Shahab Kazemzadeh v. The United States of America, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01941
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 2:25-cv-01941-JAD-NJK Shahab Kazemzadeh, 4 Petitioner Order Granting Preliminary Injunction 5 v. and Directing Release of Detainee

6 The United States of America, et al., [ECF No. 8]

7 Respondents

8 Petitioner Shahab Kazemzadeh is an Iranian citizen who arrived in the United States in 9 1999 and was ordered removed in 2020. He was released from custody after his removal order 10 became final because Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were unable to secure 11 his removal to Iran. But on June 23, 2025, ICE arrested Kazemzadeh, and he has been detained 12 at the Nevada Southern Detention Center ever since. In October 2025, Kazemzadeh filed a pro 13 se petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his release from custody, and about a month later, 14 he filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking his immediate release pending 15 a decision on the habeas petition. He contends that his prolonged detention and the 16 government’s failure to provide notice before effectively revoking his supervision order exceed 17 the government’s authority and violate his due-process rights. The court held a hearing on 18 Kazemzadeh’s TRO motion on Friday, January 9, 2026. 19 I convert Kazemzadeh’s motion to one for a preliminary injunction, and I grant it. 20 Kazemzadeh has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his prolonged 21 detention exceeds the government’s statutory authority under the United States Supreme Court’s 22 opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis1 and that he will suffer continued irreparable harm if he is not 23

1 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 1 released. So I direct his immediate release, subject to reasonable conditions of supervision set 2 forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). I do not require that Kazemzadeh post a bond securing his 3 release. 4 Background 5 Petitioner Shahab Kazemzadeh alleges that he was “born in Iran and, through his family,

6 entered the United States and received refugee status based on religious grounds.”2 Kazemzadeh 7 was convicted of sexual-assault charges in a Utah state court more than twenty years ago.3 In 8 March 2020, an immigration judge ordered his removal to Iran, but he “was not removed to Iran 9 at that time due to not having secured a travel document.”4 Kazemzadeh was released from ICE 10 custody under an order of supervision. ICE agents arrested him again on June 23, 2025, and he 11 has been in ICE detention at the Nevada Southern Detention Center ever since. 12 Discussion

13 A. This court has jurisdiction to order relief related to the petitioner’s habeas petition.

14 The constitution provides that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 15 detained in the United States.”5 That writ permits a person who is in custody to challenge the 16 legality of his detention, and the court has the authority to release the petitioner if it determines 17 that the petitioner is illegally detained. The court’s habeas jurisdiction encompasses a 18 noncitizen’s challenge to his detention under the United States’s immigration laws.6 19

21 2 ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 23. 3 ECF No. 6-2 at 3. 22 4 Id. 23 5 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const. art 1, § 9, cl. 2). 6 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 1 B. This nation’s immigration laws permit a noncitizen’s detention pending removal, 2 but that detention period should not exceed six months without a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 3 1. The government has authority to detain noncitizens after they have been 4 ordered removed.

5 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations establish a 6 complex set of rules governing the government’s authority to arrest, detain, order removed, and 7 deport noncitizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs the detention of noncitizens who have been 8 ordered removed. It establishes a 90-day “removal period” that begins on “(i) the date the order 9 of removal becomes administratively final, (ii) if the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a 10 court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order,” or the date the 11 noncitizen is released from non-immigration detention.7 During that 90-day period, detention is 12 mandatory.8 The statute gives the government the ability to detain a noncitizen beyond that 13 removal period under § 1231(a)(6) if he is inadmissible, removable “as a result of violations of 14 status requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of security or 15 foreign policy,”9 or has been determined “to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply 16 with the order of removal.”10 If those conditions aren’t met, the government may release the 17 noncitizen “subject to certain terms of supervision.”11 18

21 7 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). 8 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). 22 9 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. 23 10 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 11 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)) (cleaned up). 1 2. The due-process clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the 2 government from indefinitely detaining noncitizens pending removal.

3 Section 1231(a)(6) does not limit the length of time that a noncitizen may be held post- 4 removal period. But in Zadvydas v. Davis, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 5 government’s contention that noncitizens can be held indefinitely under § 1231(a)(6) because 6 that interpretation “would raise a serious constitutional problem” under the Fifth Amendment’s 7 due-process clause.12 To avoid its constitutional concerns, the High Court interpreted the statute 8 to permit continued detention only if a noncitizen’s removal is “reasonably foreseeable.”13 It 9 determined that six months of post-removal-period detention is presumptively reasonable.14 But 10 after six months, the noncitizen must “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no 11 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” to show that his prolonged 12 detention exceeds the government’s statutory authority and that he should be released from ICE 13 custody.15 If the noncitizen meets that burden, “the government must respond with evidence 14 sufficient to rebut that showing.”16 And as “the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, 15 what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.”17 16 17 18 19

20 12 Id. at 690. 21 13 Id. at 699. 14 Id. at 701. 22 15 Id. 23 16 Id. 17 Id. (cleaned up). 1 C. TROs and preliminary injunctions require a showing that the petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims and will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not 2 granted.

