Shah v. the Mississippi Bar

83 So. 3d 1274, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 246, 2011 WL 1797008
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedMay 12, 2011
Docket2010-BR-00933-SCT
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 83 So. 3d 1274 (Shah v. the Mississippi Bar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shah v. the Mississippi Bar, 83 So. 3d 1274, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 246, 2011 WL 1797008 (Mich. 2011).

Opinions

LAMAR, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Azki Shah has been disbarred since June 23, 2005, and became eligible for reinstatement after April 19, 2010. Shah applied for reinstatement on June 9, 2010, after obtaining the requisite score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination and complying with the various conditions imposed by this Court and under Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12. The Mississippi Bar opposes Shah’s reinstatement based on his “failure to satisfy the moral character component for reinstatement and his failure to accept and articulate full responsibility for his misconduct.” We disagree with the Bar’s position and grant Shah’s petition for reinstatement conditioned upon his passage of the complete Mississippi Bar Examination administered by the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions. Miss. R. Discipline 12.5.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On June 23, 2005, this Court disbarred Shah after he failed to perfect an appeal on behalf of Colon Yaughn, a criminal defendant. Shah v. Mississippi Bar, 919 So.2d 59, 61 (Miss.2005) (Shah I). Vaughn had paid Shah $3,750 to prosecute his appeal. Id. at 61-62. Shah had retained the payment, but never had filed Vaughn’s appeal. Id. at 64. Shah then had lied to Vaughn about the status of the appeal. Id. at 64, 66. This Court found Shah had violated Rules of Discipline 1.1 (duty of competence), 1.15 (duty of loyalty, including preserving the client’s property, maintaining confidentiality, and avoiding conflicts), 1.3 and 1.4 (duty of diligence), and 8.4 (duty of candor). Id. at 65. We disbarred Shah based on his pattern of misconduct;1 his failure to file Vaughn’s appeal and the serious deprivation that Vaughn had suffered as a result; his deception of Vaughn; and his deliberate eva[1276]*1276siveness and lack of candor throughout the investigation process. Id. at 65-66.

¶ 3. Though already disbarred, Shah received additional sanctions on January 4, 2007. Shah v. Mississippi Bar, 962 So.2d 514, 519-20 (Miss.2007) (Shah II). The Court imposed a three-year suspension from the practice of law for misconduct that had occurred prior to Shah’s June 2005 disbarment. Id. In April 2002, Marcus Simmons had hired Shah to determine whether Simmons had valid title to certain real property. Id. at 519. Simmons had paid Shah an initial research fee, and later had paid Shah an additional amount to pursue the claim. Id. Shah first had informed Simmons that a court date had been set, but that Simmons’s presence was not required. Id. Shah later had told Simmons that a second court date had been set, and that Simmons needed to attend this particular hearing. Id. Simmons had arrived at the courthouse on said date, but had found no trace of Shah. Id. Simmons eventually had learned that Shah had never filed any case on his behalf. Id. This Court determined that Shah’s actions had violated Rules of Discipline 1.2(a) (duty regarding scope of representation), 1.3 and 1.4 (duty of diligence), 8.1(a) (duty in disciplinary matter not to make a knowingly false statement of material fact), 8.4(a) (duty not to violate or attempt to violate rules of professional conduct), and 8.4(c) (duty not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). Id. at 522. Consequently, the Court suspended Shah from the practice of law for three years. Id. Since Shah already had been disbarred, the effect of this three-year suspension was simply to extend the time before Shah could petition this Court for reinstatement. In re Petition for Reinstatement of Shah, 987 So.2d 964, 966 (Miss.2008).

¶ 4. Since 2007, Shah has filed two petitions for reinstatement. His first petition was dismissed without prejudice as premature. Id. at 964, 966. The second petition was denied both as premature and because Shah had not passed the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam. In re Petition of Shah for Reinstatement, 5 So.3d 352, 355 (Miss.2008). In denying his second petition, this Court instructed that Shah could not petition for reinstatement until April 19, 2010. Id. at 356. We instructed that any petition on or after that date must be preceded by proof of a passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. Id.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5. This Court reserves “ ‘exclusive and inherent jurisdiction’ ” over attorney-reinstatement cases. In re Petition for Reinstatement of Morrison, 819 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Miss.2001) (quoting In re Petition of Smith for Reinstatement, 758 So.2d 396, 397 (Miss.1999)). These matters are reviewed de novo on a ease-by-case basis. Id. The fundamental issue in a reinstatement case is the “attorney’s rehabilitation in conduct and character since the disbarment.” In re Petition of Benson for Reinstatement, 890 So.2d 888, 890 (Miss.2004). The petitioner must demonstrate this by meeting the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 12, which are: (1) stating the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment, (2) providing the names and current addresses of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to improper conduct, (3) making full amends and restitution, (4) showing requisite moral character for the practice of law, and (5) demonstrating the requisite legal education. Id. This Court also will consider the Bar’s position as to reinstatement. Id.

I. Cause for disbarment and suspension

¶ 6. Shah acknowledges that his actions in the Vaughn and Simmons matters [1277]*1277were the bases for his disbarment and suspension. His initial petition summarily discussed the Vaughn case, but it did not address the Simmons matter. Shah filed an amendment to his petition in which he discussed the Simmons matter. While Shah did not provide details regarding the facts of these matters, we find his description sufficient. We also note that he discussed both cases more thoroughly in his deposition with the Bar, which was submitted in this matter. We find that Shah has satisfied this requirement.

II. Full amends and restitution to anyone suffering pecuniary loss

¶ 7. Shah maintains that Vaughn and Simmons are the only two individuals who suffered pecuniary loss as a result of his actions. In Shah I, this Court ordered Shah to pay restitution to Vaughn in the amount of $8,750. Shah I, 919 So.2d at 66. Shah has submitted photocopies of twenty-one cashier’s checks made out to Vaughn’s mother, Jimmie Nell Vaughn, totaling $3,750. And in Shah II, the evidence supported that Simmons had paid Shah an initial, $165 research fee and a second, $365 fee to pursue the claim. Shah II, 962 So.2d at 522, 524. Shah submitted proof that he had refunded Simmons $375 in October 2003 (prior to the disciplinary complaint being filed), and that he had forwarded Simmons an additional $165 in June 2010. We find that Shah has made full amends and restitution.

III. Rehabilitation and requisite moral character

¶ 8. Since his disbarment, Shah has worked as a cook at the local Sonic Drive-In. From January 2005 to July 2009, Shah worked part-time at Sonic and full-time at Planter’s Service and Sales, a fertilizer plant. Shah estimated that he had worked ninety hours a week between the two jobs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Thompson v. Mississippi Bar
156 So. 3d 226 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 2013)
In re Wiesner
94 A.D.3d 167 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2012)
Shah v. the Mississippi Bar
83 So. 3d 1274 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
83 So. 3d 1274, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 246, 2011 WL 1797008, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shah-v-the-mississippi-bar-miss-2011.