action, she uses “Defendants” to 14 refer to all Defendants and lists the conduct falling under that specific cause of action. FAC 15 ¶¶ 97–104. For her third and fourth causes of action, she specifically names Defendants 16 “SHEA PROPERTIES” and “VALENTIA LLC” and lists the conduct falling under that 17 specific cause of action. FAC ¶¶ 105–109. And although we do not look favorably upon 18 this strategy of incorporating all paragraphs, it still is enough to apprise Defendants of the 19 substance of the claim asserted against them. 20 However, Plaintiff’s UCL claim is different. Under her UCL claim, Plaintiff 21 “realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 96 of the Complaint 22 herein,” refers to Defendants “SHEA PROPERTIES” and “VALENTIA LLC,” but makes 23 no further mention of what conduct out of the 96 allegations applies. FAC ¶¶ 166–67. Nor 24 does Plaintiff cite the specific section of California Business and Professions Code that 25 Defendants allegedly violated. Id. In reading paragraphs 166 and 167, it is difficult to 26 ascertain the substance of the UCL claim being asserted against Defendants. Therefore, 27 Defendants’ Motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED IN PART solely as to 28 Plaintiff’s UCL claim. I IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows: 3 1. Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's First, Second, and Ninth 4 Causes of Action; 5 2. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiff?s Third, Fourth, 6 Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action; and 7 3. Defendants’ Motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED IN PART, 8 but with leave to amend. If Plaintiff wishes to amend, Plaintiff must file an 9 amended complaint by April 30, 2026, 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || Dated: March 30, 2026 NO 12 QF 13 Honorable Linda Lopez 4 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12