3 A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary” remedy 4 “never awarded as of right.”18 The Supreme Court clarified in Winter v. Natural Resources 5 Defense Council, Inc. that, to obtain an injunction, plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely 6 to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of 7 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the 8 public interest.”19 The Ninth Circuit recognizes an additional standard: if “plaintiff[s] can only 9 show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of 10 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships 11 tips sharply in the plaintiffs’ favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.”20 Under 12 either approach, the starting point is a merits analysis. 13 The respondents were given notice of Kazemzadeh’s TRO motion, as well as an 14 opportunity to respond and to be heard at an in-person hearing. I thus sua sponte convert the 15 motion into one for a preliminary injunction.21 The standard for both forms of relief is the same, 16 the parties were given notice and a hearing, and the nature of the relief granted by this case is 17 more properly addressed by a preliminary injunction. 18 19

20 18 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 21 19 Id. at 20. 22 20 Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). 23 21 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (distinguishing between a temporary-restraining order and a preliminary injunction based on notice and the responding party’s ability to be heard). 1 1. Kazemzadeh has shown that he is likely to succeed on his prolonged-detention 2 claim.

3 Kazemzadeh has shown a likelihood of success on his prolonged-detention claim. The 4 parties agree that Kazemzadeh has been detained for longer than six months, taking this case out 5 of the presumptively reasonable period of detention established by Zadvydas.22 So Kazemzadeh 6 bears the initial burden of showing that there are “good reasons to believe that that there is no 7 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”23 Kazemzadeh has been 8 subject to an order of removal for about six years, and ICE has been unable to remove him 9 throughout that period. Kazemzadeh also recounts that an Iranian official told him he would not 10 be accepted in Iran when he made inquiries in 2020. I find that Kazemzadeh’s allegations are 11 sufficient to show a good reason to believe that he is not likely to be removed in the reasonably 12 foreseeable future.24 13 22 The parties disagree over whether Kazemzadeh’s post-removal detention periods, if any, 14 should count toward the Zadvydas calculus. Many courts have found that prior detention periods must be considered; otherwise, the government could detain, release, and re-detain noncitizens 15 ad nauseam without technically violating Zadvydas. See, e.g., Shalala v. Mattos, 2025 WL 3568234, at * 6 (D. Nev. Dec. 14, 2025) (considering the “full amount of time that Petitioner has 16 spent in immigration detention since he was ordered removed” because “[o]therwise, the government could simply circumvent the INA by releasing and re-detaining citizens such that 17 they never reach six months of continuous detention”); Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F. Supp. 703, 722 (W.D. Was. 2025) (noting that, “under the reasoning of Zadvydas, a series of releases and re- 18 detentions by the government . . . in essence results in an indefinite period of detention, albeit executed in successive six-month intervals”). Because Kazemzadeh’s current detention exceeds 19 the six-month threshold and I find that the government has not shown that he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future even when considering that his detention has not yet extended 20 too far beyond that presumptively reasonable period, I do not address this issue here. 23 Id. at 701. 21 24 The government contends that Kazemzadeh’s allegations “are unsupported by competent 22 evidence,” like a declaration from a government official, correspondence from the Iranian government, or “documentary proof reflecting ICE’s removal efforts or communications with 23 foreign authorities.” ECF No. 13 at 6. The government fails to explain how Kazemzadeh would have this information, much of which is held in the government’s control. Nor does it cite any binding authority that places this high burden on a petitioner to show a “good reason to believe” 1 The government does not meaningfully rebut Kazemzadeh’s allegations, nor does it 2 provide any evidence showing a significant likelihood of his reasonably foreseeable removal. It 3 merely states without support that “[p]ast difficulties in repatriating Iranian nationals have been 4 overcome by recent diplomatic relations,” namely an agreement between Iran and the United 5 States “providing for the return of approximately 400 individuals under final orders of

6 removal.”25 It asserts that DHS has sent two repatriation flights to Iran in the past few months, 7 citing a BBC article reporting that a “second flight” carrying approximately 50 Iranian nationals 8 departed from the United States in early December 2025.26 But evidence of past deportations 9 does not, standing alone, demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood that this particular 10 petitioner will be deported in the reasonably foreseeable future. The fact that Iran has accepted 11 some deportations does not show that it will continue to do so, nor that it has reconsidered its 12 previous conclusion that Kazemzadeh would not be accepted. So even if Iran has accepted some 13 deportations, the government has failed to provide any indication that it would accept 14 Kazemzadeh’s.

