Shah v. Helen Hayes Hosp.

Opinion

25-1693-cv Shah v. Helen Hayes Hosp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of September , two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT:

REENA RAGGI,

MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,

Circuit Judges,

RACHEL P. KOVNER,

District Judge. *

_____________________________________

BHUPENDRA K. SHAH, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 25-1693-cv

HELEN HAYES HOSPITAL, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

*Judge Rachel P. Kovner of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS: BHUPENDRA K. SHAH, pro se, Pearl River, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: DAVID LAWRENCE III, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood,

Solicitor General, Ester

Murdukhayeva, Deputy

Solicitor General, on the brief) for Letitia James, Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY.

Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Karas, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the orders of the district court are AFFIRMED.

Bhupendra K. Shah, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s orders denying his motions for reconsideration of a judgment entered against him in 2006. In 2004, Shah sued his former employer, Helen Hayes Hospital and the New York State Department of Health (together, “Defendants”), alleging employment discrimination.

3

In 2006, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (“R&R”) and granted summary judgment to the Defendants. We affirmed on appeal. Shah v. Helen Hayes Hosp., 252 F. App’x 364 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order). In 2025, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), Shah twice moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for reconsideration; he also filed two motions to strike the Defendants’ opposition to the motion for reconsideration as untimely. The district court denied Shah’s motions, reasoning that it had found excusable neglect for the Defendants’ late response and that Muldrow did not undermine the judgment it had entered nearly twenty years earlier. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

I. Motions to Strike Defendants’ Opposition Shah devotes a significant portion of his appeal to challenging the district court’s denial of his motions to strike the Defendants’ opposition to his motion for reconsideration. We review decisions as to motions for an extension of time for abuse of discretion. See Sanozky v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 415 F.3d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 2005). An extension may be granted after the time to file a document has expired if the moving party shows “excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).

4

“[T]he inquiry into whether a failure to abide by a specified time constraint constitutes excusable neglect is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission, including prejudice to the other party, the reason for the delay, its duration, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Raymond v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 148 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s grant of the extension of time. Judgment was entered more than twenty years ago and the case was inactive for 16 years before Shah filed his motion for reconsideration, the Defendants’ prior attorney was deceased, the Defendants represented that they belatedly received a physical copy of the motion because it had been directed to the wrong office, and Shah has not shown prejudice from the late filing. Shah’s arguments that the extension motion misstated facts and was presented in the wrong form are meritless. See S.D.N.Y. Loc. R. 7.1(e) (authorizing letter motions). For the same reasons, there was no basis to strike the opposition, and Shah’s request for sanctions based on purported misconduct in connection with this motion was properly denied.

5

II. Motions for Reconsideration We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Mandala v.

NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2023). “Under this standard, we must affirm the denial of vacatur, unless the ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Shah “has been pro se throughout, his pleadings and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).

The district court’s denial of Shah’s Rule 60(b) motion was not an abuse of discretion. Rule 60(b) provides “a mechanism for extraordinary judicial relief invoked only if the moving party demonstrates exceptional circumstances.” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 60(b) provides that the district court may grant relief from a final judgment for, among other reasons, “any . . . reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Shah has not demonstrated he is entitled to relief based on Muldrow or any other reason. 2

2 Although Shah asserted that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3), he did not invoke that rule in his motions in the district court, and he did not move for this relief within one year of the judgment, as required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). As to Rule 60(b)(4) relief for voidness, the R&R was not void for lack of jurisdiction because, contrary to Shah’s arguments, his consent was not required for the magistrate judge to issue an R&R. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R.

6

Muldrow does not provide a basis for the relief Shah seeks. First, “[i]ntervening developments in the law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997). Second, Muldrow does not call into question the district court’s prior judgment. In Muldrow, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split by determining that “[a]lthough an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit,” the employee need not show that he suffered significant harm from the discriminatory transfer. 601 U.S. at 350. As the district court explained, the Muldrow holding does not affect the bases for the judgment in this case with respect to Shah’s 2002 transfer, which were that Shah had failed “to establish either that he applied for a promotion or that the transfer was motivated by discrimination.” See Denial of Reconsideration Motion at 3, Shah v. Helen Hayes Hosp. et al., No. 7:04-cv-07342-KMK-LMS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2025), Dkt. No. 56; see also Cruickshank & Co v. Dutchess Shipping Co., 805 F.2d 465, 467–69 (2d Cir. 1986) (denying relief under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) where subsequent judgment did not undermine the original judgment). The 2006 judgment was not based on Plaintiff’s alleged harm as to implicate Muldrow.

Civ. P. 72(b)(1). Shah argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(5) because applying the judgment prospectively is no longer equitable after Muldrow, but Muldrow does not impact the 2006 judgment.

7

We have considered all of Shah’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. We deny Shah’s remaining pending motions. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court