15 The government has also failed to adequately show that it is involved in efforts to secure 16 Kazemzadeh’s removal. It argued at the hearing that ICE was actively working to secure travel 17 documents for him, citing to one line in a custody-determination document Kazemzadeh 18 received on September 15, 2025. That document informed Kazemzadeh that he was to remain in 19 custody and that ICE “expects to effectuate [his] removal from the United States in the 20 21

22 that his removal isn’t foreseeable. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. I find that Kazemzadeh’s undisputed statements are sufficient to meet his burden. 23 25 ECF No. 13 at 4–5. 26 Id. at 5; ECF No. 13-1. 1 foreseeable future.”27 But that conclusory statement, unsupported by concrete facts 2 demonstrating why ICE expects removal to occur, is insufficient to carry the government’s 3 burden. The government has provided no details to show what it has done to obtain travel 4 documents or whether it has had any substantive communications with the Iranian government 5 about the status of Kazemzadeh’s application. And though the government may not need to

6 provide an exact removal date to meet its burden, it has failed to provide any estimate about 7 when it may obtain Kazemzadeh’s documents. The government’s showing is plainly 8 insufficient. So I find that Kazemzadeh is likely to succeed on the merits of his prolonged- 9 detention claim. And because his release is warranted based on this showing alone,28 I do not 10 address Kazemzadeh’s alternative claims for relief. 11 2. Kazemzadeh has established irreparable harm.

12 “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably 13 constitutes irreparable injury.’”29 The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that “unlawful detention 14 certainly constitutes extreme or very serious” injury that “is not compensable in damages.”30 15 The government doesn’t meaningfully address this factor, arguing only that “showing a 16 possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient” and that his harm “is essentially inherent in 17 detention.”31 Neither of these arguments makes any sense. Kazemzadeh has not shown the mere 18

19 27 ECF No. 6-6 at 2. 28 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700 (noting that “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the 20 court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute” and holding that, “[i]n that case, of course, the [noncitizen’s] release may and should be conditioned 21 on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances”). 22 29 Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 23 30 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 31 ECF No. 13 at 8. 1 “possibility” of harm—he is currently suffering irreparable harm by the fact of his continued, 2 likely unlawful detention. And the harm of unlawful detention is not “essentially inherent” in 3 detention. I find that Kazemzadeh’s continued, unlawful deprivation of liberty establishes that 4 he will continue to suffer irreparable harm if he is not released from custody. 5 3. The balance of equities and public interest tip sharply in Kazemzadeh’s favor.

6 The last two Winter factors merge when the government is the opposing party.32 7 Kazemzadeh has shown that the harm of his continued deprivation sharply outweighs the 8 government’s minimal hardship caused by releasing him under reasonable conditions of 9 supervision similar to those that he has been subject to for years. The public’s interest in the 10 government’s enforcement of its immigration laws does not tip the scales for the government, 11 especially when the petitioner has shown that his immigration detention is likely unlawful.33 So 12 I conclude that the balance of equities and public interest tip sharpy in Kazemzadeh’s favor. 13 4. The court declines to impose a bond requirement. 14 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) permits a court to grant preliminary injunctive

15 relief ‘only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the 16 costs and damages sustained by the party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or 17 restrained.”34 “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, Rule 65(c) invests the district court 18 with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any.”35 Because the government does not 19 provide any argument concerning costs and damages it might sustain, and I am convinced that it 20 32 Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 21 435 (2009)). 22 33 See Galvez v. Jaddou, 52 F.4th 821, 832 (9th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “neither equity nor the public’s interest are furthered by allowing violations of federal law to continue”). 23 34 Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c)). 35 Id. (cleaned up). 1 will not incur any such damages if it was wrongfully enjoined, I join the growing number of 2 courts that decline to require a bond in cases like this.36 3 Conclusion 4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner Shahab Kazemzadeh’s motion for a 5 temporary restraining order [ECF No. 8] is converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction

6 and is GRANTED. Petitioner Shahab Kazemzadeh must be released from detention 7 immediately under reasonable terms of supervision set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). 8 Determining reasonable terms of supervision must not impede the immediate release of the 9 petitioner. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents must file and serve on defense counsel: 11 (1) notice of the date, time, and location of Kazemzadeh’s release at least 24 hours before 12 the release is set to occur so that arrangements for his travel can be made. 13 (2) notice that Kazemzadeh’s release was effectuated within three days of this order. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this injunction will remain in effect, absent a

15 successful motion to modify or dissolve it, until this court issues a final decision on the 16 petitioner’s habeas petition. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for respondents are directed to immediately 18 provide notice of this order to the restrained parties they represent. 19 The Clerk of Court is directed to SEND a copy of this order to the Warden of Nevada 20 Southern Detention Center in Pahrump, Nevada. 21 22

23 36 See Bunnell v. Noem, 2025 WL 3707588, at *9 (D. Nev. Dec. 22, 2025) (collecting cases in which “[c]ourts regularly waive security in cases like this one”). 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for Kazemzadeh may file a supplemental 2\|reply in support of his habeas petition by January 20, 2026. 3

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